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
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
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THE HISTORY
OF THE
ROMAN REPUBLIC.

B

THE HISTORY
OF THE
ROMAN REPUBLIC.

ABRIDGED FROM THE HISTORY BY
PROFESSOR MOMMSEN

BY

C. BRYANS,

ASSISTANT-MASTER IN DULWICH COLLEGE,

AND

F. J. R. HENDY,

ASSISTANT-MASTER IN FETTES COLLEGE.

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PREFACE.



PROBABLY few whose duty it is to teach Roman history in schools will deny that some such work as the present has too long been needed. It is for men thus engaged to judge whether this book meets their need. It would be alike impertinent and superfluous to dilate on the merits of Professor Mommsen's history: those merits have won recognition from all qualified judges, and have long established his position as the prince of Roman historians. Unfortunately the size of his history is beyond the compass of ordinary schoolboys; nay, possibly, others besides schoolboys have shrunk from attempting so formidable a task. Our abridgment of his history must of necessity give but a feeble and inadequate idea of the original; but something will have been accomplished if we have given some conception, however faint, of that original, and have induced fresh inquirers to read for themselves those pages so bright with wisdom and imagination. There has been no attempt to hold the balance between Professor Mommsen and his rival Ihne, nor to answer the criticisms of Professor Freeman. Such efforts, even if we had the ability to make them, would be manifestly out of place in such a work as this. Occasionally, indeed, conflicting views have been indicated in a note; and the authorities have been studied, but our text contains the views of Professor Mommsen. Whatever merits may belong to this work should be ascribed to another; we must be held responsible for its defects. Our object has been to present the salient points clearly, and as far as possible to escape dullness, the Nemesis of the abridger. Consequently we have tried to avoid writing down to a boy's level, a process invariably

resented by the boy himself. Inverted commas indicate that the passage is directly taken from the original. The requirements of space have necessitated the omission of a special chapter on Literature, Art, Religion, Economy, etc.; nor have we thought it wise to insert a few maps or illustrations of coins, works of art, etc. An atlas is really indispensable, and one is, we believe, shortly to be published specially designed to illustrate this period. We have to express our great indebtedness to Professor Dickson for allowing us to make free use of his translation, the merits of which it would be difficult to overpraise. Our gratitude is also due to Mr. Fowler, of Lincoln College, Oxford, and to Mr. Matheson, of New College, Oxford. The former kindly revised the proof sheets of the chapter on Authorities, and gave valuable suggestions. The latter was good enough to revise all the proof sheets of the history, in the preparation of which we often found much assistance from his very useful "Outline of Roman History." We have also to thank Mr. H. E. Goldschmidt, of Fettes College, Edinburgh, for a careful revision of a large portion of the proofs.

While our history was in the press the third volume of Professor Mommsen's "*Römisches Staatsrecht*" appeared. Where possible, we have added references to it in our lists of authorities.

THE SOURCES OF ROMAN HISTORY.

At the close of each chapter we have subjoined, where possible, a list of the chief authorities for the statements therein contained, but a few remarks on the character of such authorities will not be out of place.

Modern criticism has rudely shattered the romantic legends of the origin and regal period of Rome, legends given us in one form or another by all the ancient writers whose works are still preserved. Any reconstruction of the ruined fabric must necessarily rest in the main upon conjecture, and, however great be the probability of such conjecture, absolute certainty is impossible. Not only does darkness envelop the regal period of Rome, but we have to move with great caution through the confused accounts of the triumphs abroad and conflicts at home which marked Rome's career during the first centuries of the republic. The reason of this is plain: no records except of the most meagre kind were at first preserved by the Romans, and the earliest writer of Roman history did not live until the time of the second Punic war, or five hundred years after the foundation of the city.

Our inquiry into the sources of Roman history naturally falls into two divisions: firstly, as to what were the authorities of the Roman writers themselves; secondly, as to what weight must be attached to the writers whose works have come down to us.

Among the earliest records preserved at Rome were (1) the *annales pontificii* and the *annales pontificum maximi*. The first-mentioned, although mainly devoted to the various religious forms and ceremonies, doubtless contained mention of historical events, while the *annales*

maximi contained a bare statement, by the pontifex maximus, of the chief events of the year and the names of the chief magistrates; and this statement was publicly exhibited every year.

(2) In imitation of the records kept by the priest-colleges, arose at a later time *commentarii*, or notes, kept by the chief officers of the state, *e.g.* by the consuls and quaestors, and also the *tabulae censoriae* or lists of the censors. These were known under the wider term of *libri magistratuum*, a special division of which is mentioned by Livy (iv. 13, etc.), under the name of *libri lintei*, or books written on linen.

(3) The pontifices also arranged calendars or *fasti* containing the days set apart for the transaction of business (*dies fasti*), in which were also enumerated the feasts, games, markets, sacrifices, etc., and to which were gradually added the anniversaries of disasters and other brief notices of historical events.

(4) The name of *fasti* was subsequently given to lists of years containing (a) the names of the chief magistrates (*fasti consulares*), (b) the triumphs held in each year (*fasti triumphales*), and (c) the names of the priests (*fasti sacerdotes*). Of these, the first-named, called *Fasti Capitolini* from the fact that they are now preserved in the Capitol, are the most important, and contain the names of the successive consuls, censors, dictators, and *magistri equitum*.

(5) In addition to the above-mentioned state documents, which were in the keeping of the magistrates, there existed private memorials and family chronicles of various kinds. Some were in writing, and no doubt contained gross exaggerations in glorification of particular houses. To these belong the images or ancestral busts with the attached inscriptions (*elogia*), the funeral eulogies (*laudationes funebres*), the songs (*neniae*) sung during funeral processions or at funeral banquets, and the inscriptions on votive presents, pillars, and tombs.

(6) The most important legal monument is that of the Twelve Tables, which were graven on iron and set up in the Forum, and were, in Livy's words, "*fons omnis publici privatique iuris*." The original probably perished in the burning of Rome by the Gauls, but was either

replaced by copies preserved by the pontifices or was restored from memory. We may add to this section the so-called *leges regiae*, which, though purporting to give decrees and decisions of the kings chiefly on religious matters, were really a collection of old laws, set down in writing at a period later than the Twelve Tables.

(7) Another source of information consisted of various treaties of alliance. Dionysius mentions (*a*) an apocryphal treaty between Romulus and the Veientes (ii. 55), (*b*) one between Tullus Hostilius and the Sabines (iii. 33), (*c*) one between Servius Tullius and the Latins (iv. 26), (*d*) one between Tarquinius (? Superbus) and Gabii (iv. 58). Polybius (iii. 22-26) gives an account of three ancient treaties between Rome and Carthage, Pliny (N. H. xxxiv. 14) mentions the treaty with Porsena, Cicero (*pro Balbo*, 23) mentions the treaty of alliance with the Latins in 493 B.C., and Livy (iv. 7) mentions the treaty made with Ardea, 410 B.C. To these may be added mention by Festus* (p. 318) of the first tribunician law, 493 B.C., and the mention by Livy (iii. 31) and by Dionysius (x. 32) of the Italian law *De Aventino Publicando* in 456 B.C.

Such, then, were the sources open to the earliest Roman annalists. We may now turn to them. Our first list will give those writers whose works embraced the early history of Rome but which have perished, with the exception of a few fragments.† (1) Q. Fabius Pictor, born about 254 B.C., served in the Celtic war of 225 B.C., and wrote probably in Greek. (2) L. Cincius Alimentus, praetor 210 B.C., and taken prisoner by Hannibal, wrote

* Festus' work is merely an abridgment of the lost work of M. Verrius Flaccus, a freedman of the Augustine age.

† For the student of Roman history, Hermann Peter's "*Historicorum Romanorum Fragmenta*" is invaluable. On the general question of the sources of Roman history we may refer to Teuffel's "*History of Roman Literature*," Professor Seeley's "*Introduction to the First Book of Livy*," and more especially to the "*Quellenkunde der Römischen Geschichte*," by M. Schmitz, and the instructive criticism by C. Peter, in his "*Zur Kritik der Quellen der Aelteren Römischen Geschichte*." Cf. also Schwegler, *R. G. i.*, c. 1, 2, 19, of whose work Mr. Fowler writes, "I have always thought it the greatest masterpiece of detailed, clear, and rational criticism I have ever read."

in Greek. (3) Gaius Acilius, flourished about 155 B.C., a senator, wrote in Greek. (4) Aulus Postumius Albinus, consul 151 B.C., one of the commissioners sent to settle the province of Greece, wrote in Greek. (5) Omitting the poetical description by Gaius Naevius (264–194 B.C.) of the first Punic war, and by Quintus Ennius (239–169 B.C.) of the history of Rome from the earliest times down to 172 B.C.), we now come to the first historians who wrote in Latin prose. Marcus Porcius Cato (234–149 B.C.), author of the *Origines*, is the first. (6) Lucius Cassius Hemina, flourished 146 B.C. (7) Lucius Calpurnius Piso, consul in 133 B.C. (8) Gaius Sempronius Tuditanus, consul in 129 B.C. (9) Cneius Gellius, flourished about 100 B.C. (10) Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius, flourished about 90 B.C.; his history began at the capture of Rome by the Gauls. (11) Valerius Antias, about 70 B.C. (12) Gaius Licinius Macer, tribune in 73 B.C. All these writers preceded Livy, and in most cases are cited by him as authorities. The other historians previous to Livy, such as Gaius Fannius (consul in 122 B.C.), Lucius Coelius Antipater, born in 170 B.C., Lucius Cornelius Sisenna (120–67 B.C.), wrote on special and later periods; while statesmen, such as M. Aemilius Scaurus (consul, 115–107 B.C.), Q. Lutatius Catulus (consul 102 B.C.), and Sulla the dictator, did not disdain to write memoirs in self-defence.

We may now give a second list of those writers on the early period of Rome, whose works are in part still extant. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (70–8 B.C.), of whose “*Roman Antiquities*” we possess nine complete books, and Titus Livius (59–17 B.C.) stand practically alone. Other writers, *e.g.* M. Velleius Paterculus (born about 19 B.C.), Plutarch (A.D. 46–120), Julius Florus (about A.D. 70–150), Aulus Gellius (A.D. 125–175), Diodorus Siculus, Appian (about A.D. 130), and Dio Cassius (A.D. 155–230), all throw more or less light on the early history; but practically our information is drawn from the works of Livy and Dionysius.* Unfortunately, the latter’s history, written as it was for Greeks, and avowedly written to please the reader rather than inform posterity, is disfigured by contradictions and

* On the relation of Livy (a) to the Roman annalists, (b) to Dionysius, the student is referred to the remarkably instructive analysis by C. Peter, in his above-mentioned work, pp. 55–82.

rhetorical exaggeration. Difficulties are left unsolved, and the superficial knowledge displayed throughout shows that Dionysius was content with setting down the varying statements of Roman annalists without attempting to reconcile their contradictions. Livy, on the other hand, has the great advantage of being well acquainted with Roman traditions, and is thus able to blend with picturesque language the colour of the Roman life and thought. Nor was he wanting in judgment, although incapable of scientific criticism. Yet the narrative of Rome as presented by him in the first decade, cannot be regarded as serious history, built up as it is of the jejune records preserved by the magistrates and of the absurd exaggerations and pure fictions preserved in family documents and embellished by family annalists. We do not, in truth, reach real historical ground until the first Punic war, and that we owe to the great work of Polybius. Our knowledge of the interval between the end of the first decade of Livy and the beginning of the history of Polybius (*i.e.* 293–264 B.C.) is due to passages in Dionysius, Appian, Plutarch, and Dio Cassius, but these extracts are either confused and bare notices, or fabulous anecdotes in illustration of the Roman virtues. Polybius (208–127 B.C.) covers the ground extending from 264–146 B.C. Unfortunately, we only possess in completeness his books down to 216 B.C., but the fragments of the remaining books are many and precious, and the influence he exerted on all succeeding historians was specially valuable in the interests of truth. To quote Professor Mommsen, “Polybius is not an attractive author; but as truth and truthfulness are of more value than all ornament and elegance, no other author of antiquity perhaps can be named to whom we are indebted for so much real instruction. His books are like the sun in the field of Roman history; at the point where they begin the veil of mist which still envelops the Samnite and Pyrrhic war is raised, and at the point where they end a new and, if possible, still more vexatious twilight begins.” A comparison of passages describing the same events shows that Livy made free use of the writings of Polybius,* but even where the resemblance is

* On this point, *vide* C. Peter, in his above-mentioned work, pp. 82–99.

closest we can detect signs of other sources used by Livy, and unfortunately his love of rhetorical embellishment and his carelessness as to historical connection often obscured and perverted the more straightforward accounts of Polybius. To Livy we have to turn for a detailed account of Roman history for the years 216-167 B.C., although we can often correct his statement by the copious fragments of Polybius.

From 167 B.C. onwards we depend upon Appian, Plutarch, and Sallust's Jugurthine war. The books of Appian which have come down to us contain notices of the regal period, a history of Spain and of the second Punic war, a history of Libya down to the destruction of Carthage, a history of Syria and Parthia, the war with Mithradates, and a history of the civil strife from the Gracchi down to the death of Sextus Pompeius in 35 B.C. His carelessness and inaccuracy, his tendency to sacrifice truth to petty jealousy and party spirit, lessen the value of his work.* Sallust, however, had the great advantage over Appian and similar writers of being a Roman and well versed in the politics of his time. He shows a freedom from party prejudice and a sense of historical truth, and his work is not merely instructive with regard to the Jugurthine war, but throws valuable light on the inner circumstances of that period.

From the beginning of the Social War (91-88 B.C.), the mass of contemporary material which in one form or another must have been available for later writers is continually increasing. For the Sullan period, from the Social War to the death of the dictator (91-78 B.C.), we rely chiefly on Plutarch's Lives of the chief actors on the political stage; but there are other works of various worth. Of the writers already mentioned, Claudius Quadrigarius treated of Sulla's campaign in Greece; the work of Valerius Antias extended as far as the time of Sulla; that of Sisenna embraced the Social War. They appear to have written at great length, and to have incorporated speeches and letters in their works. In addition to the sources mentioned above, there were (1) published speeches, political and forensic, such as those of L. Licinius Crassus (consul 95 B.C.), of Q. Scaevola (consul 95 B.C.),

* Cf. C. Peter, pp. 127-138.

of C. Julius Caesar Strabo (killed 87 B.C.); (2) Memoirs. Sulla (ob. 78 B.C.) wrote an autobiography which was completed after his death by his freedman Epicadus, and which was largely used by Plutarch. Lucius Lucullus (ob. 57 B.C.) wrote a history of the Social War in Greek. C. Piso narrated the war between Sulla and Marius. L. Voltacilius Pilutus, a freedman, wrote an account of the doings of Cn. Pompeius, the triumvir, and of the father of Pompeius, probably during the lifetime of the former.

Of still extant authorities the following are the most important. (1) Plutarch (lived probably from the reign of Claudius to Trajan or Hadrian). Twenty-three lives of Romans survive, few of which, those of Marius, Sulla, Lucullus, and Sertorius, fall under this period. For later times we have the lives of Crassus, Pompeius, Caesar, Cato minor, Cicero, Antonius, and Brutus. Plutarch writes with good sense and wide knowledge, but his aim is biography, not history: hence important events are often lightly touched, while trivialities characteristic of the men are dwelt upon; and as a Greek he is often defective in acquaintance with Roman institutions. He used contemporary authorities largely, though his own knowledge of Latin was slight, and he often reveals his sources; of 250 writers quoted by him 80 are wholly or partially lost. (2) Appian. (3) The epitomes of Livy, attributed to Florus, which survive of all the lost books except 136 and 137, and are valuable for the main points. (4) The compendia of several epitomists of late date have come down to us, based largely, sometimes exclusively, upon Livy. They are careful and accurate, and often contain useful information not found elsewhere, but are marked by a strong Roman bias. Such are the works of (Annaeus?) Florus (flor. 2nd cent. A.D.), Eutropius and Rufus Festus (4th cent. A.D.). (5) Justinus (date uncertain) who made a collection of extracts from the *Historiae Philippicae* of Trogus Pompeius (flor. 20 B.C.), apparently a sound and solid work, based upon Greek sources; Justinus is the chief authority for the earlier years of Mithradates.

For the next eight years (78–70 B.C.), to the overthrow of the Sullan constitution, we rely chiefly upon Plutarch, Appian, the epitomes of Livy, Justinus, Dio Cassius,

some valuable fragments of the histories of Sallust dealing with the Sertorian war and the outbreak of Lepidus, and the recently discovered fragments of Granius Licinianus.

When we come to what may conveniently be called the Ciceronian period (70-40 B.C.) the conditions are changed. A mass of contemporary material—letters, speeches, memoirs—is still extant, though much has perished, and the modern historian is in a position, if not to write history from the original sources, at least to criticise with effect the compositions of ancient writers. At the same time, the spread of culture in Rome and Italy brought with it a facility in composition which resulted in a multitude of historical works; and if all this mass of literature is the work of partisans, on the other hand we have the advantage of possessing the views of both sides.

We will now give some account, first of the contemporary records whether lost or extant, secondly of the later histories treating of this period, which survive. (1) Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.) is the most voluminous and on the whole the most valuable writer of the period. Advocate and partisan as he was, the *naïveté* and volubility of his character make him peculiarly useful as a historical witness. Of his speeches, private and public, fifty-seven survive, besides fragments of twenty more, and throw light, not only on the political situation in all its constant variations, but on many other points, such as the working of the Sullan laws, and of the numerous changes which followed rapidly on the death of Sulla, on the social condition of Italy, and the provincial administration. Incomparably more valuable than even the speeches are the letters, 864 in number, including ninety addressed to Cicero, and extending from 68 to 43 B.C. It is hardly too much to say that they are an inexhaustible storehouse of contemporary history, such as exists for no other period ancient or modern. A memoir of the year of his consulship is unfortunately lost. His voluminous philosophical and rhetorical writings contain valuable information on a great variety of subjects, especially on the Roman law and constitution, for which the *De Republica* and *De Legibus* are peculiarly valuable. With Cicero should be mentioned his faithful freedman, friend, and editor, M. Tullius Tiro, who edited the speeches and letters, and wrote a life of his patron,

and also developed a system of stenography (*notae Tironianae*). (2) There were also published speeches by Q. Hortensius Hortalus (114–50 B.C.), Pompeius Magnus, C. Scribonius Curio (killed 49 B.C.), M. Coelius Rufus (killed 48 B.C.), M. Junius Brutus (ob. 42 B.C.), C. Licinius Calvus (ob. ante 47 B.C.), and others. (3) Of historical compositions the most important in the earlier portion of this period, down to 63 B.C., were the annals of T. Pomponius Atticus (109–32 B.C.), a compendium of Roman history from the earliest time, giving special attention to the history of the great Roman families; he also wrote an account of Cicero's consulship, and a large number of letters. There were also historical compositions by Hortensius the orator, by Lucius Luceius, a correspondent of Cicero's, and by Lucius Tubero, a friend and brother-in-law of Cicero, of which almost nothing is known. (4) In the later half of the Ciceronian period, from 63 B.C. to the outbreak of the civil war, the most important author is C. Julius Caesar (102–44 B.C.). His speeches, letters, and the "*Anticato*" (a political pamphlet in answer to Cicero's panegyric on Cato Uticensis) are all lost; but there are extant (a) *Commentarii de Bello Gallico* in seven books, which is at once a military report, a history, and an apologia. "It is," says Mommsen,* "evidently designed to justify as well as possible before the public the formally unconstitutional enterprise of Caesar in conquering a great country, and constantly increasing his army for that object, without instructions from the competent authority." It was published in 51 B.C., when the storm was imminent. The work is very valuable for the condition of Gaul, Germany, and Britain, and also for the Roman military system and camp life. (b) The *Bellum Civile*, in three books, is a much less careful work; it extends to the beginning of the Alexandrine war in 47 B.C., and has equally a political purpose. (5) After Caesar's death the histories of the Gallic and of the civil war were continued by his friends. The eighth book of the Gallic war and the *Bellum Alexandrinum* are generally ascribed to Aulus Hirtius (killed 43 B.C.); the *Bellum Africanum* and *Bellum Hispanicum* are by other and unknown hands. (6) Other friends of Caesar who treated

* Vol. iv., p. 605.

of his life were C. Oppius (to whom the continuations of Caesar's *Bellum Civile* are by some ascribed, and who also wrote lives of Scipio Africanus the elder and other famous Romans), and L. Cornelius Balbus of Gades. (7) Cornelius Nepos (circ. 94–24 B.C.), besides other works, wrote lives of Cato the elder and of Cicero, both lost.

Some of the works already mentioned were written under the influence of the mighty struggle which preceded the extinction of the republic: those which still remain are nearly all directed to political objects, and are strongly affected by the passion and turmoil of the time. (8) Gaius Sallustius Crispus (87–34 B.C.), who has been mentioned above, wrote, besides his Jugurthine war, an account of the conspiracy of Catiline, to justify the democratic party, “on which in fact the Roman monarchy was based, and to clear Caesar’s memory from the blackest stain that rested on it.”* His *Historiae* were written as a continuation of Sisenna, and extended over the twelve years from 78 B.C. onwards: only fragments, together with some letters and speeches extracted from the history, survive. (9) Q. Aelius Tubero (flor. circ. 46 B.C.) wrote a history of Rome extending to his own time. (10) As evidence of the feeling about Caesar in some literary circles at Rome, and as an example of the warfare of literature which raged alongside of the political struggle, the attacks of the poet Catullus (87–54 B.C.) on Caesar and his friend Mamurra are worth mention. (11) Pamphlets in prose and verse were continually published on either side; M. Varro, C. Scribonius Curio, and Aulus Caecina wrote against Caesar. Funeral orations (*laudationes*) were used for the same purpose. The death of Cato, and even of his daughter, called forth a regular literature of its own; Cicero and Marcus Brutus were the most famous of his champions, while on the other side Aulus Hirtius, Metellus Scipio, even Caesar himself and, later, Augustus deigned to enter the lists. (12) From 59 B.C. onwards the minutes of the senate (*acta senatus*) and the chief events of the day (*acta populi* or *acta diurna*) were regularly published as a sort of official gazette: none of the latter survive. (13) Inscriptions. Only two of great importance belong to this period, con-

* Mommsen, iv. 184, note.

taining fragments of the *Lex Rubria* (Corp. Inscr. Lat. I. 205) and of the *Lex Julia Municipalis* (C. I. L. I. 206). For others, on private or local matters, see Corp. Inscr., especially No. I. 573-626; and for one containing a fragment of Sulla's law *De XX Q (uaestoribus)*, ib. I. 202.* There are also bullets used in sieges with rude inscriptions (ib. I. 644-705), tesserae (ib. I. 717-827), bricks (ib. I. p. 202), epitaphs (ib. I. 1256).

Where contemporary material is so abundant later historians are less important, and may be merely enumerated. (1) The most valuable is Dio Cassius Cocceianus (circ. A.D. 155-229), whose history extended from Aeneas to A.D. 229, and is extant from the wars of Lucullus to A.D. 10. It is written with great knowledge and judgment; fragments of the earlier and a compendium of the later portions are extant. (2) C. Suetonius Tranquillus (A.D. 75-160) wrote *Lives of the Caesars* from C. Julius Caesar to Domitian. The work is intelligent, honest, and rich in information, and is based upon valuable contemporary records of all kinds. (3) Tacitus is continually useful for the history of the last generation of the republic, especially on constitutional and legal points. (4) Velleius Paterculus (19 B.C. to A.D. 31) wrote a compendium of universal history; Memnon (not later than the Antonines), a history of Heraclea in Pontus, which survives in copious extracts by Photius, and is useful for Pontic affairs; Granus Licinianus (temp. the Antonines), annals, of which fragments relating to 163 B.C. and to 78 B.C. have recently been discovered. (5) Orosius (flor. first half 5th cent.), *Historiarum adversus Paganos*, libb. vii.,—a religious polemic of no value when unsupported.

The following works upon special subjects often throw light incidentally upon history, and may be consulted *passim* as occasion requires. The order is approximately chronological.

(1) M. Terentius Varro (116-28 B.C.), *De Re Rustica* and *De Lingua Latina*; unfortunately, all that remain, besides fragments, of the works of the most learned of the Romans; but his writings, especially the *Antiquitatum Libri*, were very largely drawn upon by later antiquarians

* For legal fragments Bruns' *Fontes Juris Romani Antiqui* may be consulted, as more convenient and accessible than the *Corpus Inscriptionum*.

and grammarians, such as those mentioned (12) to (15). In the reign of Augustus, Fenestella, Sinnius Capito, and Verrius Flaccus should be mentioned as antiquarians who wrote under Varro's influence and on similar topics, and who furnished a vast amount of information upon which later writings are based. Flaccus survives in an abridgment by Festus. (2) With Varro may be conveniently mentioned two other writers on agriculture; M. Porcius Cato (234-149 B.C.), the most valuable of the three, and Lucius Junius Moderatus Columella (1st cent. A.D.), *De Re Rustica*—a work much less valuable than Varro's. (3) Strabo (temp. Augustus and Tiberius), a voluminous work on Universal Geography. (4) Gaius Plinius Secundus (major) (A.D. 23-79), *Naturalis Historia*—an encyclopedia of the scientific knowledge of his time. (5) Vitruvius Pollio (temp. Augustus), *De Architectura*. (6) Q. Asconius Pedianus (2 B.C. to A.D. 83), commentaries on some speeches of Cicero—valuable especially for constitutional points. (7) Valerius Maximus (temp. the early Caesars), *De Factis Dictisque Memorabilibus*—contains much unique information. (8) Sex. Julius Frontinus (praetor A.D. 70), *Strategemata* Libb. iv., on military science with many anecdotes of great commanders; and *De Aqueductibus Urbis Romanae*. (9) M. Fabius Quintilianus (A.D. 40-118), *De Institutione Oratoria* Libb. xii., including a brief history of Roman literature in book x. (10) Gaius (circ. the Antonines), *Institutes*, in four books; probably the earliest systematic work on Roman jurisprudence. (11) With Gaius should be mentioned the works executed under the auspices of the Emperor Justinian (A.D. 527-565): (a) the New Code, superseding all previous codes; (b) *Pandecta* or *Digesta*, a compilation of all the valuable matter of preceding jurists; (c) the *Institutes*, based chiefly upon Gaius. (12) Aulus Gellius (temp. the Antonines), *Noctes Atticae*, a miscellany, containing information on all manner of subjects and numerous extracts from Roman writers. (13) Nonius Marcellus (between 2nd cent. and 6th, A.D.), a voluminous work on grammar, valuable as a repertory of quotations from lost writers. (14) Servius (5th cent. A.D.), *Commentary on Vergil*. (15) Macrobius (5th cent. A.D.), *Saturnaliorum Conviviorum* Libb. vii. — dissertations on mythology, history, etc.

CONTENTS.



BOOK FIRST.

THE PERIOD ANTERIOR TO THE ABOLITION OF THE MONARCHY,
CH. I.-V.

BOOK SECOND.

FROM THE ABOLITION OF THE MONARCHY IN ROME TO THE UNION
OF ITALY, CH. VI.-XI.

BOOK THIRD.

FROM THE UNION OF ITALY TO THE SUBJUGATION OF CARTHAGE
AND THE GREEK STATES, CH. XII.-XVIII.

BOOK FOURTH.

THE REVOLUTION, CH. XIX.-XXVII.

BOOK FIFTH.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MILITARY MONARCHY, CH.
XXVIII.-XXXVIII.

HISTORY OF ROME.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

Ancient history—Geography of Italy—Italian history—Primitive races—Relation of Latins to Umbro-Samnites—Resemblance and distinction between Greeks and Italians.

THE division between ancient and modern history is not one of mere convenience; it has a reality, in that it marks the distinction in point of time, place, and character between the civilization of the old and new worlds.

Ancient history is in the main an account of the rise and fall of those peoples whose civilization had a common origin, and presented similar features. In each case, however, the individuality of each nation impressed its own peculiar stamp on the character of that civilization.

The Mediterranean Sea was the theatre of the growth and decay of the great nations who may be included in the same cycle of civilization, and whose culture found its highest point in Thebes in Egypt, Carthage in Africa, Athens in Greece, Rome in Italy. When their work was finished, new peoples arose, a new cycle of civilization was begun, a new centre was found in the Atlantic Ocean in place of the Mediterranean. The province of the Roman historian is to record the closing scene of the great drama of ancient history as enacted in Italy. ✓

Geographically, this peninsula is formed by the mountain chain of the Apennines breaking off in a southerly direction from the Western Alps. The Apennines at first run south-

east, and reach their highest point in the Abruzzi. From the Abruzzi the chain runs south, at first unbroken and of considerable height; but later it splits south-east and south, forming narrow and mountainous peninsulas. It must be specially remembered that the ancient boundary of Italy on the north was *not* the Alps, but the Apennines; therefore, the flat country on the north, extending between the Alps and the Apennines as far down as the Abruzzi, does not belong geographically nor historically to the Italy of our history. As the Apennines nowhere rise precipitously, but enclose many valleys and table-lands connected by easy passes, the country is well adapted for human habitation. This is specially the case with the adjacent slopes and coast-districts. On the east coast stretches the plain of Apulia, only broken by the isolated steep of Garganus; again, on the south coast, well-watered and fertile lowlands adjoin the hill country of the interior; and on the west coast we find, not merely the extraordinarily rich and irrigated lands of Etruria, Latium, and Campania, but, owing to the action of the sea and of volcanoes, the country is varied with hill and valley, harbour and island. As the Peloponnese is attached to Greece, so the island of Sicily is attached to Italy, the Sicilian mountains being but a continuation of the Apennines, interrupted by the narrow "rent" (Πήγιον) of the straits. Although Italy lacks the island-studded sea which gave the Greeks their seafaring character, and is deficient in bays and harbours, except on the south-west coast, yet it resembles Greece in its temperate climate and wholesome mountain air, while it excels it in rich alluvial plains and grassy mountain slopes. All Italian interests centre in the west; the reverse is the case with Greece. Thus, the Apulian and Messapian coasts play a subordinate part in Italian, as Epirus and Acarnania did in Greek history. The two peninsulas lie side by side, but turn their backs on each other, and the Italians and Greeks rarely came into contact in the Adriatic Sea.

The history of Italy falls into two main sections: (1) Its internal history down to its union under the leadership of the Latin stock; (2) The history of its sovereignty over the world. It must be borne in mind that what has

been called the conquest of Italy by the Romans is really the consolidation and union of the whole Italian stock—a stock of which the Romans were the most powerful branch, but still only a branch. Our attention must now be fixed on the first of the two sections—on the settlement of the Italian stock; on its external struggles for existence against Greek and Etruscan intruders; on its conquest of these enemies; finally, on its internal strife; on the contest between the Latins and Samnites for the leadership of Italy, resulting in the victory of the Latins, at the end of the fourth century before Christ.

With regard to the earliest migrations into Italy we have no evidence to guide us, not even the uncertain voice of tradition. No monuments of a savage primitive race have ever been unearthed, such as exist in France, Germany, and England. But the remains of the Italian languages show that the three primitive stocks were (1) Iapygian, (2) Etruscan, (3) Italian. The last is divided into two main branches: (*a*) Latin; (*b*) Umbro-Samnite, or more fully that branch to which the dialects of the Umbri, Marsi, Volsci, and Samnites belong.

As to the Iapygians, owing to the fact that no one has at present been able to decipher the inscriptions in their language, very little is known. Their dialect points to a closer connection with Greek than that of other Italians; and this supposition is supported by the ease with which they became Hellenized. From the feeble resistance they made to foreign influences, and from their geographical position, it is concluded that they were the oldest immigrants or historical autochthones of Italy. In the earliest times immigrants came by land, not by sea, and the races pushed furthest south were the oldest inhabitants.

The centre of Italy was inhabited, from a remote period, by the two divisions of the Italian people. Philological analysis of the Italian tongue shows that they belong to the Indo-Germanic family, and that the Italians are brothers of the Greeks, and cousins of the Celts, Germans, and Slavonians. The same analysis further shows us that the relation of the Latin dialect in the Italian language to the Umbro-Samnite dialect is somewhat similar to the relation of Ionic to Doric Greek; and the differences between the Oscan (*i.e.* Samnite) and Umbrian

dialects may be compared to the differences between the Dorism of Sicily and that of Sparta. Language thus proves to us that, at some unknown period, from the same cradle there issued a stock which included the ancestors of the Greeks and Italians; that subsequently the Italians branched off; that the Italians divided into Latin and Umbro-Samnite stocks, and that later the Umbrians parted from the Samnites, or Oscans.

Language again shows to us what state of civilization had been reached by the Greeks and Italians before they separated. Their words for plough, field, garden, barley, wine, are identical in both languages; their choice of grain agrees, as also their methods of preparing it. The name of "Wine-land" (Οἰνωρία) given by Greek voyagers to Italy shows that vine-culture was not introduced by the Greeks. Thus, the two peoples had passed from the pastoral to the agricultural stage, and both nations closely associated agriculture with their religion, laws, and customs. Again, the Greek house, as described by Homer, differs but slightly from the model followed in Italy. In dress, also, the tunica corresponds to the chiton of the Greeks, and the toga is only a fuller himation. In fine, in language, manners, and all the material things of primitive life, the same origin is apparent in both races.

When we turn to the graver problems of life, to the moral, social, political, and religious development of the Greeks and Italians, the distinction is far more marked; nay, it is almost difficult to believe that here too there is a common basis. In the Greek world we see the full and free play of individual life, and individual thought, whether in the political arena or that of literature, whether in the games at Olympia or in religious festivals. The whole was sacrificed to its parts, the nation to the township, the township to the citizen. Thus, solemn awe of the gods was lessened and at last extinguished by that freedom of thought, which invested them with human attributes and then denied their existence. The Romans, on the contrary, merged the individual in the state, and regarded the progress and prosperity of the latter as the ideal for which all were bound to labour unceasingly. With them the son was bound to reverence the father, the citizen to reverence the ruler, all to reverence the

gods. This distinction becomes more evident, when we consider the length to which paternal and marital authority was carried by the Romans, and the merciless rigour with which a slave was treated by them. The meagre and meaningless character of individual names among the Romans, when contrasted with the luxuriant and poetic fulness of those among the Greeks, points to the wish of the Romans to reduce all to one uniform level, instead of promoting the development of distinctive personality. But we must not forget that the basis was the same with both nations. In both, the clan arose from the family and the state from the clan; but, as the relations in a Roman household differed widely from those in a Greek, so the position of a clan, as a separate power, in a Greek, was far higher than in a Roman state. Again, although the fundamental ideas of the Roman constitution—a king, a senate, and an assembly authorized merely to accept or reject proposals submitted to it—are also found in Greek states, as in the earlier constitution of Crete, yet widely different was the development which these ideas received in each nation. So, too, in religion, both nations founded their faith on the same common store of symbolic and allegorical views of nature. But the Greek lost sight of the spiritual abstractions, and gave all the phenomena of nature a concrete and corporeal shape, clothing all with the riches of his poetic fancy. The Roman, casting aside all mythical legends of the gods, sanctified every action of life by assigning a spirit to everything existing—a spirit which came into being with it, and perished with it; and thus the very word *Religio*, “that which binds,” shows what a hold this faith in the unseen and this power of spiritual abstraction had upon the Roman mind. Finally, even in art, where the greatest contrast was developed, the original simple elements are identical. The decorous armed dance, the “leap” (*triumpus θρίαμβος* *δι-θύραμβος*), the masquerade of the “full people” (*σάτυροι*, *satura*) who in their sheep or goat-skins wound up the festival with jests; the pipe, which regulated the solemn or merry dance, were common to both nations. But the Greeks alone felt the power of beauty, and evolved a system of education calculated to train mind and body alike in conformity with that ideal. “Thus the two

nations, in which the civilization of antiquity culminated, stand side by side, as different in development as they were in origin identical. The points in which the Hellenes excel the Italians are more universally intelligible, and reflect a more brilliant lustre; but the deep feeling in each individual, that he was only a part of the community, a rare devotedness and power of self-sacrifice for the common weal, an earnest faith in its own gods, form the rich treasure of the Italian nation. Wherever in Hellas a tendency towards national union appeared, it was based not on elements directly political, but on games and art; the contests at Olympia, the poems of Homer, the tragedies of Euripides, were the only bonds that held Hellas together. Resolutely, on the other hand, the Italian surrendered his own personal will for the sake of freedom, and learned to obey his father that he might know how to obey the state. Amidst this subjection individual development might be marred, and the germs of fairest promise might be arrested in the bud; the Italian gained in their stead a feeling of fatherland and of patriotism such as the Greek never knew, and, alone among all civilized nations of antiquity, succeeded in working out national unity in connection with a constitution based on self-government—a national unity which at last placed in his hands the mastery, not only over the divided Hellenic stock, but over the whole known world.”

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[N.B.—Reference is made to Mommsen’s “*Römisches Staatsrecht*” as Momms. R. St., and to Marquardt’s “*Römische Staatsverwaltung*” as Marq. Stv., and to his “*Das Privatleben der Römer*” as Marq. P.l. Ramsay’s “*Manual of Roman Antiquities*” is also of great value to the student, as also the article by Mr. Pelham on Rome, in the “*Encyclopaedia Britannica*.”]

Geography of Italy.—Strab. 210–288. Polyb. ii. 14–24.
Iapygians.—Dionys. i. 11, 12, 22, 51. Strab. 279, 282.

CHAPTER II.

LATIN SETTLEMENTS, AND ORIGIN OF ROME.

Latin settlements—Latium—Primitive society—Latin league—
Origin of Rome—Geographical position—The Palatine city;
Hill, or Quirinal Romans.

WE have no data enabling us to accurately determine the migration of the Italians into Italy, but that it took place from the north and by land may be considered certain. The fact that the Umbro-Sabellian stock had to content themselves with the rough mountain districts, proves that the Latins went first and settled on the west coast, in the plains of Latium and Campania. The Italian names Novla or Nola (new town), Campani, Capua, Volturnus, Opsci (labourers), show that an Italian and probably Latin stock, the Ausones, were in possession of Campania before the Samnite and Greek immigrations. The Itali proper, who were the primitive inhabitants of the country subsequently occupied by the Lucani and Bruttii, were probably connected with the Italian, not the Iapygian stock, and possibly with the Latin branch of the Italian; but Greek influence and Samnite invasions completely obliterated all trace of the Itali. So, too, ancient legends connect the extinct stock of the Siculi with Rome. Whatever the truth of this may be it is not improbable that the Latins in primitive times spread over Latium, Campania, Lucania, and the eastern half of Sicily. But those settled in Sicily, Magna Graecia, and Campania came into contact with the Greeks at a time when they were unable to resist so superior a civilization, and were consequently, as in Sicily, completely Hellenized, or so weakened that

they fell an easy prey to Sabine hordes. Thus, the Siculi, Itali, and Ausonians play no part in the history of Italy. On the other hand, those settled in Latium, where no Greek colony was founded, succeeded in maintaining their ground against the Sabines and more northern foes. Latium itself is a plain traversed by the Tiber and Anio, bounded on the east by the mountains of the Sabines and Aequi, which form part of the Apennines; on the south, by the Volscian range, which is separated from the main chain of the Apennines by the ancient territory of the Hernici; on the west, by the sea, whose harbours on this part of the coast are few and poor; on the north, by the broad highlands of Etruria, into which it imperceptibly merges. This plain is dotted with isolated hills, such as Soracte in the north-east, the Circeian promontory on the south-west, the lower height of Janiculum; and the Alban range, free on every side, stands between the Volscian chain and the Tiber. Here were settled the old Latins (*Prisci Latini*), as they were later on called, to distinguish them from the Latins settled outside Latium. But in early times the Tiber formed the northern boundary, and only the centre of the region between the Tiber, the spurs of the Apennines, the Alban mount, and the sea, consisting of some seven hundred square miles, formed Latium proper—the real plain land (*πλατὺς*, flat), as it seems from the height of the Alban mount. This plain is broken by hills of tufa of moderate height, and by deep fissures in the ground. Owing to this uneven character lakes are formed in winter, and as there is no natural outlet for the water, malaria arises from the noxious exhalations in summer heat. This malaria the ancient inhabitants avoided by wearing heavy woollen clothing, and by keeping a constant blazing fire, and thus a dense population existed where now no one can support a healthy life.

The conditions of early society among the settlers in Latium must be a matter of conjecture. The clan,* or gens, served as the link between house, village, and canton. Probably each canton was an aggregate of clan-villages, which villages were an aggregate of clan-houses, united

* Ihne, i. 113, notes that "clan" does not adequately represent gens, and prefers "house" or "family."

together by locality and clanship; and every political community (*civitas*, *populus*) consisted of an aggregate of cantons. No doubt each canton had its local centre, which served alike as a place of meeting and of refuge: these were called, from their position, mountain-tops (*capitolia*) or strongholds (*arces*). In time houses began to cluster round the stronghold, and were surrounded with the "ring" (*urbs*); thus the nucleus of a town was formed. There can be little doubt that the Alban range, from its natural strength and advantages of air and water, was occupied by the first comers. Here, among other ancient canton-centres, stood pre-eminent Alba, the mother-city of all the old Latin settlements. Therefore, when the various cantons, though each independent and governed by its own constitution of prince, elders, and general assembly of warriors, expressed their sense of the ties of blood and language by forming what is known as the Latin League, it was but natural that Alba should be the centre of that league, and therefore president of the thirty cantons which composed it. We have no certain knowledge as to the powers or legal rights this confederacy exercised over the various members. Probably disputes between cantons were settled by the league, wars against foreign foes decided, and a federal commander-in-chief appointed. What we do know is that on the annual day of assembly the Latin festival (*Latinae feriae*) was kept, and an ox sacrificed to the Latin god (*Jupiter Latiaris*). Each community had to contribute to the sacrificial feast its fixed proportion of cattle, milk, and cheese, and to receive in return a part of the roasted victim. During this festival "a truce of God" was observed throughout all Latium, and safe-conducts were probably granted, even by tribes at feud with one another. It is impossible to define the privileges of Alba, as presiding canton. Probably it was a purely honorary position, and had no political signification, certainly none as denoting any sort of leadership or command of the rest of the Latin cantons. But, vague as the outlines of this early canton life must necessarily be, they show us the one great fact of a common centre, which, while it did not destroy the individual independence of the cantons, kept alive the feeling of national kinship, and thus paved

the way for that national union which is the goal of every free people's progress.

In tracing the beginnings of Rome, her original constitution, and the first changes it underwent, we are on ground which the uncertain light of ancient tradition and modern theory has made most difficult, if not impossible to traverse with any certainty. The very name of Romans, with which the settlement on the low hills on the left bank of the Tiber has so long been associated, was originally not Romans, but Ramnes (possibly "bushmen"). Side by side with this Latin settlement of Ramnians two other cantons settled, and from the combination, or synoikismos, of these three arose Rome. It must be specially noted that one of these other two cantons, viz. the Tities, has been unanimously ascribed to a Sabellian, not Latin, stock; the third canton, viz. the Luceres, was probably, like the Ramnes, a Latin community. From the fact that this Sabellian mixture and absorption in a Latin canton-union has left scarce any trace of Sabellian elements in Roman institutions, we may conclude that, at the remote period at which it occurred, the Sabellian and Latin stocks were far less sharply contrasted in language, manners, and customs than was the case in a later age. A proof of the great antiquity of this triple division is the fact that the Romans regularly used *tribuere* and *tribus* in the simple sense of "divide" and "a part." The unfavourable character of the site renders it hard to understand how Rome could so early attain its prominent position in Latium. The soil is unfavourable to the growth of fig or vine, and in addition to the want of good watersprings, swamps are caused by the frequent inundations of the Tiber. Moreover, it was confined in all land directions by powerful cities: on the east, by Antemnae, Fidenae, Caenina, Collatia, and Gabii; on the south, by Tusculum and Alba; and on the south-west by Lavinium. But all these disadvantages were more than compensated by the unfettered command it had of both banks of the Tiber down to the mouth of the river. The fact that the clan of the Romilii was settled on the right bank from time immemorial, and that there lay the grove of the creative goddess (Dea Dia), the primitive seat of the

Arval festival and Arval brotherhood, proves that the original territory of Rome comprehended Janiculum and Ostia, which afterwards fell into the hands of the Etruscans. Not only did this position on both banks of the Tiber place in Rome's hands all the traffic of Latium, but, as the Tiber was the natural barrier against northern invaders, Rome became the maritime frontier fortress of Latium. Again, this situation acted in two ways. Firstly, it brought Rome into commercial relations with the outer world, cemented her alliance with Caere, and taught her the importance of building bridges. Secondly, it caused the Roman canton to become united in the city itself far earlier than was the case with other Latin communities. And thus, though Latium was a strictly agricultural country, Rome was a centre of commerce; and this commercial position stamped its peculiar mark on the Roman character, distinguishing them from the rest of the Latins and Italians, as the citizen is distinguished from the rustic. Not, indeed, that the Roman neglected his farm, or ceased to regard it as his home; but the unwholesome air of the Campagna tended to make him withdraw to the more healthy city hills; and from early times by the side of the Roman farmer arose a non-agricultural population, composed partly of foreigners and partly of natives, which tended to develop urban life. The town originally embraced only the Palatine, or what was later known as "Square Rome" (*Roma quadrata*), so called from the quadraugular form of the Palatine Hill. The "Festival of the Seven Mounts" (*Septimontium*) was a memorial of the growth of suburbs and of the gradual extension of the city. Each suburb was surrounded with its own ring-wall, and connected with the original ring-wall of the Palatine. This ancient Palatine city with its seven rings embraced the Palatine, the Palatine slope called *Cermalus*, the *Velia*, or ridge connecting the Palatine and the *Esquiline*, the three peaks of the *Esquiline*, and the fortress of *Subura*, which protected the new town on the *Carinae*, in the low ground between the *Esquiline* and the *Quirinal*. This ancient city of the seven mounts has left no tradition of its history, being completely absorbed in the mightier Rome. That other ground was very early occupied, we may well

believe, such as the Capitol and Aventine, and the height of the Janiculum; but as to the distribution of the three component elements, the Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres, we have no knowledge. There is, however, strong evidence in favour of the view that, coexistent with the Palatine Romans, was another settlement on the Quirinal, facing the city on the Palatine, and independent of it. The twofold worship of Mars on the Palatine and Quirinal, the duplicate existence in later Rome of his two priest-colleges of Salii and Lupercei, representing the original colleges of each priesthood on the two hills, and the fact that the Romans on the Palatine called themselves Montani and those on the Quirinal Collini, all point to the coexistence of two separate and independent communities. That a distinction of race caused the founding of these two cities is unproved. The Palatine Romans soon overshadowed those on the hill, but it was the work of Servius Tullius to comprehend both these small cities, and also the heights of the Aventine and Capitoline, within a single ring-wall, and thus create the greater Rome of history.

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Alba Longa and Latins.—Dionys. i. 66–67; iii. 1–34; iv. 49.

Early society.—Vide Marq. Stv. i. 1–20.

Triple settlement of Rome.—Liv. i. 13. Varro L. L. v. 51, 55, 74.

Early city.—Liv. i. 44. Dionys. i. 88. Cic. de Rep. ii. 6. Aul. Gell. xiii. 14. Varro L. L. v. 48, 50, 143. Festus 258, 348. Tac. Ann. xii. 24.

On all topographical and archæological questions, *vide* Middleton's "Ancient Rome" and his article in "Encyclopaedia Britannica."

On early Latium and Rome's position, cf. Momms. R. St. iii. 607, sqq.

CHAPTER III.

ROME'S ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION.

**Father—Slave—Client—King—Community—Rights and burdens of
burgesses—Senate.**

THE basis of the Roman constitution was the family, and the constitution of the state was but an expansion of that of the family. The head of the household was of necessity a man, and his authority alike as father or husband was supreme, and in the eye of the law as absolute over wife and child as over slave. Though a woman could acquire property, she was under the absolute dominion of her father, or, if married, under that of her husband, or, if he died, under the guardianship (*tutela*) of her nearest male relations. This authority of the *pater familias* was alike irresponsible and unchangeable; nor could it be dissolved except by death. Although a grown-up son might establish a separate household of his own, all his property, however acquired, belonged legally to his father; and it was easier for a slave to obtain release from his master than for a son to free himself from the control of his father. A daughter, if married, passed out of her father's hand into that of her husband, to whose clan or gens she henceforth belonged. On the father's death the sons still preserved the unity of the family, nor did it become broken till the male stock died out, but, as the connecting links became gradually weaker in succeeding generations, there arose the distinction between members of a family (*agnati*) and members of a clan (*gentiles*). The former denoted those male members of a family who could show the successive steps of their descent from a

common progenitor, the latter, those who could no longer prove their degree of relationship by pointing out the intermediate links of connection with a common ancestor. Slaves belonging to a household were regarded by the law, not as living beings, but as chattels, whose position was not affected by the death of the head of the house. Attached to the Roman household was an intermediate class of person, called *clientes* ("listeners"), or dependants. These consisted partly of refugees from foreign states; partly of slaves living in a state of practical freedom; partly of persons who, though not free citizens of any community, lived in a condition of protected freedom. Although these formed with the slaves the *familia*, or "body of servants," and were dependent on the will of the head of the house or patron (*patronus*), their position was practically one of considerable freedom; and in the course of several generations the clients of a household acquired more and more liberty. Every one who was a member of a Roman family, and therefore of one of the *gentes*, or clanships, whose union formed the state, was a true citizen or burgess of Rome. Every one born of parents united by the ceremony of the sacred salted cake (*confarreatio*) was also a full citizen; and therefore the Roman burgesses called themselves "fathers' children" (*patricii*), as in the eye of the law they alone had a father. Thus the state consisted of *gentes*, or clans, and the clans of families, and although the relations of the various members of the household were not altered by their incorporation with the state, yet a son outside the household was on a footing of equality with the father in respect of political rights and duties. So, too, the various clients, though not admitted to the rights and duties proper to true burgesses, were not wholly excluded from participation in state festivals and state worship; and this would be specially true of those who were not clients of special families, but of the community at large.

Since the family served as the model for the constitution of the state, it was necessary to choose some one who should stand in the same relation to the body-politic as the head of the family did to the household. He who was so chosen *rex*, or leader, possessed the same absolute power over the state as the house-father had over his household,

and, like him, ruled for life : there was no other holder of power beside him. His "command" (*imperium*) was all-powerful in peace and war, and he was preceded by *lictors*, or "summoners," armed with axes and rods on all public occasions. He nominated priests and priestesses, and acted as the nation's intercessor with the gods. He held the keys of the public treasury, and alone had the right of publicly addressing the burgesses. He was supreme judge in all private and criminal trials, and had the power of life and death : he called out the people for military service, and commanded the army. Any magistrates, any religious colleges, any military officers, that he might appoint, derived all their power from him, and only existed during his pleasure. His power only ended with death, and he appointed his successor, thus imparting a sense of permanence to the kingship, despite the personal change of the holders of the sovereign power. But, although the king's authority was so absolute, he never came to be regarded by the Romans as other than mortal, nor, as by divine right, higher and better than his fellow-citizens. This view of the kingship was at once the moral and practical limitation of its power. The king was the people's representative, and derived his power from them, and was accountable to them for its use and abuse. Moreover, the legal limitation to his power lay in the principle that he was entitled only to execute the law, not to alter it. Any deviation from the law had to receive the previous sanction of the assembly of the people and the council of elders. There is no parallel in modern life to the Roman family or Roman state or Roman sovereign.

The principle on which the division of the burgesses rested was that ten houses formed a clan, ten clans a wardship (*curia*), ten wardships the community. Each householder furnished a foot-soldier (*mīl-es*, thousand-walker), and each clan a horseman and senator. If communities combined, each was a part or tribe (*tribus*) of the whole community. Originally each household had its own portion of land ; but when households combined into a gens, each clan had its lands, and this system naturally extended to curies and communities, whether single or combined. Thus clan-lands formed in primitive times the

smallest unit in the division of land. Although this division into ten curies early disappeared in Rome, we find it in later Latin communities, which always had one hundred acting councillors (*centumviri*), each of whom was "head of ten households" (*decurio*). This constitutional scheme did not originate in Rome, but was a primitive institution, common to all Latins. What the precise object and value of this division was we cannot now determine; and it is clear that any attempt to rigidly fix the number of households and clans must, through ordinary human accidents, have failed. The really important unit in the division was the *curia*, the members of which were bound by religious ties, and had a priest of their own (*flamen curialis*). Military levies and money valuations were made according to curial divisions, and the burgesses met and voted by curies. Although all full citizens or burgesses were on a footing of absolute equality as regarded one another, the distinction between those who were burgesses and those who were not was most sharply and rigidly defined. If a stranger were adopted into the burgess-body (*patronum cooptari* or *in patricios cooptari*, as *patronus* like *patricius* merely denoted the "full citizen"), he could not retain his rights as citizen elsewhere. If he did, he merely possessed honorary citizenship at Rome, and was entitled to the privileges and protection of a guest (*ius hospitii*), not to the exercise of full citizen rights. There were no class privileges at Rome. All wore the simple woollen toga in public, although certain officers by virtue of their office were distinguished by dress. As the Latin immigrants had no conquered race to deal with, the nobility of Greece and the caste of India were unknown to them. The most important duty of the burgesses was military service, as they alone had the right of bearing arms. Hence the name *populus* ("body of warriors," connected with *populari*, "to lay waste"), called in old litanies *pilumnus populus*, "spear-armed host;" hence, too, the name of *quirites* * ("lance-men"), given them by the king. Other duties incumbent on the burgesses were such as the king laid upon them; among these was the all-important task of building walls, to which the name of *moenia* ("tasks") was given.

* On this word, cf. Momms. R. St. iii. p. 5, note.

As there was no state pay for services so rendered, there was no direct state expenditure or state taxation. The very victims for sacrifice were provided by the deposit, or cattle-fine (*sacramentum*), which the defeated party in a law-suit was bound to pay. In cases of urgent need a direct contribution (*tributum*) was levied; but this was regarded as a loan, and repaid when times improved. Although the king managed the state exchequer, the state property, *e.g.* the land won in war, was not identified with the private property of the king. His exchequer was filled partly by the land-taxes, *i.e.* the *scriptura*, or pasture tribute, paid by those who fed cattle on the common pasture, and the *vectigalia*, or payment in kind in place of rent, by those who were lessees of the state lands; partly by gains in war; partly by harbour-dues levied on the exports and imports of Ostia; partly, perhaps, by the tax which the non-burgesses settled at Rome (*aerarii*) paid him for protection. In addition to these duties the burgesses had also rights. They were convoked by the king (1) in formal assemblies (*comitia curiata*) twice a year, or (2) in such meetings (*contiones*) as the king thought fit to hold. They had no power of speech on such occasions, unless the king saw fit to grant it; their duty was merely to listen and return simple answers without discussion to the king's questions. As long as the king was executor of existing laws, no intervention was necessary on the part of the citizens; but where abnormal events arose which necessitated any change of or deviation from existing laws, the co-operation and assent of the burgess body was essential. The king put the question (*rogatio*), and the people returned answer; and the *lex*, or law, which was the outcome of this process, was not in its origin a command of a king but a contract proposed by the king and accepted or refused by his hearers. The citizens alone could allow a man to make such a will as transferred his property on his death to another; they alone could sanction the adoption of a man into the burgess body, or allow a burgess to surrender his rights as citizen; they alone could pardon a condemned criminal, whence arose the right of appeal (*provocatio*), which was only allowed to those who pleaded guilty. "Thus far the assembly of

the community, restricted and hampered as it first appears, was yet from antiquity a constituent element of the Roman commonwealth, and was in law superior to, rather than co-ordinate with, the king."

The origin of the senate can with probability be ascribed to that remote period when each clan in Latium was under the rule of its own elder. As the clans became amalgamated, the position of such an elder was necessarily subordinated to that of the head or king of the community ; but that the senate was not a mere conclave of trusty councillors called into being by the king, but an institution as old as that of king and burgess-assembly, admits of little doubt. It resembled the assembly of princes and rulers, gathered in a circle round the king as described by Homer. The number was fixed at three hundred, corresponding to the three hundred clans of which the three primitive communities, forming the whole state, were composed. All senators sat for life ; they were chosen by the king, and it is only natural to suppose that, if originally the senate consisted of the ancient body of clan elders, the king always chose, when a senator died, a man of the same clan to fill his place. The senators were, therefore, so many kings of the whole community, although the chief power, as in the household, was vested in one of their body, namely the king : their insignia, though inferior to those of the king, were of the same character ; the purple border (*latus clavus*) being substituted for the purple robe of the king, and the red shoes of the senator being lower and less striking than those which the king wore. Should the king die without appointing a successor, one of the senators, chosen by lot as *interrex*, exercised his authority for five days, and this *interrex* appointed the next, thus passing on the five days' sovereign power to one of his own body. Finally, one of these *interreges*, but never the one first chosen, nominated the king, and his choice was ratified by the whole assembly of the citizens. Thus the senate was the ultimate holder of the ruling power, and was a guarantee of the permanence of the monarchy. Further, it was the guardian of the constitution, examining every new resolution which the king suggested and the burgesses adopted, and having the right of vetoing these resolutions, should they appear to violate existing rights. The senate's

consent (*patrum auctoritas*) had also to be obtained before war could be declared. And thus the senate's duty was to guard against any innovation or violation of the constitution, whether coming from king or burgess-assembly. In consequence of, or, at least, in close connection with, this power of the senate, arose the very ancient custom of the king's convoking the senate, and submitting to it the proposals he intended to bring before the citizens. By thus ascertaining the opinions of the individual members, the king avoided the possibility of any subsequent opposition from that body. On most questions, involving no breach of the constitution, the senate's part was doubtless merely that of compliance with the king's wishes. The senate could not meet unless convoked by the king, and no one might declare his opinion unasked: nor was the consultation of the senate on ordinary matters of state business legally incumbent on the king; but this consultation soon became usual, and from this usage the subsequent extensive powers of the senate were in great measure developed. To sum up, "the oldest constitution of Rome was in some measure constitutional monarchy inverted. In the Roman constitution the community of the people exercised very much the same functions as belong to the king in England. The right of pardon, which in England is the prerogative of the crown, was in Rome the prerogative of the community; while all government was vested in the president of the state," whose royal power was at once absolute and limited by the laws (*imperium legitimum*). Further, in the relations of the state to the individual, we find that the family was not sacrificed to the community, but that, though power of imprisonment or death was vested in the state, no burgess could have his son or his field taken from him, or even taxation imposed on him. In no other community could a citizen live so absolutely secure from encroachment, either on the part of his fellows or of the state itself. This constitution was neither manufactured nor borrowed; it grew and developed with the growth and development of the Roman people, and "as long as there existed a Roman community, in spite of changes of form, it was always held that the magistrate had absolute command, that the council of elders was the highest authority in the state, and that every exceptional resolution required the

sanction of the sovereign, or, in other words, of the community of the people."

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Populus.—Cf. Momms. R. St. iii. 2-8.
Gentes and adoption.—Momms. R. St. iii. 9-40.
Citizen rights.—Momms. R. St. iii. 40-48.
Curies.—Momms. R. St. iii. 89-103.

CHAPTER IV.

REFORMS OF SERVIUS TULLIUS—SUPREMACY OF ROME IN LATIUM.

Rise of the plebs—Military reforms of Servius Tullius—Political effects—Rise of Rome to supremacy in Latium—Her relation to Latium—Extension of Rome and Roman territory—Treatment of conquered Latins.

WE have already stated that the earliest amalgamation in the history of Rome was that which blended together the Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres. This was followed by the union of the settlement on the Quirinal with that on the Palatine. Traces of this union existed in the duplicate religious institutions retained in Rome, but politically it left little mark. The town on the Quirinal counted as one of the four divisions of the Palatine city, the other three being the Suburan, Palatine, and Esquiline. No new tribe, however, was added to the original three; and the new burgesses were distributed among the existing tribes and curies. Henceforth each of the three tribes contained two divisions or ranks, and these ranks were denoted by the names "first" (*priores*) and "second" (*posteriores*). But no increase was made in the number of the senate, the primitive number of three hundred remaining unchanged down to the seventh century of the city's history. So also the magistrates or king's deputies remained the same. If, then, the Quirinal citizens furnished the posterior or "second" gentes of the old tribes, this distinction must not be confused with the subsequent *maiores* and *minores gentes* (greater and lesser clans) who figure in history: these probably belonged to those communities which, beginning with Alba, were subsequently amalgamated with the Roman people. Thus the

incorporation of the Quirinal or Hill Romans with the Palatine or Mountain Romans marks an intermediate stage between the earliest synoikismos, which united into one body the Tities, Ramnes, and Luceres, and all subsequent incorporations. This amalgamation, then, increased the bulk, but did not change the character of the Roman state. But another process of incorporation, the first steps of which may be traced to this period, and which proceeded very gradually, did profoundly affect the community. We refer to the development of the *plebs*—a problem most intricate and elusive. In the previous chapter the position of “clients” was described as twofold: (1) that of those dependent on and protected by the master of the household; (2) that of those dependent on and protected by the state, *i.e.* by the king. Every fresh amalgamation doubtless brought in an accession of clients, but the principal increase must have been due (1) to the attraction Rome, as a commercial centre, possessed for foreigners, who became metoecs (*μέτοικοι*), or resident aliens; (2) to the influence of war, which, while it transferred the citizens of conquered towns to Rome, at the same time thinned the ranks of the Roman citizens, who alone had the doubtful privilege of bearing the brunt of such wars. In truth this latter fact was the chief cause in promoting the amalgamation of the clients and the citizens. With the increase of the whole body of clients, and especially of that portion consisting of foreigners, attached as clients to the Roman state, but often retaining the citizenship of other communities, the old restrictions, which were more easily observed in the case of household clients, must have broken down. Many, in fact, must have enjoyed practical freedom, though, of course, not the full rights of Roman citizens. The immemorial principle of Roman law that, when once a master or owner had renounced his ownership (*dominium*), he could never resume it over the freedman or the freedman’s descendants; the liberal concessions, made by Roman law especially to foreigners, as regarded marriage and the acquisition of property; the increasing number of manumitted slaves; the influx alike of traders, and still more of Latins vanquished in war; the corresponding decrease of true Roman patricians; the constant vexation of the relations between client and patron,—these

and other causes must have all sufficed to threaten a revolution of the direst consequences to the Roman state. The new name of plebes, or multitude, (from *pleo*, *plenus*), by which the clients were now called, was ominous, signifying, as it did, that the majority no longer felt so much their special dependence as their want of political rights. The danger was averted by the reform associated with the name of Servius Tullius, although the new constitution assigned the plebeians primarily only duties, not rights. Military service was now changed from a burden upon birth to a burden on property. All freeholders, from seventeen to sixty years of age, whether burgesses, metoecs, or manumitted slaves, provided only they held land, were bound to serve; and they were distributed, according to the size of their property, into five classes (lit. "summonings"—*classis*, from *calare*). The first class, who were obliged to appear in complete armour, consisted of the possessors of an entire hide of land, and were called *classici*. The remaining four classes consisted of the respective possessors of three-quarters, half, a quarter, or an eighth of a nominal farm, *i.e.* of a farm whose size served as the standard by which such divisions were regulated (probably such a farm contained at least twenty *jugera*). The cavalry was dealt with in the same way: its existing six divisions, which retained their old names, were tripled; only the richest landholders, whether burgesses or non-burgesses, served as horsemen. All those who held land and were incapable of service, either from sex or age, were bound to provide horses and fodder for special troopers. To facilitate the levying of the infantry, the city was divided into four parts (*tribus*), (1) the Palatine, comprising also the Velia; (2) the Suburan, comprising also the Carinae and Coelian; (3) the Esquiline; (4) the Colline, *i.e.* the Quirinal and Viminal. Each of these four divisions contributed a fourth part, not merely of the force as a whole, but of each of its military subdivisions; and this arrangement tended to merge all distinctions of clan and place, and also to blend, by its levelling spirit, burgesses and metoecs into one people. The army was divided into two levies: the first comprised the juniors, who served in the field from their seventeenth to their forty-sixth year; the second, the seniors, who guarded the walls

at home. The whole force of infantry consisted of four legions ("musters," *legiones*), each of 4200 men, or 42 centuries, 3000 of whom were heavy armed, and 1200 light armed (*velites*); two of these legions were juniors and two seniors. Added to these were 1800 cavalry, thus bringing the whole force to about 20,000 men. The century, or body of one hundred, formed the unit of this military scheme, and by the arrangement above indicated there would be 18 centuries of cavalry and 168 of infantry. To these, other centuries of supernumeraries (*adcenti*) must be added, who marched with the army unarmed (*velati*), and took the place of those who fell ill or died in battle. The whole number of centuries amounted to 193 or 194; nor was it increased as the population rose. Out of this military organization arose the census or register of landed property, including the slaves, cattle, etc., that each man possessed, and this was strictly revised every fourth year. This reform, though instituted on purely military lines and for military purposes, had important political results. In the first place, every soldier, whether a full citizen or not, would be certain to have it in his power to become a centurion and, further, a military tribune. In the second, those rights which the burgesses had formerly possessed, not as an assembly of citizens in curies, but as a levy of armed burgesses, would now be shared by the whole army of centuries. These rights conferred the power on the military centuries of authorizing soldiers to make wills before battle, and of granting permission to the king to make an aggressive war. In the third place, although the rights of the old burgess assembly were in no way restricted, there thus arose three classes: (1) the full burgesses or citizens; (2) the clients possessing freeholds, called later, "burgesses without the right of voting" (*cives sine suffragio*), who shared in the public burdens, *i.e.* military service, tribute, and task-work, and were, therefore, called municipals (*municipes*); (3) those metoecs who were not included in the tribes, and who paid protection-money, and were non-freeholders (*aerarii*). The period at which this reform took place must be a matter of conjecture, but it presupposes the existence of the Servian wall, embracing the four regions of the city: and the smallest extent to which the city must have

spread is 420 square miles; and we must assume that not only the district between the Tiber and the Anio had been acquired, but also the Alban territory. Analogy from Greek states inclines to the view that this reform was modelled on Greek lines, and produced by Greek influence. The adoption of the armour and arrangements of the Greek hoplite system in the legion, the supply of cavalry horses by widows and orphans, point in this direction; moreover, about this time the Greek states in Lower Italy adopted a modification of the pure clan constitution, and gave the preponderance of power to the landholders.

The steps by which Rome rose to the proud position of head state in Latium, the union of the Latin communities under her headship, the extension alike of Latin territory and of the city of Rome, the splendour of that regal period which shed a special lustre on the royal house of Tarquin, cannot now be described, save in faint outline. We may, however, briefly summarize the results, the details of which have either been buried in oblivion or falsified by mythical legend. Firstly, those Latin communities situated on the Upper Tiber, and between the Tiber and the Anio—Antemnae, Crustumerium, Ficulnea, Medullia, Caenina, Corniculum, Cameria, Collatia, which on the east side sorely hampered Rome—were very early subjugated; the only one which retained its independence was Nomentum, probably by alliance with Rome. Constant war was waged between the Romans and the Etruscan people of Veii for the possession of Fidenae, situate on the left (Latin) bank of the Tiber, about five miles from Rome, but apparently without the Romans becoming permanent masters of this important outpost. Secondly, Alba was conquered and destroyed; to her position as the recognized political head and sacred metropolis of Latium, Rome succeeded. Rome thus became president of the Latin league of thirty cantons, and the seat of the religious ceremonial observed at the Latin festival. An alliance was concluded on equal terms between Rome on the one hand and the Latin confederacy on the other, establishing lasting peace throughout Latium, and a perpetual league for offence and defence. Equality of rights was established between the members of this

federation, alike as to commerce and intermarriage. No member of the league could exist as a slave within the league's territory, and, though every member only exercised political rights, as member of the community to which he belonged, he had the private right of living anywhere he liked within the Latin territory; and, further, although Latin law was not of necessity identical with Roman, the league naturally brought the two into more complete harmony with one another. The difference between the position occupied by Rome and that formerly held by Alba, was that the honorary presidency of the latter was replaced by the real supremacy of the former. Rome was not, as Alba, a mere member of the league, and included within it, but rather existed alongside it; this is shown by the composition of the federal army, the Roman and Latin force being of equal strength, and the supreme command being held by Rome and Latium alternately. In accordance with this principle, all land and other property acquired in war by the league was divided equally between Rome and Latium. Each Latin community retained its own independent constitution and administration, so far as its obligations to the league were not concerned; and the league of the thirty Latin communities retained its independence, and had its own federal council, in contradistinction to the self-government and council of Rome. Thirdly, although Rome failed to master Fidenæ, it kept its hold upon Janiculum, and upon both banks at the mouth of the Tiber. In the direction of the Sabines and Aequi, Rome advanced her position, and, by the help of an alliance with the Hernici, held in check her eastern neighbours. On the south, constant wars, not without success, were waged against the Volscians and Rutulians; and in this quarter we first meet with Latin colonies, *i.e.* communities founded by Rome and Latium on the enemy's soil, which shows that the earliest extension of Latin territory took place in this direction. Lastly, in addition to this enlargement of the Latin borders towards the east and south, the city of Rome, owing to its increase of inhabitants, and commercial and political prominence, needed new defences. In consequence the Servian wall was constructed: this, beginning at the river below the Aventine, embraced

that hill, the Coelian, the whole of the Esquiline, Viminal, and Quirinal; thence it ran to the Capitoline, and abutted on the river above the island in the Tiber.* The Palatine, which had hitherto been the stronghold, was now left open to be built upon, and the stronghold (*arx*, or *capitolium*) was constructed on the Capitoline, which was free on every side and easily defensible; it was sometimes called Mons Tarpeius ("the Tarpeian hill"), and its lower summit facing the Tiber was the famous Tarpeian rock, a precipice, in ancient days, of some eighty feet. Here, too, was the enclosed "well-house" (*tullianum*), the treasury (*aerarium*), the prison, and the most ancient place of assembling for the burgesses (*Area Capitolina*). No stone dwelling-houses were allowed to be built on the hill; and trees or shrubs covered the space between the two hill summits, which was afterwards called the Asylum. Thus the Capitol was the true Acropolis of Rome, a castle of refuge when the city itself had fallen. Janiculum, though outside the city limits, was fortified, and embraced by the Servian wall, and connected with the city by the bridge of piles (*Pons Sublicius*) which ran across to the Tiber island. The great work of draining the marshy valley between the Capitol and the Palatine was undertaken in this regal period, and the assembly-place of the community was transferred from the *Area Capitolina* to the flat space (*comitium*) between the Palatine and the *Carinae*. Not far from here was built the senate-house (*Curia Hostilia*); here stood the tribunal, or judgment-seat platform, and the stage, whence the burgesses were addressed (afterwards called *rostra*). In the direction of the *Velia* arose the new market (*Forum Romanorum*). To the west of the forum, beneath the Palatine, was the temple of *Vesta*, the common hearth of the city; and in the valley between the Palatine and *Aventine* was marked off a racecourse, the circus of later times. Among the numerous temples and sanctuaries on

* It is necessary to remark that this enlarged Rome was never looked upon as the "city of seven hills," which title was exclusively reserved for the narrower old Rome of the Palatine, described at the end of Chapter II. The modern list of the seven hills, as comprising those embraced by the Servian wall, viz. Palatine, *Aventine*, Coelian, Esquiline, Viminal, Quirinal, Capitoline, is unknown to any ancient author.

all the summits, were conspicuous the federal sanctuary of Diana on the Aventine, and the far-seen temple of Jupiter Diovis on the Capitoline. That Greek influences, as in the Servian military organization, can be traced in this remodelling of the Roman state cannot well be doubted; but how far and in what way they did so cannot now be shown. There may be some truth in the traditions which ascribe to different kings the various improvements and new buildings of Rome, but it is clear that in any case they are to be assigned to the period when Rome remodelled her army and rose to the hegemony of Latium.

Reverting for a moment to the first two sections above enumerated, we may briefly touch on the treatment of the conquered Latins by Rome. The circumstances of each particular case doubtless decided the question, as to whether the inhabitants of a conquered town were forced to migrate to Rome, or allowed to remain in the open villages of their old district. Strongholds in all cases were razed, and the conquered country was included in the Roman territory, and the vanquished farmers were taught to regard Rome as their market-centre and seat of justice. Legally they occupied the position of clients, though in some cases of individuals and clans full burgess-rights were granted; this was specially the case with Alban clans. The jealousy with which the Latin cantons, and especially the Roman, guarded against the rise of colonies as rival political centres, is well shown in Rome's treatment of Ostia; the latter city had no political independence, and its citizens were only allowed to retain, if they already possessed, the general burgess-rights of Rome. Thus this centralizing process, which caused the absorption of a number of smaller states in a larger one, though not essentially a Roman nor even Italian idea, was carried out more consistently and perseveringly by the Roman than by any other Italian canton; and the success of Rome, as of Athens, is doubtless due to the thorough application of this system of centralization.

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On the tribes. cf. Momms. R. St. iii. 161, sq.

CHAPTER V.

THE ETRUSCANS—THE GREEKS IN ITALY.

The Etruscans—Origin—Settlements in Italy—Etruria—Relations with Rome—Constitution—Maritime power—Religion—Art—The Greeks in Italy—Date of immigration—League of Achaean cities—Tarentum—Cumae—Relations of Greeks with Latins, Etruscans, and Phoenicians.

BEFORE proceeding to describe the changes of Republican Rome, it will be well to direct our attention to the other races inhabiting Italy. For convenience, we will omit the movements of the Umbro-Sabellian stocks for the present, and only include in this chapter the two foreign races, whose history is interwoven with our subject: (1) the Etruscans; (2) the Italian Greeks. A mystery shrouds the first people as to their origin, language, race-classification, and original home. Their heavy bodily structure, gloomy and fantastic religion, strange manners and customs, and harsh language, point to their original distinctness from all Italian and Greek races. No one has been able either to decipher the numerous remains of their language or to classify with precision the language itself. Its original soft and melodious character was by the weakening of vowels and loss of soft terminations, completely changed. Tarquinius became Tarchnaf; Minerva, Menrva; Menelaos, Menle; indistinct pronunciation confused *o* with *u*, *b* with *p*, *c* with *g*, *d* with *t*, and the termination *al* signified "son of" (e.g. Canial = Cainia natus); *sa* denoted "wife of" (e.g. Lecnesa = "wife of Licinius"); Hermes became Turms; Aphrodite, Turan; Bacchus, Fufuns. All these present not the remotest analogy to the tongues of

Greece or Italy. But the clan termination *enas* or *ena* (e.g. Porsena, Maecenas, Spurrinna) corresponds closely to that found in Italian, especially Sabellian, names (compare Vibius, or Vibienus, and Spurius with Vivenna and Spurrinna). The Etruscan names of divinities, which at first sight would point to a close connection with the Latin language (e.g. Usil, sun and dawn, connected with ausum, aurum, aurora, sol, Menrva, and Minerva, etc.), probably arose from the subsequent political and religious relations between the Etruscans and Latins. Still, in default of anything more certain, we may conclude that the Etruscans belonged to the Indo-Germanic family, although standing strangely isolated. Many conjectures have been hazarded as to their original home before migrating into Italy—all equally in vain. The fact that their oldest and most important towns (with the exception of Populonia, which was not one of the old twelve cities) lay far inland, and never on the coast, makes it probable that they migrated by land from the north or west of Italy; possibly they came over the Raetian Alps, for the Raeti spoke Etruscan down to historical times, and their name sounds similar to that of Ras, by which the Etruscans called themselves. The old tradition that they were Lydian emigrants from Asia has nothing to support it, except the accidental resemblance of Tursennae (which in Greek became *Τυρσ-ηνοί*, *Τυρρῆνοί*; in Umbrian, Tursci; and in Latin, Tusci, Etrusci) to the Lydian *Τορρῆβοί* of the town *Τύρρβα*. These Torrhebi were sometimes denoted by the word Tyrrhenians; and, as the Lydians, and especially the Torrhebi, were noted for piracy, and the Etruscans for commerce by sea, this unfortunate error easily arose. Whatever, then, was their original home, the fact of the Etruscan dialect being still spoken in Livy's time by the inhabitants of the Raetian Alps, and of Mantua remaining Tuscan to a late period, proves that Etruscans dwelt in the district north of the Po, bounded on the east by the Veneti, and on the west by the Ligurians. To the south of the Po, and at its mouths, the Umbrians, who were the older settlers, were mingled with and under the supremacy of the Etruscan immigrants; and the towns of Hatria and Spina, founded by the Umbrians, and Felsina (Bologna) and Ravenna, founded by the Etruscans, point to this joint settlement; but the irrup-

tions of the Celts forced the Etruscans early to abandon their position on the left bank of the Po, and later that on the right bank of that river.

The great settlement of the Tuscans in the land that still bears their name completely effaced all traces of Ligurian or Umbrian predecessors in that country, and maintained its position with great tenacity down to the time of the empire. Etruria proper was bounded on the east by the Apennines, on the north by the Arnus, on the south at first by the Ciminian forest, and later by the Tiber. The land north of the Arnus, as far as the mouth of the Macra and the Apennines, was debatable border territory, held now by Ligurians, now by Etruscans. The land between the Ciminian range and the Tiber, with the towns of Sutrium, Nepete, Falerii, Veii, and Caere, was occupied at a later date, possibly in the second century of Rome; and the Italian population there held its ground, especially in Falerii, though in a state of dependence. When the Tiber became the boundary, the relations between Rome and the Etruscan invader were on the whole peaceful and friendly, especially with the town of Caere. But where an Etruscan town threatened Rome's commercial position on the Tiber, as was the case with Veii, constant war naturally resulted. Any trace of Etruscans to the south of the Tiber must be ascribed to plundering expeditions by sea, never to regular land invasions; nor is there any reliable evidence of any Etruscan settlement south of the Tiber being planted by settlers who came by land.* The name of "Tuscan quarter" (*Tusculus vicus*) at the foot of the Palatine, and the undoubted fact that the last royal house of Rome, the Tarquin, was of Etruscan origin (whether sprung from Tarquinius or Caere), coupled with minor and similar traditions, prove that Tuscan settlements took place in Rome; but the fact that a house of Etruscan origin held the royal sceptre does not warrant the conclusion that the Etruscans ever were dominant in Rome. There is no evidence that Etruria exercised any essential influence on

* Others—*e.g.* O. Müller and Pelham ("Encyclopædia Britannica")—hold the contrary view, and base it on the evidence for Etruscan rule over Rome and Latium found in *Dionys.* i. 29, 64, 65; *Plut. Q. R.* 18; *Liv.* i. 2.

the language or customs or political development of Rome. The passive attitude of Etruria towards Rome was probably due to two causes: (1) to their struggles with the Celtic hordes from the North; (2) to their sea-faring tendency, which is especially shown in their Campanian settlements.

The commercial instincts of the Etruscans caused them to form cities earlier than any other Italian race. Hence Caere is the first Italian town mentioned in Greek records. This same instinct disposed them less to war, and led them to employ mercenaries at a very early period. They were governed by kings, or *lucumones*, with powers probably similar to those of Roman kings. They probably had a system of clans not dissimilar from that of the Romans; the nobles were marked off strictly from the common people. They were formed into loose confederacies, each consisting of twelve communities, with a metropolis and federal head, or high priest of the league. The whole nation was not embraced in one confederation, as the Etruscans in the north and those in Campania had leagues of their own. *Volsinii* was the metropolis of the league in Etruria proper. Of the rest of the twelve towns we only know for certain *Perusia*, *Vetulonium*, *Volci*, and *Tarquinius*. The laxity of the league allowed, or rather preferred, that separate communities should carry on ordinary wars; nor did all the towns join, when, in exceptional cases, a war was resolved on by the confederacy. "The Etruscan confederations appear to have been from the first deficient in a firm and paramount central authority."

When the tide of Greek invasion swept over Italy, it met a firm but not bitter resistance from the Latins and the inhabitants of the southern part of Etruria. Caere, in fact, attained its early prosperity by its tolerance of, and benefit from, commercial intercourse with the Greeks. But the "wild *Tyrrhenians*," alike on the banks of the *Po* and on the west coast, proved a deadly foe to the Greek intruders; they dislodged them from *Aethalia* (*Ilva*, *Elba*) and *Populonia*. The depredations of Etruscan privateers were the dread of all Greek merchants, and caused the Greeks to call the western sea of Italy by their name (*Tyrrhenum mare*). Although the Etruscans failed to effect a settle-

ment in Latium, or to dislodge the Greeks at Vesuvius, they held sway in Antium and Surrentum. The Volscians became their clients, and they founded a league of twelve cities in Campania. Their very piracy helped them to develop their commercial instincts; and, though at war with Italian Greeks, they were often on peaceful and intimate relations with Greece proper and Asia Minor. Their position as inhabitants of Northern Italy from sea to sea, and thus commanding the mouths of the Po on the Adriatic and the great free ports on the western sea, as holding the land route from Pisae on the western coast to Spina on the eastern, and as masters in the south of the rich plains of Capua and Nola, gave them exceptional advantages; and the luxury thus speedily introduced was doubtless no small factor in their rapid decline. The part they played, as allies of the Phoenicians, and specially of the Carthaginians, in opposing Hellenic influence, belongs to another chapter; but the main result at first was to increase their trade and establish their naval power. Corsica, with the towns of Alalia and Nicaea, became subject to them, while Carthage seized the sister island of Sardinia.

The subsequent decay of the Etruscan power must be treated of elsewhere; but we may conclude this account with a brief estimate of their religious and artistic development. Livy's statement that Etruscan culture was in early times the basis of Roman education, as Greek culture was in later days, is due to a false notion prevalent among ancient and modern scholars touching the intellectual eminence of the Etruscans. The chief characteristics of Etruscan religion were a gloomy mysticism, an insipid play on numbers, a system of fortune-telling, by interpretation of all portents, especially lightning, and by entrail-inspection, and a horrible conception of a future world of torment, ruled over by malignant deities, whose favour was to be appeased by the most cruel worship. Etruscan art exercised very little influence on the development of that of the Italians; and indeed the Etruscans, except in tomb-painting, mirror-designing, and graving on stone, showed but little genius; and even in these three branches it is probable that the best works of Italian artists were superior. Barbaric extra-

vagance alike in material and design, an ostentatious love of size and costly eccentricity, and an absence of all originality characterize Etruscan art. The fact that no progress was made by the Etruscans after an early period caused people to regard Etruscan art as the mother instead of the stunted daughter of Greek art. A close connection is visible between the Etruscan and oldest Attic art, which arose doubtless from their commercial relations; and the bronze candlesticks and gold cups decorated by the great technical skill of the Tyrrhenian workmen found a market in Attica at an early time. Fresco-painting, copper mirrors, bronze statues of colossal size, and painted vases were also produced in great numbers by Etruscan artists. But it is specially to be noticed that it is in South Etruria, in the districts of Caere, Tarquinii, and Volci, where Greek influence was strongly prevalent, and where the population was not purely Etruscan, that the great treasures of so-called Tuscan art have been preserved. What northern Etruria, unassisted by Greek or Latin influence, was able to produce is shown by the copper coins which chiefly belong to it. "Etruscan art is a remarkable evidence of dexterity mechanically acquired and mechanically retained; but it is as little as the Chinese an evidence even of genial receptivity. As scholars have long since desisted from the attempt to derive Greek art from that of the Etruscans, so they must, with whatever reluctance, make up their minds to transfer the Etruscans from the first to the lowest place in the history of Italian art."

We now turn to the subject of the second and concluding portion of this chapter—the position of the Greeks in Italy. All civilizing influences reached Italy by sea, and not by land; but it is remarkable that the Phoenicians, who established trading stations on almost every coast of the Mediterranean, have left only one trace in Italy. Their factory at Caere, however, was probably no older than the stations established by the Greeks on the same coast; and the name Poeni, which the Latins gave to the Phoenicians, was borrowed from the Greeks, and points to the probability that the Greeks introduced the Phoenicians to Italian knowledge. The name of the Ionian sea applied to the waters between Epirus and

Sicily, and that of Ionian gulf, applied by early Greeks to the Adriatic, prove that seafarers from Ionia first discovered the southern and eastern coasts of Italy. Kyme (Cumae), the oldest Greek settlement in Italy, was founded by the town of the same name on the Anatolian coast. The Phocaeans are said to have been the first to explore the western sea; and doubtless they were soon followed by other Greeks, not only from Asia Minor, but from Greece itself and the larger islands of the Aegean. These, in their new homes in southern Italy or Magna Graecia, as it was called, and in Sicily, recognizing their community of character and interests, became blended together, as in our own time different settlers from the old world have combined in their new home of Northern America. These Greek colonies may be grouped in three divisions: (1) The original Ionian group included in Italy Cumae with the other Greek settlements at Vesuvius and Rhegium, and in Sicily Zankle (later Messana), Naxos, Catana, Leontini, and Himera. (2) The Achaean group embraced Sybaris and most of the cities of Magna Graecia. (3) The Dorian group comprehended Syracuse, Gela, Agrigentum, and most of the Sicilian colonies; but in Italy it only possessed Tarentum and Heraclea. As to the period at which these several settlements took place, we rely on the fact that, while in Homer's time Sicily and Italy were practically unknown, in Hesiod's poems the outlines of these two lands are more clearly defined; and in the literature subsequent to Hesiod a general and fairly accurate knowledge appears to have been possessed by the Greeks. That Cumae was the oldest Greek settlement in Italy is generally allowed; that between that settlement and the main Greek immigration into Sicily and lower Italy a considerable period elapsed is also probable: but the two first dates in Italian history which can be regarded as fairly accurate are (1) the founding of Sybaris by the Achaeans in 721 B.C., and (2) that of the Dorian Tarentum in 708 B.C.

It is important to remember that the Italian and Sicilian Greeks always retained the closest connection with their old homes, and that therefore their history is always a history of Greeks, never of true Italians or Sicilians. This is most clearly shown by the league of the Achaean

cities, comprising Siris, Pandosia, Metapontum, Sybaris with its offshoots Posidonia and Laus, Croton, Caulonia, Temesa, Terina, and Pyxus; which, like the Achæan league in the Peloponnese, preserved its own nationality, distinct alike from the barbarians of Italy and the other Greek colonies. These Achæan Greeks attained a very rapid prosperity, especially in the case of Sybaris, Croton, and Metapontum; but they did so more from the fertility of their soil, which they compelled the natives to cultivate for them, than from their own efforts in commerce or agriculture. This rapid bloom bore no fruit. Demoralized by a life of luxury and indolence, these Italian Greeks produced no famous names in Greek art or literature; and their political constitution, sapped in the first place by the attempt of a few families under the guise of Pythagorean philosophy to seize absolute power, and later torn by party feuds, slave insurrections, and the grossest social abuses, completely broke down. Thus the Achæans exercised but little influence on the civilization of Italy; and "the bilingual mongrel people, that arose out of the remains of the native Italians and Achæans and the more recent immigrants of Sabellian descent, never attained any real prosperity."

The other Greeks settled in Italy had a very different effect on that country. Although, unlike the Achæans, they founded their cities by the best harbours, and mainly for trading purposes, they did not despise agriculture and the acquisition of territory. The two cities of greatest influence on Italy were the Doric Tarentum and the Ionic Cumæ. The first named, from its possession of the only good harbour on the southern coast, from the rich fisheries on its gulf, from the excellence of its wool, and the dyeing of it with the purple juice of the Tarentine murex, rapidly acquired an unrivalled commercial position in the south of Italy. The fact, moreover, that the Greeks planted no colony on the Italian shore of the Adriatic, and only two of importance on the Illyrian coast, viz. Epidamnus and Apollonia, caused Tarentum to have no small share in the Adriatic commerce, carried on by Corinth and Corcyra; and, as Ancona and Brundisium rose at a far later period, the ports at the mouths of the Po were the only rivals of Tarentum along the whole east coast. Her intercourse

by land with Apulia sowed the seeds of civilization in the south-east of Italy; but it is noteworthy that, as a rule, the eastern provinces of Italy acquired the elements of civilization, not from the scanty Greek settlements on the Illyrian and Italian coasts of the Adriatic, but from the more numerous colonies on the west coast of Italy. The people of Cumae, and of the other Greek stations near Vesuvius, attained a more moderate prosperity than either the Achaeans or Tarentines. The district they occupied was small, and they contented themselves with spreading Greek civilization by peaceful commercial intercourse rather than by a policy of conquest and oppression. The sea-port of Dicaearchia (later Puteoli), and the cities of Parthenope and Neapolis were founded by the settlers at Cumae. There is no doubt that in very early times the western coast north of Vesuvius was visited by Greek voyagers; the adventures of Ulysses himself have been localized in this region. The name and architecture of Pyrgi near Caere, the names of Aethalia ("the fire island," Elba), Telamon in Etruria, and Alsium near Pyrgi, all point to early Greek settlements; but, as we have already observed, the Latins and Etruscans successfully resisted the intruders, and north of Vesuvius no independent Greek community existed in historical times. Nay, we may conclude that the danger from Greek depredations first turned the attention of the Italians in central Italy to navigation and the founding of towns; Spina and Hatria at the mouth of the Po, and Ariminum further south, were Italian, not Greek foundations. Although this firm resistance was offered to the Greeks, yet, as far as Latium and southern Etruria were concerned, commercial intercourse was welcomed and fostered. Caere, Rome, and the cities at the mouth of the Po, not only prospered commercially by this friendly connection, but, as their earliest traditions show, enjoyed religious intercourse with the Greek oracles of Delphi and Cumae. The different treatment that Greek voyagers met with from the Etruscans proper has been already set forth: how the Etruscans wrested from their grasp the iron trade of Aethalia, and the silver mines of Populonia, and did not even allow individual traders to enter their waters. This union of the Etruscans with the Phoenicians, and

the sudden rise of Carthage itself, arrested that Greek colonization which had, up to the middle of the second century of Rome, threatened to sweep the Phoenicians out of the Mediterranean. The establishment of Massilia, in 600 B.C., on the Celtic coast marks the limit of Greek enterprise; an attempt in 579 B.C. to settle at Lilybaeum was frustrated by the natives and the Phoenicians, and a similar fate befell the Phocaeans at Alalia in Corsica, which they evacuated after a naval battle with the combined Etruscans and Carthaginians in 537 B.C., preferring to settle at Hyele (Velia) in Lucania. In this struggle between the Greeks and the combined Etruscans and Phoenicians, Latium observed a strict neutrality, being on friendly and commercial relations with Caere and Carthage on the one hand, and Velia and Massilia on the other. Although the Greeks did not give up the struggle, and even founded fresh stations, they no longer gained ground; and, after the foundation of Agrigentum in 580 B.C., they gained no important additions of territory on the Adriatic or on the western sea, and they remained excluded from the Spanish waters as well as the Atlantic ocean.

The part played by the Greeks, and in particular the Sicilian Greeks, in revenging themselves at Himera in 480 B.C. upon the Etruscans and Carthaginians, must be described when we reach the fall of the Etruscan power; and the decline of the Greek colonies in Italy, and specially the oppression of the Greeks in Campania and southern Italy by the Samnites, must belong to our account of that race.

AUTHORITIES.

- Etruscans*.—Dionys. i. 28-30; iii. 45-66; iv. 27. Liv. i. 2; v. 33.
For fresh evidence of Etruscan supremacy in Rome, cf. Middleton's "Rome," pp. 42, 43.
- Greeks*.—Dionys. ii. 21; viii. 22; xix. 1, 6, 14. Polyb. i. 6; ii. 39.
Liv. vii. 25-26. Herod. i. 166.

CHAPTER VI.

CHANGE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Triple cause of political agitation—Expulsion of the Tarquins—Powers of the consuls—The dictator—Comitia centuriata—The senate—Chief results of the revolution.

THE close of the regal period, and the causes which led to the subsequent changes in the Roman constitution, render it necessary for us to revert to the internal state of Rome itself. Three distinct movements agitated the community. The first proceeded from the body of full citizens, and was confined to it: its object was to limit and lessen the life-power of the single president or king; in all such movements at Rome, from the time of the Tarquins to that of the Gracchi, there was no attempt to assert the rights of the individual at the expense of the state, nor to limit the power of the state, but only that of its magistrates. The second was the demand for equality of political privileges, and was the cause of bitter struggles between the full burgesses and those, whether plebeians, freedmen, Latins, or Italians, who keenly resented their political inequality. The third movement was an equally prolific source of trouble in Roman history; it arose from the embittered relations between landholders and those who had either lost possession of their farms, or, as was the case with many small farmers, held possession at the mercy of the capitalist or landlord. These three movements must be clearly grasped, as upon them hinges the internal history of Rome. Although often intertwined and confused with one another, they were, nevertheless, essentially and fundamentally distinct. The natural outcome

of the first was the abolition of the monarchy—a result which we find everywhere, alike in Greek and Italian states, and which seems to have been a certain evolution of the form of constitution peculiar to both peoples. What is remarkable in the change at Rome, is that violent measures had to be adopted, and that the Tarquins, both the king and all the members of his clan, had to be forcibly expelled. The romantic details colouring this event do not affect the fact itself, nor are the reasons assigned by tradition undeserving of belief. Tarquin “the proud” is said to have neglected to consult the senate, and fill up the vacancies in it; to have pronounced sentences of death and confiscation without consulting his counsellors; to have stored his own granaries, and exacted undue military service and other duties from the citizens. The formal vow registered by each citizen that no king should ever again be tolerated, the blind hatred felt at Rome ever afterwards for the name of king, the enactment that the “king of sacrifice” (*rex sacrorum*) should never hold any other office,—all these sufficiently testify to the exasperation of the people. There is no proof that foreign nations took part in the struggle which ensued between the royal house and its expellers, nor can we regard the great war with Etruria in that light, since, although successful, the Etruscans neither restored the monarchy, nor even brought back the family of the Tarquins. The change, violently accomplished as it was, did not abolish the royal power; the one life-king was simply replaced by two year-kings, called either generals (*praetores*) or judges (*iudices*) or, more commonly, colleagues (*consules*). Although, probably from the first, the consuls divided their functions—the one, for instance, taking charge of the army, the other of the administration of justice—such a partition was not binding, and each possessed and exercised the supreme power as completely as the king had done. In consequence of this each consul could forbid what the other enjoined, and thus the consular commands, being both absolute, would, if they clashed, neutralize one another. It is hard to parallel this system of co-ordinate supreme authorities, which, if not peculiarly Roman, was a peculiarly Latin institution. The object clearly was to preserve the regal power undiminished, but, by doubling the holder of this

power, to neutralize its effects. The limit of a year, fixed for the duration of the consular office, was reckoned from the day of entry upon office to the day of the solemn laying down of power by the consuls; and, as the consuls to a certain extent laid down their power of their own free will, and as, even if they overstepped the year's limit, their consular acts were still valid, they were not so much restricted directly by the law, as induced by it to restrict themselves. Still, the effect of this tenure of office for a set term was to abolish the irresponsibility of the king, who, as supreme judge, had been accountable to no tribunal and liable to no punishment. The consul, on the other hand, when his term had expired, and the protection given by his office had been removed, was liable to be called to account just like any other burgess. Together with the abolition of the monarchy, the ancient privilege of the king to have his fields tilled by the burgesses, and the position which the metoecs held as special clients of the king, naturally came to an end. The contrast between the old royal power and the new consular office was brought out more clearly by the following restrictions. (1) The old right of appeal, which the king had granted or not at his pleasure in all criminal procedure, was now established by the Valerian law in 509 B.C.; the consul was now bound to grant this right to every criminal who was condemned to suffer capital or corporal punishment; unless, indeed, the sentence was pronounced under martial law. In token of this right, which before 451 B.C. was extended to cases of heavy fines, the consular lictors laid aside the axes, which had been the sign of the king's penal jurisdiction. (2) The need of deputies, which had caused, but not compelled, the king to appoint a city-warden (*urbi praeffectus*) to act in his absence, ceased with the substitution of two consuls for one king. If the consul in time of war did entrust the supreme command to a deputy, such a deputy was only adjutant or lieutenant (*legatus*) of the consul. It is true that, in times of special emergency, the consuls could nominate a third colleague, who, under the name of dictator, revived the old single supremacy of the king, and who for the time was obeyed by the consuls and the whole state; but such an office was a special creation to meet an exceptional state of

things. (3) Although in the field a consul could delegate his functions to a deputy, at home he had no free will in the matter. The two quaestors ("trackers of murder"), whose appointment by the king to deal with criminal cases had not been obligatory although usual, became now regular state officers. The consul was obliged to nominate them, and their province was enlarged, so as to include the charge of the state treasure and state archives; their tenure of office, like that of the consuls, lasted for one year. On the other hand, the chief magistrate in the city had to act in person, or not at all, in those cases in which a delegation of his authority was not expressly incumbent on him. Thus in the home government no deputy acting for a city magistrate (*pro magistratu*) was possible, while military deputies (*pro consule*, *pro praetore*, *pro quaestore*) were only possible in the field, and had no power to act within the community itself. (4) The consul retained the right, which the king had exercised absolutely, of nominating his successor, but he was bound to follow the expressed wishes of the community in his nomination. He might reject particular candidates, and at first even limit the choice to a list of candidates proposed by himself; and, what was more important, the candidate, once appointed, could never be deposed by the community. (5) The consuls had not the right, which had belonged to the kings, of appointing the priests; the colleges of priests now filled up the vacancies in their own body, and the appointment of the vestals and single priests passed into the hands of the president, or Pontifex Maximus, now nominated for the first time by the pontifical college. Thus the supreme authority in religion was separated from the civil power, and the semi-magisterial position of the Pontifex Maximus is a further proof of the wish to impose limits on the consular power. (6) The insignia of the consul were markedly inferior to those which had distinguished the king. The lictor's axe was taken away, the purple robe of the king was replaced by the purple border of the consul's toga, the royal chariot was abolished, and the consul was obliged, like every other citizen, to go on foot within the city.

We have above alluded to the revival of the royal power in the person of the dictator. His other title, "master

of the army" (magister populi), as also that of his chief assistant (magister equitum, "master of the horse"), coupled with what we know about the circumstances and causes of his appointment, prove that the dictatorship was an essentially military institution. No doubt it was designed to obviate the disadvantage of divided power in the field, and its restriction to a maximum limit of six months indicates that the office was not to last longer than the duration of a summer campaign. The dictator was nominated by one of the consuls; and, as their colleague, he was obliged to lay down his office when they did. All magistrates were subject to him, and no appeal was allowed from his sentence; the community had no part in his election. The consuls, then, were, with certain restrictions, what the kings had been, the supreme administrators, judges, and generals; in matters of religion, too, they offered prayers and sacrifices for the community, and with the aid of skilled interpreters ascertained the will of the gods. The very restrictions which hampered the consuls could, in time of need, be broken through by the dictatorship, and Rome could see again, under a new name, the absolute authority of the king. "In this way the problem of legally retaining and practically restricting the regal authority was solved in genuine Roman fashion, with equal acuteness and simplicity, by the nameless statesmen who worked out this revolution."

A further change of great importance followed the new powers given to the community as a whole. The right of annually electing the consuls, and of deciding, upon appeal from a criminal, the life or death of a citizen, gave the public assembly something more than the passive formal part in state-administration which it had played under the kings. The growth, wealth, and importance of the plebs, and the necessity of their help in making the reform, rendered it impossible for all power to remain in the hands of the smaller body of the patriciate, which by this time had practically become an order of nobility. Therefore the new community was extended, so as to embrace the whole body of plebeians; all the non-burgesses, who were neither slaves nor citizens of foreign states, living at Rome under the *ius hospitii*, were admitted into the curies, and the old burgesses, who had hitherto formed the curies,

lost the right of meeting and passing resolutions. Further, the curiate assembly (*comitia curiata*) had thus lost its fundamental character of burgesses belonging to different clans, and included many plebeians, who belonged to no clan, but were legally on an equal footing with the most aristocratic citizens. To obviate the results of such a democratic levelling, all political power was taken away from the *comitia curiata*, and was transferred to the assembly of the centuries (*comitia centuriata*); that is, to the assembled levy of those bound to military service, who now received the rights, as they had previously borne the burdens, of citizens. This body, originally constituted for purely military purposes, now decided cases of appeal, nominated magistrates, adopted or rejected laws. There was no debate in this assembly, any more than in that of the curies; but the constitution of the assembly gave the preponderance of power to the possessors of property; and the peculiar system, by which the decision of an election was often determined by the voting of the first centuries, gave a manifest advantage to the possessors of property, whose centuries had the privilege of giving their votes first.

The prerogatives of the senate were increased by the reform of the constitution. In addition to its old rights of appointing the interrex, and of confirming or rejecting the resolutions passed by the community, the senate could now either reject or confirm the appointment of the magistrates elected by the public assembly. The senate was still composed exclusively of patricians, but on occasions when its advice was asked, side by side with the *patres*, or true patrician senators, a number of non-patricians were admitted and "added to the senate-roll" (*conscripti*). These plebeians were not by this admission placed on a footing of equality; they did not become true senators, and were not invested with the senatorial insignia; they had no share in the magisterial prerogatives of the senate (*auctoritas*), nor were they allowed to express their opinion on those occasions when the senate met in the character of a state-council, and discussed what advice (*consilium*) should be tendered the community: they were simply silent voters in the divisions of the house, and called "foot-members" (*pedarii*) by the proud nobility, or "men who voted with their feet" (*pedibus ire in*

sententiam). Still, this admission of plebeians into the senate-house was a most important step, and one fraught with no slight consequences. Among the patres themselves distinctions of rank arose: those who had been consuls, or were already designated as successors to the outgoing consuls, occupied the first place on the senate-roll, and voted first; the position of the first of these, or foremost man of the senate (*princeps senatus*), naturally was much coveted. The consuls in office did not vote, but they selected the new members of the senate, alike the patres and the plebeian *conscripti*, although they were no doubt more restricted by the opinions of the nobility in their selection than the king had been. Two rules early obtained—(1) that the consulship entailed upon the holder of it admission to the senate for life; (2) that vacancies in the senate were not filled up at once, but on the occasion of the census, taken every fourth year, when the roll of senators was revised and completed. The number of senators remained unchanged, and, from the fact that the *conscripti* were included in the number, we may infer the diminution of the number of patriciate clans. It is easy to see what an immense preponderance of power the revolution gave the senate. Its right of rejecting the proposals of the *comitia centuriata*, its position as adviser of the chief magistrate, its tenure of office for life, as contrasted with the annual duration of magistracies,—all tended to place the government in its hands. But what chiefly did so, was the fact that the consul ruled for but a brief space, and was, on the expiry of his office, merely one of the nobility; and thus, even if a consul were inclined to question the senate's influence, he lacked the first element of political power, viz. time; while his authority was paralyzed alike by the priestly colleges and his own colleagues, and, if need be, could be suspended by the dictatorship. The result was that the senate became the real governing power, and the consul subsided into a president, acting as its chairman and executing its decrees. The senate also drew into its own hands the management of the state finances, by causing the consul to commit the administration of the public chest to two *quaestors*, who naturally became dependent on the senate.

The revolution thus accomplished at Rome was, as we

have seen, conservative in its character, in that the fundamental elements of the old constitution were retained. It was, in fact, a compromise between the two state parties—the old burgesses and the plebeians—who, for the time being sank their party quarrels, and united, under the pressure of the common danger of a despotism. The necessity of their co-operation caused those mutual concessions we have described above, and the importance of the revolution lay far more in the indirect effects of those concessions than in the limit of time imposed on the supreme magistracy. The chief of these indirect effects were (1) the rise of the Roman citizens in the later sense of the term. The plebeians had hitherto been little better than aliens or metoecs in the eye of the law. Now they were enrolled in the curies as citizens, they voted in the common assembly and in the senate, and they were protected by the right of appeal. (2) The elevation of the old burgess-body, or patriciate, into an exclusive aristocracy. The very incorporation of the plebeians into the burgess-body caused the patres to close up their ranks, and hold stubbornly to the privileges that remained to them: the admission of new clans into their body, which had not been very rare under the kings, now ceased. Although the plebeians might become military officers and senators, they could hold no public magistracy or priesthood: and the patres still maintained the legal impossibility of marriage between their order and the plebeians. (3) It further became necessary to define the distinction between the enlarged burgess-body and those who were now the non-burgesses. “To this epoch, therefore, we may trace back—in the views and feelings of the people—both the invidiousness of the distinction between the patricians and plebeians, and the strict and haughty line of demarcation between *cives Romani* and aliens.”

(4) Further, at this period arose the separation between law and edict. The principle of Roman law that every command of a magistrate, even if illegal, was valid during his tenure of office, must, owing to the official life-tenure of a king, have caused the distinction between law and edict to have been lost sight of. But it is obvious that the annual change of consuls led to the two being clearly separated.

(5) The provinces of civil and military authority were now finally separated. The power of the consul within the city limits was restricted by law, as shown above; his power as general was absolute. Therefore the general and the army could not in their military capacity enter the city proper, unless allowed to do so. Thus the distinction between quirites and soldiers became deeply rooted in the minds of the people.

Viewing the revolution as a whole, its immediate effect was to establish an aristocratic government, by making the senate practically supreme. But the germs of a more representative constitution were visible. The enrolment of the plebeians among the burgesses, the admission of certain of them to the senate, were victories of happy augury for the future. Those plebeian families admitted on account of their wealth or position into the senate naturally held aloof from the mass of the plebs. In addition to this distinction in the plebeian body, there arose another out of the system of voting in the comitia centuriata, which placed the chief power in that class of farmers whose property was in excess of that of the small freeholders, but inferior to that of the great proprietors; and this arrangement further enabled the seniors, although less numerous, to have as many voting divisions as the juniors. "While in this way the axe was laid to the root of the old burgess-body and their clan-nobility, and the basis of a new burgess-body was laid, the preponderance in the latter rested on the possession of land and on age, and the first beginnings were already visible of a new aristocracy, based primarily on the consideration in which the families were held—the future nobility."

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Seeley, Introd. to Liv. bk. i. Momms. R. St. iii. 301-368.
- Conscripti Senatores*.—Aul. Gell. iii. 18.
- Senate's power*.—Polyb. vi. 13, 16, sqq.

CHAPTER VII.

THE TRIBUNATE OF THE PLEBS, AND THE DECENVIRATE.

Land-tenure and agriculture—Public land—Evil influence of capitalists—Ruin of small farmers—Secession to the “Sacred Mount”—The tribunes and aediles—Powers of the tribunes—Political value of the tribunate—Further dissensions—Agrarian law of Spurius Cassius—The Decemvirs—Twelve Tables—Fall of the Decemvirs—The Valerio-Horatian laws.

AT the beginning of the last chapter we noted the importance of the struggle which was intimately connected with land-occupation. Before proceeding to describe the constitutional changes which arose from this struggle, we must revert for a time to the original land-tenure among the Romans, and, as far as possible, strive to clearly present the main features of this most difficult and important question. From the first, agriculture was felt to be the main support and fundamental basis of every Italian commonwealth. The Roman state in particular secured by the plough what it won by the sword; it felt that the strength of man and of the state lay in their hold over the soil; and this feeling caused the state to avoid, if possible, the cession of Roman soil, and caused the farmers to cling tenaciously to their fields and homesteads. The main object of war was to increase the number of freeholders; this object was also evident in the Servian constitution, which showed the original preponderance of the agricultural class in the state; and which, by its division of the community into “freeholders” (*adsidui*) and “producers of children” (*proletarii*), without reference to their political position, proved that a large portion of the landed

property had passed into the hands of non-burgesses. This division, by imposing upon the freeholders the duties of citizens, paved the way, as we have seen, to conceding them political rights. In the earliest times no burgess had any special property in land: all arable land was the common possession of the several clans; each clan tilled its own portion and divided the produce among its constituent households. When and how the distribution of land among the individual burgesses was made, we cannot tell—at any rate it was previous to the Servian constitution; and that same constitution leads us to conclude that the mass of the land was divided into medium-sized farms of not less than 20 jugera, or $12\frac{1}{2}$ acres. Landed estates were successfully guarded against excessive subdivision by custom and the sound sense of the population. Evidence is also furnished by the Servian constitution that even in the regal period of Rome there were small cottagers and garden proprietors, with whom the mattock took the place of the plough. In addition to the ordinary farmers, it is clear from the same constitution that large landed proprietors had also come into existence—partly perhaps from the numerical inequality of the members of the various clans, when the clan-lands were divided among the members; partly, too, from the great influx of mercantile capital into Rome. But, as we cannot suppose that there were many slaves at this time, by whose labour such large estates were afterwards worked, we must conclude that a landowner assigned lots to tenants of such portion of his estate as he could not farm in person. Such tenants were composed of decayed farmers, clients, and freedmen, and formed the bulk of the agricultural proletariat. They were often free men, and were then called “tenants on sufferance” (*precarii*), as their possession was only held at the pleasure of the owner. For this usufruct of the soil the tenant did not necessarily pay rent in kind, and, when he did, his position was not quite the same as that of the lessee of later times. The relation between the landlord and his tenants was all the closer, because the landlords did not employ middlemen, but lived themselves on their estates, and took the greatest interest in the welfare of those dependent on them; their lodging in the city was only for business purposes, and for avoid-

ing, at certain seasons, the unhealthy atmosphere of the country. Such slaves as were employed were, as a rule, of Italian race, and must have occupied very different relations towards their masters from those held by Syrians and Celts in later days. It was from these large land-owners, and the system above described, that there sprang up in Rome a landed, and not an urban, nobility; and further, these tenants-on-sufferance were of the greatest service to the state, in furnishing trained and intelligent farmers to carry out the Roman policy of colonization. A sharp line divided arable from pasture land. The latter belonged to the state and not to the clan, and was consequently not subjected to the distribution, which has been described above. The state used such land for its own flocks and herds, which were intended for sacrifices and other purposes, and which were kept up by cattle fines: and such land was also used by individuals who paid a certain tax (*scriptura*) for the right to graze their cattle on the common pasture. This right was a special privilege of the burgess, and never granted to a plebeian, except under extraordinary circumstances. In the regal period such common pasture land was probably not extensive, and, as a rule, any conquered territory was parcelled out as arable land, originally among the clans, and then among individuals. This description of land-tenure in the earliest period now allows us to resume our history at the point of our digression.

Although the new government at Rome passed certain measures—such as the reduction of port-dues; the state-purchase of corn and salt, so as to supply the citizens at reasonable prices; the addition of a day to the national festival; the limitation of the magisterial power of fining,—which seemed intended for the good of the more numerous and less wealthy classes, unfortunately such regulations were exceptional. The object of the kings had probably been to check the power of capital, and increase the number of farmers. The object of the new aristocratic government was to destroy the middle classes, and especially the smaller independent farmers; and thus to develop the power of the capitalists, and of large land-owners, and to increase the number of the agricultural proletariat. Out of this action on the part of those in

power arose the evil influence of the capitalists. The extension of the financial province of the state treasury to such matters as the purchase of grain and salt, caused the state to employ agents, or middlemen, to collect its indirect revenues and more complicated payments. These men paid the state a set sum, and farmed the revenues for their own benefit. "Thus there grew up a class of tax-farmers and contractors, who, in the rapid growth of their wealth, in their power over the state, to which they appeared to be servants, and in the absurd and sterile basis of their moneyed dominion, are completely on a parallel with the speculators on the stock-exchange of the present day."

The mismanagement of the public land (*ager publicus*) brought out these evils most clearly. The patricians now claimed the sole right of the use of the public pasture and state lands: a right which, as shown above, belonged by law to every burgess. Although the senate made exceptions in favour of the wealthy plebeian houses, the small farmers and tenants-on-sufferance, who needed it most, were excluded from the common pasture. Moreover, to oblige men of their own order, the patrician quaestors gradually omitted to collect the pasture-tax (*scriptura*), and thus diminished the state revenues. And further, instead of making fresh assignments of land, acquired by conquest, to the poorer citizens, the ruling class introduced a pernicious system of what was practically permanent occupation, on the condition of the state receiving from the occupier one tenth of corn, or one fifth of oil and wine. Thus the system of "*precarium*," or tenure-on-sufferance, above described, was now applied to the state lands; and not only did this tenure become permanent, but it was only allowed to the privileged patricians and their favourites; nor was the collection of the fifths or tenths enforced with more rigour than that of the pasture-tax. Thus the smaller landholders (1) were deprived of the usufructs which were their right as burgesses; (2) were more heavily taxed in consequence of the lax collection of the revenues from the use of the public land; (3) and lost the old outlet for their energies, which had been provided by the assignments of land. Added to these evils was the system of working large estates by slaves, which at this time was introduced, and dispossessed the small agrarian

clients, or free labourers. Moreover, owing to the enforced absence from his farm in time of war, and the exorbitant taxation and other state-imposed works which war entailed, the farmer often lost possession of his farm, and was reduced to the position of bondsman, if not slave, of his creditor. His creditor was often a capitalist, to whom speculation in land offered a new and lucrative field; if left by his creditor as nominal proprietor, and actual possessor of the farm, he was perhaps saved from utter ruin, but was demoralized by the consciousness that his person and estate really belonged to another, and that he was entirely dependent on his creditor's mercy. The misery and distress caused by these evils threatened to annihilate the middle class of smaller farmers, and matters were not long in coming to a crisis. In 495 B.C. (but this date is probably too early), a levy was called for: owing to the exasperation produced by the strict enforcement of the law of debt, the farmers refused to obey. One of the consuls, Publius Servilius, induced them to do so, by suspending the law and liberating the imprisoned debtors. On their return from the field of victory, the other consul, Appius Claudius, enforced the debtor-laws with merciless rigour. The war was renewed in the following year; and this time the authority, attaching to the dictatorship, and the personal popularity of the dictator, Manius Valerius, were found necessary to win over the reluctant farmers. Victory again was with the Roman army; but, on its return, the senate refused to agree to the reforms proposed by the dictator. On the news of this refusal reaching the army, arrayed outside the city gates, the whole force left its general and encampment, and marched to a hill between the Tiber and the Anio, in the district of Crustumeria. This celebrated secession, to what was afterwards called "the sacred mount" (*Mons Sacer*), was terminated by the mediation of the dictator and the submission of the senate. The consequences of this secession, undertaken by the multitude without a settled leader, and accomplished without bloodshed, were felt for many centuries. It was the origin of the tribunate of the plebs. The law which created this new office was deposited in a temple, under the charge of two plebeian magistrates specially appointed for the purpose, and called *aediles*, or "house-

masters." These aediles were attached to the tribunes as assistants, and their jurisdiction chiefly concerned such minor cases as were settled by fines.

The following were the chief characteristics of the tribunate. (1) The two tribunes were of plebeian rank, and elected by the plebeians assembled in curies. (2) Their power was confined to the city's limits, and thus could not oppose the military imperium of the consul, which was all-powerful outside those limits, nor the authority of the dictator, whether exercised inside or outside the city. (3) Within these limits the tribunes stood on an equal and independent footing with the consuls, and had the right to cancel any command, issued by a magistrate, upon a formal protest from the burgess aggrieved by such a command. This power of intercession made it possible for the tribunes to bring the ordinary administration and execution of the law to a dead-lock while an appeal against the sentence of a judge or decree of the senate was being investigated. (4) Their judicial powers, owing to the vague and ill-defined laws touching offences against order, and crime against the community, were alike extensive and arbitrary. They could by their messengers (*viatores*) summon before them any burgess, even the consul, arrest him on refusal, imprison him, or allow him bail during investigation, and finally sentence him to death or the payment of a fine. An appeal from their sentence was heard, not by the whole body of burgesses, but by the whole plebeian body, and the tribunes defended themselves before this assembly in case of such an appeal. (5) Out of this right of defence sprang the right of holding assemblies of the people, and addressing them on other matters: a right expressly guaranteed to the tribunes by the Icilian law (B.C. 492), which rendered liable to severe punishment any one who interrupted a tribune while speaking, or who bade the assembly disperse. They could take the vote of the people at such meetings, and the "plebiscites" (*plebi scita*), or resolutions thus passed, soon came to have a force and validity which did not properly belong to them. (6) Lastly, the persons of the tribunes were declared inviolable (*sacro-sancti*), and the man who laid hands on them was counted accursed in the sight of gods and men.

This outline of the tribunician power serves to show that it was really a copy of the consular power. In both cases the Roman check of intercession, or veto, plays a prominent part; as one consul could veto his colleague, so one tribune could thwart the other. The special power of vetoing the consul, or any other state magistrate, belonged to the tribune, in virtue of his position as protector and counsel of the plebs. Again, the duration of office was limited to a year in both cases, and in both cases the holder of the office could not be deposed. Further, in their criminal jurisdiction, two aediles were associated with the tribunes, just as two quæstors had been attached to the consuls; but the consul submitted to the prohibition of the tribune, while the tribune was unrestricted by any such prohibition from the consul. Still, although a copy, the tribunician power presented a contrast to the consular. It was essentially negative, while that of the consuls was essentially positive. The consuls alone were magistrates of the Roman people, as being elected by the whole burgess-body, and not merely by the plebeians. Therefore the consul alone had the outward insignia of office; the tribune lacked official attendants, the purple border, and had no seat in the senate. "Thus in this remarkable institution absolute prohibition was in the most stern and abrupt fashion opposed to absolute command; the quarrel was settled by legally recognizing and regulating the discord between rich and poor."

It remains for us to consider what was the political value of the tribunate. Springing as it did from the miseries caused by over-taxation, the baleful system of credit, and the pernicious occupation of the state lands, it yet put no stop to these evils. The reason of this is simply that the wealthy plebeians had as much interest in these abuses as the patricians. The good that the office might do in individual cases of hardship, and in helping plebeians to gain admission to state offices, was more than counterbalanced by the evil of rendering the administration of criminal law subject to the party passion of politics. For party purposes, too, the tribunes could employ their power of veto, and throw out of gear the machine of state, and thus pave the way for that very tyranny which they were created to render impossible.

In the later days of the Republic we shall find that this was the very course they pursued ; and the odium thus incurred found expression in the contemptuous definition of the tribunate as a "pestiferous power, the offspring of sedition, with sedition for its end and aim." The events which followed the institution of the tribunes indicate a state of organized civil war between the two parties of the state. Among minor conflicts stands out the story of Gaius Marcius, surnamed Coriolanus, from the storming of Corioli. Romance has doubtless coloured his bitter opposition to the tribunes in 491 B.C., his expulsion by them from Rome, his return at the head of the Volscian army, his withdrawal on the appeal of his mother, his death at the hands of the exasperated Volscians ; but the truth of these disgraceful conflicts between the Roman orders remains unshaken. The surprise of the Capitol by a band of political refugees, led by a Sabine chief, Appius Herdonius, in 460 B.C., the extirpation of the Fabii by the Etruscans at Cremera in 477 B.C., and other events of this period were connected with the same fanatical violence. But the murder of the tribune, Gnaeus Genucius, who had dared to impeach two men of consular rank in 473 B.C., had a more lasting result, giving rise two years later to the Publilian law. The proposer of this law, Volero Publilius, who was tribune in 471 B.C., established in the first place the *comitia tributa*,* or plebeian assembly of tribes. Hitherto the plebeians had voted by *curies*, and numbers alone had determined their decision. The clients of patrician families voted in these assemblies, and thus enabled the nobility to exercise no small influence on the result. The new plebeian assembly was composed solely of those who were freeholders, and thus excluded the great majority of freedmen and clients, as well as all the patricians. Owing to this the *comitia tributa* was practically an assembly of the independent middle class, and was, owing to its exclusion alike of patricians and non-freeholder plebeians, less representative of the burghesses than the assembly of *curies* had been. In the

* The view here taken is the simplest one held by Schwegler, Pelham, etc., that the *comitia tributa* was a development of the *concilium plebis tributum*. Mommsen holds that the Publilian law refers only to the latter.

second place we must ascribe, if not directly to the provisions of the Publilian law, at least indirectly to its effects, the fact that the resolutions of the plebs (*plebiscita*) were recognized as legally binding on the whole community, and had the same validity as the decrees of the *comitia centuriata*. Probably, also, the increase of the number of tribunes from two to five was due to this law, and their election was now transferred to the *comitia tributa*. Previous to this outcome of party triumph and party legislation, a far wiser and far more serious attempt to deal with the real source of evil was made by Spurius Cassius, a patrician of the patricians, and personally illustrious by two triumphs. In his third consulate (486 B.C.) he brought forward an agrarian bill, in which he proposed to have the state land measured, and to lease part of it for the benefit of the public treasury, and to distribute a larger part among the needy citizens. With an unwise generosity he wished to give the Latin confederates a share in this distribution of public land. This proposal, aimed as it was at the control of the state lands by the senate, and the selfish system of occupation, drew down on its author the wrath of the nobles and the rich plebeians. The cry of "king" was raised, and the commons, irritated by the proposed association of the Latins in the distribution, and ever ready to believe that royal power was being aimed at, refused to save their champion. Cassius fell, and "his law was buried along with him; but its spectre thenceforward incessantly haunted the eyes of the rich, and again and again it rose from the tomb against them, until, amidst the conflicts to which it led, the commonwealth perished."

Later, in 462 B.C., a further attempt to abolish the tribunate came from one holding that office. Gaius Terentilius Arsa, proposed to nominate a commission of five men for the purpose of preparing a legal code which should bind the consuls in the exercise of their judicial powers. Ten years of party strife elapsed before this proposal was carried into effect, and during that strife two concessions were made to induce the plebeians to give up this legal code. (1) In 457 B.C. the tribunes were increased from five to ten; (2) in 456 B.C. the Aventine, which had hitherto been sacred ground and uninhabited,

was distributed among the poorer burgesses, for them to build on and occupy. But these concessions did not turn aside the plebs. The legal code was agreed to, and in 451 B.C. ten men were elected by the centuries, for the purpose of drawing it up (*decemviri consulari imperio legibus scribundis*). These decemvirs had full powers as supreme magistrates in the place of the consuls; no appeal was allowed in their case; the tribunate was suspended; and, what was more important, plebeians, as well as patricians, were eligible for the new office. The first plebeians were elected at the second election in 450 B.C., and these were the first non-patrician magistrates of the Roman community. Although the proposal for the institution of the decemvirate was made in 454 B.C., no decemvirs were elected for three years; during that interval an embassy was sent to Greece to collect the more famous Greek laws, and especially those of Solon; this embassy did not return till 451 B.C. The object of this new creation was to substitute a limitation of the consular powers by written law for the more turbulent veto of the tribunes. The pledge given by the decemvirs not to infringe the liberties of the plebs did not, perhaps, imply the abolition of the tribunate; but a wise compromise would doubtless have brought this about, had the decemvirs retired when their task was done. In 451 B.C. the law, engraven on ten tables of copper, was affixed in the Forum to the rostra in front of the senate-house. Two more tables were added in the following year, and thus originated the first and only legal code of Rome—the Twelve Tables. The changes introduced by this code were of a comparatively slight character; the maximum of interest was fixed at ten per cent., and the usurer was rendered liable to heavy penalties. The legal distinction between freeholders and non-freeholders was retained, as also the invalidity of marriage between patricians and plebeians. The chief feature was the denial of appeal to the *comitia tributa* in capital cases, and the confirmation of it in the case of the *comitia centuriata*. The political significance of this code lay not so much in the particulars of its legislation, as in the fact that the consuls were now bound to administer justice according to set forms and rules; while the exhibition of the code in public subjected the administrator to the

control of the public eye. The downfall of the decemvirs, who under various pretexts refused to abdicate their office, has been ascribed by legend to the tyranny of their chief, Appius Claudius. The murder of Lucius Siccus Dentatus, the bravest soldier in Rome, and a former tribune, was laid at the door of the decemvirs; and the act of the centurion Lucius Verginius, who slew his own daughter to save her from the brutal lust of Appius, caused the storm of popular indignation to break forth. The two armies, which a double war against the Sabines and Volscians had called into the field, on hearing the story from Verginius and Lucius Icilius, the betrothed lover of the dead maiden, straightway left their camps, and once more seceded to the Sacred Mount. They there nominated their tribunes, and, as the decemvirs still remained obstinate, returned to the city, and encamped on the Aventine. The decemvirs now gave way, and Appius Claudius and Spurius Oppius put an end to their lives, while the remaining eight went into exile. It is hard to believe that the decemvirate, one of the triumphs of the plebs, was abolished by that body. Possibly the whole story is a myth of the aristocrats. The overthrow of the decemvirate would more naturally have come from the patricians. A subsequent contest may possibly have ensued to force the patricians to restore the tribunate, resulting in the victory of the plebs, and in the compromise which was confirmed by the Valerio-Horatian laws, the so-called *Magna Charta* of Rome.

At any rate the tribunate was restored, and, under the Valerio-Horatian laws, gained the following new powers in 449 B.C.: (1) The consuls were forced to administer justice in accordance with the twelve tables of the decemvirs. (2) To compensate for the loss of right of appeal in capital cases to the *comitia tributa*,* every magistrate, the dictator among the rest, was obliged to allow the right of appeal. (3) The tribunes could, as before, inflict fines without limitation, and submit their sentences to the *comitia tributa*. (4) The management of the military chest was taken from the

* According to Mommsen it would be better to read in (2) and (3) "the assembly of the plebs" for "*comitia tributa*," and to reserve that name for (4).

consuls, and entrusted to two quaestors, who were chosen by the whole body of freeholders, both patrician and plebeian; the votes of this assembly were taken by districts, which gave the plebeian farmers far more weight than they possessed in the comitia centuriata. (5) The tribunes were allowed to sit on a bench at the door of the senate-house, and thus have a share in the proceedings of that body. And from this important concession gradually arose the principle, that the tribune could by his veto stop any resolution of the senate or of the public assembly. (6) The persons of the tribunes were pronounced inviolable (*sacrosancti*), and the most hallowed ordinances of religion were employed to impart sacredness to their office. "No attempt to abolish this magistracy was ever from this time forward made in Rome."

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- Appius Herdonius*.—Liv. iii. 15–18. Dionys. x. 14, 16, 37.
- Spurius Cassius*.—Liv. ii. 41. Dionys. vi. 95; viii. 68–87. Festus. p. 241.
- Lex Publilia*.—Liv. ii. 56–60. Dionys. ix. 39–43.
- Lex Terentilia*.—Liv. iii. 9, 32.
- Decemvirate and Valerio-Horatian laws*.—Liv. iii. 33–58. Dionys. x. 54–60; xi. 1–49.
- Twelve Tables*, cf. Schwegler R. G. iii. 1–47; Bruns fontes, 147; Dirksen's Review of the Explanations of XII. Tables, Schmitz Quellen-Kunde, p. 12–14.
- Comitia Tributa*.—Mommsen (R. St. iii. 322, sq.; Römische Forschungen, i. 165) holds that Roman writers confused the comitia populi tributa with the concilium plebis tributum. Strachan-Davidson (*Historical Review*, p. 209, sq.) suggests a third view,

CHAPTER VIII.

EQUALIZATION OF THE ORDERS, AND THE NEW ARISTOCRACY.

Union of the plebeians—*Lex Canuleia*, 445 B.C.—Military tribunes with consular powers—Censorship, 435 B.C.—*Quaestorship*, 421 B.C.—Bitter resistance of the nobility—Social distress—Attempted remedies—*Licinio-Sextian laws*—Death-blows of the old aristocracy—Utility of the *Licinio-Sextian laws*—New aristocracy and new opposition—Increase of the powers of burgesses—Decreasing importance of the *comitia*—Subdivision and diminution of the consular power—Changed character of the tribunate—The senate all-powerful.

THE contest between the patricians and plebeians was not yet ended. For two hundred years the bitter strife continued; each successive struggle wrested from the old aristocracy one or more of their dearly loved privileges, until at last not one remained, save that which birth alone gives and nought can take away, the exclusive pride of caste. To present a continuous history of the internal strife of parties, it will be necessary to confine this chapter to a narrative of the inner life of Rome, and to summarize as briefly as possible the events of each blow to the patrician power, and the results of the conflict as a whole. The history of Rome's foreign relations, although they exercised no slight influence on her internal discord, must be reserved for another place.

Social discontent, rather than political, had given rise to the tribunician movement, a movement viewed with suspicion by wealthy plebeians as well as by patricians. Doubtless some of the leading plebeians had supported their less powerful brethren in the struggle, whether from motives of justice or self-interest. But, now that the

office of tribune was firmly established, the whole plebeian body, comprising both those wealthier families who had already become members of the senate, and the general mass of the citizens, became firmly united together, and used the tribunate as a lever to remove the political disabilities of their order. The first blow was dealt by the Canuleian law in 445 B.C. This law (1) legalized the validity of marriage between a patrician and plebeian, giving the children of such a marriage the rank of their father. (2) It further created six military tribunes in the place of consuls, with consular powers and consular duration of office, whose election was intrusted to the centuries. This office was open alike to plebeians and patricians. As the creation of this magistracy was doubtless a compromise between the claim of the plebeians to be admitted to the consulship and the opposition of the patricians, we must seek for some reason why the patricians practically conceded the claim of the plebeians, but changed the form of the consulate to that of a military tribunate. Certain honorary distinctions were associated with the holding of the consular power, such as the honour of a triumph, and the *ius imaginum*, or right which allowed a consul's descendants to set up their ancestor's image in the family hall, and to exhibit it on certain occasions in public. These honours were not allowed to the military tribunes. Further, a plebeian military tribune did not have the right of speech in the senate, which would of necessity have belonged to plebeian consuls; since the opinion of all chosen to fill the office of consul, and of all who had filled it, had to be asked before that of the other senators. It must be specially noted that the old patrician consuls were not abolished by this new office; indeed, every year the struggle was renewed as to whether military tribunes or patrician consuls should be elected. During the period of nearly eighty years, *i.e.* from 444 B.C. to the throwing open of the consulship to the plebeians by the Licinian law in 367 B.C., we find that the military tribunes were elected fifty times, and the patrician consuls twenty-three times. The miserable shifts by which the patricians thus sought to baffle their opponents found further expression in the creation of the censorship in 435 B.C. The two officers, or "valuers" (*censores*), thus

created, were chosen from the patricians, and held office for a period of not more than eighteen months. They had charge of the registration of the whole body of citizens for the purposes of taxation, and the duty of ascertaining the age and property of each man, and of assigning him his proper position on the burgess-roll. This task had hitherto been managed by the consuls every fourth year. The censorship, although at this period lacking its subsequent importance and moral supremacy, from its influence in filling up the vacancies in the senate and the equites, and from its power to remove persons from the lists of senators, equites, and burgesses, came to be regarded as the palladium of the aristocracy. The second great victory over the patricians was gained in 421 B.C., when the quaestorship was thrown open to the plebeians. Hitherto the consuls had nominated the two city quaestors, who had charge of the public money: their election was now transferred to the same body which elected their two colleagues who had charge of the military chest (cf. p. 60). Thus the plebeians became eligible for the first time to one of the ordinary magistracies, although we do not find that they were able to avail themselves of this privilege until 409 B.C., when they secured three places out of the four. In their bitter resistance to the plebs the aristocracy had resort to every artifice which could influence elections; the aristocratic colleges of priests, under the guise of religion, seconded the bribery and intimidation freely practised on the electorate. Laws could be arrested, elections made null and void, by the convenient discovery of portentous omens, whether from the flight of birds or other phenomena. The blood of Rome's best and bravest citizens was shed in the vain hope of stemming the tide of plebeian victory. We have already (p. 58) narrated the fall of Cassius; to the same list of judicial murders must be added the names of Spurius Maelius and Marcus Manlius. The first of these, in a time of great distress (B.C. 439) sold corn at greatly reduced prices for the benefit of the sufferers. This roused the ire of the patrician "store-president" (*praefectus annonae*), Gaius Minucius. The old cry of "king" was raised, and Maelius fell by the hand of the master of the horse, Gaius Servilius Ahala, because he refused to obey the summons of the

dictator Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus. The house of Maelius was pulled down, and the corn from his granaries distributed among the people. The second victim was Marcus Manlius, whose name, as the saviour of the Capitol during the Gallic siege, was specially dear to the Roman people. The same evils which had roused Spurius Cassius now wrung the heart of his ill-fated successor. The mismanagement of the state lands, the evil system of credit, and the misery of the decaying farmers still called loudly for reform. Assignations of conquered territory had, indeed, been made, notably in the case of lands taken from Ardea in 412 B.C., from Labici in 418 B.C., and from Veii in 393 B.C., but the relief thus afforded was by no means adequate. Attempts had been made, moreover, to revive the law of Cassius—as, for instance, the proposal of Spurius Maecilius and Spurius Metilius in 417 B.C. to distribute all the state land; but all such efforts had met with the same success as that of Spurius Cassius. No better fate befell the patrician Marcus Manlius. His noble generosity in freeing with his own money a brave officer, who was about to be led away to a debtor's prison, and his bold utterance that such iniquities should not occur as long as he had a foot of land to sell, roused against him the hatred of the aristocrats and the blind credulity and fanaticism of the multitude. The brave champion of the oppressed was tried for high treason, and condemned to death by those whom he had vainly tried to free, in 384 B.C.; and thus once more the charge of aiming at royal power exercised its deadly charm. Despite the constant acquisition of fresh territory by successful wars, the social distress among the farmers only deepened; and the severe war with Veii from 406–396 B.C., when the soldiers remained under arms both summer and winter, coupled with the burning of Rome by the Gauls in 390 B.C., added fresh horrors to the widespread misery.

At last a solution of the troubles arising from political discontent and social wretchedness sprang out of the combination of the chief plebeians with the farmers. This solution was found in the famous proposals brought forward in 377 B.C. by the tribunes Gaius Licinius and Lucius Sextius. Their proposals were, (1) that the military tribunes should be abolished, and that at least

one of the consuls should be a plebeian; (2) that plebeians should be admitted to one of the three great priest-colleges, viz. that of the decemviri (hitherto duoviri) *sacris faciundis*, or custodians of the oracles; (3) that no one should keep on the common pasture-land more than a hundred oxen and five hundred sheep, or hold more than five hundred jugera (about three hundred acres) of the state lands left free for occupation; (4) that every landlord should be obliged to employ in land cultivation a certain number of free labourers, in proportion to that of his rural slaves; (5) that debtors should be relieved by the deduction of the interest already paid from the capital, and by arranging set terms for the payment of arrears.

The three watch-words of this great movement were clearly the abolition of privilege, social reform, civil equality. The hereditary distinctions associated with the curule magistracy, the right to speak in the senate-house, (cf. p. 45), the possession of spiritual dignities, were no longer to be the exclusive property of the nobles. Social distress was to be relieved, and the poorest burgess was to have his rightful share in those lands from which the selfishness of the rich had so long excluded him. That the patricians struggled hard to prevent these proposals becoming law is not surprising; but that they were passed, after a struggle of eleven years, in 367 B.C., proves the strength of the united forces of the farmers and rich plebeians. The passing of these laws was marked by the founding of a temple of concord at the foot of the Capitol;—the last act of the aged warrior and statesman Marcus Furius Camillus, who perhaps trusted that the struggle, too long continued, was now at an end. But the patrician spirit still showed itself in the creation of a third consul, or, as he was usually called, a praetor. However, this office among others was thrown open to the plebeians in 337 B.C., having remained in the hands of the aristocracy only twenty-nine years. The last blows which destroyed aristocratic exclusiveness were (1) that by which the dictatorship was thrown open to the plebeians in 356 B.C.; (2) that which gave the plebeians access to the censorship in 351 B.C.; (3) that dealt by the Publilian law in 339 B.C., which ordained that at least one of the censors must be a plebeian, and which rendered it impossible for the senate

to reject a decree of the community. The result of this was that the senate had to give their consent beforehand to any measures which might be passed by the *comitia tributa*. (4) The next blow, aimed at the religious privileges of the patricians, fell later. In 300 B.C., the *Ogulnian* law increased the number of pontifices from five to eight, and that of the augurs from six to nine, and distributed the stalls in the two colleges between the patricians and plebeians. (5) Lastly, owing to another secession of the plebs, the final blow was given by the law of the dictator *Quintus Hortensius*, in 287 B.C. This law declared that the decrees of the plebs, passed in their tribal assembly, should have equal force with the decrees of the whole *populus*, or community. Thus it was brought about that those very burgesses, who had once exclusively possessed the right of voting, no longer had even a vote in that assembly whose resolutions were binding on the whole state.

The end had at last come to a strife of two hundred years. The clan nobility, as such, was no longer a political factor in the Roman Republic; but, although its power and privileges were gone, its exclusive patrician spirit was ever a disturbing element of discontent in the public and private life of Rome. "To understand rightly the history of Rome in the fifth and sixth centuries, we must never overlook this sulking patricianism; it could, indeed, do little more than irritate itself and others, but this it did to the best of its ability."

It remains for us to estimate the result of these changes, as to whether they checked social distress and established political equality.

With regard to the first point, we should first consider what relief was really given by the *Licinio-Sextian* laws, passed in 367 B.C. No doubt a substantial benefit was conferred upon the small farmer and free labourer by the provisions of these laws, and this benefit was the more felt as long as the regulations touching the maximum of public land held by individuals, and the number of cattle grazing on the public pasture, were strictly enforced. But it is obvious that no legislation could really check the system of large estates, or the employment of slave-labour, without at the same time shaking the foundations of the

civil organization of that time, in a way that would entail far-reaching consequences. Again, the maximum fixed as to occupation of domain-land and the grazing of flocks and herds was a high one, and in effect was a concession to the wealthy, whose tenure, although liable to certain restrictions, acquired a certain legal sanction. Moreover, these laws provided no better means than had previously existed for the collection of the pasture-tax and the tenths or fifths. No officer was appointed to revise the list of those already holding such land, nor to ensure that, in case of fresh territorial acquisitions, a distribution should at once be made, nor to secure to those who already were in possession, or should be so in future, full ownership. The absence of these provisions, which the necessities of the case demanded, is in itself suspicious. It seems only too probable that the plebeian aristocracy, at whose instance these laws were proposed, regarded their own selfish interests rather than those of the poorer citizens. Indeed, Gaius Licinius Stolo, one of the authors of these laws, was among the first to be condemned for having exceeded the maximum of land. Still some real good was done, and other measures followed, of a beneficial character. In 357 B.C., a tax was imposed by the Manlian law on the manumissions of slaves; this was the first direct tax upon the rich, and its object was to check the undesirable multiplication of freedmen. Moreover, the usury laws established by the Twelve Tables (p. 59) were rendered more stringent, and the maximum of interest, which the law of Duilius Maenius had fixed at ten per cent. in 357 B.C., was lowered to five per cent. ten years later; and later on, the Genucian law in 342 B.C. forbade the taking of interest altogether. This foolish law, though it remained formally in force, was practically inoperative; but the maximum of interest at a rate of five or six per cent. would, at this period, represent the usual rate of twelve per cent., which obtained in later times. More important were the restrictions introduced by the Paetelian and Papirian law of 326 B.C.: by this law, no citizen of Rome could be led away to prison for debt until he had been sentenced by jurymen; and the debtor could, after declaring on oath that he was solvent, save his personal freedom by giving up his property. Notwithstanding these measures

we have clear proof that the distress of the middle class still continued. The appointment of a board to advance money (*quinqueviri mensarii*) in 352 B.C., the violent insurrection and secession of the plebs to the Janiculum in 287 B.C., and the concessions thereby obtained, all point to the same fact. The real relief came not from legislation, but from the successes of Rome, and the necessity of sending out large colonies to consolidate the Roman rule in Italy. Added to this, the general increase of prosperity from successful war and commerce, and the flourishing condition of the state finances, must have lightened the burdens of the farmers, and diffused material well-being among the whole community.

Again, as to the second point, political equality was now practically attained. In the eye of the law, at least, all arbitrary distinctions were abolished. The different gradations, which age, wisdom, and wealth always produce in society, were lessened by the system that pervaded Roman life. That system aimed rather at a uniform level of ability, than at bringing into prominence those more highly gifted. Rich and poor alike lived frugal lives, avoiding even the luxury of silver plate. From the last war with Veii down to that against Pyrrhus, the farmers played a more important part than the old patriciate: the exploits of a plebeian, like Decius, and of a poor farmer, like Manius Curius, now began to take equal rank with, and even eclipse, those of the noblest aristocrat. But, great as the strides to this republican equality were, the government still remained aristocratic. The mere opening of state magistracies to the humblest and poorest burgess does not remove the difficulties which always hinder the rise of a man from the ranks. Moreover, a new aristocracy, consisting of the wealthy plebeians, had existed from the first, and now developed fresh powers. Their policy had always followed lines distinct from, and often opposed to, that of the plebs. This new aristocracy coalesced with the old patriciate, and largely adopted its views, and soon practically took its place. A natural result of this development was the rise of a new opposition. This new democratic party was formed no longer of plebeians, as such, but of the lower classes and the small farmers. But, fortunately for Rome, her struggles with foreign foes

caused the leaders of the two new state parties to forego their quarrels in the face of a common danger; and thus we find the patrician Appius Claudius uniting with his personal foe, the farmer Manius Curius, for the purpose of crushing Pyrrhus. "The breach was already formed; but the adversaries still shook hands across it."

Finally, let us consider what effect the political abolition of the old nobility had upon the relations between the burgesses, the magistrates, and the senate. It has been already pointed out that the Hortensian law in 287 B.C. had given great powers to the *comitia tributa*; and that in this assembly all voted on a footing of equality, without reference to their means, thus differing from the practice in the *comitia centuriata*. The censor, Appius Claudius, in 312 B.C., even struck a blow at the old freehold basis of suffrage, and allowed landless citizens to be enrolled in the tribes. His action was, however, greatly limited by Quintus Fabius Rullianus, the conqueror of the Samnites, in 304 B.C. He incorporated all free men who had no land, and also all freedmen whose landed property was under thirty thousand sesterces (£300), in the four city tribes. But he reserved the rural tribes, whose number gradually increased from seventeen to thirty-one, for all freeborn freeholders, and for those freedmen whose estate exceeded thirty thousand sesterces in value. Thus he gave a great preponderance of power in the two assemblies of the citizens to the holders of land and wealth, and he placed a check upon the increasing importance of the freedmen. Although the powers of the burgess assemblies were increased in certain directions, chiefly with respect to the number of magistrates nominated by them, they did not as a rule interfere with the administration of government. They kept a firm hold on their right to declare war, and occasionally settled disputes between the governing powers, when appealed to by the disputants, and in 390 B.C. they even annulled a decree of the senate. The Hortensian law probably marks the extension of the powers of the *comitia tributa*, which came to be consulted as to the conclusion of peace and alliances. Still, the influence of these assemblies on public affairs towards the close of this period began to wane. This was mainly due to the ex-

tension of the bounds of Rome, whose burgess-body no longer composed a city, but a state. Thus the interest felt in their proceedings on ordinary occasions was comparatively slight, inasmuch as only those residing in the capital as a rule attended. Moreover, the magistrate who convoked the assembly could prevent all discussion; hence the assemblies became mere instruments in his hands, and played a passive part, neither helping nor hindering the administration of the government.

With regard to the Roman magistrates, a great loss of power was the outcome of party contests. The close of the struggle left the consular power subdivided and weakened. Jurisdiction, city police, election of senators and equites, the census and financial administration, were all transferred to magistrates elected by the community, and occupying a position co-ordinate with, rather than subordinate to, the consuls. Further, although the consulship ranked higher than the praetorship, aedileship, and quaestorship, it ranked below the censorship, which office now exercised a wholly arbitrary control over the entire community and every individual burgess. In addition to this creation of collateral standing offices such as the praetorship, the senate now annually defined, though it did not directly assign, the different departments (*provinciae*) of the consuls; and the senate no longer allowed the consuls to conclude peace, without first receiving instructions from the assembled senators. Lastly, the senate could in emergencies suspend a consul by creating a dictator; and, although nominally designated by the consul, the consul elect was, as a rule, really chosen by the senate. Even the dictator's power was no longer regarded as absolute and unlimited. The definition of the functions of the dictator, as of that of the consul and other magistrates, came to be regarded as a constitutional necessity. Thus we find in 363 B.C., and again in 351 B.C., a dictator appointed for a special and limited duty, such as the performance of a religious ceremony. Moreover, restrictions were imposed in 342 B.C. by plebiscites, enacting that no one should hold two magistracies in the same year, and that the same man should not hold the same office twice within a period of ten years. Later, again, in 265 B.C., the Marcian law forbade any one

holding the censorship twice. Although the rule forbidding pluralism, *i.e.* the holding of two offices at the same time, was strictly observed, we frequently find instances of a relaxation of the other restriction. Thus Quintus Fabius Rullianus was five times consul in eight and twenty years, and Marcus Valerius Corvus (370-271 B.C.) held the consulship six times—the first in his twenty-third, and the last in his seventy-second year. The change, which thus transformed the supreme power of the state into a limited magistracy with definite functions, also affected the tribunate. Now that this office had accomplished the purpose for which it had been used, by securing the abolition of the legal disabilities of the commons and of the privileges of the old nobility, the original object of the tribunate as counsel and protector of the humblest and weakest was as odious to the new plebeian aristocracy as it had been to the patrician. Therefore, under the new organization the office lost its old character of a weapon of opposition, and became an instrument of government. The tribunes no longer sat on a bench at the door of the senate-house, but took their seats by the side of the other magistrates, and took part in the discussions. Like the other acting magistrates, they did not during their year of office vote in the senate, but they had the right of convoking it, of consulting it, and of procuring decrees from it. Thus, by becoming magistrates of the state, the tribunes for the time lost their old revolutionary and obstructive character, and paved the way for the steady growth of the power of the new aristocracy; indeed, the tribunes were, as a rule, members of that body. Yet the preservation and the associations of the name of tribunate, might well forbode danger in the future. "For the moment, however, and for a long time to come, the aristocracy was so absolutely powerful, and so completely possessed control over the tribunate, that no trace is to be met with of a collegiate opposition on the part of the tribunes to the senate." What opposition did arise came from single independent tribunes, and was easily crushed, often by the aid of the tribune-college itself.

The real governing power became vested in the senate. The Ovinian law, probably passed soon after the Sexto-Licinian laws, regulated the composition of that body. All

who had been curule aediles, praetors, or consuls became members. The action of the censors was in this way greatly restricted, although it was still their duty to fill up all the vacancies which remained after the above-mentioned officers had been placed on the senatorial roll. Even in making this selection the censors were bound by oath to choose all the best citizens. Moreover, usage, if not law, seemed to have ordained that burgesses, who had filled a non-curule office, or who were eminent for personal valour, or who had saved the life of a fellow-citizen, should be selected for the honour. Those thus chosen by the censor voted, but took no part in debate, and thus were *senatores pedarii* (cf. p. 45). The main part of the senate, whose election was determined by the Ovinian law, and not by the selection of the censors, and who held the reins of government, were in this way indirectly elected by the people. "The Roman government in this way made some approach to, although it did not reach, the great institution of modern times, representative popular government, while the aggregate of the non-debating senators furnished—what it is so necessary, and yet so difficult to get in governing corporations—a compact mass of members, capable of forming and entitled to pronounce an opinion, but voting in silence." No magistrate submitted a proposal to the people without, or in opposition to, the senate's opinion; if he did so, the senate, by means of the vetoing power of the magistrates and the annulling powers of the priests, easily thwarted him; and in extreme cases the senate could refuse to execute the decrees of the people. Through the presiding magistrate the senate practically exerted a paramount influence on the elections, and, as was shown above in the case of the consuls, bore no small part in settling what was to be the special sphere of the elected magistrates. Further, the senate acquired the right, which by law belonged only to the community, of extending the term of office to the consul or praetor, acting outside the city's limits; and the consul or praetor, whose term was thus prolonged, was said to be acting "in a consul's or praetor's stead" (*pro consule, pro praetore*). From the year 307 B.C. the term of the commander-in-chief was regularly prolonged by a mere decree of the senate. Finally, as regards administration, war, peace,

and alliances, the founding of colonies, the assignation of lands, and the whole system of finance, the senate became practically supreme. Great as the powers entrusted to the senate were, the senate proved fully worthy of the trust. Although it is clear that the steps above described arrested the free action of the burgesses, and reduced the magistrates to mere executors of the senate's will, the assembly, by its ability to govern, justified its usurpation of power. Its members owed their position to merit and the people's choice, not to birth; those unworthy of their high position were liable to removal by the censors every fifth year. Their life-tenure of office freed them from the necessity of trimming their sails to the shifting breeze of public opinion, and gave them a complete control over the executive magistrates, whose office annually changed hands. This continuity of existence rendered possible a firm, unwavering, and patriotic foreign policy; and never was a state more firmly and worthily represented in its external relations than Rome in its best times by its senate. We cannot deny that, in matters of internal administration, the senate too often favoured the selfish interests of the moneyed and landed aristocracy, which was largely represented in that body. But, when we consider its conduct as a whole, we must allow that "the Roman senate was the noblest organ of the nation, and in consistency and political sagacity, in unanimity and patriotism, in grasp of power, and unwavering courage, the foremost political corporation of all times—still even now "an assembly of kings," which knew well how to combine despotic energy with republican self-devotion.

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- Com. tributa*.—Liv. ii. 56. Dionys. vii. 59; ix. 41. Momms. R. St. iii. 340, sqq.
- Plebiscites limiting number of magistracies*.—Liv. vii. 42.
- Marcian law*.—Plut. Coriol. i. Valer. Max. 4, 1. Liv. xxiii. 23.
- Ovinian law*.—Liv. xxiii. 23. Festus, 246.
- Proconsul*.—Liv. viii. 23; ix. 42; x. 22. Momms. R. St. i. 615–622.
- On the difficulties connected with the Publilian and Hortensian laws, cf. Strachan Davidson, *Historical Review*, p. 210, etc.

CHAPTER IX.

FALL OF THE ETRUSCAN POWER—THE CELTS.

Maritime supremacy of the allied Etruscans and Carthaginians — Etruscan subjugation of and expulsion from Latium. Effects of victories at Salamis and Himera—Rise of maritime power of Tarentum and Syracuse—Wars between Rome and Veii; between Samnites and Campanian Etruscans—Character of the Celts—Celtic migrations—Fall of Veii, 396 B.C.—Celtic attack and capture of Rome—Effects of Celtic victory—Conquest of South Etruria by Rome—Pacification of North Italy—Decline of Etruria proper.

THE last three chapters have been devoted to the internal struggles of Rome, and their political results: we can now turn to the external history both of Rome and of Italy. Two notable events meet our eyes—firstly, the collapse of the Etruscan power; secondly, the incursions of the Celts. The history of the rise of the Etruscans has been given in the fifth chapter; it is here resumed. About 500 B.C. they had reached their zenith of prosperity. Allied with the Carthaginians, who were absolute masters of Sardinia, and had a firm foothold in Sicily, they ruled the Etruscan and Adriatic seas. Although Massilia retained her independence, the seaports of Campania and of the Volscian land, and the island of Corsica, were in the hands of the Etruscans. The possession of Latium, which interposed a firm barrier between Etruria proper and the Tuscan settlements in Campania, was naturally of the utmost importance; and, for a short time, the conquest of Rome by Lars Porsena in 507 B.C. seemed to open out a prospect of the realization of Tuscan supremacy in Italy. But the advance of the victorious Etruscans into Latium

received a check beneath the walls of Aricia, from the timely succour of the people of Cumæ in 506 B.C. The end of this war is unknown; possibly the disgraceful terms of the peace, which Rome had concluded with Lars Porsena the previous year, were somewhat modified; but, for a time at least, Latium was in imminent danger of being reduced to subjection by Etruscan arms. Fortunately, however, for Rome, the main strength of the Etruscan nation was diverted from Latium, and called to do battle elsewhere; while Veii and the neighbouring towns grappled with Rome, the rest of the Etruscans were engaged in another cause.

The arrest of Greek colonization by the combined Etruscans and Carthaginians has been already described; a more deadly blow, on a far grander scale, if we may believe tradition, threatened the whole Greek world. The simultaneous defeat of the Persians at Salamis and the Carthaginians at Himera by the rulers of Syracuse and Agrigentum, Gelon and Theron, in 480 B.C., utterly crushed the great combination of Persians, Carthaginians, and Etruscans against liberty and civilization. Six years later, the Cumæans and Hiero of Syracuse vanquished the Etruscan fleet off Cumæ; and the rise of Syracuse to the chief power in Sicily, and of Tarentum to the leading position in the south of Italy, put an end to the maritime supremacy of both Etruscans and Carthaginians. Syracuse in 453 B.C. ravaged the island of Corsica and the Etrurian coast, and occupied Aethalia; and later, in 415 to 413 B.C., the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which received support from Etruscan galleys, ended in ignominious failure, and left Syracuse free to turn on her old enemy with redoubled vigour. Dionysius, who reigned from 406 to 367 B.C., founded Syracusan colonies on the Illyrian coast at Lissus and the island of Issa, and on the eastern coast of Italy at the ports of Ancona, Numana, and Hatria; thus ousting the Etruscans from the Adriatic. In addition to this, he captured, in 358 B.C., Pyrgi, the rich seaport of Caere, a blow from which the Etruscans never recovered. Later, too, when the death of Dionysius and the ensuing political troubles of Syracuse opened the way to Carthaginian arms, we find that the revival of maritime supremacy by Carthage brought no similar revival to their

old allies the Etruscans. On the contrary, the relations between the two powers had become so strained, that in 310 B.C. Tuscan men-of-war assisted Agathocles of Syracuse in his war against Carthage, and the old alliance was thus severed. This rapid collapse of the naval power of the Etruscans was due in great measure to the fact that, at the same time that they were struggling with the Sicilian Greeks by sea, they were assailed on all sides by foes on land. During the period of the combination of Persians, Carthaginians, and Etruscans, above alluded to, a bitter war raged between Rome and Veii from 483 to 474 B.C. This war is memorable for the extermination of the Fabian clan at Cremera in 477 B.C., which clan, doubtless owing to the party struggles, had voluntarily banished itself from Rome, and undertaken the defence of the frontier. The result of this war was so far favourable to Rome that the Etruscans gave up Fidenæ, and the district they had won on the right bank of the Tiber. Moreover, the Samnites attacked the Etruscan settlements in Campania; Capua fell in 424 B.C., and the Etruscan population was extirpated or expelled. But in northern Italy a new nation was knocking at the gates of the Alps. it was the Celts; and the brunt of their inroad fell first upon the Etruscans.

The character of the Celtic nation, their origin, and the part they played in Italian history at this period, now claim our attention. Nature, though she lavished upon the Celts her most brilliant gifts, had denied them those more solid and enduring qualities which lead to the highest human development, alike in morality and politics. The mainspring of their life and action was a boundless vanity. Whether we regard their chivalrous feats of bravery, their impetuous generosity, and ready acceptance of new impressions, or their want of perseverance, hatred of discipline and order, constant discord, love of ostentation, and extreme instability,—to all these many-sided manifestations of the Celtic temperament egotism supplies the key. They preferred a pastoral life to an agricultural, and had none of that attachment to their native soil which characterized the Italians and the Germans. Their fondness for congregating in towns and villages did not lead them to develop political constitutions. As a nation

they had little sense of unity ; their individual communities were equally deficient in sincere patriotism, consistent purpose, and united effort. Ever ready to rove, they were the true soldiers-of-fortune of antiquity, and possessed all the qualities of good soldiers, but of bad citizens,—qualities which explain the historical fact that the Celts have shaken all states and founded none. “All their enterprises melted away like snow in spring ; and nowhere did they create a great state, or develop a distinctive culture of their own.” Sprung from the same cradle as the Hellenic, Italian, and Germanic peoples, the Celts at a very early period settled in modern France ; from there they crossed over to Britain in the north, and in the south passed the Pyrenees, and contested the possession of Spain with the Iberian tribes. Our history is immediately concerned with their movements in the opposite direction, when, leaving their homes in the West, they retraced their steps and poured over the Alps in ceaseless streams. Their hordes, on passing the Graian Alps (the little St. Bernard), first formed the Celtic canton of the Insubres, with Mediolanum (Milan) as its capital. The canton of the Cenomani, with the towns of Brixia (Brescia) and Verona, soon followed. The Ligurians were dislodged, and the possessions of the Etruscans on the left bank of the Po were soon wrested from their grasp ; Melpum fell, and soon the invaders crossed the Po, and assailed the Etruscans and Umbrians in their original home. The Boii, and later the Senones, were the chief assailants in this quarter : the former took the Etruscan town Felsina, and changed its name to Bononia ; the latter settled along the Adriatic coast from Rimini to Ancona. Isolated roving bands no doubt reached the borders of Etruria proper, and about the middle of the fourth century the Tuscan nation were practically restricted to that land, which still bears their name. About the year 426 B.C., the Etruscans were thus engaged in war with three enemies : in the north with the encroaching Celts ; in the south with the Samnites, who had invaded Campania ; and with the Romans. A fresh outbreak of hostilities between Rome and Veii was due to the revolt of the people of Fidenæ, who had murdered the Roman envoys and called in the help of Lars Tolumnius, king of Veii. This king was slain by the consul

Aulus Cornelius Cossus, and the war ended favourably to the Romans. After a truce, during which the position of Etruria grew more and more critical, war broke out again in 406 B.C. between Rome and Veii: the latter received support from Capena and Falerii, but, owing to their struggles with the Celts, and their dislike for the regal form of government in Veii, the Etruscan nation as a whole gave no aid to the hard-pressed Veientines. The city fell in 396 B.C., and was destroyed by the triumphant Romans, to whom the heroism of Marcus Furius Camillus had first opened up the brilliant and perilous career of foreign conquest. Tradition tells us that Melpum and Veii fell on the same day; whether this be so or not, "the double assault from the north and the south, and the fall of the two frontier strongholds, were the beginning of the end of the great Etruscan nation." For a moment, however, it seemed as if the folly of Rome was destined to turn aside from the head of the Etruscans the sword of the foreign barbarian. In 391 B.C., Clusium, situated in the heart of Etruria, was hard pressed by the Celtic Senones; so low was Tuscan pride, that Clusium begged aid from the destroyers of Veii. Rome, however, in place of substantial help, despatched envoys, who attempted to impose on the Celts by haughty language; when this failed, the envoys violated the law of nations by fighting in the ranks of the men of Clusium. To the demand of the barbarians for the surrender of these envoys the Romans refused to listen. Then the Brennus, or king of the Gallic host, abandoned the siege of Clusium, and turned against Rome. The battle of the Allia in 390 B.C., and the capture and destruction of Rome, taught the Romans a bitter lesson. The horrors of this catastrophe, the burning of the city, the saving of the Capitol by the sacred geese and the brave Marcus Manlius, the scornful throwing down into the scale of the Gallic sword, have left a lasting impression on the imagination of posterity; but the victory of the Gauls had no permanent consequences—nay, it only served to knit more closely the ties of union between Latium and rebuilt Rome. The Gauls often returned to Latium during this century. Camillus, indeed, crowned his great career by defeating them at Alba in 367 B.C.; the dictator Gaius Sulpicius Peticus

routed a Gallic host in 358 B.C., and, eight years later, Lucius Furius Camillus, the son of the celebrated general, dislodged the Gauls from the Alban mount, where they had encamped during the winter. But these plundering incursions only served to make all Italy regard Rome as the bulwark against the barbarians, and thus to further her claim, not only to supremacy in Italy, but also to universal empire. The Etruscans had attempted to recover what they had lost in the Veientine war, while the Celts were assailing Rome. When the barbarians had departed, Rome turned once more on her old enemy. The whole of southern Etruria, as far as the Ciminian range, passed into Roman hands, and the advanced frontier line was secured by the fortresses of Sutrium and Nepete, established respectively in 383 and 373 B.C. Moreover, four new tribes were formed in the territories of Veii, Capena, and Falerii, in 387 B.C., and the whole country became rapidly Romanized. A revolt of Tarquinii, Falerii, and Caere, about 358 B.C., against Roman aggression was soon crushed; and Caere had to cede half its territory, and withdraw from the Etruscan league. The relation of political subjection in which Caere stood to Rome was called "citizenship without the power of voting" (*civitas sine suffragio*); thus the state lost its freedom, but could still administer its own affairs. This occurred in 351 B.C.; and eight years later Falerii withdrew from the Etruscan league, and became a perpetual ally of Rome. Thus the whole of southern Etruria became subject to Roman supremacy.

Gradually the conflicts in northern Italy ceased, and the various nations settled side by side within more defined limits. The stream of Celtic immigrations over the Alps flowed back; whether from the desperate efforts of the Etruscans, and the strong barrier of the Romans, or from some causes operating on the other side of the Alps, we cannot determine. In a general way the Celts now ruled between the Alps and the Apennines, and as far south as the Abruzzi: but their dominion did not sink deep into the land, nor had it the character of exclusive possession. It is certain that the Etruscans still remained in the modern Grisons and Tyrol, the Umbrians in the Apennine valleys, the Veneti in the

north-eastern valley of the Po, and the Ligurian tribes in the western mountains, dividing Celt-land proper from Etruria. Even in the flat country occupied by the Celts Etruscan settlements still existed. Mantua was a Tuscan city even in the days of the empire, as also was Hatria on the Po; and Etruscan corsairs still rendered the Adriatic unsafe far on into the fifth century. Further, although mere fragments of the former supremacy of the Etruscans were now left in these districts, such civilization as we find among the Celts and Alpine peoples was due to Tuscan influence. To this we must ascribe the fact that the Celts in the plains of Lombardy abandoned their roving warrior-life, and permanently settled in that district. But the Etruscan nation was now hemmed in on all sides. Its possessions in Campania, and in the district north of the Apennines and south of the Ciminian forest, were lost for ever—its day of power had passed away. Socially and politically the whole nation had completely degenerated. Unbounded luxury and gross immorality had eaten out the heart of the people. Gladiatorial combats first came into vogue among the Etruscans; sensual indulgence of every sort sapped the nation's vigour. The abolition of royalty, which had been carried out in every city about the time of the siege of Veii, introduced the worst form of aristocratic government. The federal bond had always exercised but little restraint; now the abuse of power by the nobles caused social revolution and bitter distress. When the aristocrats of Arretium in 301 B.C., and of Volsinii in 266 B.C., called in the Romans to put an end to the disorder, the Romans answered the call in such a way as to extinguish the lingering sparks of independence. "The energies of the nation were broken from the day of Veii and of Melpum. Earnest attempts were still once or twice made to escape from the Roman supremacy, but in these instances the stimulus was communicated to the Etruscans from without—from another Italian stock, the Samnites."

AUTHORITIES.

Himera.—Plut. Camill. 138. Timol. 23.

Dionysius and Agathocles.—Polyb. i. 6, 7, 82; ii. 39; viii. 12; ix. 23; xii. 4, 10, 15; xv. 35.

Capua taken by Samnites.—Liv. iv. 37.

Celts.—Polyb. ii. 17-22, 32-35; iii. 70, 79. Liv. v. 33-55. Dionys. xiii. 6-12.

Defeats of Celts.—Liv. vi. 42; vii. 12-15, 25-26.

Conquest of South Etruria.—Liv. vi. 3-10. Dionys. xii. 10-15.

Revolt of Caere.—Liv. vii. 17-20, 38.

Arretium.—Liv. viii. 3-5.

Melpum.—Plin. N. H. iii. 17,

CHAPTER X.

ADVANCE OF ROME TO THE SUPREME POWER IN ITALY.

Encroachment on the rights of the Latins by Rome—Extension of Roman and Latin territory by wars with the Sabines, Aequi, and Volsci—League with the Hernici—Revolt of Latin towns against Rome—Closing of the Latin confederation—Practical subjection of Latium—Early history of the Umbro-Sabellian migrations—The Samnites—Their political development and conquests in southern Italy—Their relations with the Greeks—The Campanian Samnites—Samnium proper—First collision with Rome—Revolt of the Latins and Campanians against Rome—Battle of Trifanum, 340 B.C.—Its effects—Outbreak of thirty-seven years' war between Samnium and Rome—Part played by Tarentum, the Etruscans, central Italy, and the Gauls—Battles of Sentinum and Aquilonia—Complete triumph of Rome.

WE have now reached a turning-point in the fortunes of Rome. In the last chapter it was shown that she had abandoned her old defensive attitude towards Etruria, and had succeeded in annexing the southern portion of that country, and in repelling the restless Celtic hordes. Her next foes are no longer foreign intruders, but men of her own stock, or of Italian race.

We may briefly summarize the steps by which Rome became mistress of Italy as follows: (1) The subjugation of the Latins and Campanians. (2) The gallant struggles of the Samnites, both on their own behalf and on behalf of the rest of the still independent Italians. (3) The invasion and defeat of Pyrrhus. With regard to the first point, we must for a moment revert to the old position of Rome in Latium, as exercising a hegemony, based upon complete equality between the Roman state on the

one hand and the Latin confederacy on the other. That these relations were violently shaken by the abolition of the monarchy at Rome we know from tradition, which has painted in glowing colours the victory at Lake Regillus, gained by the Romans about 499 B.C. More certain proof is afforded by the renewal of the perpetual league between Rome and Latium by Spurius Cassius six years later. At what time the rest of Latium followed Rome's lead and abolished the regal power we do not know, but probably this took place at an early period. Although we are without definite information on each point, it is easy to understand how the basis of equal rights soon became impracticable; how Rome not only bore the brunt of most of the wars, but also naturally appropriated the substantial fruits of the victories; how she not only decided the question of war or peace, but practically appointed from her own body the federal generals and chief officers, and assumed the direction of every campaign, and how in founding colonies she supplied most of the colonists. Although the public rights of the federal Latins were thus encroached upon, their private rights remained the same. To whatever federal town a Latin migrated, he was a passive burgess (*municipes*), could hold property, marry, make wills; and, though not eligible for office, he shared in all other political rights and duties, and could vote in the *comitia tributa*, if not in the other assemblies. Long before the allied Latins dared to penetrate Etruria, they successfully extended their power towards the east and south. The Sabines between the Tiber and Anio offered but a feeble resistance to the confederate arms, possibly owing to the fact that the Sabine hordes were pouring into lower Italy. It was not even found necessary to plant colonies in this Sabine land to keep it in subjection. Their neighbours, the *Aequi*, on the upper Anio, and the *Volscians* on the coast, proved far tougher foes. In their constant struggles with these two peoples, the Romans and Latins made it their chief aim to sever the *Aequi* from the *Volsci*. This object they partly obtained by planting Latin colonies at *Cora*, *Norba*, and *Signia*, about 495 B.C., and still more by forming a league with the *Hernici* in 486 B.C.; the accession of this state isolated the *Volscians*, and formed a bulwark

against the Sabellian tribes on the south and east. The power of the Aequi was thus broken, but it was not till the system of fortresses or colonies had been extended throughout the Volscian land that the Volsci ceased to resist. Chief among these colonies were Velitrae, founded in 494 B.C., Suessa Pometia and Ardea in 442 B.C., Circeii in 393 B.C.; and finally, after two great victories, won by the dictator Camillus in 389 B.C., and the dictator Aulus Cornelius Cossus in 385 B.C., the Pomptine territory was secured by the founding of the fortresses Satricum in 385 B.C., and Setia in 382 B.C., and the territory itself was distributed into farm allotments and tribes about 383 B.C. These successes of the league, which now embraced Rome, Latium, and the Hernici, only rendered it more liable to disunion. The allies felt all the more acutely the overshadowing burden of Rome's increased power, and were naturally indignant at her overbearing acts of injustice. A glaring instance of wrong was the appropriation by Rome of a border territory between the lands of the people of Aricia and Ardea, to which both cities laid claim, and had called in Rome to act as arbiter in 446 B.C. Dissensions, owing to this, arose in Ardea between the aristocratic party, which held to Rome, and the popular party, which sided with the Volscians. The chief cause of the disruption of the league was the absence of a common foe. The capture of Rome by the Celts, and the appropriation by Rome of the Pomptine territory caused the most famous Latin towns to break off from their alliance. Separate wars, in consequence, occurred with the revolted towns—with Lanuvium, 383 B.C.; Praeneste, 382–380 B.C.; and Tusculum, 381 B.C. The latter was reduced to the position of a municipality (*municipium*), and was incorporated in the Roman state with the full rights of Roman citizenship, retaining certain powers of self-government. This was the first instance of a *municipium* in its later sense. In addition to these towns, Tibur, in 360 B.C., and some of the colonies planted in Volscian land, such as Velitrae and Circeii and Satricum, all revolted from Rome; and Tibur even made common cause with the again advancing Celtic hordes, whom the dictator Ahala defeated in 360 B.C. But, owing to the want of concert between the various Latin cities, Rome subdued each

separately, and also proved victorious in the later and severer struggle with her allies, the Hernicans, from 362–358 B.C. In the latter year, the treaty between Rome and the Latins and Hernicans was renewed, but the terms were doubtless greatly to Rome's advantage.

To this period must be referred the closing of the Latin confederation, which took place about 384 B.C. Probably this was in no small degree the cause of the revolt of Latium above described. The league, as now constituted, included thirty towns with full Latin rights, some of which were old Latin towns, viz. Nomentum, between the Tiber and Anio; Tibur, Gabii, Scaptia, Labici, Pedom and Praeneste, between the Anio and the Alban hills; Corbio, Tusculum, Bovillae, Aricia, Corioli, and Lanuvium, on the Alban range; and lastly, Laurentum and Lavinium in the plain by the coast. In addition, there were the colonies founded by Rome and the Latin league, viz. Ardea in the territory of the Rutuli, and Velitrae, Satricum, Cora, Norba, Setia, and Circeii in what had been Volscian territory. A second class of seventeen towns, whose names are not known, had no right of voting, but shared in the Latin festival. Such communities as were subsequently founded, *e.g.* Sutrium, Nepete, Cales, and Tarracina, were not incorporated in the league; nor were those communities whose independence was afterwards taken away, such as Tusculum and Satricum, erased from the list. The geographical limits of Latium were fixed by the closing of the league. Moreover, in the case of all Latin communities subsequently founded, right of commerce and marriage was granted to them only in relation to Rome; they could not enjoy the interchange of these privileges with any other Latin community. Further, all special leagues between Latin communities, irrespective of Rome, were for the future prevented, as being dangerous to Rome's pre-eminence. Owing also to Rome's influence, aediles were created in the Latin communities, and their constitutions were remodelled on the Roman pattern. After the fall of Veii and the conquest of the Pomptine land, Rome tightened the reins of government over the practically subject Latins; and the exasperation arising therefrom caused Latin volunteers to join foreign foes in their conflicts with Rome; and, in 349 B.C., the

Latin league refused the Romans its regular contingent. The defeat of the Aurunci and the capture of Sora in 345 B.C. had advanced Roman arms to the Liris. Thus Rome was brought into contact with the Samnites, and the struggle with this brave people now claims our attention. Before, however, we give the details of this conflict, we must revert to the early movements of the Umbro-Sabellian stocks.

With regard to the Umbrians and their movements our information is of the most meagre kind. They probably migrated into Italy at a later period than the Latins, and, while moving south, kept in the centre of the peninsula and along the east coast. At a remote period they occupied the greater part of northern Italy; and the Italian names of towns in the valley of the Po, *e.g.* Hatria and Spina, and of other places in southern Etruria, *e.g.* Camars, the old name of Clusium, the river Umbro, etc., point to the fact that an Italian population preceded the Etruscan alike in the valleys of the Po and in southern Etruria (cf. p. 31). Inscriptions found in the district of Falerii indicate that an Italian language long kept its hold in that town—an inference which is supported by the statement of Strabo, and the religious ceremonies of Falerii point in the same direction. The probability that an Umbrian population existed in southern Etruria after the Tuscan conquest is supported by the remarkable rapidity with which that part of Etruria became Latinized (cf. pp. 32 and 81). The pressure exerted on the Umbrians by the victorious Etruscans confined them in the narrow mountainous country between the two arms of the Apennines, which was called by their name, and also drove them south along the mountainous ridges, as the plains were already occupied by the Latins. The absorption of a Sabellian element in the Roman community at an early period (p. 10) marks the fact that during the progress southward of the Umbro-Sabellian stocks such mixtures often took place; and we infer from this circumstance, and from the ease with which Sabina became Latinized, and from the numerous relations between the Volscians and Latins, that in remote times the Latins and Umbro-Sabellians were not markedly distinct in language and customs.

But the chief branch of the Umbrian stock turned eastward from Sabina into the mountains of the Abruzzi and the adjacent hill-country to the south. Owing to external pressure the Sabines are said to have vowed a *ver sacrum*, which oath bound all the children born in a particular year of war to emigrate as soon as they reached maturity. Owing to this the Safini, or Samnites, went forth from the Sabine land, and settled first on the mountains near the river Sagrus, and later in the plain on the east of the Matese chain, near the sources of the Tifernus. The sign that led them was the Ox of Mars, and in consequence they named both the places of their public assembly Bovianum. The Samnites were followed by other tribes: the Picentes, who occupied the district near Ancona, and the Hirpini, who settled near Beneventum. Smaller tribes also branched off, among whom were the Frentani on the Apulian frontier, the Paeligni near the Majella mountains, and the Marsi about lake Fucinus. Their secluded and isolated position in mountain valleys and steep table-lands not only protected these settlers from external assaults, but also rendered all internal intercourse, whether commercial or political, very difficult. Thus their communities never formed a single state, nor were their leagues ever closely knit together. Cut off from the rest of Italy and communicating but little with one another, despite their bravery, "they exercised less influence than any other portion of the Italian nation on the development of the history of the peninsula." But the Samnites were an exception to the other Sabellian tribes in their genius for political development. The subsequent strength of the Samnite nation proves that their league was of long standing, though as to its formation we have no knowledge. No one community preponderated as Rome did in Latium, and no one town served as a centre. The healthy life of the Samnite nation of husbandmen was its strength; their assembly of representatives appointed in time of need a federal commander-in-chief. The policy they pursued was the exact opposite of that of Rome. They were content with the defence of their territory, and rarely sought to enlarge it; any new lands gained were the result of adventurous bands who left their homes in search of plunder, and were left to their own resources by their

native state. Thus their gains were not direct gains to the Samnite nation, while Rome secured every success by a system of colonization. The movements of the Samnites had hitherto been partly checked by the Daunians, whose town of Arpi had attained no small degree of prosperity and power, but still more by the Greeks and Etruscans. The rapid collapse of the Etruscans, and the decline of the Greek colonies from 450-350 B.C., left them free to march west and south. We have already narrated their capture of Capua in 424 B.C. (cf. p. 78); four years later they dealt a fatal blow to the Campanian Greeks by taking Cumae. It is about this time that another Samnite stock, called Lucanians, made its appearance in southern Italy. The Lucanians proved too powerful for the demoralized Greeks; and, despite the united efforts of the chief Achaean cities, who reconstructed their league in 393 B.C., in a very short time but few Greek towns remained. Their speedy downfall was due in great measure to the fact that Dionysius the elder, of Syracuse, sided with the Lucanians against his countrymen. Even Tarentum, powerful and warlike as she was, was forced to turn for aid to her mother country. Thus, at the period when Rome began to advance southward, the Samnites and their kinsfolk the Lucanians and Bruttians had practically swept over the whole of southern Italy. Isolated Greek towns continued to exist, such as Tarentum, Thurii, Croton, Metapontum, Heraclea, Rhegium, and Neapolis; some of these retained their independence. Other Greek cities, such as Cumae, Posidonia, Laus, and Hipponium, were under Samnite rule. In this way mixed populations arose; this was specially the case with the bilingual Bruttii, and in a lesser degree with the Samnites in Lucania and Campania. The very extent of the Samnite conquests, owing to the want of a settled policy, and of some bond by which the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Samnites proper might be closely united, proved a source of weakness rather than strength. The space they occupied was out of proportion to their numbers, and the hold they exercised over their possessions was loose and insecure. Moreover, Greek culture exercised a fatal influence on the Samnite nation. Thus in Campania the Samnite population of Capua, Nola, Nuceria, and Teanum adopted Greek manners, and a

Greek form of constitution. Capua became notorious for its wealth and luxury, for its gladiatorial combats, and its warlike, if dissolute, youth; whose plundering excursions to Sicily and other places had no small effect on the history of Italy. The Campanian Samnites—especially in Capua, where Etruscan influences still lingered—thus completely changed their old habits of life; and, though they did not lose their love of enterprise and bravery, they were unable to resist the demoralizing influences with which they were there surrounded. The same result in a lesser degree is observable in the Lucanians and Bruttians. Treasures of Greek art have been discovered in their tombs, and they abandoned their old national mode of writing for that of the Greeks. The stock inhabiting Samnium proper alone retained its old character, and was free from all the debasing effects of a superior but immoral civilization. The Hellenized Samnites of Campania soon learned to fear their hardier and purer kinsmen in Samnium, who, pouring down from their mountain strongholds, ravaged the rich plains of their weaker brethren. Roman interference sprung from this very cause. The Sidicini in Teanum, and the Campanians in Capua, called in Rome to protect them against the Samnites in 343 B.C. When Rome at first refused, the Campanians offered to submit to Roman supremacy; this offer was too tempting to be rejected. Rome and Samnium, whether after a campaign or not is doubtful, came to terms; Capua was left under Roman, and Teanum under Samnite sway, and the upper Liris was left in Volscian hands. Both sides were glad to lay down arms—the Samnites, because Tarentum was threatening her Sabellian neighbours; the Romans, because a fresh storm was brewing in Latium. The old grievances of the Latin towns were aggravated by the prospect of Roman rule extending to the south of them, and once more they broke into open revolt. All the original Latin communities, except the Laurentes, took up arms against Rome; but all the Roman colonies in Latium, except Velitrae, remained firm to the Roman side. Capua seized the opportunity to get rid of Roman rule, and other Campanian cities joined the revolted Latins. The Volscians also felt that still another chance was given them of recovering their liberty; but the

Hernici and the Campanian aristocracy did not unite with the insurgents. The battle of Trifanum in 340 B.C., gained by Titus Manlius Torquatus over the joint forces of the Latins and Campanians, broke the neck of the rebellion. The old Latin league was dissolved in 338 B.C., and was changed from a political federation into a mere association for religious purposes. The Latin communities were isolated from one another by the application to the whole of Latium of the principle which was introduced in the case of those colonies founded after the closing of the Latin league in 384 B.C. (cf. p. 87). Moreover, each community had to form a separate alliance with Rome, as the old confederacy no longer existed. In certain cases harsh measures were adopted. Tibur and Praeneste had to give up part of their territory to Rome. Colonists were sent to Antium, the most important and strongest town of the Volscians; and the town was treated as Tusculum had been in 381 B.C. (cf. p. 86). Lanuvium, Pedum, Aricia, and Nomentum also lost their independence and became Roman municipia. Velitrae lost its walls, and its senate was deported to the interior of South Etruria, while the town was probably treated as Caere had been in 351 B.C. (cf. p. 81). The land thus acquired by Rome was partly distributed among Roman citizens, and two new tribes were instituted in 332 B.C., thus bringing the total up to twenty-nine. The decoration of the orators' platform in the Forum with the beaks of the galleys of Antium by the dictator Gaius Maenius, in 338 B.C., and the erection of a column in the Forum to his honour, attested the Roman sense of the great results achieved by this war. Roman rule was secured in similar fashion in the Volscian and Campanian provinces. A number of towns, among which were Capua, Fundi, Formiae, and Cumae, became dependent on Rome in the same way that Caere was. Privernum, under Vitruvius Vaccus, struck the last blow for Latin freedom; but in 329 B.C. the town was stormed, and its leader executed. About ten years later, two new tribes were formed out of the numerous settlers planted in the Falernian and Privernate territories. The two strong colonies of Cales, in the middle of the Campanian plain, and Fregellae, commanding the passage of the Liris, finally secured the newly won land. These were founded in

334 and 328 B.C. respectively. The Romans even established a garrison in Sora, which properly belonged to Samnite territory. This steady pursuit of a far-reaching policy of colonization secured to Rome what she won on the field of battle, and contrasts strongly with the unsteady violence and loose grasp of the Samnite nation. It is clear that the Samnites must have been alarmed at the advance of the Romans, but with the exception of garrisoning Teanum they did little to prevent it. "The Samnite confederacy allowed the Roman conquest of Campania to be completed, before they in earnest opposed it; and the reason for their doing so is to be sought partly in the contemporary hostilities between the Samnite nation and the Italian Hellenes, but principally in the remiss and distracted policy which the confederacy pursued."

While Rome had been securing her hold in the centre of Italy, the Samnite tribes of the Lucanians and Bruttians had been engaged in constant struggles with the Italian Greeks in the south, and especially with Tarentum. So hard pressed was the latter city that she called in the aid of the Spartan king, Archidamus, who was defeated by the Lucanians on the same day as Philip conquered at Chaeronea, in 338 B.C. Alexander, the Molossian, uncle of Alexander the Great, proved far more successful in his championship of the Greek cause in southern Italy. Not only did he capture Consentia, the centre of the Lucanians and their confederates, but he defeated the Samnites who brought aid to the Lucanians, and subdued the Daunians and Messapians who had made common cause with the Sabellian tribes against the Greeks. His successes, however, alarmed the Tarentines, who turned against their commander; and his scheme of founding a new Hellenic empire in the West was cut short by the hand of an assassin in 332 B.C. His death left the Lucanians and other Sabellian tribes again paramount in the south of Italy, and destroyed all hopes of a combined resistance from the Greek cities.

We have already shown that war was sooner or later unavoidable between Rome and the Samnites, as the latter were the only power capable of disputing with Rome the supremacy of Italy. Had the Samnites been able to count on the active co-operation of all Sabellian tribes, of the

Lucanians and Bruttians, as well as of the smaller cantons, such as the Vestini, Frentani and Marrucini,—had they, further, been able to persuade the Greeks of Campania and of southern Italy to sink minor differences in the face of a common danger,—had they been able to rouse at once the Etruscans in the north, and the still chafing and indignant Latins, Volscians, and Hernicans, Rome might no doubt have succumbed. But such combinations belong rather to the imagination of the historian than to the facts of history. The immediate cause of the outbreak of war lay in the two independent Greek cities of Campania, Palaeopolis and Neapolis. Rome was scheming to obtain possession of these towns, and the Samnites combined with the Tarentines to prevent them. A strong garrison was placed in Palaeopolis by the Samnites. The Romans laid siege to the town; and thus war began, nominally against the people of Palaeopolis, really against the Samnites, in 327 B.C. Palaeopolis, weary alike of the foes without and the Samnite garrison within, got rid of the latter by stratagem, and concluded peace with Rome on the most favourable conditions in the following year. The Campanian Greeks generally followed the example of Palaeopolis, and held to the Roman side; and Rome still further attained her object of isolating Samnium, by detaching the Sabellian towns to the south of the Volturnus—Nola, Nuceria, Herculaneum, and Pompeii—through the influence of the aristocratic party in those cities. By the same means Rome secured an alliance with the Lucanians, who were the natural allies of the Samnites. This alliance was of great importance, as it left Rome free to turn all her attention to Samnium, while the Samnite ally, Tarentum, was occupied with guarding herself against Lucanian inroads.

It is not necessary to recount in detail all the events of this war, which lasted seven and thirty years. The isolated position of the Samnites, the disasters that befell them in quick succession, the humble request they made for peace in 322 B.C., the rejection of the same by the Romans; the desperate resistance and brief success of Samnite arms at the Caudine Pass, under the brave Gavius Pontius, in 321 B.C.; the refusal of the senate to recognize the agreement made by the defeated generals, mark the first period

of the war. When it was renewed, the Samnites occupied Luceria in Apulia, the attempt to relieve which town had caused the Romans the disaster in the pass of Caudium; and they captured Fregellae, and gained over the Satricans. Lucius Papirius Cursor now was placed in command of the Roman forces, which divided, part marching by Sabina and the Adriatic coast, part proceeding through Samnium. They united again before the walls of Luceria, and took the town in 319 B.C., having received no small assistance from the people of Arpi and other Apulians. Roman successes followed this important capture, and Satricum was recovered and severely punished. For a moment, indeed, fortune deluded the Samnites with hopes of victory. The frontier towns of Nuceria and Nola sided with them. Sora, on the upper Liris, expelled the Roman garrison. The Ausonians on the coast and at the mouth of the Liris threatened to rise, and the Samnite party in Capua began to bestir itself. But the recapture of Sora in 314 B.C., the cruel suppression of the Ausonian revolt, the execution or voluntary death of the leaders of the Samnite party in Capua, the defeat of the Samnite army before the walls of that city, the treaty with Nola which detached that city for ever from the Samnites in 313 B.C., and the fall of Fregellae in the same year, turned the tide of war once more in Rome's favour, and placed Apulia and Campania in her hands. Her position was secured by the usual process of founding new fortresses; *e.g.* Luceria in Apulia, Saticula on the frontier of Campania and Samnium, Interamna and Suessa Aurunca on the road from Rome to Capua. Appius Claudius, the censor, completed in 313 B.C. the great military road from Rome to Capua, across the Pomptine marshes. Thus by roads and fortresses Samnium was now cut off, and the ultimate object of the subjugation of Italy was within Rome's grasp. The close of the second period of the war exhibits to us an attempt at that coalition which at the outset might have rescued Italy. Tarentum, indeed, practically continued an inactive spectator of the contest; with childish arrogance its rulers had, in 320 B.C., ordered the Roman and Samnite armies in Apulia to lay down their arms; but, when Rome refused, Tarentum lacked the courage and sense of honour to declare war.

Towards the close of the war she once more invoked Greek aid against the Lucanians, and the Spartan prince Cleonymus succeeded in compelling the latter to make peace with Tarentum; but he did not dare to enter on the more perilous course of actively siding with the Samnites against Rome. But in the north and centre of Italy the ignoble example of Tarentum found no imitators. The Etruscans in 311 B.C. made one more fiery effort for freedom, and for two years the Roman frontier-fortress of Sutrium was hotly besieged. But all was in vain; in 310 B.C. Quintus Fabius Rullianus penetrated for the first time Etruria proper, marching through the Ciminian forest, and at the Vadimonian lake crushed the roused Etruscans. The three most powerful towns, Perugia, Cortona, and Arretium, made peace with Rome; and two years later, after another defeat, Tarquinii followed their example; and the Etruscans laid down their arms. Meanwhile the Samnites abated not their exertions; but their hopes, based on Etruscan aid, were rudely dashed to the ground by the terrible battle in 309 B.C., in which the very flower of their army—the wearers of striped tunics and golden shields, and the wearers of white tunics and silver shields—was extirpated by Lucius Papirius Cursor. Too late to save them came the allied forces of the Umbrians, the Marsi, and Paeligni, and, later, the Hernicans, who all rose against Rome,—too late, for the Etruscans had already cowered back into inaction. The first three peoples were soon mastered by Roman arms; but for a moment the rising of the Hernicans in the rear of the Roman army threatened destruction. But Anagnia, the chief Hernican city, fell; and two consular armies penetrated the fastnesses of Samnium, and took the Samnian capital, Bovianum, by storm in 305 B.C. A brief peace, on moderate terms, ensued, not only with Samnium, but with all the Sabellian tribes; and about the same time, owing to the withdrawal of the Spartan Cleonymus to Corcyra, Tarentum, whose part in the contest we have already described, came to formal terms with Rome.

Rome lost no time in turning her victory to good account. In the first place, she dissolved the Hernican league, and punished those communities which had revolted, by taking away their autonomy and giving them

citizenship without voting power. Those Hernican communities which had not joined in the revolt, viz. Aletrium, Verulae, and Ferentinum, remained with their old rights. In carrying out her wise policy of subjugating central Italy, Rome severed the north of Italy from the south, and prevented the inhabitants from being in direct touch with one another. The old Volscian land was completely subdued and soon Romanized, by planting a legion of four thousand men in Sora on the upper Liris, by making Arpinum subject, and taking away a third of its territory from Frusino. Two military roads ran through the country separating Samnium from Etruria; the northern one, which was afterwards the Flaminian, covered the line of the Tiber, passing through Oriculum to Nequinum, which was later called Narnia, when the Romans colonized it in 299 B.C. The southern road, afterwards called the Valerian, commanded the Marsian and Aequian land, running along the Fucine lake by way of Carsioli and Alba, in both of which towns colonies were planted. Thus, when we remember the roads and fortresses which already commanded Apulia and Campania, it is easy to see that Samnium was enclosed by a net of Roman strongholds. Such a peace was more ruinous than war, and the proud and heroic Samnites viewed it in that light. We have now reached the third and final period of their brave but ill-fated struggle. This time the Samnites, taught by former experience, brought pressure to bear on the Lucanians, and secured their alliance; strong hopes were entertained, not only of a rising in central Italy, but of active aid from the Etruscans and from mercenary Gauls. War broke out afresh in 298 B.C., and the first move was the suppression of the Lucanians by Roman arms, and two Samnite defeats in the following year. The superhuman efforts of the Samnite nation put three fresh armies into the field, and their general, Gellius Egnatius, who led an army into Etruria, caused the Etruscans to rise once more and take into their pay numerous Celtic bands. The Romans strained every nerve to meet the threatened danger; and, by sending part of their forces into Etruria, drew off a large portion of the Etruscan forces which were encamped with the Samnites and Gauls near Sentinum, in Umbria, on the

eastern slope of the Apennines, in 295 B.C. It was here that the two consuls Publius Decius Mus and the aged Quintus Fabius Rullianus encountered the confederate army; and it was here that the heroic death of Publius Decius rallied the Roman legions when wavering before the Gallic hordes, and at the cost of nine thousand Roman lives gained a victory, which broke the coalition and made Etruria sue for peace. The Samnites, however, met their fate with a spirit unbroken by disaster, and in the following year gained some successes over the Roman consul, Marcus Atilius; but in 293 B.C. the battle of Aquilonia dealt a blow to the Samnites from which they never recovered; and, though in their mountain strongholds they continued the struggle till 290 B.C., deserted by all to whom they looked for aid, decimated and exhausted by a war which had lasted thirty-seven years, they at last concluded an honourable peace with their great antagonist. Rome was too wise to impose disgraceful or ruinous conditions. Her object was to secure for ever what she had already subjugated. With this end in view, two fortresses, Minturnae and Sinuessa, were established on the Campanian coast in 295 B.C. All the Sabines were forced to become subjects in 290, and the strong fortress of Hatria was established in the Abruzzi, not far from the coast, in 289 B.C. Still more important was the colony of Venusia, founded with twenty thousand colonists in 291 B.C., which, standing on the great road between Tarentum and Samnium, at the borders of Samnium, Apulia, and Lucania, kept in check the neighbouring tribes, and interrupted the communications between Rome's two most powerful enemies in southern Italy. "Thus the compact Roman domain at the close of the Samnite wars extended on the north to the Ciminian forest, on the east to the Abruzzi, on the south to Capua, while the two advanced posts, Luceria and Venusia, established towards the east and south on the lines of communication of their opponents, isolated them on every side. Rome was no longer merely the first, but was already the ruling power in the peninsula when, towards the end of the fifth century of the city, those nations which had been raised to supremacy by the favour of the gods and by their own capacity, began to come into contact in council and on the battle-field; and

as at Olympia the preliminary victors girt themselves for a second and more serious struggle, so on the larger arena of the nations, Carthage, Macedonia, and Rome now prepared for the final and decisive contest."

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CHAPTER XI.

WAR WITH PYRRHUS—UNION WITH ITALY.

Rising of Italians against Rome—Annihilation of the Senones—
Outrage of the Tarentines, who invoke aid of Pyrrhus—Early
history and character of Pyrrhus—He lands, 280 B.C.—Battle of
Heraclea—Negotiations with Rome—Battle of Ausculum, 279 B.C.
— League between Rome and Carthage—Pyrrhus master of
Sicily—Returns to Italy—Battle of Beneventum, 275 B.C.—
Capture of Tarentum—Naval power of Rome—Treatment of the
Italians.—New position of Rome.

THE preceding chapter presented the chief features of that career of conquest which left Rome without a rival in Italy. But before her position was firmly and permanently established, and before the various Italian races were united under her rule, one more step remained, and one more struggle had to be decided. The interest of this final phase in the subjugation of Italy is chiefly due to the romantic charm of the name of Pyrrhus. The personal qualities and adventurous enterprises of Pyrrhus himself cannot but excite our imagination and kindle our sympathies. Of still greater moment is the fact that this was the first occasion on which Roman and Greek influences met in conflict; that from Pyrrhus date Rome's direct relations with Greece; that "the struggle between phalanxes and cohorts, between a mercenary army and a militia, between military monarchy and senatorial government, between individual talent and national vigour, was first fought out in the battles between Pyrrhus and the Roman generals." The victory on this occasion, as on all others, rested with Roman arms, but the victory was

of a different character from that over Gauls and Phoenicians; for in the end the subtle charm of Hellenic ideas and Hellenic life amply avenged the physical and political inferiority of the Greek to the Roman.

For the sake of chronological sequence it will be well to reach the causes which brought Pyrrhus to Italy before we narrate his previous career or estimate his position in history.

The peace with Samnium had scarce been concluded when the storm broke out afresh, and this time from a new quarter. The Romans had granted the Lucanians, in consideration of their services in the Samnite war, the Greek cities in their territory. In consequence of this, Thurii, among other cities, was attacked by the Lucanians and Bruttians, and reduced to great extremities. Thurii appealed for protection to Rome; and Rome, feeling that the fortress of Venusia enabled her to dispense with the Lucanian alliance, granted the appeal. The Lucanians and Bruttians, thus foiled by the Romans, proceeded to form a new coalition against their old allies, and at the same time opened the campaign by a fresh attack on Thurii about 285 B.C. This coalition was at once joined by the Etruscans, Gauls, Umbrians, and Samnites. The last-named, exhausted and hemmed in on all sides as they were, could render but little assistance. But in the north, under the walls of Arretium, the Roman army, led by the praetor Lucius Cæcilius, was annihilated by the Celtic Senones, who were in the pay of the Etruscans. A terrible revenge was executed on the Senones in 283 B.C., by the consul Publius Cornelius Dolabella, who carried fire and sword through their territory, and completely expelled the whole Celtic tribe from Italy. Their Celtic kinsmen and neighbours, the Boii, at once joined the Etruscans, and a mighty combined army marched to wreak vengeance on Rome; but two battles, one near Lake Vadimo in 283 B.C., and another near Populonia in the following year, crushed this combination, and caused the Boii to conclude a separate peace with Rome. The Romans were now free to prosecute with vigour the war in southern Italy. Thurii was relieved and the Lucanians utterly defeated in 282 B.C.; the most important places—Locri, Croton, Thurii, and

Rhegium—were garrisoned. That part of the Adriatic coast which had been occupied by the Senones was secured by a colony planted in the seaport of Sena, the former Senonian capital. A Roman fleet sailed from the Tyrrhene sea to take up its station in the Adriatic, and, on its way, anchored in the harbour of Tarentum. The time had at last arrived for the supine people of Tarentum to shake off their lethargy; but their awakening came too late. Old treaties had forbidden Roman men-of-war from sailing beyond the promontory of Lacinium. Fiery appeals by mob-orators excited the Tarentine multitude to such a degree of senseless passion that it rushed down to the harbour, fell upon the unsuspecting Romans, and seized their ships and crews after a sharp struggle. This wanton outrage was followed up by the surprise of Thurii and the severe punishment of its inhabitants. Notwithstanding this violent breach of all civilized law, the Romans displayed great moderation and forbearance in the terms they offered Tarentum. But all negotiations failed, and the Roman consul, Lucius Aemilius, entered Tarentine territory in 281 B.C. It was clear that Tarentum could not resist Rome single-handed, and the fear of the demagogues as to the vengeance which Rome would exact drove them to urge the completion of the alliance with Pyrrhus on the terms proposed by the Epirot king.

At this point we must revert to the previous history of the man whose name has cast a halo of romance upon this war. Born in 320 B.C., Pyrrhus, when but six years old, was by his father's downfall deprived of his hereditary throne among the Molossians of Epirus, and subjected to the many vicissitudes that befell all those engaged in Macedonian politics. Trained in the campaigns of the veteran Antigonus, one of Alexander's chief generals, universally admired by the Alexandrian court of Ptolemy, whither the battle of Ipsus brought him as a hostage, he was restored to his native land and kingdom of Epirus in 296 B.C., through the influence of Ptolemy, who wished to counteract the growing power of the Macedonian ruler, Demetrius Poliorcetes. Aided by the brave Epirots, whose loyalty and enthusiasm were fired by their young ruler, "the eagle of Epirus," as they styled him, extended his dominions. When Demetrius was

driven from his throne in 287 B.C., Pyrrhus was summoned to wear the royal diadem of Philip and of Alexander. No worthier successor could have been found. But Macedonian jealousy, and that national feeling which could not brook a foreign leader, caused him to resign the kingdom after a short reign of seven months. The colourless life of an Epirot king could not satisfy the ambition of such a man as Pyrrhus. Conscious of his great powers as a general, fired with a desire to imitate the great Alexander, Pyrrhus eagerly embraced the opportunity that now offered itself of founding an Hellenic empire in the West. In estimating the possibilities of success, and the historical position of Pyrrhus himself, we cannot but feel that the attempt to draw a comparison between him and Alexander completely fails. Alexander was at the head of a powerful and well-officered Macedonian army; he was the foremost general and most gifted statesman of his time; his own dominions were secured by the powerful army he left behind him; the foes he went to encounter were such as, long inured to despotism, knew nothing of national independence and national vigour, and regarded with indifference a change of despots. In the case of Pyrrhus none of these advantages existed. Despite his noble descent, his strategic ability, his pure and chivalrous nature, he was but a soldier of fortune, a king of mountain-tribes, a man whose chances of success depended on mercenaries and foreign alliances, and on his ability to keep together a coalition of secondary states. Wide-reaching as was his scheme of founding a great Hellenic empire in the West, it was the unreal dream of a romantic adventurer, not the possible and practicable aim of a powerful conqueror and statesman.

When once Tarentum had signed the treaty with Pyrrhus, the arrival of Cineas, the confidential adviser of Pyrrhus, and of his general, Milo, in 281 B.C., with three thousand Epirots, put an end to all further vacillation. Pyrrhus himself landed early in the following year, with a mixed force of various Greek tribes, amounting in all to about twenty thousand infantry, two thousand archers, five hundred slingers, three thousand cavalry, and twenty elephants. The boasts which the Tarentine envoys had

made, of the huge confederate army ready to take the field in Italy, were soon proved to be utterly fallacious. In the north, the Etruscans alone were still in arms, but misfortune attended every effort they made. The Tarentines, who had hoped that Pyrrhus would take all the blows while they shared the spoil, found their master in the eagle of Epirus. They were called upon to serve; and the foreign soldiers were quartered in their houses, and foreign guards set over their gates. The strictest military government everywhere prevailed; and all the clubs, theatres, and amusements of the pleasure-loving Tarentines were ruthlessly suspended.

Special exertions were made by Rome to meet the new danger. In 280 B.C., on the banks of the Siris, near Heraclea, the Roman consul, Publius Laevinus, first measured swords with a Greek army under the greatest general of the day. After a stubborn contest, varied by many vicissitudes of fortune, the elephants of Pyrrhus decided the issue. The losses of the Romans, estimated from fifteen to twenty thousand, were almost equalled by those of Pyrrhus. But the value of winning the first battle was at once shown by the fact that the Lucantians, Bruttians, Samnites, and all the Greek cities joined Pyrrhus. The Latins, however, remained firm, and the frontier fortress, Venusia, although completely hemmed in by enemies, refused to desert Rome. Pyrrhus saw that his hopes lay in securing favourable terms from the Romans, while the impressions of the battle of Heraclea were still vivid. He commissioned Cineas, whose rhetorical powers were famous, to go to Rome and demand the freedom of all Greek towns, and the restitution of the territory taken from the Samnites, Daunians, Lucanians, and Bruttians. The leniency and respect shown by Pyrrhus towards his Roman prisoners, and the persuasive arts of Cineas, made the senate waver, but the undaunted energy of the blind and aged Appius Claudius, who had been censor in 312, and consul in 307 and 296 B.C., and who had caused himself to be carried into the senate-house at this critical moment, revived the true Roman spirit in the hearts of his audience. The proud answer was given that Rome could not negotiate with foreign troops as long as they were on Italian soil. This answer,

then heard for the first time, passed thenceforth into a maxim of state.

Pyrrhus now marched upon Rome, hoping by this step to shake the allegiance of her allies and to terrify the capital. Roman courage, however, was proof alike against the flatteries of Cineas, and the armed threats of Pyrrhus. No Latin ally, no Campanian Greek state joined him; moreover, the Etruscans at this time concluded peace with Rome, and thus set free the army of the consul Tiberius Coruncanius. Three armies, one in his rear under Laevinus, and two in the vicinity of the capital, barred his progress. After surprising Fregellae and reaching Anagnia, the king was forced to retrace his steps without striking a decisive blow. At the approach of winter he returned to his old quarters in Tarentum. In the spring of 279 B.C., Pyrrhus resumed the offensive, and met the Roman army in Apulia near Ausculum. The allied forces of Pyrrhus amounted to about seventy thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, and nineteen elephants. The Romans with their confederates were not inferior in number; and as a protection against the elephants they had invented a sort of war-chariot, armed with projecting iron poles and movable masts, capable of being lowered, and fitted with an iron spike. Pyrrhus also had copied the Roman system of maniples, and placed companies on the wings of the phalanx, with spaces between them, in imitation of the cohorts. For two days the battle raged; at last the elephants, as at Heraclea, forced back the Roman line, and Pyrrhus remained in possession of the field. This defeat cost the Roman forces some six thousand lives; but Pyrrhus himself was wounded. Nor was the victory decisive enough to break up the Roman confederacy, and thus further the political designs of the Epirot king. Forced by his wound to renounce the campaign and remain inactive in Tarentum, Pyrrhus soon perceived that the losses he had sustained, and the petty quarrels and hatred of discipline which characterized his allies, rendered all chance of ultimate success with his present resources out of the question. The condition of the Sicilian Greeks gave him an opportunity of leaving Italy, and of this he gladly availed himself.

After the death of Agathocles of Syracuse, in 289 B.C.,

Carthage had made great strides in the subjugation of Sicily. No resistance could be offered by the smaller Greek cities, whose government, whether under demagogues or despots, was always equally incapable. Agrigentum had fallen, and Syracuse was now hard pressed by the victorious Carthaginians. In the hour of her peril Syracuse acted as Tarentum had done; she offered the supreme power to Pyrrhus. Thus fortune, by placing in his hands at the same moment Tarentum and Syracuse, seemed to give to Pyrrhus a great opportunity of realizing his mighty schemes. One effect of this union of Italian and Sicilian Greeks under one head was to bring into closer relations Carthage and Rome. An offensive and defensive treaty was concluded between them, in 279 B.C., against Pyrrhus, binding each party to assist the other in case of attack, and binding both states not to conclude a separate peace with Pyrrhus. Messana, which had previously been seized by the Mamertines, who were the Campanian mercenaries of Agathocles (cf. p. 78), in fear of the vengeance of Pyrrhus joined the Romans and Carthaginians, and thus secured for them the Sicilian side of the straits. But Rhegium, on the Italian side, which had been wrested from the Romans by a mutiny of the Campanian troops stationed there in 281 B.C., could not be allowed by Rome to follow the example of their Mamertine kinsmen; and a combined attack of Carthaginians and Romans failed to capture the city. A strong Carthaginian fleet proceeded to blockade Syracuse, while at the same time a land army laid siege to it, in 278 B.C. Pyrrhus was therefore forced to desert the Lucanians and Samnites, and content himself with occupying Tarentum by a garrison under Milo, and Locri with a force under his son Alexander. He himself set sail with the rest of his troops for Syracuse in the spring of 278 B.C. During his absence from Italy the Romans, exhausted by their previous struggles, allowed the war to drag on, without being able to completely expel the troops left behind by Pyrrhus. Heraclea, indeed, made peace with Rome in 278, and Locri slaughtered its Epirot garrison in 277 B.C.; but Milo retained his hold of Tarentum, and made successful sorties against the Romans. Ignorance of the art of besieging towns, and the want of a fleet, made the capture

of Tarentum almost impossible; and the Carthaginians, owing to their disasters in Sicily, were unable to render any real assistance. Pyrrhus, on landing at Syracuse, met with complete success. At the head of the Greek cities he wrested from the Carthaginians almost all that they had won. To cope with their powerful fleet and capture the all-important position of Lilybaeum, Pyrrhus built himself a fleet, and in 276 B.C. seemed to have within his grasp the realization of his aims. But his methods of governing Sicily were those which he had seen Ptolemy practise in Egypt: personal favourites, not native Greeks, exercised absolute authority as magistrates and judges in the various cities; his own troops acted as garrisons, and his own acts were arbitrary and despotic to the last degree. His reign thus became more detested than even the threatened Carthaginian yoke had been, and negotiations were entered into by the principal Greek cities with the Carthaginians. To this error Pyrrhus added a second. Instead of securing his rule in Sicily, expelling the Carthaginians and capturing Lilybaeum, he turned his thoughts once more to Italy. Possibly a sense of honour and the cry of his old allies, the Lucanians and Samnites, moved him to do so; but the folly of the step was at once apparent. When once it was known that he had set sail for Italy, towards the close of 276 B.C., all the Sicilian cities revolted, and refused to grant him money or troops; and "thus the enterprise of Pyrrhus was wrecked, and the plan of his life irretrievably ruined, he was thenceforth an adventurer who felt that he had been great, and was so no longer." Foiled in an attack on Rhegium, he surprised Locri, and avenged himself on the treacherous inhabitants. In the spring of 275 B.C. he marched to the aid of the hard-pressed Samnites, and near Beneventum, on the Campus Arusinus, he fought his final battle on Italian soil. The very elephants, which had won his previous victories, proved the cause of his defeat by attacking their own side. Unable any longer to keep the field, or to get reinforcements from abroad, Pyrrhus left Italy, and once more took part in Greek politics. He even succeeded in recovering the whole of his former kingdom, and in paving the way for a return to the throne of Macedonia. But his successes bore no lasting fruit,

and he perished ingloriously in a street fight at Argos, in 272 B.C.

With the battle of Beneventum and the departure of Pyrrhus the war in Italy came to an end. Milo, who had been left behind in Tarentum, made over that city to the Roman consul Lucius Papirius in 272 B.C., on hearing of his master's death. He thus prevented the citizens from surrendering the town to the Carthaginians, who had entered the harbour with a fleet, and secured for himself and his troops a free departure. The Carthaginians, thus frustrated in their attempt to gain a foothold in Italy, pretended that their presence was merely due to their wish to help the Romans. The gain to Rome from the act of Milo can scarcely be overestimated. In the same year, the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians laid down their arms. Rhegium was at last stormed in 270 B.C., and the remnant of the mutineers who had so long held the town were scourged and executed. Rome was now mistress of all Italy. New colonies and new roads held in a firm grip the conquered territories. Paestum and Cosa in Lucania, Beneventum and Aesernia to command Samnium, Ariminum, Firmum in Picenum, and Castrum Novum to hold in check the Gauls, were all established in the ten years from 273-264 B.C. Preparations were made to continue the southern highway to the seaports of Tarentum and Brundisium, to colonize the latter seaport and make it the rival of Tarentum. Wars with small tribes, whose territory was encroached upon, were caused by the construction of these fortresses and roads: with the Picentes in 269-268 B.C., with the Sallentines and the Umbrian Sassinates in 267-266 B.C. Rome's dominion was thus extended from the Apennines to the Ionian sea. Nor did she solely confine her attention to the development of her power by land. At this time Carthage was practically paramount in the western waters of the Mediterranean. Even Syracuse gradually ceased to compete with her; Tarentum, owing to the Roman occupation, was no longer formidable; the naval power of Etruria had long been broken, and the Etruscan island of Corsica lay open to the ships of Carthage. The constant struggles by land had caused the Roman fleet to dwindle in neglect, until about 350 B.C. it reached its lowest point of ineffi-

ciency. A treaty with Carthage in 348 B.C. bound Roman ships not to sail beyond the Fair Promontory (Cape Bon) on the Libyan coast; a like stipulation with Tarentum excluded Roman ships from the eastern basin of the Mediterranean. As soon as she was able, Rome made efforts to free herself from this humiliating position. The chief towns along the Tyrrhene and Adriatic seas were colonized, and thus protected the coasts from invasion and pillage. The Roman navy was in part revived, and the war-ships taken from Antium in 338 B.C. served as a nucleus for this purpose. Such Greek cities as were admitted into a state of dependence on Rome furnished a certain number of vessels as a war contribution. In 311 B.C., two masters of the fleet (*duoviri navales*) were created by a special resolution of the burgesses, and the Roman fleet lent assistance in the Samnite war at the siege of Nuceria. But the renewal of the treaty with Carthage in 306 B.C. shows how little Rome really accomplished. Carthage only allowed the Romans to trade with Sicily and Carthage, but prohibited their navigation of the Atlantic, and thus restricted them to the narrow space of the western Mediterranean. Although obliged to acquiesce in the conditions imposed by Carthage, the Romans continued to improve the state of their navy. Four quaestors of the fleet (*quaestores classici*) were appointed in 267 B.C., for the purpose of jointly guarding the coasts and creating a navy for their protection. The first was stationed at Ostia, the Roman port; the second at Cales, the capital of Roman Campania; the third at Ariminum, to watch over the ports on the Adriatic; the province of the fourth is not known.

The lukewarm alliance formed with Carthage against Pyrrhus did not lessen the wish of Rome to free herself from the fetters imposed by Carthage on the growth of her maritime power. To further this object she attached herself closely to such Greek maritime states as could counterbalance the Carthaginian ascendancy by sea: to Massilia, whose citizens held a position of honour at the Roman games; to Rhodes, and Apollonia on the Epirot coast; above all to Syracuse, after the Pyrrhic war was ended. Nature herself favoured the growth of her naval power. Latium supplied the finest timber for ships, and

the commercial and geographical position of Rome was specially adapted for the development of a war marine. Although, indeed, so far Rome had not availed herself of these advantages, yet at this period signs were not wanting that the old indifference to naval matters was a thing of the past; "and, considering the great resources of Italy, the Phoenicians might well follow her efforts with anxious eyes."

It remains for us to consider the political effect of the mighty changes consequent upon the establishment of Roman supremacy in Italy. We do not know with exactness what privileges Rome reserved for herself as sovereign state. It is certain that she alone could make war, conclude treaties, and coin money; and that, further, any war or treaty resolved upon by the Roman people was legally binding on all Italian communities, and that the silver money of Rome was current everywhere in Italy.

The relations of the Italians to Rome cannot in all cases be precisely defined, but the main features are as follows. In the first place, the full Roman franchise was extended as far as was compatible with the preservation of the urban character of the Roman community. Those who received this franchise may be divided into three classes: (1) All the occupants of the various allotments of state lands, which now embraced a considerable portion of Etruria and Campania. (2) All the communities which, after the method first adopted in the case of Tusculum, were incorporated and completely merged in the Roman state. As above mentioned (p. 92), this course had been followed in the case of many of the original members of the Latin league: it was now, in 268 B.C., pursued with regard to all the Sabine communities and many of the Volscian. (3) Further, full Roman citizenship was possessed by the maritime or burgess colonies which had been instituted for the protection of the coast; the names of these were Pyrgi, Ostia, Antium, Tarracina, Minturnae, Sinuessa, Sena Gallica, and Castrum Novum. In these towns the young men were exempted from service in the legions, and devoted all their attention to guarding the coasts.

Thus the title of Roman citizen in its fullest sense was

possessed by men dwelling as far north as Caere,* as far east as the Apennines, and as far south as Formiae. But within these limits isolated communities, such as Tibur, Praeneste, Signia, and Norba, were without the Roman franchise; while beyond them other communities, such as Sena, possessed it.

In the next place, we must distinguish the various grades of subjection which marked all the communities not honoured with the full Roman franchise. As in the case of the recipients of full citizenship, so here we may make a threefold division. To the first division belong the Latin towns: these retained their Latin rights; that is, they were self-governing and stood on an equal footing with Roman citizens as regards the right of trading and inheritance. But it is important to observe that the Latins of the later times of the Republic were no longer for the most part members of the old Latin towns, which had participated in the Alban festival, but were colonists planted in Latium by Rome, who honoured Rome as their capital and parent city, and formed the main supports of Roman rule in Latium. Indeed, the old Latin communities, with the exception of Tibur and Praeneste, had sunk into insignificance. It was but natural that the Latin colonies, issuing as they did from the burgess-body of Rome, should not rest content with mere Latin rights, but should aim at the full rights of Roman citizens. Rome, on the other hand, now that Italy was subjugated, no longer felt her former need of these colonies; nor did she deem it prudent to extend the full franchise with the same freedom as she hitherto had done. A line was now strictly drawn, and all members of autonomous communities founded after 268 B.C. could no longer by settling in Rome become *municipes* or passive burgesses with the power of voting in the *comitia tributa* (cf. p. 85). Men of eminence, *e.g.* public magistrates, in such communities were alone in future eligible to the Roman franchise. By these means the old power of migration to Rome was somewhat restricted, and a jealous guard was set upon the privilege of becoming a full Roman citizen.

To the second division belong those towns whose in-

* Of course Caere is not meant to be included, but men living near it had full citizen rights.

habitants were passive citizens of Rome (*cives sine suffragio*). They were liable to service in the Roman legions, and to taxation, and were included in the Roman census. A deputy or praefect appointed annually by the Roman praetor administered justice according to laws which were subjected to Roman revision. In other respects they retained their old form of government and appointed their own magistrates. Caere (cf. p. 81) was the first town to be placed on this footing; afterwards Capua and other more remote towns were treated in the same way.

In the third and last division we may include all allied communities which were not Latin states; the relation of these towns to Rome was defined by separate treaties, and therefore varied in accordance with the terms imposed by such agreements.

No doubt all national leagues, such as the Samnite and Lucanian, shared the fate which had earlier befallen the Latin and Hernican confederations; and any movements which might tend to bind one community with another, whether by rights of intermarriage or of acquisition of property or by common council-chambers, were doubtless suppressed by the vigilance of Rome. Further, all the Italian communities were obliged to equip and furnish at their own expense contingents in time of war. Those Latin towns classified above in the first division furnished a definitely fixed number of infantry and cavalry which acted on the wings of the Roman legion and were therefore named "wings" (*alae*) and "winged cohorts" (*cohortes alariae*). The same duty was imposed on most of the allied communities classified in the third division, such as Apulians, Sabellians, and Etruscans. Further, the passive citizens defined in the second division were, as above stated, bound to serve in the ranks of the Roman legions, while the duty of supplying ships of war fell almost entirely on the Greek cities. Such were the leading features of the Roman government of Italy, the details of which can no longer be ascertained. In addition to breaking up all existing confederacies, and thus splitting up the subject states into a number of smaller communities, Rome fostered schisms and factions among them. In pursuance of the same object the government of all dependent com-

munities was now placed in the hands of the wealthy and leading families, whose interests were naturally opposed to those of the multitude, and who were inclined to favour Roman views. Capua, whose nobles had sided with Rome throughout the war against the revolted Latins and Campanians, furnished a notorious instance of this policy. Special privileges and pensions were granted by Rome to the Campanian aristocracy. But the great wisdom and moderation of Rome is shown by the fact that she either extended to these dependent states the Roman franchise, or allowed them to retain a certain amount of self-government, and gave them a share in the successes of Rome. Thus in Italy, at least, no community of Helots existed, nor, which was equally important, was there any tributary state; for Rome with a wise magnanimity never assumed that most dangerous of rights, the right of taxing any of her Italian subjects. Rome exercised control and supervision over the various Italian communities by means of the four quaestors of the fleet, who had a district and residence outside Rome assigned them by law. In addition, the chief magistrate of every community had to take a census of his state every fourth or fifth year; by this means the Roman senate was kept informed of the resources in men and money of the whole of Italy.

Politically united under the leadership of Rome, the various tribes inhabiting Italy now began to realize more completely and feel more intensely their unity as a nation. This feeling must have first sprung into existence from the contrast presented by the Greeks, and must have been heightened by the danger with which the Celts threatened all Italians equally. It found expression in two names, which now began to be applied to all the peoples inhabiting Italy. The name of Italians, which was originally a Greek term, became current everywhere, and Italia, originally limited to the modern Calabria, was now used of the whole land. The name of Togati, or "men of the toga," was now for the first time used to designate all the Italians, and thus sharply contrasted them with the Celtic "men of the hose" (Braccati). The common use by all of the Latin toga seemed to point to the day when the Latin language would be regarded as the mother-tongue of every Italian: the germs of the Latinization of the whole

peninsula were already planted; time alone was needed for their development.

The recognition of Rome's new position as one of the great powers in the political world was first marked by an embassy sent from Alexandria to Rome in 273 B.C., primarily with a view to settling commercial relations. Egypt was at that time at variance with Carthage touching Cyrene, and with Macedonia touching the predominating influence in Greece; the complications that were eventually to arise between Rome and Carthage for the possession of Sicily, and between Rome and Macedonia for the sovereignty of the Adriatic coasts, were doubtless foreshadowed even then, and may well have suggested an alliance with Egypt. "The new struggles, which were preparing on all sides, could not but influence each other; and Rome, as mistress of Italy, could not fail to be drawn into the wide arena, which the victories and projects of Alexander the Great had marked out as the field of conflict to his successors."

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Præfecti.—Momms. R. St. iii. 581.

CHAPTER XII.

CARTHAGE.

The Phoenicians—Position of Carthage—Opposition to the Greeks—
Empire—Constitution—Financial position—Comparison between
Rome and Carthage.

WE now turn our eyes to a race of people widely differing from any in Italy in nature and origin, viz. the Carthaginians. Belonging to the great Semitic race, which has ever, as though from some instinctive sense of its wide diversity, kept itself severed from the Indo-Germanic nations, Carthage was one of the numerous settlements of the enterprising Phoenicians. This particular branch of the Semitic stock issued forth from its native land of Canaan or "the plain," and spread further west than any other people of the same race. Utilizing to the full the excellent harbours, and the bountiful supply of timber and metals of their own country, the Phoenicians early attained an unrivalled position in the ancient world as the pioneers of commerce, navigation, manufacture, and colonization. In the most remote times we find them in Cyprus and Egypt, Greece and Sicily, Africa and Spain, and even on the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea. "The field of their commerce reached from Sierra Leone and Cornwall in the west, eastward to the coast of Malabar."

But the one-sided character that marks the development of the great nations of antiquity is specially visible in the case of the Phoenicians. We cannot ascribe to them the credit of having originated any of the intellectual or scientific discoveries which have been the glory of other members of the Semitic family. Their religious

conceptions were gross and barbarous; their art was not comparable to that of Italy, still less to that of Greece; their knowledge of astronomy and chronology, of the alphabet, of weights and measures, was derived from Babylon. No doubt, in their commercial dealings, the Phoenicians spread valuable germs of civilization, but rather as a bird dropping grain than a husbandman sowing seed. They never civilized and assimilated to themselves the nations with which they came into contact.

Moreover, politically, the Phoenicians were, like the rest of the Aramaean nations, without the ennobling idea of self-governed freedom. A policy of conquest was never in their eyes to be compared with a policy of commerce. Their colonies were factories. The power to trade with natives was bought too dear if it entailed constant war and the interruption of peaceful barter. Thus they allowed themselves to be supplanted in Egypt, Greece, Italy, and the east of Sicily, almost without resistance; and in the great naval battles at Alalia in 537 B.C., and at Cumae in 474 B.C., for the supremacy of the western Mediterranean, the brunt of the struggle with the Greeks fell upon the Etruscans, and not on the Phoenicians. In the great Sicilian expedition, which ended in their defeat at Himera by Gelo of Syracuse in 480 B.C., the African Phoenicians only took the field as subjects of the Great King, and to avoid being obliged to aid him in the East instead of the West. This was not from want of courage or national spirit; indeed, the tenacity and obstinacy with which the Aramaeans have ever held to their feelings and prejudices as a nation far exceeds the pertinacity of any Indo-Germanic race: it was rather due to their want of political instinct and of the love of liberty. No Phoenician settlements attained a more rapid and secure prosperity than those established by the cities of Tyre and Sidon on the south coast of Spain and the north coast of Africa. Here they were out of the reach of the great king and of Greek rivals, and held the same relation to the natives as the Europeans held to the American Indians. Although not the earliest settlement, by far the most prominent was Karthada, "the new town," or Carthage. Situated near the mouth of the river Bagradas, which flows through the

richest corn district in North Africa, on rising ground which slopes gently towards the plain and ends in a sea-girt promontory, commanding the great roadstead of North Africa, the Gulf of Tunis, Carthage owed its sudden rise to pre-eminence even more to the natural advantages of its situation than to the character of its inhabitants. Even when restored, Carthage at once became the third city in the Roman empire; and in our day, on a far worse site, and under far less favourable conditions, a city exists in that district, whose inhabitants number one hundred thousand. We need no explanation, then, of the commercial prosperity of ancient Carthage; but we must answer the question raised by its development of political power, a development never attained by any other Phoenician city.

At the outset Carthage pursued the usual passive policy of Phoenician cities. She paid a ground-rent for the space occupied by the city to the native Berbers, the tribe of Maxitani or Maxyes; and she recognized the nominal supremacy of the great king by paying tribute to him on different occasions. It gradually, however, became clear to the Carthaginians that, unless they undertook the task of repelling Greek influences and Greek migrations, the Phoenicians would be supplanted in Africa, as they had already been in Greece, Italy, and Sicily. The colony of Cyrene threatened their very stronghold and imperilled their existence. The Carthaginians, therefore, undertook the task; and by about 500 B.C., after a long and obstinate struggle, they had to a great extent effected their purpose, and set bounds to Greek invasion. These successes changed the character of the city itself; it no longer aimed at being merely pre-eminent in commerce, but at establishing an empire as mistress of Libya and of part of the Mediterranean.

About the year 450 B.C. the Carthaginians refused any longer to pay rent for the soil they occupied to the natives, and were thus enabled to prosecute agriculture on a greatly extended scale. Capital thus found a new outlet, and the rich soil of Libya was cultivated on a system similar to that employed by modern planters. Single landowners appear to have employed on their estates no fewer than twenty thousand slaves. Moreover,

the native Libyan farmers were subdued, and reduced to the position of fellahs, who paid a fourth of the produce of their soil as tribute to their new masters, and served as a recruiting ground for the Carthaginian armies. The Nomades, or roving pastoral tribes, were driven back into the deserts and mountains, or were compelled to pay tribute and supply soldiers. The capture of their great town Theveste took place about the time of the first Punic war. These two classes of subjects gave rise to the expression found in Carthaginian state treaties of "towns and tribes of subjects;" the first refers to the dependent Libyan villages, the second to the subject Nomades. Thirdly, the Carthaginian rule embraced the other Phœnician settlements in Africa, or the so-called Liby-Phœnicians. These consisted partly of the older Phœnician colonies, such as Hippo, Hadrumetum, Thapsus, and the Little and Great Leptis; partly of colonies sent from Carthage itself. These states, with the exception of Utica, the ancient protectress of Carthage, lost their independence, and had to pull down their walls and to contribute a fixed sum of money and a definite number of soldiers. But they did not pay a land-tax, nor were they subject to the recruiting system like the subject Libyans; and they enjoyed equal legal privileges and right of intermarriage with the Carthaginians.

Thus Carthage became the capital of a great North African empire, extending from the desert of Tripoli to the Atlantic ocean; on the west (Morocco and Algiers), indeed, she merely held a belt along the coast, but on the east (Constantine and Tunis) she extended her sway far into the interior. In the words of an ancient writer, the Carthaginians were changed from Tyrians into Libyans. The Phœnician tongue and civilization were, at any rate among the more advanced natives, adopted in Libya. These changes have been associated with the name of Hanno; but they were no doubt gradual, and cannot, therefore, be assigned to any period with precision. The rise of Carthage was synchronous with a decline of the great cities in the mother-country of Tyre and Sidon; and from the first-named most of the powerful families emigrated to their prosperous daughter city.

In addition to the empire in Libya we must bear in

mind the parallel growth of the maritime and colonial dominion of Carthage. The early Tyrian settlement at Gades (Cadiz) was the chief Phœnician colony in Spain. By a chain of factories on the west and east of Gades, and by the possession of the silver mines in the interior, the Phœnicians occupied nearly all the modern Andalusia and Granada. Although not strictly under the rule of Carthage, no doubt Gades and the other stations in Spain fell under her hegemony. The island of Ebusus and the Baleares were early occupied by the Carthaginians, partly as fishing-stations, partly as outposts against the Greek colony of Massilia, with which Carthage was ever at war. Moreover, about 500 B.C., the Carthaginians established themselves in Sardinia, the natives of which island retired before them into the mountainous interior, just as the Numidians withdrew to the borders of the African desert. The fertile districts of the Sardinian coast were cultivated by imported Libyans, and colonies were planted at Caralis (Cagliari) and other points. They also held the west and north-west coast of Sicily, together with the smaller adjacent islands of the Ægates, Melita, Gaulos, Cossyra; the station at Motya, and later at Lilybaeum, preserved their communication with Africa, as those at Panormus and Soluntum did with Sardinia. For a long period, down to the Athenian expedition to Sicily (415-413 B.C.), the Greeks and Carthaginians seem to have agreed to tolerate one another in Sicily. All these possessions served not only as commercial centres, but as pillars of the Carthaginian supremacy by sea. The western straits of the Mediterranean were practically closed to other nations, and in the Tyrrhene and Gallic seas alone the Phœnicians had to endure the rivalry of foreign fleets. As long, indeed, as the Etruscan power counterbalanced the Greek in those waters, Carthage could afford to remain passive; but on the fall of the Etruscans and the rise of the naval power of Syracuse, a great contest ensued between Dionysius of Syracuse (406-365 B.C.) and Carthage, in the course of which all the smaller Greek cities in Sicily were either totally destroyed, *e.g.* Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum, Gela, and Messana, or reduced to a state of utter prostration. The island was partitioned between the Syracusans and

Carthaginians, and on several occasions each side in turn was on the point of completely expelling its rival from the island. But gradually the balance inclined in favour of the Carthaginians, and, after the failure of the attempt of Pyrrhus to restore the Syracusan fleet, the Carthaginians commanded without a rival the whole western Mediterranean; and their efforts to occupy Syracuse, Rhegium, and Tarentum, show the extent of their power, and the objects they had in view. They shrank from no violence in their attempt to monopolize the whole trade of the West; any foreigner sailing towards Sardinia and Gades, if apprehended, was thrown into the sea; and the treaty of 306 B.C. closed every Phœnician port except that of Carthage against Roman vessels, which forty-two years before had been allowed to trade with the ports in Spain, Sardinia, and Libya.

The constitution of Carthage was described by Aristotle as having changed from a monarchy to an aristocracy, or as a democracy inclining towards oligarchy. The conduct of affairs was directly vested in the hands of a council of elders, which consisted, like the Spartan gerusia, of two kings, annually nominated by the citizens, and of twenty-eight elders also annually chosen by the same body. All the chief business of state was transacted by this council, and the general and his chief officers, who were always "elders," were appointed by it. The kings seem to have had comparatively little power, and acted as supreme judges. The general was much more of an autocrat, and is described by Roman writers as a dictator; the term of his office was not fixed, but the gerusiasts attached to him as sub-commanders must have restricted his power, and on laying down his office he had to give an official account of his actions.

But over the gerusia and the magistrates was the body of the Hundred and Four, or the judges, the bulwark of the Carthaginian oligarchy. Its origin was due to the danger that threatened Carthage of all the power being concentrated in the hands of a single family. Public offices could be bought, and, as the supreme board consisted originally of only a few members, this result was not only possible, but did actually occur in the case of the Mago family. The aristocratic opposition brought about

a reform and created this body of the judges. Although there is considerable obscurity as to the mode of their election and the length of their tenure of office, we may infer from the name of senators, given them by the Greeks and Romans, that they practically held office for life, and that they were elected by some method of co-optation. At first intended to act as political jurymen and hear the accounts of, and, if necessary, punish the general, or any of the gerusiasts, the judges gradually came to interfere in all legislation and thus usurp the functions of those gerusiasts whom they controlled. We can thus easily understand how the generals and statesmen of Carthage were perpetually hampered in council and action by the fear of this control.

The body of citizens seems to have exercised very little influence in Carthage. Open corruption prevailed in the election of gerusiasts; and, although the people were consulted in the election of a general, their opinion was only taken after the general had been nominated by the gerusia. On other questions the people were only consulted if the gerusia thought fit to do so. The citizens possessed no assemblies with judicial functions; they were split up into political coteries or mess associations, like the Spartan *pheditia*, and these were probably guilds under oligarchical management.

Viewing the Carthaginian constitution as a whole, we may conclude that the government was one of capitalists, such as would arise in a city where there was no rich middle class, but merely a city rabble on the one hand and a class of great merchants, planters, and noble governors on the other. Beguiled by the bribes of the rich governing class, the needy nobles did not, for a long time at least, play the part of leaders of a democratic revolution, and thus, up to the time of the first Punic war, no influential party representing a democratic opposition had arisen. At a later time, due in some measure to the defeats sustained by the Carthaginian arms, such a party arose to prominence, and by its rapidly increasing influence broke down the power of the Carthaginian oligarchy. At the close of the second Punic war Hannibal carried a proposal that no member of the Council of a Hundred should hold office for two consecutive

years; and thus a complete democracy was introduced; but, owing to the corruption prevalent at Carthage, and the ungovernable nature of the body of citizens, such revolutions were powerless to effect the good they brought about in other states.

Regarded from a financial point of view, Carthage stands pre-eminent among the states of antiquity. Polybius calls it the wealthiest city in the world, and indeed it rivalled the London of our own times. The high pitch reached by the Carthaginians in the art of husbandry is attested by the agricultural treatise of Mago, the textbook not only of Carthage but of Rome, which was translated into Greek and edited in Latin by the express order of the Roman senate, for the benefit of Italian landholders. The close connection between agriculture and the management of capital was a special feature of their enlightened system; no one held more land than he could thoroughly manage. Thus enriched at home by the well-nigh inexhaustible resources of fertile Libya, whose horses, oxen, sheep, and goats excelled those of all other lands, and drawing a huge rental from her subjects, while abroad she held in her hands the trade and manufactures of the interior as well as of the coasts of the western Mediterranean, Carthage occupied a commercial position up to that time unrivalled in the ancient world; and the whole carrying trade between east and west became more and more concentrated in her single harbour. For science and art Carthage was chiefly indebted to Hellenic influences, and rich treasures were carried off to Carthage from Sicilian temples. Native intellect was subservient to the interests of capital: and therefore her literature bore chiefly upon agriculture and geography, and such subjects as advanced commerce. The same utilitarian view of education caused the Carthaginians to pay special attention to the knowledge of foreign languages. In consequence of the huge accumulation of wealth in the city no direct taxation was found necessary; and after the second Punic war, when the power of Carthage was broken, it was found possible, by a stricter administration of the finances, to meet the current expenses and pay the yearly instalment of £48,000 to Rome without levying any tax. Carthage anticipated the economical principles

of a later epoch in her financial management of loans and currency. "In fact, if government had resolved itself into a mere mercantile speculation, never would any state have solved the problem more brilliantly than Carthage."

Some comparison between the resources of Rome and Carthage will be a fitting close to this chapter. Both cities were purely agricultural and mercantile, art and science in both playing a subordinate and wholly practical part. In Rome the landed interest still preponderated over the moneyed: in Carthage the reverse was the case. In the former the great mass of citizens tilled their own fields, in the latter the agricultural interest was centred in the hands of large landholders and slave-owners. Thus at Rome, owing to the fact that most of the citizens held property, the tone was conservative; in Carthage the majority held no property, and were therefore moved alike by the bribes of the rich and the reform-cries of the democrats. Rome still prescribed pristine frugal simplicity in her mode of life; Carthage was the victim of opulence and luxury.

Politically, the constitution of both was aristocratic. The judges of Carthage and the senate of Rome governed on the same system of police-control. In both cities the individual magistrate was subject to the control of the governing board, but the cruel severity and absurd restrictions visible in the Carthaginian system contrast very unfavourably with the milder and more reasonable powers of the Roman council. Moreover, the Roman senate was open to and filled by men of eminent ability, representatives of the nation in the truest and best sense, while the Carthaginian senate exercised a jealous control on the executive, and represented only a few leading families, and was inspired by a sense of mistrust of all above and below it. Hence the steady unwavering policy of Rome, and the confidence and good understanding generally existing between the senate and its magistrates; while at Carthage a wavering half-hearted policy was pursued, and the best officers were generally at feud with the governing body at home, and were thus forced to join the reform or opposition party. Again, as to their treatment of subject states, Rome threw open her citizenship to one district after another, and made it even legally attain-

able by the Latin communities: Carthage never allowed such a hope to be entertained, still less to be realized. Rome granted a share in the fruits of victory, and sought to create a party in each state favourable to her own interests; Carthage reserved to herself all the spoils of victory, and took away from all cities the freedom of trade. Rome allowed a shadow of independence even to the lowest grade of her subject states, and imposed a fixed tribute on none; Carthage enforced a heavy tribute on even the old Phœnician cities (with the exception of Utica), and treated subject tribes as state slaves. Thus every African community (with the above exception) would have profited by the fall of Carthage, whereas every state in Italy would have lost rather than gained by a rebellion against Rome. The strength of the Roman alliance was shown in the war against Pyrrhus; the landing of Agathocles and Regulus in Africa, and the mercenary war, proved the hollow and rotten nature of the Carthaginian confederacy. In Sicily alone Carthage pursued a wiser and milder policy, owing to her inability to take Syracuse, and thus there was always a party there favourable to her interests.

The state revenues of Carthage were far superior to those of Rome, but the sources of that revenue—tribute and customs—were exhausted far sooner than those of Rome, and the Carthaginian mode of conducting war was far costlier than the Roman.

Though very different, the military resources of the two rivals were not unequally balanced. Carthage, at the time of her conquest, still numbered 700,000 citizens, and at the close of the fifth century she could put into the field an army of 40,000 hoplites. Rome's advantage lay not so much in the superiority of numbers, as in the superior physique and character of the Roman husbandman. Neither the Carthaginians nor the Liby-Phœnicians were naturally soldiers; the flower of the Carthaginian armies consisted of the Libyans, who made good infantry, and were unsurpassed as light cavalry. Aided by the forces of the dependent tribes of Libya and Spain, and by the famous slingers of the Baleares, as well as by mercenary foreigners, the Carthaginians could raise their armies to almost any strength; but a long and dangerous interval

must elapse before such hosts could be collected, and, when assembled, they lacked that unity of interests and ties of fatherland which made the Roman army so formidable. Moreover, the relations between the Carthaginian officers and the mercenary and Libyan troops were marked by a callous indifference on the one hand, and a dangerous and mutinous dissatisfaction on the other. Officers broke their word to the troops, and even betrayed them,—wrongs which were bitterly avenged by Libyan insurrections. Great efforts were always made by the Carthaginian government to remedy the defects of their military system. Not only were the army chests and magazines kept fully stored, but special attention was paid to all machines of war, and to the use of elephants. As the Carthaginians did not dare to fortify their dependent cities, owing to their fear of their subject states, they spared no pains in making Carthage impregnable. Rome, on the other hand, allowed most of the subject towns to retain their walls, and secured her power by a chain of frontier fortresses throughout Italy. The great strength of Carthage lay in her war-marine, composed of ships and sailors unrivalled in the world. Ships with more than three banks of oars were first built at Carthage, and her quinqueremes were better sailers than the Greek ships of war. In this point Rome was no match, and could not at this period venture into the open sea against her rivals.

To sum up, the resources of the two great powers were at the outset very equally matched; but the danger of Carthage lay in the want of a land army of her own, and of a confederacy of states resting on a secure and self-supporting basis. It was plain that neither Rome nor Carthage could be seriously attacked except in the home of her power: but, in the one case, almost insuperable obstacles met the invader; while, in the other, half his task was accomplished as soon as he had set foot on African soil.

AUTHORITIES.

- Phoenicians*.—Strab. 756-760. Thuc. i. 8, 13, 16, 100; viii. 81, 87.
Carthage; position, etc.—Strab. 832, sqq. Polyb. i. 73-75. Appian,
Lib. i. sqq. Plut. Timol. 8.
Colonies.—Appian Sp. 2-3.
Constitution.—Polyb. vi. 51, sqq. Aristot. Pol. ii. 11.
Resources.—Strab. 833, sqq. Polyb. iii. 39, vi. 52.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR, 264-241 B.C.—EXTENSION OF ROMAN DOMINION.

State of Sicily—Cause of rupture between Rome and Carthage—Roman fleet—Naval victories of Mylae, 260 B.C., and Ecnomus, 256 B.C.—Regulus in Africa—Siege of Lilybaeum, and Roman defeat off Drepana, 249 B.C.—Despondency at Rome—Victory at Aegusa, 241 B.C.—Terms of peace—Roman administration of the new provinces—Suppression of Illyrian piracy—Conquest of the Italian Celts.

As was but natural, the first conflict between Rome and Carthage had its origin in the island which lay between Italy and Africa. After Pyrrhus had been driven from Sicily and Italy in 275 B.C., the Carthaginians were left masters of more than half the island, and were in possession of the important town of Agrigentum. Syracuse retained nothing but Tauromenium and the south-east of the island. We have above (p. 91) alluded to the roving and mercenary character of the Campanian youth, who, feeling no strong attachment to their native land, had ever been willing to join the forces of Greek adventurers. On the death of Agathocles a band of these mercenaries had, by an act of odious treachery, seized Messana (cf. p. 106), and in a short time these Mamertines, or men of Mars, as they styled themselves, became the third power in Sicily. Their increasing strength was not unwelcome to the Carthaginians, who gladly saw a new and hostile power established close to Syracuse. Hiero, the new ruler and able general of Syracuse, made great efforts to restore the city to its former eminence, and to unite

the Sicilian Greeks. Being at peace for the time with the Carthaginians, he turned his arms against Messina, at the very time that Rome was taking vigorous measures against the Campanian kinsmen of the Mamertines, who had established themselves in Rhegium. Hiero succeeded in shutting up the Mamertines in their city, and was on the point of successfully terminating a siege which had lasted some years, when the Mamertines in their dire strait turned for help to Rome, and offered to deliver their city into her hands. "It was a moment of the deepest significance in the history of the world, when the envoys of the Mamertines appeared in the Roman senate." If the Romans acceded to their request, they would not only do violence to their own feelings of right and wrong, by receiving into alliance a band of adventurers stained with the worst crimes, whose very kinsmen in Rhegium they had just punished for the same offence, but they would throw aside their views of establishing a mere sovereignty in Italy for the wider and more dangerous policy of interference with the outside world—a policy which could not fail to bring them into complicated relations with powers strictly outside their own land. A war with Carthage, serious as it might prove, was not the only result that might follow such a step; no one could calculate the consequences of so bold a leap in the dark. After long deliberation the senate referred the matter to the citizens; and they, fired by a consciousness of what they had already achieved, and by a belief in their future destiny, authorized the senate to receive the Mamertines into the Italian confederacy, and to send them aid at once—265 B.C.

The question now was, what would be the action of Carthage and of Hiero, both nominally allies of Rome, when the news came that the Mamertines were under Roman protection, and that therefore Hiero must desist from his siege of Messina. We have already pointed out (p. 108) that the relations between Carthage and Rome had been somewhat strained by the Carthaginian attempt to occupy Tarentum in 272 B.C. Envoys were now sent to Carthage to demand explanations of this act; but the Carthaginians avoided an open rupture, and did not threaten to regard the meditated Roman invasion of Sicily

as a *casus belli*. When, however, the Roman fleet, together with the vanguard of the land army under Gaius Claudius, appeared at Rhegium in the spring of 274 B.C., news came that Hiero and the Mamertines had accepted the mediation of Carthage, that the siege of Messina was raised, and the town in the hands of Hanno, the Carthaginian admiral. The Mamertines, while thanking Rome for her speedy aid, said that they no longer required it. The Roman general, however, refused to acquiesce in this arrangement, and, despite the warnings of the Carthaginians, set sail. Although at first foiled by the Carthaginian fleet, he succeeded in crossing on the second attempt, and seized the town of Messina, which the cowardly Carthaginian admiral evacuated. Carthage declared war 264 B.C., and a strong fleet under Hanno, the son of Hannibal, blockaded Messina. At the same time a Carthaginian land army laid siege to the town on the north side, and Hiero undertook the attack on the south side of the city. But the Roman consul, Appius Claudius Caudex, crossed over from Rhegium, and, uniting his forces with those of Claudius, surprised the enemy, and succeeded in raising the siege. In the following year (263 B.C.) Marcus Valerius Maximus, afterwards called Messalla, "the hero of Messina," defeated the allied armies of Carthage and Syracuse. Upon this Hiero went over to the Roman side, and continued to be the most important and the firmest ally the Romans had in the island. The desertion of Hiero and the success of Roman arms forced the Carthaginians to take refuge in their fortresses; and the succeeding year (262 B.C.) practically saw the close, for the time being, of the war in Sicily. The siege of Agrigentum, which was held by Hannibal, son of Gisgo, and the flower of the Carthaginian army, was the main episode in this year. Unable to storm so strong a city, the Romans strove to reduce it by famine, but were themselves cut off from provisions by the arrival of a Carthaginian fleet under Hanno. At last a severe battle, in which both sides suffered heavily, gave Rome the coveted town; although the besieged Carthaginians, during the confusion and exhaustion of their conquerors, managed to escape to their fleet at Heraclea. This victory placed the whole island in the hands of the Romans, with

the exception of the maritime fortresses, held by the firm grip of Hamilcar, and the coast towns, which were awed into obedience by the all-powerful Carthaginian fleet. The real difficulties of the war were at last beginning to be realized by the Romans, and the necessity of a fleet was clearly recognized. Not only was it impossible for them completely to subdue Sicily while Carthage ruled the sea, but their own coast was continually ravaged by Carthaginian privateers, and their commerce was well-nigh ruined. Therefore they resolved to build a fleet of one hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. A stranded Carthaginian man-of-war served as a model to the Roman shipbuilders, and in the spring of 260 B.C. the great task was accomplished, and the fleet launched. We have above shown in what poor estimation the Romans held naval matters (cf. p. 108), and, even now, not only the sailors but also the naval officers were almost exclusively drawn from their Italian allies. To compensate for their ignorance of nautical tactics and manœuvres, the Romans made great use of soldiers; and by lowering flying-bridges on to the Carthaginian ships, and fastening them with grappling-irons, they reduced the fight to a land conflict, making it possible to board and capture the enemy's ships by assault. The first great trial of strength took place at Mylae, a promontory to the north-west of Messina, where the Roman fleet under Gaius Duilius encountered the Carthaginian fleet under the command of Hannibal. The Carthaginians, despising their awkward-looking opponents, fell upon them in irregular order; but the boarding-bridges gave the Romans a complete victory, the moral effect of which was far greater than the victory itself. "Rome had suddenly become a naval power, and held in her hand the means of energetically terminating a war, which threatened to be endlessly prolonged, and to involve the commerce of Italy in ruin." In the following year (259 B.C.) the consul Lucius Scipio captured the port of Aleria in Corsica; but no permanent hold was gained in Sardinia, although the coast was plundered. In Sicily, Hamilcar showed great skill and energy in his conduct of the war, and by political proselytism, as well as by force of arms, baffled the Romans in their attempts to completely oust

the Carthaginians. The small towns inland continually returned to their Carthaginian allegiance, while the fortresses on the coast, of which Panormus and Drepana were the chief, were practically impregnable. The war dragged on without any decisive action. At last, weary of this unsatisfactory state of things, the Romans determined to strike at Carthage in her native land. In the spring of 256 B.C. a powerful fleet of 330 ships set sail for Africa; on the way, it received on board at Himera, on the south coast of Sicily, four legions under the command of the two consuls, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Volso. The Carthaginian fleet, consisting of some 350 ships, had taken up its station at Ecnomus to protect its native shores; thus, when the two fleets met, each side must have numbered little less than one hundred and fifty thousand men. After an obstinate struggle, in which both sides suffered heavily, the Romans gained the day; and the consuls, having deceived the Carthaginians as to their place of landing, disembarked, without any hindrance from the enemy, on the eastern side of the gulf of Carthage, at the bay of Clupea. An entrenched camp was formed on a hill above the harbour; and so confident were the Romans rendered by the success of their plan, that half the army and most of the fleet were recalled home by the senate. Regulus remained in Africa with 40 ships, 15,000 infantry, and 500 cavalry. The terror-stricken Carthaginians did not dare to face the Romans in the field; the towns everywhere surrendered, and the Numidians rose in revolt against Carthage. Cowed by this accumulation of disasters, the proud Phœnician city sued for peace, but the exorbitant terms proposed by Regulus were little calculated to render such a solution possible. Under the spur of dire necessity, Carthage evinced that energy and enthusiasm which on such occasions often marks Oriental nations. Hamilcar, the hero of the guerilla war in Sicily, appeared on the scene with the flower of his Sicilian troops; gold purchased the support both of Numidian cavalry and of Greek mercenaries, among whom was the Spartan Xanthippus, famous for his knowledge and skill in the art of war. During the energetic preparations of Carthage, Regulus remained idle at Tunes; he still pretended to besiege

Carthage, and did not even take measures to secure his retreat to the naval camp at Clupea. His folly cost him dear. In the spring of 255 B.C. the Carthaginians were in a position to take the field; and Regulus accepted battle without waiting for reinforcements. Roman courage availed not against the superior tactics of Xanthippus. Outflanked and surrounded by the Numidian horse, crushed and completely broken up by the elephants, the Romans were almost annihilated. The consul was one of the few prisoners; about two thousand fugitives reached Clupea in safety. On the news of this disaster reaching Rome, a large fleet at once started to save the remnant shut up in Clupea. After defeating the Carthaginians off the Hermaean promontory, the Roman ships arrived at Clupea, and carried off what remained of the army of Regulus. Content with accomplishing this, they sailed homewards, and thus evacuated a most important position, and left their African allies to Carthaginian vengeance. To crown the misfortunes of Rome, a terrible storm destroyed three-fourths of their fleet, and only eighty ships reached home in safety.

Carthage took a stern vengeance on the revolted Numidians, and filled her exhausted treasury with the heavy fines in money and cattle which she exacted from her rebellious subjects. Able now to assume the offensive, she despatched Hasdrubal, son of Hanno, to Sicily, with a force especially strong in elephants. He landed at Lilybaeum, and Sicily once more became the theatre of the war. A new Roman fleet of three hundred ships was despatched thither in the incredibly short space of three months; and the Carthaginian stronghold of Panormus, with many other places of minor importance, fell into the hands of the Romans. But by land no progress was made, and the Romans did not dare to risk a battle in the face of the overwhelming numbers of Carthaginian elephants. The year 254 B.C. passed by; and the next year, while returning from a plundering expedition to the coast of Africa, the Romans lost 150 vessels in another storm, owing to their obstinate refusal to allow the pilots to take their own course. The senate, utterly downcast by this disaster, reduced their fleet to sixty sail, and limited themselves to the defence of the coast and the convoy of transports. The land war in Sicily was more

successful. In 252 B.C., *Thermae*, the last Carthaginian position on the north coast, and the island of *Lipara*, yielded to Roman arms; and in the following year the consul *Gaius Caecilius Metellus* gained a great victory over the Carthaginian army under the walls of *Panormus*, owing to the disorder of the elephants, which charged their own side. The Carthaginians could no longer take the field, and in a short time they only retained their hold on *Drepana* and *Lilybaeum*. The Romans refused the Carthaginian proposals for peace in 249 B.C., and concentrated all their efforts on the capture of *Lilybaeum*. This was the first great siege undertaken by Rome; but the greater adroitness of the Carthaginian sailors and the ability of *Himilco*, the commander of *Lilybaeum*, parried all the efforts of the Romans both by sea and land. Foiled in their efforts to take the city by assault, they were forced to attempt to reduce it by blockade; but they were unable to completely prevent Carthaginian ships from running into the harbour with supplies from *Drepana*, while the light Numidian cavalry made all foraging both difficult and dangerous on land. In addition, disease, arising from the malaria of the district, thinned the ranks of the Roman land army. Weary of the tedious blockade, the new consul, *Publius Claudius*, attempted to surprise the Carthaginian fleet as it lay at anchor before *Drepana*. Completely outmanœuvred by the Phœnician admiral, *Atarbas*, the Roman consul fell into the trap set for him, and only escaped by prompt flight himself. Ninety-three Roman vessels, with the legions on board, were captured; and the Carthaginians won their first and only great naval victory over the Romans. *Lilybaeum* was thus set free from the blockade by sea; in fact, the remains of the Roman fleet were in their turn blockaded by the Carthaginian vice-admiral, *Carthalo*. The latter also took advantage of the folly of the second consul, *Lucius Junius Pullus*, who was in charge of a second Roman fleet, intended to convey supplies to the army at *Lilybaeum*. *Carthalo* met this fleet off the south coast, sailing in two squadrons at some distance from each other; interposing his own ships between the squadrons, he forced both to run on shore. A violent storm completed the work begun by Carthaginian assaults, and both squadrons were com-

pletely wrecked, while the Carthaginians easily weathered the storm out on the open sea.

Now, if ever, was the time for Carthage to humble her great antagonist. During a war of fifteen years the Romans had lost four fleets, three with armies on board; and one land army had been destroyed in Libya. This, added to the many minor losses by disease, guerilla warfare, battles by sea and land, had reduced the burgess-roll, from the years 252-247 B.C. alone, by about forty thousand men, without reckoning the losses of the allies, who bore the whole brunt of the war by sea. The loss of ships and war-material, and the utter paralysis of trade, had inflicted incalculable damage. Moreover, every method and every plan had been tried, and Rome was no nearer the end than she was at the outset of the war. In utter despondency the senate no longer felt equal to the task of subduing Sicily; the fleet was discarded, and the state ships were placed at the disposal of privateer captains, whose unaided valour might perhaps compensate in some degree for the feebleness of the senate. The miserable indolence and weakness of the Carthaginian government alone saved Rome: relieved of the necessity of self-defence, the Carthaginians imitated the example of their enemy, and confined their operations by land and sea to the petty warfare in and around Sicily.

The next six years of uneventful warfare, from 248-243 B.C., reflect little credit on Carthage, and still less on Rome. Hamilcar, named Barak or Barca (*i.e.* lightning), the Carthaginian commander in Sicily, alone showed proper energy and spirit. Aware that the infantry of Carthage were no match for the Roman legions, and aware that his mercenaries cared as little for Carthage as for Rome, he proved that personal attachment to a general could compensate in the minds of his soldiers for the want of ties of nation and country. He established himself on mount Ercte (Monte Pellegrino), and later captured the town of Eryx, and from these strong positions he carried on a plundering warfare, and levied contributions from the plains, while Phoenician privateers ravaged the Italian coast. The Romans were unable to dislodge him from either of his positions, and every day threatened to bring fresh defeat and disgrace to the

Roman arms. No Roman general was a match for Hamilcar, and the Carthaginian mercenary had learnt to look the Roman legionary in the face. This gloomy aspect of affairs was completely changed, not by the energy of the Roman government, but by the noble patriotism of individuals. By private subscription a fleet of two hundred ships, manned by sixty thousand sailors, and fitted out with the greatest care, was raised and presented to the state. This fleet, under the consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus, had no difficulty in occupying the harbours of Drepana and Lilybaeum, and prosecuted the siege of both places with great vigour. Carthage, taken by surprise, despatched a weak fleet with supplies to the beleaguered towns, and hoped to effect a landing without interference from the Romans. They were, however, intercepted and forced to accept battle off the small island of Aegusa, in the spring of 241 B.C. The result was never doubtful, and the Romans gained a complete and decisive victory. "The last effort of the Roman patriots had borne fruit; it brought victory, and with victory peace."

Peace was concluded at last on terms not wholly unfavourable to Carthage. Sicily, however, had to be abandoned, and Hamilcar was forced by the incapacity of others to descend from the positions he had occupied for seven years with such conspicuous success. In addition to Sicily, Carthage ceded all the islands between Sicily and Italy. She was also condemned to pay a war indemnity of £790,000, a third of which was to be paid down at once, and the remainder in ten annual instalments. But Hamilcar refused to accede to certain demands of the Roman consul; and the independence and integrity of the Carthaginian state and territory were expressly guaranteed. Both Rome and Carthage bound themselves not to enter into a separate alliance with any dependency of the other, nor in any way to encroach on the rights which each exercised in her own dominions. The dissatisfaction of the patriotic party at Rome was so great, that at first the public assembly refused to sanction the proposed terms of peace. But a commission was appointed to settle the question on the spot in Sicily; and practically the proposals of Catulus were adopted, and Hamilcar, the unconquered general of a vanquished

nation, delivered up to the new masters of Sicily the fortresses which had been in the possession of the Phoenicians for at least four hundred years; and in 241 B.C. the West had peace.

The severe struggle, which thus ended in the extension of Roman dominion beyond Italy, throws a strong and by no means favourable light on the Roman military and political system. Notwithstanding the noble patriotism and heroic energy often exhibited by the citizens, we cannot fail to mark the miserable vacillation shown by Rome in the conduct of this war. The fact is that the organization of the Roman senate and of the military system were only adapted for a purely Italian policy, and a purely continental war. The wide area of the battlefield, the necessity of a fleet, the siege of maritime fortresses, were all hitherto unknown to the Romans. For the solution of such problems the senate, from its composition and ignorance, was quite unfitted: moreover, the system of choosing a new commander every year, often to reverse the plans of his predecessor, was manifestly absurd. The noble creation of this war—a Roman fleet—was never truly Roman; Italian Greeks commanded, and subjects, nay even slaves and outcasts, composed the crews; naval service was always held in slight esteem when compared with the honour of the legionary. The general, again, as we see in the case of Regulus, could not change his tactics to suit the exigencies of the moment. The old idea that any citizen was fit to be a general was true only in rustic warfare, while the notion that the chief command of the fleet should be regarded as a mere adjunct of the chief command of the land army excites our wonder and ridicule. To the energy of her citizens, and still more to the terrible blunders of her adversaries, Rome owed her victorious issue from the first Punic war.

In the years that followed this peace Rome gradually extended her dominion to what we may term the natural boundaries of Italy, to the Alps in the north and to Sicily in the south. On the expulsion of the Phoenicians, Rome contented herself with allowing her steadfast ally, Hiero, to retain his independence as ruler of Syracuse, and of the neighbouring districts of Elorus, Neetum, Acrae, Leontini,

Megara, and Tauromenium; the rest of Sicily she permanently appropriated. Meanwhile Carthage, in consequence of her cowardly and miserly attempt to dock the pay of the mercenaries of Hamilcar, was engaged in a deadly conflict with her revolted soldiers and her Libyan dependencies, among whom the revolution spread far and wide. The city of Carthage itself was besieged, and not only in Libya but even in Sardinia the insurgents looked to Rome for aid. Rome, although she refused to succour the revolted Libyans, availed herself of the treachery of the Sardinian garrisons, and seized possession of that island in 238 B.C.; shortly afterwards she added Corsica to her new possessions. Carthage, restored by the genius of Hamilcar to her full sovereignty in Africa, demanded in 237 B.C. the restitution of Sardinia; but she did not dare to take up the gage of battle which was promptly thrown down by Rome; and therefore she had to submit to the cession of Sardinia, and, in addition, to pay 1200 talents (£292,000).

The acquisition of Sicily and Sardinia caused an important change in the Roman method of administration, and one which marked the difference between Italy and the provinces, between the conquests of Rome in her own proper land of Italy and those she made across the sea. The necessity of some special magistrate for these transmarine regions caused the appointment of two provincial praetors, one for Sicily, and one for Sardinia and Corsica; the coasts of these latter islands alone were occupied, and with the natives of the wild interior perpetual war was waged. The two praetors exercised powers very similar to those of the consuls in early times; the praetor was commander-in-chief, chief magistrate, and supreme judge. One or more quaestors were assigned to each praetor, to look after the finance-administration. With the exception of this difference in the chief power, the same principles were adhered to as those which Rome had observed in organizing her dependencies in Italy. All independence in external relations was taken away from the provincial communities; every provincial was restricted, as regards the acquisition of property, and, perhaps, the right of marriage, to his own community. But in Sicily, at least, the cities retained their old federal organization, and

their harmless federal diets : the power of coining money was probably withdrawn. The land, however, was left untouched, and each Sardinian and Sicilian community retained self-administration and some sort of autonomy. A general valuation corresponding to the Roman census was instituted every fifth year, and all democratic constitutions were set aside in favour of aristocratic councils.

Another *de facto* distinction, of great importance, between the Italian and transmarine communities, was that the latter furnished no fixed contingent to the army or fleet of Rome ; they lost the right of bearing arms, and could only use them in self-defence when called upon by the praetor. In lieu of a contingent they paid a tithe of their produce and a tax of five per cent. on all articles of commerce exported or imported ; these taxes were not new to the Sicilian Greeks, who had paid them to the ruling power, whether the Persian king, Carthage, or Syracuse. Certain communities were no doubt exempted from these imposts ; Messana, for instance, was enrolled in the Roman alliance, and furnished its contingent of ships ; other towns, such as Segesta and Halicyae, Centuripa and Alaesæ, and Panormus, the future capital of Roman Sicily, though not admitted as confederates of Rome, were exempted from taxation. But on the whole the position of Sicilian and Sardinian communities was one of tributary subjection, not of dependent alliance.

By the possession of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, Rome might now call the Tyrrhene sea her own. On the east coast, the founding of Brundisium in 244 B.C. had from the first established Roman supremacy ; the quarrels of the Greek states prevented any rival power arising in Greece itself. But the Adriatic Sea was a prey to Illyrian pirates, and hordes of these tribes, in their dreaded Liburnian galleys, defied all authority and ravaged every coast. They established themselves in Phoenice, the most flourishing town in Epirus, and at length took possession of the rich island of Corcyra. Urgent appeals from hard-pressed Greek settlements on the Adriatic coast, and constant complaints from Italian mariners, at last caused Rome to interfere, and to send an embassy to Agron, king of Scodra and Illyria, with demands that he should put the evil down. His refusal was met with an insulting threat

from one of the Roman envoys, for which all the ambassadors paid with their lives. A Roman fleet, with an army on board, appeared to succour the hard-pressed town of Apollonia in 229 B.C., and the corsairs were completely vanquished and their strongholds razed to the ground. The territory of the sovereigns of Scodra was greatly restricted by the terms imposed by Rome; and much of the Illyrian and Dalmatian coasts, together with several Greek cities in that quarter, was practically reduced under Roman sway, or attached to Rome under forms of alliance. The Greeks submitted with a good grace to the humility of seeing their countrymen delivered from the scourge of piracy by barbarians from across the sea, and admitted the Romans to the Isthmian games and the Eleusinian mysteries. Macedonia was too weak to protest by aught but words, and that part she disdained to play.

With the exception of a six-days' war with Falerii in 241 B.C., nothing broke the peace of Italy proper. But matters were not so settled in the northern district between the Alps and the Apennines, where strong Celtic races still held their ground. South of the Po were the Boii and Lingones, and other minor tribes; the Ligurians, mingled with isolated Celtic tribes, occupied the Apennines to the west, near the sources of the Po; while the eastern part of the plain to the north of that river, from Verona to the coast, was held by the Veneti, an Illyrian race. Besides these, were the Cenomani, settled near Cremona and Brescia, and the most important of all the Celtic tribes in Italy, the Insubres, who were established around Milan. It was but natural that Rome should now wrest the gates of the Alps from the grasp of the barbarian, and make herself mistress, not only of the mighty river, navigable for 230 miles, but of the largest and most fertile plain in the then civilized Europe. The Celts, indeed, had begun to stir in 238 B.C., and two years later the army of the Boii, united with the Transalpine Gauls, encamped before the walls of Ariminum. Fortunately for Rome, exhausted as she then was by her struggle with Carthage, the two Celtic hosts turned on one another, and thus freed Rome from the threatened danger. In 232 B.C., the Celts, weary of waiting for the outbreak of that contest for Lombardy, which they per-

ceived was inevitable, resolved to strike the first blow. All the Italian Celts, except the Cenomani and Veneti, took part in the war against Rome; advancing to the Apennines in 225 B.C., from which quarter the Romans did not expect an attack, they ravaged Etruria up to the walls of Clusium; and by a clever strategy almost succeeded in cutting off one Roman army before the other could relieve it. Failing in this attempt, the Celts retreated, but were intercepted at Telamon by some legions which had crossed from Sardinia and landed at Pisae. The consul Gaius Atilius Regulus commanded this force, and at once made a flank attack with his cavalry; he fell in the engagement, but his colleague, Papus, at the head of the Italian army, now came into action. Despite their desperate resistance against the double attack, the Celts were utterly defeated; and all the tribes south of the Po submitted in the following year (224 B.C.). The next year saw the struggle renewed on the northern side of the river. The valour of the Roman soldiers redeemed the blunder of their general, Gaius Flaminius, and turned what nearly proved a defeat into a glorious victory over the Insubres. Many conflicts took place in 222 B.C., but the capture of the Insubrian capital, Mediolanum, by Gnaeus Scipio, put an end to their resistance. Thus the Celts of Italy were completely vanquished; and, though in the most northern and remote districts Celtic cantons were allowed to remain, in all the country south of the Po the Celtic race gradually disappeared. By extensive assignations of land in the country between Picenum and Ariminum; by carrying the great northern highway, or "Flaminian road," on from Narnia across the Apennines to Ariminum on the Adriatic coast; by planting fortresses and Roman townships, *e.g.* Placentia and Cremona on the Po itself, in the newly acquired territory, the Romans showed their determination to reap the fruits of their late conquests; but a sudden event checked them while in the full tide of their prosperity.

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First Punic war.—Polyb. i. 5-end; ii. 22-35. Appian. Sic. 2, sq.; Lib. 3-5. Dio. Cass. Fr. 43, sq.
Provincial government.—Marq. Stv. i. 242, sqq.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SECOND PUNIC, OR HANNIBALIAN, WAR, 218-202 B.C.

Hamilcar Barca—Founds kingdom in Spain—Hannibal—Capture of Saguntum—Rome declares war—Hannibal reaches Gaul—Passage of the Alps—Rise of the Italian Celts—Battles on the Ticinus and Trebia—Crossing of the Apennines—Battle at Lake Trasimene—War in Apulia—Battle of Cannae—Its results—State of things in Spain, Africa, Macedonia, and Sicily—Attitude of Rome.

THE most shallow-minded Carthaginian can scarcely have regarded the peace with Rome in 241 B.C. as likely to prove lasting. Carthage had, no doubt, long been divided into two parties, the one eager for political reform, the other striving to retain the close oligarchical constitution. These two parties were now further rent asunder by the cry for war and the demand for peace. To the latter, or peace-party, belonged the gerusia and Council of a Hundred, under the leadership of Hanno; to this party the timorous and indolent, the worshippers of money and place, naturally attached themselves. The war-party found its chief support in the democratic leaders and military officers, among whom Hasdrubal and Hamilcar were pre-eminent; the wisest, most far-seeing, and most patriotic Carthaginians lent their aid to this section of the state. The successful conclusion of the war against the revolted Numidians, while it made clear to all the genius of Hamilcar Barca, brought out in odious contrast the miserable incapacity of Hanno, and the utterly corrupt and pernicious character of the ruling oligarchy. Great prominence was thus given to the patriotic party; and, although political reform was impracticable, while Rome

was all-powerrul and gave her countenance to the treacherous oligarchs, important changes were effected in the military system of Carthage. Hanno was deposed from his command, and Hamilcar was nominated commander-in-chief of all Africa for an indefinite period. He could only be recalled by the vote of the popular assembly, and the choice of a successor was made to depend, not on the magisterial board at home, but on the decision of the officers serving in the army. Apparently Hamilcar was invested with these dictatorial powers for the purpose of superintending the border-warfare with the Numidians; but we shall see what a different view he took of the charge committed to him.

The task set Hamilcar of saving the state by means of the army was calculated to try to the uttermost the abilities of that great man. Not only had he to construct an army out of poor material, and to pay his mercenaries out of an ill-supplied chest, but he had also, as leader of a party, to please and delude in turn the venal multitude at home, whose fickle devotion he knew but too well how to appraise. Although still a young man, Hamilcar possibly foreboded his premature fate; and, ere he left Carthage, he bound his son Hannibal, then nine years of age, by the most solemn oath to swear eternal enmity to Rome, and thus he transmitted to his children his schemes, his genius, and his hatred. At the head of a strong army, and accompanied by a fleet under his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, Hamilcar marched westwards, apparently against the Libyans in that quarter; suddenly, without any authority from the government, he crossed over into Spain, and there laid the foundations of the Spanish kingdom of the Barcides. Of his personal achievements we have no details, save that Cato the elder, on seeing the still fresh traces of his work, exclaimed that no king was worthy to be named by the side of Hamilcar Barca. After nine years of constant war with the Spanish native tribes, when he was beginning to see the result of all his labours, he fell fighting, in 228 B.C.

For the next eight years, his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, carried on his plans in the same spirit. The adroit statemanship of Hasdrubal consolidated the Carthaginian kingdom in Spain, which the generalship of Hamilcar had

founded. The fairest regions of Spain, the southern and eastern coasts, became Carthaginian provinces; towns were founded, chief of which was Cartagena on the only good harbour on the south coast, whose silver mines, then first discovered, a century later produced a yearly yield of more than £360,000. The revenues of the province not only paid for the maintenance of the army, but enabled Hasdrubal to remit a large sum to Carthage every year. The native chiefs were by every means attached to Carthage, and all the subject communities served as an excellent recruiting-ground for the Carthaginian army. Constant conflicts with the Iberians and Celtic tribes in Spain greatly improved the character of the Carthaginian infantry. The revival of commerce, which thus recouped in Spain what it had lost in Sicily and Sardinia, was in itself a sufficient reason for the non-interference of the home government with the plans of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal.

We must ascribe the inaction of Rome during such a long period of brilliant Carthaginian successes to the ignorance of the Romans, who knew very little of so remote a country as Spain, and who, no doubt, at first regarded with contempt the reports furnished them by their spies in Carthage. In 226 B.C., however, the senate warned Hasdrubal not to pass the Ebro, and received into alliance the two Greek towns on the east coast of Spain. Saguntum and Emporiae; by fixing this limit to the Carthaginian advance, the Romans intended to secure a basis of operations in the country between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, should occasion arise for their active interference in Spain. The delay of the Romans in beginning the second Punic war was due to many causes, but chiefly to their inability to form a true conception of the great scheme which the family of Barca was pursuing with such success. "The policy of the Romans was always more remarkable for tenacity, cunning, and consistency, than for grandeur of conception or power of rapid organization."

So far fortune had smiled on the Carthaginians. It was not fated that Hasdrubal should attempt to realize the dream of his great predecessor. In 220 B.C., he fell by an assassin's hand, and his place was filled by Hannibal, the eldest son of Hamilcar, then in his twenty-ninth year.

Despite his youth, the man thus chosen by his comrades-in-arms, was fully worthy of their confidence. Nature had bestowed upon him gifts both mental and physical, which were no mean qualifications for his mighty task; education and association had completed nature's work. Brought up from his infancy to cherish thoughts of vengeance on Rome, trained as a soldier in early youth under his father's eye, already highly distinguished, as the commander of the Spanish cavalry, alike for personal bravery and for the higher qualities of a leader, Hannibal was specially fitted to carry out the great projects of his father. Anger, envy, and meanness have written his history, but have not been able to mar the pure and noble image which it presents. Combining in rare perfection discretion and enthusiasm, caution and energy, Hannibal was marked in a peculiar degree by the Phœnician characteristic of inventive craftiness. "Every page of the history of the period attests his genius as a general; and his gifts as a statesman were, after the peace with Rome, no less conspicuously displayed in the reform of the Carthaginian constitution, and in the unparalleled influence which, as a foreign exile, he exercised in the cabinets of the eastern potentates. The power which he wielded over men is shown by his incomparable control over an army of various nations and many tongues—an army which never, in the worst times, mutinied against him. He was a great man; wherever he went, he riveted the eyes of all."

Hannibal resolved at once to begin the war, while the Celts in Italy were still unsubdued, and while a war between Rome and Antigonus Doson, the far-seeing ruler of Macedonia, seemed imminent. Unfortunately the death of the latter reduced Macedonia to silence; while the death of Hasdrubal had again brought the peace-party in Carthage to the helm of the state. But Hannibal was not to be deterred by the opposition of the miserable politicians at home. Having in vain tried to provoke the people of Saguntum to break the peace, he attacked the town in 219 B.C. on the pretext that the Saguntines were oppressing the Torboletes, a native tribe subject to Carthage. The authorities at home, whose sanction Hannibal had purposely refused to wait for, did not dare to oppose the

war thus begun. Owing to the supineness of the Romans, who were engaged in war with the Illyrian brigands, Saguntum fell after a siege of eight months; and the rich spoils sent home to Carthage roused the people to such a pitch of enthusiasm that they accepted the challenge of war from the Roman envoys, who had been sent to demand the surrender of Hannibal, in the spring of 218 B.C.

Hannibal entrusted the safety of Spain to his younger brother, Hasdrubal, and sent home about 20,000 men to defend Africa. The fleet remained in Spain to secure the communications between that country and Africa. Two smaller fleets were despatched, the one to ravage the coast of Italy, the other to attempt to surprise Lilybaeum, and to renew the war in Sicily. Hannibal himself, relying on the enmity of the Celts and Ligurians to Rome, determined to make northern Italy the meeting-place, where all foes of Rome might unite and aid him in the achievement of his great enterprise. It is not clear why he chose the land-route, the old pathway of Celtic hordes, in preference to that by sea; for neither the maritime supremacy of the Romans, nor their league with Massilia, could have prevented a landing at Genoa.

In the spring of 218 B.C., with a force of 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 37 elephants, he set out from Cartagena to cross the Ebro; and he inspired all his soldiers with enthusiasm by pointing out the main plan and object of his undertaking. Distracted by the unexpected nature of the danger which threatened them, the Romans seem to have been but little prepared with a settled plan of war, and to have fatally delayed both in aiding Saguntum and in meeting Hannibal on the Ebro; the losses inflicted on Hannibal by the native tribes, when he forced the passage of that river, show clearly where the Romans ought to have first opposed him. Part of his troops he left behind to secure the newly won country between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, part he sent home on reaching that chain of mountains; with the rest, amounting to 50,000 infantry and 9000 cavalry, all veterans, he crossed the Pyrenees, nor did he meet with any serious resistance until he reached the Rhone, opposite Avignon; there a levy of Celts, raised by the consul Publius Cornelius Scipio, but not yet united to the consular army, threatened

opposition. Hannibal, however, by buying up all the available boats, and constructing rafts with great speed, crossed the Rhone at the same moment that the Celts were taken in the rear by a detachment under Hanno, which had three days previously crossed the Rhone much higher up. Scipio, although warned by the Celts of Hannibal's arrival, had delayed fatally at Massilia; when at last he did move to Avignon, he found that the Carthaginians had passed on into the Celtic territory on the Roman side of the Rhone, and could not now be prevented from reaching the Alps. Hannibal had the choice of three routes in crossing the Alps. The coast-route was, however, out of the question, as it was not only barred by the Romans, but would also have taken him away from his destination. The remaining two routes at that time consisted of the pass of the Cottian Alps (Mont Genève), which route, though shorter, passes through a difficult and poor mountain country, and of the pass of the Graian Alps (the little St. Bernard). This, though longer, is far the easiest to traverse; and the route by this pass leads through the broadest and most fertile of the Alpine valleys; moreover, the Celts favourable to Hannibal inhabited the country on the Italian side of the little St. Bernard, while the Cottian pass led directly into the territory of the Taurini, a Celtic tribe at feud with the Insubres, who were Hannibal's allies. Thus every circumstance tended to make Hannibal choose the pass of the Graian Alps.*

The march along the Rhone towards the valley of the upper Isère, through the rich country of the Allobroges, brought the Carthaginian army, after sixteen uneventful days, to the foot of the Alps, and there the first dangers were encountered from some cantons of the Allobroges, who made constant assaults on the army during its ascent of the first Alpine chain, and during the descent of the precipitous path that trends sheer down to the lake of Bourget. A welcome rest in the fertile valley of Cham-

* The question as to the Alpine route of Hannibal is still open. For an able summary of the various views, see pp. 362-372 of Mr. W. T. Arnold's edition of the third volume of his grandfather's history. Strong arguments are there advanced in favour of the Mont Genève and of the Col d'Argentière passes.

béry gave Hannibal time to repair his losses in beasts of burthen and horses. Marching up the Isère, the army now entered the territory of the Ceutrones, whose courteous hospitality did but mask their coming treachery. On reaching the narrow track that led to the summit of the St. Bernard, Hannibal found the pass occupied on both sides, and in the rear, by the perfidious Ceutrones. His forethought in sending forward the baggage and cavalry saved him from the intended robbery of his supplies; but all along the line of his ascent constant conflicts caused not only loss of men and beasts, but confusion and utter despondency in his soldiers' hearts. At last, however, the summit was reached, and, after a brief rest, the perilous descent began; here the late season, with its fresh mantle of September snows, proved more terrible than the treacherous attacks of barbarians. But all difficulties gave way before the iron will and unshaken confidence of the great general; and at last the shattered army enjoyed a nobly earned repose in the plain of Ivrea, quartered in the villages of the friendly Salassi, clients of the Insubres. Fortunately for Hannibal, no Roman troops were stationed so far north to await his arrival. The Alps were crossed, and Hannibal had attained his object; but to this end he had sacrificed more than half his infantry and three thousand cavalry. The military value of this wonderful achievement may well be called in question, but the courage, skill, and masterly execution of the plan by Hannibal himself admit of no doubt. "The grand idea of Hamilcar, that of taking up the conflict with Rome in Italy, was now realized. It was his genius that projected this expedition; and the unerring tact of historical tradition has always dwelt on the last link in the great chain of preparatory steps, the passage of the Alps, with a greater admiration than on the battles of the Trasimene lake and of the plain of Cannæ."

Hannibal's arrival in Italy disconcerted the Roman plans. The army of Publius Scipio had already landed in Spain, under the command of Gnaeus, the brother of Publius. The latter, on being foiled by Hannibal at the passage of the Rhone, had himself returned to Pisae with a few troops, and was now in command of the Roman force in the valley of the Po. A fortunate delay had

prevented the army of the other consul, Tiberius Sempronius, from reaching its destination in Africa. Owing to the futile attempt of the Carthaginian squadron to surprise Lilybaeum, and the threatened attack on the Italian coast, Sempronius had passed the summer in securing the Sicilian and Italian coasts against the possibility of surprise by Carthaginian fleets. Urgent orders from the senate now recalled him to the defence of Italy. The Boii and Insubres, who had been driven to revolt before the time agreed upon with Hannibal, by the erection of the Roman fortresses in their country, fully occupied the attention of the hard-pressed colonists and of the two legions sent to their aid. Thus Hannibal had time both to rest his troops, capture the capital of the Taurini, and bring over to his side all the Ligurian and Celtic communities in the upper basin of the Po, before Publius Scipio encountered him.

The two armies met in the plain between the Ticino and the Sesia, not far from Vercellae, and Scipio was decisively beaten, owing to the overpowering force of the light Numidian cavalry. Scipio himself was severely wounded, and only saved by the spirited devotion of his son, then a youth of seventeen. Scipio at once wisely recrossed the Po, and broke down the bridge over it. But despite his able precautions Hannibal easily crossed the river higher up on a bridge of boats, and again confronted the Roman army, which had withdrawn from its previous position in the plain before Placentia to a very strong position on the hills behind the Trebia. Scipio, although unable to save Clastidium from being plundered, or to extinguish the torch of insurrection now passed on from Celtic canton to Celtic canton, had by this move completely checked the advance of Hannibal; moreover, he had thus given an opportunity to the second army, which, under Sempronius, had marched by land from Messana to Ariminum, to unite with his own force at Placentia. The Roman army, thus strengthened and occupying a highly advantageous position, might await with confidence the next move of Hannibal. Fortunately for the latter, Scipio's wound caused the sole command to devolve on Tiberius Sempronius, who was fired with impatience to avenge the previous defeat on the Ticinus,

and the desolation of the villages of such Celts as still remained loyal to Rome. Drawn on by the simulated flight of the enemy's cavalry, the Romans crossed the Trebia* in hot pursuit, and suddenly found themselves face to face with the whole army of Hannibal drawn up for battle. The Roman cavalry proved no match for their opponents; but the stubborn courage of the infantry resisted every attack both of foot and horse, until a picked force of two thousand Carthaginians under Mago by an attack in the rear decided the day. Even then the first division of the Roman infantry, ten thousand strong, cut their way through the midst of the enemy and succeeded in reaching the fortress of Placentia. The losses of Hannibal in battle fell chiefly on the Celts; but many of his veterans and all his elephants, except one, perished afterwards of fatal diseases caused by the cold and wet of that bitter December day. This victory made Hannibal master of northern Italy, and the Celtic insurrection spread far and wide without let or hindrance from Roman arms. Hannibal bivouacked for the winter where he was, and organized the Celtic accessions to his army, which are said to have numbered more than sixty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry.

Despite this brilliant success Hannibal was probably well aware of his true position in Italy. He knew that his chance of ultimate victory depended rather on political than military achievements, upon the gradual loosening and breaking up of the Italian confederation: as long as that confederation remained united, and confronted him with its vastly superior resources, he no doubt felt that with his inferior infantry, with his precarious and irregular support from home, with the capricious aid of the fickle Celts, he had no hope of humbling to the dust his proud antagonist. Owing to this conviction, Hannibal's conduct of the war in Italy is marked by a constant change both of the theatre of war and of the plan of operations, and also by an earnest endeavour to turn every success to good account by posing as the liberator of Italian cities from

* On the geographical questions raised by the battles of Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae, and by the passage of the Apennines and the escape from Fabius, see able notes by Mr. W. T. Arnold in his edition above referred to, pp. 373-399.

the tyranny of Rome. With this object in view he released all the Italian prisoners without a ransom, and charged them to report that he waged war against Rome, not Italy, whose saviour and restorer of ancient powers and independence he professed himself. The Roman prisoners, on the other hand, he loaded with chains as slaves.

In the early spring of 217 B.C., Hannibal set out from the Po; and at a point as far west as possible, while the new consul, Gaius Flaminius, lay idle at Arretium, he crossed the Apennines.* His army suffered terrible hardships on the other side of the mountains when struggling through the low-lying and flooded country extending between the Serchio and Arno, and Hannibal himself lost the sight of one eye from ophthalmia. However, at last he reached the rich land at Faesulae, where he encamped, having thus completely baffled the consul Flaminius.

The latter, raised by the popular party at Rome to a second consulship, did not wait for his colleague, Gnaeus Servilius, to leave his useless post at Ariminum, and join him. Fired by his ambition to justify the good opinion of the democrats, and stung by the sight of the devastation which marked far and wide the line of Hannibal's march through Etruria, Flaminius hastily followed, and overtook Hannibal in the district of Cortona. Here Hannibal had chosen his field of battle—a narrow defile between two steep mountains, closed at its outlet by a high hill, and its entrance by the lake Trasimene.* The outlet was barred by the Libyan infantry, and on both sides the cavalry and light troops of Hannibal were posted in concealment. The unsuspecting Romans in the thick mist advanced into the pass. When they drew near the hill at the outlet, the cavalry of Hannibal, at a given signal, closed the entrance, and the mist rolling away revealed the enemy on all sides. There was no battle; it was a mere rout. Fifteen thousand Romans fell, and among them the consul; and as many more were captured: while Hannibal's loss was but fifteen hundred. The vanguard of the Romans, six thousand strong, proved once more the irresistible might of the legion, and cut its way through the opposing infantry; but they were next day surrounded and made prisoners of war by Maharbal, at the head of a squadron of cavalry.

* See note on preceding page.

About the same time the cavalry of the army of Servilius, which had been sent forward to support Flaminius, fell in with the enemy and was cut to pieces. All Etruria was lost; and the Romans broke down the bridges over the Tiber, and nominated Quintus Fabius Maximus dictator, to make all preparations for the defence of the city, upon which it was supposed Hannibal would at once march.

Hannibal, however, knew better; suddenly marching through Umbria, he carried fire and sword through the territory of Picenum, and then gave a much-needed rest to his army on the shores of the Adriatic. More than this, he here adopted the marvellously bold experiment of reorganizing his Libyan infantry, after the Roman fashion, and of equipping them with the arms taken from the Roman spoils. From here, too, he sent messages of his victory by sea to Carthage. After a sufficient rest and practice of the new method of warfare, he marched slowly along the coast into southern Italy. His hope that the Italian confederacy would now break up was not fulfilled: not a single community entered into alliance with the Carthaginians.

A new general of very different tactics now confronted Hannibal, in the person of the dictator Quintus Fabius. Elected to counteract the demagogic spirit, which had given the consulship to Flaminius, he was as opposed in strategy as in policy to his predecessor. Determined to avoid a pitched battle, and to wear out Hannibal by small conflicts and deprivation of provisions, Fabius followed Hannibal, as he marched over the Apennines into the heart of Italy and made a futile attempt on the loyalty of Capua. Bitter indeed must have been the feelings of the Roman soldier as from the heights along which Fabius marched was visible the flaming track of ruin and desolation throughout Samnium and Campania, beneath the devastating blight of the Numidian horsemen. At last, however, the patient policy of Fabius seemed to grasp its reward. When Hannibal, foiled in his attempt on Capua, began to retreat, Fabius intercepted his route near Casilinum by strongly garrisoning that town on the left bank of the Volturnus, and occupying the heights commanding the right bank with his main army, while a division blockaded the road along that river.

All his efforts were, however, baffled by the famous ruse of Hannibal, who caused his light-armed troops to climb the heights immediately above the road, and drive before them a number of oxen with lighted faggots on their horns. The Romans, thinking that they saw the whole Carthaginian army marching off during the night by torch-light, abandoned their blockade of the road, and made for the heights. Hannibal thus gained a free passage for his main army, and on the morrow easily disengaged his light troops; then marching north-east, and laying all the country under contribution as he marched, he proceeded to entrench himself for the winter in the plains of Apulia at Gerunium. Huge stores of grain and supplies were daily amassed by detachments sent out for that purpose.

Marcus Minucius, the master of the horse, in the absence of the dictator formed a camp not far off, in the territory of the Larinates; and by some successful engagements with Carthaginian detachments he caused the storm, which had long been brewing at Rome, to break out against Fabius and his policy. The Roman legions felt that they had borne long enough the passive attitude of vigilant observation, and had too long acquiesced in the sight of all Italy spoiled by the invader without striking a blow in her defence. Indeed, the policy of Fabius not only did not save Rome, but never really hindered Hannibal from carrying into execution any single operation he had planned. The outcry at Rome gave rise to the absurd resolution of the people, by which Minucius was appointed co-dictator with the same powers as Fabius, but with a diametrically opposite policy. Minucius, in his eagerness to give effect to his spirited policy, was soon lured into a foolish attack, and only escaped annihilation by the timely rescue of Fabius. Rome, now thoroughly aroused, haughtily declined the offers of money from Hiero of Syracuse, and from the Greek cities in Italy, and determined to send out such a force as had never before been seen: consisting of eight legions, each raised a fifth above the normal strength, with a corresponding number of allies. Weary of the dictatorship, and bitterly distrusting the senate, the people elected, in 216 B.C., as consul, Marcus Terentius Varro, whose sole recommendation was his low origin and hot-headed zeal for the popular cause. His

colleague was the able Lucius Aemilius Paullus, whose candidature was supported, and with great difficulty carried, by the senatorial party.

Hannibal had already resumed the offensive in Apulia, and, marching south from Gerunium, took the citadel of Cannae, which commanded the plain of Canusium. Hither came the two new consuls with a united army of eighty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, as compared with the forty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry of Hannibal. Paullus saw that the wide, open plain was very favourable to the superior horse of his enemy, and therefore constructed two camps higher up the river, the larger on the right bank, the smaller on the left of the Aufidus, hoping thus to compel Hannibal to retire from his position. But the soldiers and his hot-headed colleague were impatient of camp-work, and longed to measure swords with the hated foe. At early dawn, on one of the days on which Varro held the supreme command, the Romans crossed over the river, then almost dry, and took up position near their smaller camp in the wide plain that stretches westward from Cannae. The Carthaginians followed them, and Hannibal formed his infantry in crescent shape, with the Celtic and Iberian troops in the centre to meet the first shock of the serried ranks of the enemy; the light Numidian horse occupied the open space in the plain facing the Italian cavalry under Varro; the heavy cavalry under Hasdrubal occupied the ground near the river on the right, and faced the less numerous Roman horse under Paullus. The Roman legions easily overthrew the Celts and Iberians, and pressed on into the centre to complete their success. On the left wing the cavalry action was undecided, but on the right Hasdrubal completely scattered and cut down the Roman horse. Meanwhile the Roman infantry had become wedged in by their eager efforts to follow up their first success, and were unable to deploy their ranks so as to meet the attacks of the Libyan infantry, who closed in upon all sides. At this crisis, Hasdrubal, who had previously completely routed the horse under Varro and left their pursuit to the light Numidian horse, made a third and final charge on the confused ranks of the Roman infantry. All was lost, and

the Romans merely stood to be butchered. The army was annihilated: seventy thousand Romans lay on the field, while Hannibal lost but six thousand, two-thirds of whom were Celts. Paullus was among the slain, as also the pro-consul Gnaeus Servilius, who had led the infantry, and eighty men of senatorial rank. Varro was not ashamed to survive the disaster, and, saved by his swift steed, reached Venusia; and the senators, with a noble, if to us ironical, generosity, met him at the gates of Rome, and thanked him for not having despaired of the safety of the state. In addition to those slain on the field of battle, most of the division guarding the Roman camp were made prisoners; and, as if to crown the disasters of Rome, a little later a legion sent to Gaul fell into an ambush, and was completely destroyed, together with its general, Lucius Postumius, the consul-designate for the coming year.

Now at last there seemed good hope of realizing that great political combination for the sake of which Hannibal had invaded Italy; his army had nobly performed its task, and opened the way for the union of the eastern and western foes of the proud city. In one essential quarter, indeed, all chance of succour had been for the time destroyed. Gnaeus Scipio had met with great success in Spain, and was not only master of the country north of the Ebro, but with the aid of his brother Publius, had in 217 B.C. crossed that river, after inflicting a severe defeat on the Carthaginian fleet at its mouth, and advanced as far as Saguntum. Further, in the following year, almost at the same time as the great victory of Cannae, the two Scipios totally defeated Hasdrubal, when attempting to cross the Ebro and bring a fresh army across the Pyrenees to his brother's aid. As far as Africa was concerned, Hannibal had received all the assistance he could hope for from home, though he was continually pinched for want of money wherewith to pay his soldiers. The news of the victory of Cannae made Carthage resolve to send him reinforcements of money and men, and to prosecute the war with energy both in Italy and Spain. Now, too, Philip of Macedon formed his long-deferred alliance with Carthage, and undertook to land an army on the east coast of Italy, in return for the restoration of the lands in

Epirus, which had been wrested from Macedonia by the Romans. Moreover, Hieronymus, the young and incapable successor of the shrewd Hiero, joined the side of the Carthaginians; and the united fleet of Syracuse and Carthage at once rendered the position of the Romans at Lilybaeum most critical. But, above all, signs were at last visible that the Italian confederacy was losing its cohesion, and throwing off its allegiance to Rome. Arpi in Apulia, and Uxentum in Messapia, all the towns of the Bruttii, most of the Lucanians, the transplanted Picentes near Salernum, the Hirpini, the Samnites with the exception of the Pentri, and Capua, the second city in Italy, with the neighbouring towns of Atella and Calatia, passed over to the side of Hannibal. The aristocratic party in all these places vehemently opposed the change of sides, and their bitter opposition, especially in Capua, produced internal conflicts, which greatly lessened the advantage derived by Hannibal from these secessions. On the other hand, the south Italian and Campanian Greeks remained firmly loyal to Rome, despite their perilous position and the attacks of Hannibal; naturally, too, all the Latin colonies in southern and central Italy presented an unyielding front to the enemy.

Such were the direct consequences of the day of Cannae, a cruel but just punishment for the grave political errors of the Roman people. The war with Hannibal had revealed, with fatal clearness, the absurdity of the method of electing generals, and the still greater danger of such a method when, as in the case of the two consuls Flaminius and Varro, it became the tool of party and the two-edged instrument of demagogism. It was clear that, to work the deliverance of the state, the breach between the senate and the citizens must be healed, and that the government and the governed must unite in the great cause with a trustful confidence in each other. It was clear, too, that the selection of generals must depend upon the one stable element in the state, the senate; and that their choice, no longer subject to the suspicion of party favouritism, but based upon the necessary qualities of a leader, must be heartily ratified by a united people. The noble and patriotic manner in which the senate performed its task, and healed the party

quarrels by abstaining from all recriminations, constitutes its glorious and imperishable honour. Quintus Fabius took the lead in all the defensive measures, and the praetor, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, whose destination previous to the battle of Cannae had been Sicily, was appointed to the chief command of the hastily collected army. Every nerve was strained to gather troops and supply arms. All those above boyhood were called out, debtor-serfs and criminals were armed, and even eight thousand slaves were incorporated in the army. All proposals from Hannibal touching a ransom of captives were contemptuously rejected; no word, no action, was suffered to have even the semblance of a thought of peace, while Hannibal was still in Italy and Cannae unavenged.

AUTHORITIES.

Second Punic war—Cannae.—Polyb. ii. 1, 36; iii. 8-21, 29-end; vi. 58. Liv. xxi. xxii. xxiii.-c. 30. Plut. Q. Fabius. Appian Sp. 3, sqq.; Hann. 1-28; Lib. 6, sqq.

CHAPTER XV.

FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA.

Marcellus—War in Campania and Apulia—Siege of Syracuse—End of war in Sicily—Philip of Macedonia—Spanish war—Defeat and death of the Scipios—Publius Scipio—Capture of New Carthage—Conquest of Spain—War in Italy—Fall of Capua—Weariness of Roman allies—Hasdrubal in Italy—Battle of the Metaurus—Scipio in Africa—Recall of Hannibal—Battle of Zama—Peace—Results of the war in and out of Italy.

THE closing act of the second Punic war shifts the scene of active operations once more to Sicily, where the petty jealousy of Carthaginian generals was as potent a factor in the final triumph of Rome as the ability of her commanders and the prowess of her soldiers. From Sicily we turn again to Spain, where the genius and good fortune of Publius Scipio revived the drooping spirits of his countrymen by a series of brilliant successes : finally, with Hannibal, we strain our anxious gaze to the mighty Alpine wall, and await the coming of Hasdrubal to join hands with his great brother, and shake Rome to her foundations in her native land.

In Italy itself the war flagged. The gradual decline of Hannibal's power dates really from his victory at Cannae. He had gained all that he could hope for by mere force of arms, but the Roman confederation in central Italy still presented an unbroken front to his invincible army. The support of the Sabellian communities was not such a gain to Hannibal as it would have been in earlier days, when the Sabellian youth was trained to arms and when their land was not overawed.

by Roman fortresses. The great difficulty of taking fortified towns prevented a single battle from being so decisive as it is in our own days. Further, Rome had grown wiser, and the selection of Marcus Claudius Marcellus as commander of the forces in Italy contributed in no small degree to Rome's preservation. Hannibal could no longer hope that Roman armies would remain inactive spectators on mountain heights, while he laid waste the valleys below ; nor that rash and inexperienced generals would leave the protection of their own fortresses and meet him on battle-fields specially chosen by himself. At first, indeed, Hannibal's advance into Campania from the field of Cannae met with conspicuous success. Capua, Nuceria, Acerrae, joined him ; Casilinum, the key of the Volturnus, fell after an obstinate siege in 215 B.C. But the important ports of Neapolis, Cumae, and Nuceria remained faithful to Rome, and Nola was secured in its fidelity by the activity of Marcellus, who repulsed Hannibal with considerable loss in 216 B.C. The winter of this year was passed by Hannibal in Capua, and the luxury of this town had a pernicious effect on his troops, who for three years had not been under a roof.

In 215 B.C., the Romans took the field with three armies : one, under Marcellus, posted near Nola ; a second, under the veteran Quintus Fabius Maximus, encamped near Cales ; a third, under Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, covering the coast and the ports of Neapolis and Cumae. Thus Hannibal was watched on all sides, and the investment of Capua was threatened. An attempt by the Campanians to surprise Cumae was completely frustrated by Gracchus, who not only defeated the Campanians, but even worsted Hannibal when he appeared to avenge the defeat of his allies.

A fourth Roman army meanwhile, under the praetor Marcus Valerius, had taken up its position at Luceria, and in conjunction with the force under Marcellus caused great annoyance to Hannibal's allies in Apulia and Lucania. To relieve these, Hannibal again attacked Marcellus, and again suffered defeat beneath the walls of Nola.

This succession of misfortunes obliged Hannibal to evacuate Campania and march to Arpi, where he might

in person put a stop to the further progress of the Romans in Apulia. Gracchus followed him, leaving the other two Roman armies to arrange for the attack on Capua in the coming spring.

It was clear to Hannibal that the offensive was no longer possible, and that the defensive became daily more difficult. The accomplishment of his great purpose depended on the strenuous co-operation of the government at Carthage, on the success of the Carthaginian generals in Spain, and on the long-promised aid of Philip of Macedon. But the peace party in Carthage, after the first impressions of the victory of Cannae had died away, regained the ascendancy, and, with the exception of a small force of four thousand Africans, no adequate reinforcements reached Hannibal from Carthage. To this miserable short-sightedness and indolence of the Carthaginian citizens the safety of Rome was in no small measure due. Compelled to turn for help from his native land to Spain, Macedonia, and Sicily, Hannibal caused the interest of the war, so far as active operations were concerned, to centre in those countries; his allies there renewed their exertions to reach out to him the help his own country refused, while the Romans strained every nerve to confine Hannibal's allies to their respective countries and to prevent reinforcements reaching him. Thus, although Italy plays a somewhat passive part in the future events of the war, "all efforts were directed towards, as all interest centred in, the removal or the continuance of Hannibal's isolation in southern Italy." Had Hannibal been able to bring into play the united forces of Carthage, Spain, Sicily, and Macedonia, the overthrow of Rome would have been well-nigh certain; but in no quarter did matters go well for him. The activity and success of the two Scipios in Spain held Hasdrubal in check; and the reinforcements sent thither from Carthage failed to produce much effect. An attempt to secure Sardinia was baffled by Titus Manlius Torquatus, who completely destroyed the Carthaginian force in 215 B.C. The assassination of Hieronymus at the close of the same year left the state of Syracuse in great confusion; and Hippocrates and Epicydes, emissaries of Hannibal, counteracted a tendency on the part of the chief Syracusans to return to their old

alliance with Rome. Marcellus himself was sent over to finish the war in Sicily in 214 B.C. Owing to the dread of Roman vengeance and the passionate enthusiasm for liberty which Hannibal's emissaries had excited in the Syracusan multitude, Marcellus was obliged to lay siege to the city, and after eight months to convert the siege into a blockade.

The defence of Syracuse was notable alike for the famous ingenuity of the great engineer, Archimedes, and for the efforts made by Carthage in its behalf. A strong army landed under Himilco, and occupied Agrigentum; this army was joined by a force under Hippocrates, the able commander of Syracuse. A combined attack on the Roman besieging army failed, and the relieving armies were compelled to encamp on the low, marshy grounds along the Anapus. The deadly pestilence engendered in those districts swept off the troops, while the Romans remained unscathed in their quarters, which they had transferred to a part of the suburbs, surprised by them not long before during a festival of the Syracusans. The survivors of the Carthaginian and Syracusan armies dispersed into the neighbouring towns, and Epicydes, the successor of Hippocrates as commander of Syracuse, abandoned the city as lost. Shortly afterwards, Syracuse surrendered, in 212 B.C., and was completely sacked by the soldiers of Marcellus, Archimedes being among the slain. Syracuse was deprived of its freedom and was classed among the communities that paid tribute to Rome.

All Sicily seemed lost to the Carthaginians, whose force at Agrigentum, under Hanno and Epicydes, dared not make a move against the triumphant Romans. But Hannibal's influence, and the ability of one of his Libyan cavalry officers, Mutines, whom Hannibal sent from Italy, carried on a guerilla warfare throughout the island with great success. Mutines, at the head of the Numidian cavalry, even succeeded in worsting Marcellus himself. Hanno, however, as appointed by the Carthaginian government, was jealous of the success of one of Hannibal's officers; insisting upon giving battle to Marcellus against the advice of Mutines, he was utterly beaten. Mutines still gained brilliant successes, which only served to aggravate the stupid jealousy of Hanno; the latter even

deposed him from his command of the cavalry, and gave it to his own son. In indignation at such treatment, Mutines delivered up Agrigentum to the Roman general Marcus Valerius Laevinus, and thus put an end to the war in Sicily in 210 B.C. Carthage made no further effort to regain her former position in that island, which was gradually reduced to order and tranquillity under Roman rule.

Hannibal might with good reason have looked for more substantial aid from Macedonia. In Greece generally there was a strong outburst of national patriotism; internal discord had been healed and peace established in 217 B.C. between Philip and the Aetolian league. But in Greece, as in Carthage, a national leader was wanting to give effect to the national ardour of the moment. Philip of Macedon lacked that enthusiasm and faith in the Greek nation which alone could have fitted him for such an enterprise. "He knew not how to solve the arduous problem of transforming himself from the oppressor into the champion of Greece." After a futile attempt to take Apollonia in 216 B.C., and after constantly threatening but never daring to carry out his promised descent on the east coast of Italy, he made a useless attack on the Roman possessions in Epirus in 214 B.C. The energetic action of the Romans, who crossed over from Brundisium and stormed his camp, cowed him back into inaction. Nor was he roused out of this inertness until a coalition, headed by the Aetolians, and joined by the old Greek enemies of Macedonia, and supported by Rome, forced him to bestir himself. In the long and dreary war that followed, Philip repelled the attacks of his foes with vigour and success, but Hannibal soon ceased to look eastward for aid. The war itself bore no fruit, except that it exhausted the Greek states and rendered them the easier prey to Roman oppression. Worn out by useless conflicts, at last Philip made peace with the Aetolians in 205 B.C., and then with Rome: a peace favourable, indeed, to Philip, in so far as it left matters in much the same position as they were at the beginning of the war; but disastrous to him and to the Greek nation as a whole, since by it "the grand and just combination, which Hannibal had projected and all Greece had for a moment joined, was shattered irretrievably."

In Spain the struggle was sharpest, and was marked by the vicissitudes incidental to the character of the country and habits of the people. Neither Rome nor Carthage had brought into Spain a force sufficiently powerful to terminate the contest; therefore both sides had to have recourse to native help; but the natives regarded neither side with ardent partisanship, and they were never to be depended upon for persistent and united action. For a time, indeed, the two Roman generals, Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, were brilliantly successful. Not only did they firmly secure the barrier of the Pyrenees, but they established a new Rome, as a rival to Nova Carthago, in the city of Tarraco, and penetrated Andalusia in 215 and 214 B.C. In the latter year they almost reached the Pillars of Hercules, and extended the Roman protectorate in southern Spain, and regained and restored the important town of Saguntum; at the same time they raised up a powerful enemy to Carthage, in the African prince Syphax, who ruled in the modern provinces of Oran and Algiers. A revolt was excited by Syphax among the Libyan dependencies of Carthage, to quell which Hasdrubal Barca took the flower of his Spanish troops in 212 B.C. Syphax was defeated by the brave Massinissa, son of Gala, king of the modern Constantine and ally of Carthage, and was compelled to make peace with Carthage. The Libyan revolt was easily quelled, and Carthage wreaked her usual vengeance on the rebels.

Hasdrubal proceeded to Spain in 211 B.C., followed by Massinissa, who commanded the Numidian cavalry, and three Carthaginian armies took the field. The two Scipios were thus surprised while plundering the Carthaginian territory in Spain. Instead of retreating, they took into their pay 20,000 Celtiberians, and divided their forces so as to face the three armies of the enemy. Hasdrubal easily induced the Celtiberians by a sum of money to leave the Romans to their fate. Hemmed in on all sides, while attempting to retreat, the two armies, with their brave commanders, were cut to pieces. The result of this twofold disaster was that Carthage was again paramount in all Spain south of the Ebro.

In the following year, Rome was enabled, by the fall of Capua, to despatch a force of 12,000 men, under the pro-

praetor Gaius Claudius Nero, to check the Carthaginian advance in Spain. Nero was not unsuccessful on the field, but his strategic ability was more than counterbalanced by his harshness and inability to deal with the natives. The senate, aware of the great exertions which were being made in Carthage to send Hasdrubal and Massinissa with a powerful army across the Pyrenees to Italy, resolved to send an extraordinary general with a numerous force to Spain. His nomination, if we may credit the story, was left to the people. At first no one in Rome offered himself as a candidate; but at last Publius Scipio, son of the Publius Scipio who had fallen in Spain, although not properly qualified for the office, came forward. The youth, personal beauty, enthusiasm, military distinctions gained on the fields of Trebia and Cannae, and political eminence of Publius Scipio were of themselves calculated to deeply impress the people of Rome: the thought that a youth of twenty-seven, who had merely held the offices of aedile and military tribune, was thus suddenly raised to the highest and proudest office in the state at a time of great peril, and was going forth to avenge a father's death, rendered that impression indelible, and has coloured the story with romantic details. Although lacking the energy, and iron will, and statesmanlike grasp of such men as Caesar and Alexander, Publius Scipio was eminently calculated to inspire others with his own enthusiasm. His personal qualities, both of appearance and manner; his graceful oratory; his happy union of Hellenic culture and Roman patriotism; above all, his intense belief in himself as one specially favoured by the gods, served to cast a romantic glamour round his name, and to kindle in men's hearts a fervent belief that a true prophet and divinely inspired saviour had arisen to give victory and peace to his country.

On being elected general, Scipio proceeded to Spain in 210 B.C., accompanied by the propraetor Marcus Silanus, and by his friend Gaius Laelius as admiral, with a strong force and well-filled chest. He at once successfully executed one of the boldest *coups-de-main* known in history. All the three Carthaginian generals were at least ten days' march from Nova Carthago. Suddenly, early in the spring of 209 B.C., Scipio appeared before the

weakly garrisoned town with his whole army and fleet. By engaging the attention of the garrison with an attack from the land side, Scipio had no difficulty in scaling the undefended walls from the harbour side, where at ebb-tide a land passage was left open to his troops. The capture of the Carthaginian capital, apart from the immense stores thus thrown into the conqueror's hands, completely restored Roman prestige in Spain. Scipio's command was indefinitely prolonged, and not only were the passes of the Pyrenees, and all the country north of the Ebro, secured, but incursions were successfully made into Andalusia. Rendered over-confident by success, Scipio extended his operations over too large an area, and, when in Andalusia, he encountered Hasdrubal Barca at Baecula, in 208 B.C., on his march northward to his brother's aid. Scipio claimed the victory, but Hasdrubal attained his object, and succeeded in crossing the Pyrenees, and taking up his quarters in Gaul for the winter. On Hasdrubal's departure, the two other Carthaginian generals retired to positions of safety, and left all active warfare to the light cavalry of Massinissa.

Fresh armies were sent from Carthage in 207 and 206 B.C.; but in both years the Romans were successful. In the latter year, Scipio fought a second battle at Baecula against the enemy, who numerically were far superior, and by this battle decided the question as to which power should rule in Spain. Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, and Mago, the youngest of Hamilcar's sons, were completely defeated, and escaped to Gades. Mago held the latter place, and for a moment the illness of Scipio and mutiny of one of his corps, owing to arrears of pay, encouraged the hope that a national insurrection would take place in Spain against the Romans, and restore to Carthage her lost supremacy. Scipio, however, speedily recovered, and quelled the tumult; and Mago, by order of the Carthaginian government, collected what ships and troops he could, and set sail for Italy. Gades, the first and last of Carthaginian possessions in Spain, submitted on favourable terms to the Romans; and thus Spain, after a struggle of thirteen years, became a Roman province. Scipio resigned his command, and returned to Rome in 206 B.C.

Meanwhile the great conflict in Italy had been continued without interruption. After Hannibal's departure, the north of Italy had been reoccupied by the Romans, whereas all lower Italy, as far as Mount Garganus and the river Volturnus, with the exception of the fortresses and most of the ports, was in Hannibal's hands. His main army lay at Arpi, and was confronted by four legions, under Tiberius Gracchus; further south, and as yet opposed by no Roman force, a second Carthaginian army, under Hanno, held possession of all the Bruttian land. The main Roman army, under the two consuls Quintus Fabius and Marcus Marcellus, was occupied with the attack on Capua. An estimate of all the Roman forces employed at this time in Italy, Sicily, Spain, and Sardinia, can scarcely fix the number at less than 200,000 men. The finances of Rome, especially those derived from the land-tax, were terribly embarrassed; and the culture of the fields, where possible, must have been left to slaves, old men, women, and children. Still, Rome gradually recovered what she had so rapidly lost; her forces increased, those of Hannibal diminished; her commanders were no longer mere citizen-generals, but experienced and able officers of the stern school of Marcellus.

Hannibal, unable even to protect his Italian allies, had to play the waiting game, until Philip of Macedon or his brothers in Spain should come to his aid. "We hardly recognize in the obstinate defensive system which he now began, the same general who had carried on the offensive with almost unequalled impetuosity and boldness: it is marvellous in a psychological, as well as in a military point of view, that the same man should have accomplished the two tasks prescribed to him—tasks so diametrically opposite in their character—with equal completeness." His efforts were at first chiefly directed to preventing the investment of Capua, in which for a time he was successful. But in 214 B.C., among other towns, the important position of Casilinum was retaken by the consular army; and Hannibal failed in an attempt to capture Tarentum. In the same year, Tiberius Gracchus gained several successes over Hanno's Bruttian army, and, after a victory near Beneventum, he gave liberty and citizenship to the slave-soldiers fighting in the ranks. The following year was

equally favourable to Rome. Arpi was recovered, and several Bruttian towns passed over to Rome; even a Spanish division deserted the Carthaginian army and enlisted on the Roman side. In 212 B.C. Rome outraged Greek feeling by putting to death all the hostages of Tarentum and Thurii, who had been induced by Hannibal to attempt to escape. As a result of this senseless revenge, Tarentum opened her gates to Hannibal, though her citadel still remained in possession of the Romans; and Heraclea, Thurii, and Metapontum, shortly afterwards followed her example. The same year saw the death of Tiberius Gracchus and the dispersion of his army, which had been posted on the Appian Way to prevent Hannibal's approach to Capua. Betrayed by a Lucanian, Gracchus fell, and Hannibal raised the blockade of Capua, which the other two consuls had begun. Various cavalry successes were also gained by the Phœnician horse, and two Roman forces were completely defeated in Apulia and Lucania.

Despite these successes, as soon as Hannibal left Capua for Apulia, three Roman armies, under Appius Claudius, Quintus Fulvius, and Gaius Claudius Nero, gathered and strongly entrenched themselves round the doomed Capua. Towards the close of the winter 212-211 B.C. provisions were almost exhausted, and urgent messages were sent to Hannibal at Tarentum requesting his immediate succour. Hannibal at once set out and encamped on Mount Tifata, close to Capua; but the Romans refused to stir from their entrenchments, despite the insulting onset of the Numidian and Campanian cavalry as they dashed against their lines. As a last resource, Hannibal tried to draw off the Roman armies by a rapid march towards Rome. Passing through Samnium, and along the Valerian Way past Tibur, he crossed the bridge over the Anio, and encamped on the opposite bank, five miles from the city. The two legions in the capital prevented any successful operations against Rome itself. In truth there was no real danger. Hannibal had never hoped to surprise the city, but merely to draw off the legions around Capua, and raise the blockade. But the Roman generals refused to be lured from their Capuan lines.

The consul Publius Galba followed Hannibal on his retreat from Rome; suddenly Hannibal turned on him

and utterly defeated him, capturing his camp by storm. This was but a poor compensation for the inevitable fall of Capua. This city, after a siege of two years, capitulated, and suffered a terrible revenge at the hands of the exasperated Romans. Her chief magistrates were scourged and executed, many citizens were sold into slavery, the property of the rich was confiscated, and the old constitution abolished. The fall of Capua gave a tremendous shock to the respect and confidence which Hannibal had enjoyed among the Italian allies, and Roman arms straightway recovered that ascendancy which the secession of Capua had shown them to have lost. The citadel of Tarentum still held out, and an attempt of Hannibal to surprise Rhegium had previously failed.

Rome now felt confident as to the issue of the war in Italy, and was for the first time able to reduce the number of her legions, and also to despatch large reinforcements to Spain. The following year, 210 B.C., saw Rome prosecute the war in Italy with less vigour. Marcellus infused his wonted energy into the struggle in 209 B.C., and, after a two-days' battle, gained a costly victory over Hannibal. Tarentum soon after was surrendered by the treachery of its garrison to the veteran Quintus Fabius, then consul for the fifth time. The city was pillaged, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. Hannibal arrived too late for its relief, and retired to Metapontum. By the fall of Tarentum, and the loss of all his most important acquisitions, he was gradually hemmed in to the south-western point of the peninsula.

In the following year, Marcus Marcellus, chosen as consul with Titus Quintius Crispinus, hoped to strike a decisive blow. Fortune, however, willed otherwise, and robbed the aged general of the laurels which he, more than any other Roman, deserved. Surprised during a reconnaissance near Venusia by a strong force of African cavalry, Marcellus fell fighting, and his colleague died afterwards of his wounds. The war had now reached its eleventh year. The material distress of Rome was terrible: the exchequer was utterly impoverished, the lands lay fallow, and starvation was only averted by corn-supplies from Egypt; the pay of the soldiers was greatly in arrear, and the country villages, no longer smiling

homes of farmers, were nests of beggars and brigands. Still more ominous was the fact that the allies of Rome began to weary of the struggle, and even Latium to waver in her allegiance. In 209 B.C. many of the Latin communities announced that henceforth they would neither send contingents nor contributions, and that Rome must carry on the struggle single-handed. Fortunately the colonies in Gaul, Picenum, and southern Italy, with Fregellae at their head, refused to adopt so short-sighted a policy. Arretium gave dangerous signs that the Etruscans were preparing to rise once more in aid of Hannibal.

In the midst of all these difficulties and signs of coming trouble, the news arrived that Hasdrubal had crossed the Pyrenees in the autumn of 208 B.C., and that Rome would have to face, next year, both sons of Hamilcar in Italy. Thus, at last, it seemed as if Hannibal was destined to reap the reward of his long and patient waiting. Rome once more called out twenty-three legions. Hasdrubal, however, was too quick for them, and, ere the Romans could occupy the outlets of the Alpine passes, news came that he had reached the Po, that the Gauls were flocking to his standard, and that Placentia was invested. Marcus Livius hastened to the northern army: while his colleague Gaius Nero, with the aid of the force at Venusia under Gaius Hostilius Tubulus, barred the advance of Hannibal. The latter marched from the Bruttian territory and fought an indecisive engagement with Nero at Grumentum; he succeeded, however, in his object, and by a flank march reached Apulia, and encamped at Canusium. Nero followed, and took up his position opposite to him.

While the two armies remained idly facing one another, Nero had the good fortune to intercept the all-important despatch from Hasdrubal, acquainting Hannibal with his intention to meet him at Narnia. Nero thereupon made his bold and famous march with a picked force of seven thousand men, and joined Marcus Livius in the north at Sena Gallica: he left behind him the bulk of his army strongly entrenched against attack, and, what was more important, he left Hannibal unconscious of his departure and ignorant of Hasdrubal's intention. The two consuls at once marched against Hasdrubal, and found him crossing the Metaurus. Hasdrubal tried to avoid a battle, but,

being deserted by his guides, made the best provision for the inevitable. A flank attack by Nero decided the hotly contested day. Hasdrubal scorned to survive the disaster, and his army was destroyed.

The defeat and death of Hasdrubal, in 207 B.C., solved the mighty question of the triumph or humiliation of Rome. After fourteen days' absence, Nero again reached his old station at Canusium, and confronted the unconscious Hannibal in Apulia. With him, in ghastly fashion, he brought the news of Hasdrubal's defeat, and the overthrow of all Hannibal's plans and hopes. Hannibal retired to the Bruttian territory; while Rome, overjoyed at the relief from the terrible strain of past years, and conscious that the peril was over, resumed business and even pleasure as in time of peace, and made no great effort to finish the war.

Thenceforth the war languished in Italy, nor could all the superior force of his opponents compel Hannibal to shut himself up in fortresses or to leave Italian soil. The next few years are marked by the lethargy of Rome, and the gradual retreat of Hannibal into the southernmost corner of Italy. The Carthaginian government, alarmed at the prospect of an African invasion, showed some vigour in 206-205 B.C., and sent reinforcements to Hannibal and an embassy to Philip, and commissioned Mago to revive the war in the north of Italy. Philip, however, had already made peace with Rome. Mago, indeed, prosecuted the war with vigour. Landing at Genoa with the remains of the Spanish army, he sacked the town, and formed a new army of Gauls and Ligurians. But the exertions of the Carthaginian government and its adoption of the views of Hannibal came too late.

We have now reached the final scene of this great contest. Publius Scipio, who had returned from Spain in the previous year, was chosen consul in 205 B.C. His popularity with the multitude made him no favourite with the senate, whose members viewed with suspicion his Greek refinement and modern culture, and not unjustly criticized his leniency and indulgence towards his officers and his conduct of the war in Spain. Moreover, the senate was averse from an expedition to Africa as long as Hannibal was in Italy, and was specially disinclined to intrust it to Scipio, who had shown too clearly a

tendency to slight the constitutional authority of the senate and to rely on his fame and popularity with the masses. At last, however, Scipio was intrusted with the task of building a fleet in Sicily, and raising an army, of which the two legions in Sicily formed the nucleus. The fleet was ready in forty days, and seven thousand volunteers responded to the call of their beloved commander.

In the spring of 204 B.C., Scipio set sail with 30,000 men, 40 ships of war, and 400 transports, and landed unopposed at the Fair Promontory near Utica. He was at once joined by his old foe Massinissa, who had been driven from his kingdom by the combined armies of Carthage and Syphax. The latter had embraced the side of Carthage, and, as a reward, had caused Carthage to renounce her old ally Massinissa. The arrival of Syphax with a powerful army, and his junction with the Carthaginian force stationed to oppose Scipio, caused the Roman general to abandon the siege of Utica, and to entrench himself for the winter on a promontory between Utica and Carthage. Fortune, however, never failed to smile on Scipio, and, under cover of proposals for peace, Scipio succeeded in surprising both camps on the same night, and in utterly routing the two armies. Reinforcements at this moment arrived, consisting of a Macedonian corps under Sopater, and of Celtiberian mercenaries. The Carthaginians, thus strengthened, resolved to venture on a pitched battle in the "Great Plains," five days' march from Utica. Scipio was completely successful, and Syphax fell into his hands.

The peace party at Carthage now tried to reverse the Barcid policy, and sued for peace. The terms proposed by Scipio were so moderate that the peace faction were for accepting them at once. But the patriotic party had not lost hope, and during the negotiations recalled Hannibal and Mago from Italy. The latter, however, after striving for three years to form a coalition in northern Italy against Rome, had just been defeated near Milan, and during his voyage home died of a wound received in that battle. Hannibal at once embarked at Croton, and, after an absence of thirty-six years, returned once more to his native land in 203 B.C. "The Roman citizens

breathed freely, when the mighty Libyan lion, whose departure no one even now ventured to compel, thus voluntarily turned his back on Italian ground." To mark the occasion, a grass wreath, the highest distinction possible in the Roman state, was presented to the veteran Quintus Fabius, then nearly ninety,—his last honour, for in the same year he passed away.

Hannibal's arrival in Africa ignited the torch of war once more. The people of Carthage refused to ratify the peace practically concluded, and the seizure of a ship of war with Roman envoys on board broke the armistice. Scipio, in just wrath, ravaged the valley of the Bagradas, and penetrated the interior, when his course was arrested by Hannibal. After fruitless negotiations both armies prepared for a decisive battle at Zama, in 202 B.C. By a skilful disposition Scipio managed that the elephants of the enemy should pass through his lines without breaking them: forcing their way to the side, these unwieldy creatures threw the cavalry of Hannibal into disorder, and the far more numerous horse of Massinissa easily scattered the Carthaginian squadrons. The infantry battle was most bloody and severe: nor did the veterans of Hannibal ever flinch until the cavalry of Massinissa, returning from pursuit, surrounded them on all sides. The Phœnician army was annihilated and Cannæ avenged. Hannibal with a few men escaped to Hadrumetum.

Peace was now inevitable if Carthage was to be saved from destruction. The terms proposed by Scipio, and subsequently ratified by the senate, were: (1) the cession of the Spanish possessions and the islands of the Mediterranean; (2) the transference of the kingdom of Syphax to Massinissa; (3) the surrender of all ships of war except twenty, and an annual contribution of two hundred talents (£48,000) for the next fifty years; (4) an engagement not to make war against Rome or her allies, and not to wage war in Africa beyond the Carthaginian boundaries without the permission of Rome. The practical effect of these terms was to render Carthage tributary and to deprive her of her political independence. The terms of this peace have often been considered too light, and they served as a handle to the charge that Scipio, in his eagerness to secure for

himself the glory of finishing the war, forgot what was due to Rome. A true estimate of the peace and of its effect on the future position of Carthage inclines rather to the view that these terms were the outcome of the nobleness of the two greatest men of the age, and a recognition on the part of Scipio of the crime of blotting out one of the main props of civilization merely to gratify the petty ferocity of his fellow-countrymen. "The noble-mindedness and statesmanlike gifts of the great antagonists are no less apparent in the magnanimous submission of Hannibal to what was inevitable, than in the wise abstinence of Scipio from an extravagant and insulting use of victory."

It remains for us to sum up the results of this terrible war, which for seventeen years had devastated the lands and islands from the Hellespont to the Pillars of Hercules. Rome was henceforth compelled by the force of circumstances to assume a position at which she had not directly aimed, and to exercise sovereignty over all the lands of the Mediterranean. Outside Italy, there arose the two new provinces in Spain, where the natives lived in a state of perpetual insurrection: the kingdom of Syracuse was now included in the Roman province of Sicily: a Roman instead of a Carthaginian protectorate was now established over the most important Numidian chiefs: Carthage was changed from a powerful commercial state into a defenceless mercantile town. Thus all the western Mediterranean passed under the supremacy of Rome. In Italy itself, the destruction of the Celts became a mere question of time: the ruling Latin people had been exalted by the struggle to a position of still greater eminence over the heads of the non-Latin or Latinized Italians, such as the Etruscans and Sabellians in lower Italy. A terrible punishment was inflicted on the allies of Hannibal. Capua was reduced from the position of second city to that of first village in Italy: the whole soil, with a few exceptions, was declared to be public domain-land, and was leased out to small occupiers. The same fate befell the Picentes on the Silarus. The Bruttians became in a manner bondsmen to the Romans, and were forbidden to carry arms. All the Greek cities which had supported Hannibal were treated with great severity: and in the

case of a number of Apulian, Lucanian, and Samnite communities a loss of territory was inflicted, and new colonies were planted. Throughout Italy the non-Latin allies were made to feel their utter subjection to Rome, and the comedy of the period testifies to the scorn of the victorious Romans.

It seems probable that not less than three hundred thousand Italians perished in this war, the brunt of which loss fell chiefly on Rome. After the battle of Cannæ it was found necessary to fill up the hideous gap in the senate by an extraordinary nomination of 177 senators: the ordinary burgesses suffered hardly less severely. Further, the terrible strain on the resources of the state had shaken the national economy to its very foundations. Four hundred flourishing townships had been utterly ruined. The blows inflicted on the simple morality of the citizens and farmers by a camp-life worked no less mischief. Gangs of robbers and desperadoes plundered Italy in dangerous numbers. Home agriculture saw its existence endangered by the proof, first given in this war, that the Roman people could be supported by foreign grain from Sicily and Egypt. Still, at the close and happy issue of so terrible a struggle, Rome might justly point with pride to the past and with confidence to the future. In spite of many errors she had survived all danger, and the only question now was whether she would have the wisdom to make a right use of her victory, to bind still more closely to herself the Latin people, to gradually Latinize all her Italian subjects, and to rule her foreign dependents as subjects, not as slaves,—whether she would reform her constitution and infuse new vigour into the unsound and fast-decaying portion of her state.

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Cannæ to Zama.—Polyb. vii. 1-4; viii. 1, 3-9, 26-end; ix. 3-11, 21-26, 44; x. 1-20, 32-40; xi. 1-3, 19-33; xiv. 1-10; xv. 1-19. Liv. xxiii. 31-end of xxx. Plut. Marcell. P. Scipio. Appian Sp. 15-38; Hann. 28-end; Lib. 7-67.

CHAPTER XVI.

A REVIEW OF THE WEST AND EAST.

Celtic wars—Roman colonization of North Italy—Treatment of Carthage—Flight of Hannibal—Massinissa—Wars with the Spaniards and government of Spain—Macedonia—Asia—Egypt—Powers of Asia Minor—State of Greece—Philip of Macedon—Causes of Roman interference with and declaration of war against Philip—Events of the war—Battle of Cynoscephalæ, 197 B.C.—Terms of the peace—Settlement of Greece by Flamininus.

THE war with Hannibal had interrupted Rome in the extension of her dominion to the Alpine boundary of Italy; that task was now resumed. The Celts, aware of the coming vengeance, had again taken up arms in 201 B.C. The insurrection spread far and wide, and Celtic and Ligurian bands, under the leadership of the Boii and Insubres, sacked Placentia and invested Cremona in the following year. A great battle before the latter city ended in the overthrow of the Celts; but the struggle continued, nor was it till the Boii and Insubres quarrelled, and the Cenomani turned traitors on the field of battle and attacked their old allies, that the Insubres submitted in 196 B.C. The Romans, though they excluded them from Roman citizenship for ever, allowed the Cenomani and Insubres to retain their national constitution and cantonal independence, and exempted them from tribute. They intended that these Transpadane Celts should serve as a bulwark against the incursions of northern tribes. It seems that the Celtic nationality in these districts rapidly became submerged in the all-absorbing spread

of Latin influence. The terror of the Roman name penetrated even beyond the Alps, and by the founding of Aquileia, about 183 B.C., the Romans showed their determination to close the gates of the Alps for ever against the Celtic nation.

The resolve of the senate, in 194 B.C., to incorporate the region south of the Po with Italy roused the Boii to a last struggle; but the bloody battle of Mutina, in the succeeding year, crushed their expiring efforts, and the war became a slave-hunt. Even in the territory still allowed them by the Romans the Boii soon disappeared, and became amalgamated with their conquerors. The old fortresses of Placentia and Cremona were re-established, and new colonies—Potentia and Pisaurum in the old land of the Senones, Mutina and Parma in the lately conquered soil of the Boii—were planted in 184–183 B.C. New means of communication were opened up by the extension of the Flaminian road, under the name of the Aemilian, from Ariminum to Placentia, and by the reconstruction of the Cassian Way from Rome to Arretium. The result of these steps was that the Po, and not the Apennines, now divided Celtic from Italian land, and that south of the Po the old name of *Ager Celticus*, applied to the district between the Po and the Apennines, ceased to have any meaning.

The same policy was pursued with the Ligurian tribes occupying the hills and valleys in the north-western highlands of Italy. Some were extirpated, others transplanted, and the mountainous country between the valley of the Po and the Arno was practically cleared. The fortress of Luna was established in 177 B.C., to act as a bulwark against the Ligurians, and as a port for ships sailing to Massilia or Spain.

With the more western Ligurian tribes in the Genoese Apennines and the Maritime Alps conflicts were incessant, but no permanent results were effected; possibly they served to keep the coast road from Luna to Emporiae comparatively clear. Wars, too, of a similar character were waged in Corsica and Sardinia, where the natives in the interior were continually hunted down by Roman troops.

With regard to Carthage, Rome's great aim was to

keep suspended over her head the fear of a declaration of war. Massinissa was established close at her doors as a most powerful Numidian chief, and Carthaginian territory was constantly exposed to the spoliations of the Libyan and Numidian tribes, who exulted in thus retaliating on their old tormentors for their former sufferings. Carthage bore every insult with true Phœnician patience. Her embassies and complaints to Rome had no effect, save that of making her victor more resolved in this short-sighted policy of humiliation. One man, however, still remained at Carthage, a just object of dread to his enemies. Hannibal had already overthrown the rotten oligarchy and instituted the most beneficial political and financial reforms. By checking the embezzlement of the public moneys it was soon found that the tribute to Rome could be paid without extraordinary taxation. Hannibal was doubtless reorganizing Carthage to be ready for the complications which he saw must arise for Rome in the East. We cannot wonder that the Romans at last insisted on the surrender of Hannibal, in 195 B.C., which demand he anticipated by a speedy flight to the East, and thus "left to his ancestral city merely the lesser disgrace of banishing its greatest citizen for ever from his native land, of confiscating his property, and of razing his house. The profound saying, that those are the favourites of the gods on whom they lavish infinite joys and infinite sorrows, thus verified itself in full measure in the case of Hannibal." Even after his withdrawal, Rome, still not content, adopted a course of perpetual irritation against Carthage. Jealous of her financial prosperity, which remained unshaken by the loss of political power, Rome was ever the credulous receptacle of every rumour of Carthaginian perfidy and intrigue.

Unwilling to have any possessions of her own in Africa, Rome established the great Berber chief Massinissa in his new Numidian kingdom. This remarkable man was in every way fitted for the post. Thoroughly conversant with Carthage, in which city he had been educated, and with whose armies he had fought both as friend and foe, fired with bitter hatred of the Carthaginian oppressor, both as a native African and as a prince personally wronged, gifted with a physique which knew

no fatigue, and with a nature that recked not of scruple or honour, Massinissa became the soul of his nation's revival; and, during ninety years of unimpaired life and sixty years of vigorous reign, was completely successful in consolidating the vast kingdom of which he was the founder. By the addition of the Massaesylian kingdom of Syphax, who died in captivity in Rome, Massinissa extended his sway, not only far into the interior and over the upper valley of the Bagradas, but, by occupying the old Sidonian city of Great Leptis and other districts, he held rule from the Mauretanian to the Cyrenaean frontier, and enclosed the Carthaginian territory on all sides; indeed, he fixed his eyes on Carthage as his future capital. Under his example the Berber became converted from a nomad shepherd into a farmer and settled citizen; the Numidian hordes of plunderers became trained soldiers, worthy to fight by the side of Roman legions; Cirta, his capital, became the seat of Phoenician civilization, which the king specially fostered, with a view, perhaps, to the future extension of his power over Carthage. Thus the Libyan language, nationality, and manners, after so many years of degradation, reasserted their position, and made themselves felt even in the old Phoenician cities.

In Spain the Greek and Phoenician towns along the coast at once submitted to the Romans, and were absorbed in their civilization. On the other hand, the natives, especially in the west and north and the interior, were a perpetual thorn in the side of the Romans, nor was it even safe for a Roman governor to travel without a strong escort. In the southern and eastern districts, where the natives were more civilized, Roman culture was more readily adopted; this was specially the case with the unwarlike Turdetani, situated round Seville, who are said to have evinced no small literary development, and to have practised agriculture with great success. But this was never true of the mass of Spain. Bound together by all-powerful laws of chivalry, proud of their military honour, fired with a love of war and change, the barbaric Spaniards were utterly devoid of political instinct, and could neither submit to military discipline nor political combination. Thus in Spain there was no serious war nor real peace.

The Romans divided the peninsula into two provinces, and while the governor of Hither Spain, the modern Arragon and Catalonia, was ever occupied with quelling Celtiberian revolts, his colleague in Further Spain, which comprised the modern Andalusia, Granada, Murcia, and Valencia, was similarly busy in attempts to hold in check the Lusitanians. Necessity thus compelled the Romans to adopt a new policy—to maintain a standing army of four legions in the country; hence it was in Spain that the military occupation of the land on a large scale first became continuous, and that the military service first acquired a permanent character. The obvious danger of withdrawing or even changing every year a large portion of the forces in so remote and turbulent a country as Spain forced the Romans to adopt this course. Thus service in Spain became very odious to the Roman people, who now learnt that dominion over a foreign nation is a burden not only to the slave but also to the master.

Wars in Spain lasted during the whole of the second Punic war, and in 197 B.C. a general insurrection broke out, which was only quelled by a complete victory gained by the consul Marcus Cato in 195 B.C. Owing to a false report of his return to Italy the insurgents again rebelled, and this time Cato sold numbers into slavery, disarmed all the natives of Hither Spain, and ordered all the towns in the disturbed districts to pull down their walls. Two more Roman victories, in 189 and 185 B.C., were necessary to reduce the Lusitanians to a state of tranquillity. Reality was first given to the Roman rule in Further Spain by the valour of Quintus Fulvius Flaccus in 181 B.C.; and, two years later, his successor, Tiberius Gracchus, achieved results of a permanent character, not merely by force of arms, but by his adroit comprehension of the Spanish character. By inducing Celtiberians to serve in the Roman army, by settling free-booting tribes in towns, by wise and equitable treaties, Gracchus made the Roman name not only feared but liked, and his own memory was ever held dear by the natives.

The Spanish provinces were governed on principles similar to those which were observed in Sicily and Sar-

dinia; but the Romans proceeded with great caution, and often conceded considerable privileges to Spanish towns, such as the right of coining their own money. The old Carthaginian imposts of fixed money payments and other contributions were retained, instead of the tithes and customs paid by Sicilian and Sardinian communities. The grave fault of changing the praetors every year was still committed, and that in spite of the Baebian law, which in 192 B.C. specially prolonged the command of Spanish governors for two years. On the whole, Spain, notwithstanding its mines both of iron and silver, was a burden rather than a gain to the Roman state; but probably the chief reason for its retention as a province was the fear that, if left unoccupied, it might serve another foe as it had served Hannibal, and act as a basis of operations against the sovereignty of Rome.

We must now turn our eyes eastward, and see how those complications arose which involved Rome in the Macedonian and Asiatic wars. Macedonia, alone of all the Greek states, had preserved that national vigour which made the Greek race so famous in earlier days. Philip V. ruled not only over Macedonia proper, but over all Thessaly, Euboea, Locris, Phocis, and Doris, and held many isolated and important positions in Attica and the Peloponnese, of which the chief were Demetrias in Magnesia, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth, "the three fetters of the Hellenes." His real strength, however, lay in his hereditary kingdom of Macedonia proper. It is true that this land was very sparsely populated, but the national character of its loyal and courageous people, never shaken in their fidelity to their native land and hereditary form of government, places the Macedonians almost on a level with the Romans themselves; in particular, the regeneration of the state after the storm of Celtic invasion was as honourable as it was marvellous.

The huge unwieldy empire of Asia, pretending to stretch from the Hellespont to the Punjab, was in reality an aggregate of states in different stages of dependence, or rather a conglomeration of insubordinate satrapies and half-free Greek cities. Along the coast the great king vainly endeavoured to expel the Egyptians; on the eastern frontier he was perpetually harassed by Parthians and

Bactrians; while in Asia Minor the Celtic hordes had settled on the north coast and the eastern interior, and on the west the Greek cities were constantly trying to assert and make good their independence. Indeed, in Asia Minor the king's authority was little more than nominal except in Cilicia, Phrygia, and Lydia, for the powerful kingdom of Pergamus embraced a large portion of the west, and a number of cities and native princes practically owned no lord.

Egypt, on the other hand, presented a marked contrast to the loose organization of Asia. Under the prudent Lagidae, Egypt had been welded into a firmly united and compact state, incapable of revolt or disruption under the worst misrule. The objects of the Ptolemies' policy were not, like the Macedonian or Persian, vague dreams of universal empire, but definite and capable of realization. The whole traffic between India and the Mediterranean was in the hands of the rulers of Egypt, and owing to their excellent geographical position, whether for defence or attack, the Egyptians established themselves not only in Cyrene, but in Cyprus and the Cyclades, on the Phœnician and Syrian coast, on the whole of the south and west coast of Asia Minor, and even in the Thracian Chersonese. The finances of Egypt were most flourishing, and Alexandria, the seat of the Ptolemies, attracted all the learning, whether scientific or literary, of the time. The mutual relation of these three great Eastern powers was naturally one of antagonism and rivalry; but Egypt, as a maritime power, and the protectress of the Asiatic Greek towns and minor states, was the foe of both Macedonia and Asia, while the two latter powers, though rivals, were ready to combine against Egypt, their common enemy.

In addition to the various states of the second rank in Asia Minor, such as Atropatene, Armenia, Cappadocia, Pontus, and Bithynia, there were the three powerful Celtic tribes of the Tolistobogi, Tectosages, and Trocmi, who had settled with their national customs and constitution in the interior. From their barbarous strength and free-booting habits they were the constant terror of the more degenerate Asiatics. It was due to his successful opposition to these hordes that Attalus was raised from the

position of a wealthy citizen to that of king of Pergamus. His court was a miniature Alexandria, and, as the patron of art and science, and from his retention, when king, of his simple citizen character, Attalus may not inaptly be styled the Lorenzo de' Medici of antiquity.

In Greece proper we find a great decay of national energy. The Aetolian league, whose policy was alike hostile to the Achaean confederacy and to Macedonia, would have proved of far more service to the Greek nation had not its members pursued a system of organized robbery, and by their unfortunate policy prevented any union of the whole Hellenic race. In the Peloponnese, the Achaean league had knit together the best elements of Greece, and breathed new life and true patriotism into the nobler portion of the Hellenes. But, owing to the selfish diplomacy of Aratus and the foolish invocation of Macedonian interference to settle its disputes with Sparta, the league had become entirely subject to Macedonian influence, and had admitted Macedonian garrisons into its chief fortresses. Sparta alone of the other Peloponnesian states showed any vigour, and under the unscrupulous Nabis daily increased its strength. The commercial prosperity enjoyed by Byzantium, the mistress of the Bosphorus, and by Cyzicus, on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, was at this time very considerable; but they were both eclipsed by Rhodes, which had secured the carrying trade of all the eastern Mediterranean. Aided by her fleet and the courageous temper of her citizens, Rhodes was the champion of all the Greek maritime cities, and, though as a rule pursuing a policy of neutrality and of friendly relationship with the neighbouring powers, she did not shrink, if need be, from adopting sterner measures. The Rhodians became the leaders of a league of the chief Greek cities scattered along the coasts and islands of Asia Minor and elsewhere, such as Sinope, Lampsacus, Halicarnassus, Chios, Smyrna, etc. This league upheld with success the cause of freedom against the attacks of neighbouring tyrants, and securely fostered the arts of peace and the old Greek spirit, uncontaminated by the tyranny of a dissolute soldiery or the corrupt atmosphere of an Eastern court.

Such, then, was the state of things in the East when

Philip of Macedon was induced to break down the wall of political separation, and to interfere in the West. The miserable incompetence he had shown in the first Macedonian war, 215–205 B.C., and the contemptible indolence which caused him to utterly disappoint Hannibal at a critical period, have been already pointed out. Now, however, though Philip was not the man needed at this juncture, he exhibited none of those faults which had marred his first war with Rome. Philip was a true king in the worst and best sense of the term. Inflated with arrogance and pride, incapable of taking advice or brooking opposition, he was utterly callous to the lives and sufferings of those about him; bound by no sense of moral tie or obligation, the slave of passion, combining in singular fashion sagacity and resolution with supineness and procrastination, he was yet gifted with the valour of a soldier and the eye of a general; jealous of his honour as a Macedonian king, he could rise to a spirited and dignified public policy; full of intelligence and wit, he won the hearts of all whom he wished to gain.

At the present moment Philip directed his attentions to Egypt. About 205 B.C. he had formed an alliance with Antiochus of Asia to break up the Egyptian state, now ruled over by Ptolemy Epiphanes, a child of five years old, and to divide the spoil. In 201 B.C. Philip had begun his task of plunder. By the aid of his ally Prusias, king of Bithynia, Philip crossed to Asia and proceeded to make war upon the Greek cities on the coast. Chalcedon saved itself by submission, but Cius and Thasos were stormed and sacked. Rhodes, at the head of her league, declared war against Philip; she was joined by Byzantium and Attalus of Pergamus. Several indecisive battles were fought at sea; towards the close of the year Philip withdrew to Macedonia, where his presence was urgently needed.

At this point the Romans thought right to interfere. They could not view with indifference the possible extension of Philip's power, the conquest of Rhodes and Egypt, the fall of Cyrene, and the future peril of all the Greek cities, whose protectors they claimed to be, and they could not honourably refuse aid to Attalus of Pergamus, who had been their staunch ally since the

first Macedonian war. The policy of interference in the East was not actuated by greed for further conquest, but was dictated by necessity; it redounds to the senate's honour that it resolved to prepare for war with Philip at a time when the Roman citizens were thoroughly weary of and exhausted by one transmarine war, and when such a war was sure to rouse a storm of popular disapprobation.

At first, indeed, the Romans lacked a pretext for war. Their ambassador, sent to Abydus, after the capture of that city by Philip in 200 B.C., was politely reprov'd by the Macedonian king for attempting to interfere with his designs. The Athenians, however, had at this time put to death two Acarnanians who strayed into their mysteries. The Acarnanians at once invoked Philip's aid, and he proceeded to lay waste Attica. Athens applied for help to Rome, and the popular assembly was at length induced by various concessions to ratify the declaration of war by the senate, in 200 B.C. These concessions were chiefly made at the expense of the allies, who had to supply the garrison service in Gaul, Lower Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia: volunteers alone, as was alleged, were enrolled for the Macedonian campaign. Two of the six legions, thus called out, embarked at Brundisium under the leadership of the consul Publius Sulpicius Galba.

The position of Philip was very critical. Antiochus stood aloof; Egypt, despite its anxiety to keep a Roman fleet out of Eastern waters, was utterly estranged from Philip by his recent scheme of partition; the Rhodian confederacy of Greek cities was also, owing to recent events, a pronounced enemy; while in Greece itself many of the most powerful states were ready to welcome the Romans as deliverers, and the Acarnanians and Boeotians alone remained the steadfast allies of Macedonia. The Achaean league, previously estranged by the murder of Aratus, had, under the able leadership of Philopoemen, revived its military power and freed itself from the oppressive influence of Macedonia. Aware of the danger to Greece of invoking Roman aid, this league attempted in vain to mediate between Philip and Rhodes, and in despair remained neutral, awaiting the coming of the Roman troops with undisguised but inactive dread. Thus Philip, by his cruelty and arrogance, had alienated all

those Eastern powers which at this critical hour should have proved his staunchest allies in repelling the common danger to Greek freedom and independence.

The land army under Galba at first effected very little of importance, though a division of the fleet under Cento surprised and captured Chalcis in Euboea, the chief stronghold of Philip in Greece, but from want of troops was unable to retain it. Philip, in revenge, made two futile attempts on Athens, and laid waste Attica.

In the spring of 199 B.C. a joint invasion of Macedonia was concerted by Galba with the wild races of the Dardani and Illyrians on the north, and the Athamanes and Aetolians on the south. Galba with his various allies advanced from the west into Macedonia, and made every effort to draw Philip into a decisive engagement. Aided by his knowledge of the country and his ease in procuring supplies, Philip for a long time avoided an engagement, and continually harassed the Romans. Compelled at last to withdraw, by the news that the barbarians from the north had entered his territory, and that the Aetolians had joined the Athamanes in an incursion into Thessaly, Philip easily evaded the pursuit of Galba, and took up his position in a narrow pass on ground favourable, as he thought, to his troops. But in the battle that followed, Galba was victorious. The result of this victory was not great, as Galba feared to pursue his foe in a difficult and unknown country, and, after laying waste the land and capturing Celetrum, he retreated to Apollonia.

Philip now turned his arms with great effect against the Aetolians and Athamanes, while his officer Athenagoras chased the Dardani back over the mountains.

The Roman fleet was scarcely more successful than the land army.

On the whole, then, the result of the first campaign was favourable to Philip. Elated by his success, and by hopes, never realized, of active assistance from Antiochus, Philip next year encamped in a narrow pass on the Aous, where he was confronted by the Roman army strongly reinforced, and by a much abler officer in the person of the consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus. After much delay, caused both by fruitless negotiations and by the strength of Philip's position, Flamininus was enabled, by

the treachery of some Epirot chiefs, to take the Macedonians both in front and rear, and rout them with considerable loss. Philip retreated to the pass of Tempe, and, with the exception of certain fortresses in Thessaly, and of the Acarnanian territory, all northern Greece speedily fell into the hands of the Romans. In the south, the strong fortresses of Chalcis and Corinth still kept the Macedonian influence paramount, but the exertions of the allied fleet which threatened Corinth, and the action of the Achæan league in joining the victorious Romans, soon made Philip aware of the desperate nature of his position.

Negotiations with Flamininus, and afterwards with the Roman senate, ended in the determination of Philip to risk another battle; and in 197 B.C. he encountered the enemy in the district of Scotussa. The battle takes its name from the steep height of Cynoscephalæ, which, lying between the two camps, was the scene of the first encounter between the vanguard of both armies. Owing to the success of the Macedonians at the outset, Philip was encouraged to risk a battle with his whole force, and, after a fierce conflict, in which the phalanx exhibited its ancient prowess, Philip was utterly defeated, and escaped to Larissa.

At this defeat, even his most staunch allies, the Acarnanians, submitted to Rome; resistance was no longer possible. The terms imposed do honour to the Romans. They gave no ear to the malignity of the Aetolians, who demanded the annihilation of the Macedonian kingdom; for they clearly saw that it alone could serve as a bulwark against the encroaching Celts and Thracians. A commission of ten was appointed, at the head of which was Flamininus, to settle the complicated affairs of Greece. The result of their deliberations was the decision that Philip should give up all his possessions in Asia Minor, Thrace, Greece, and the islands of the Aegean; that he should pay a contribution of a thousand talents (£244,000); that he should conclude no foreign alliances without Rome's consent, and wage no foreign wars; that he should enter into the Roman alliance, and send a contingent when required; that the Macedonian army should not exceed five thousand men, nor its fleet five decked ships; that the territory of Macedonia should

remain unimpaired, with the exception of some small strips and of the revolted province of Orestis.

With regard to the disposition of the possessions thus ceded by Philip, Rome, having learnt by experience in Spain the doubtful value of transmarine provinces, kept none of the spoil for herself, and decreed freedom to the Greek states,—a freedom rather in name than deed, when we consider the value of it to a nation devoid of all union and unity. Athens received the three islands of Paros, Scyros, and Imbros, as a reward for the hardships she had suffered and for the many courtesies she had shown to Rome. All Philip's possessions in the Peloponnese and on the Isthmus were ceded to the Achæan league, which was thus practically made ruler of the Peloponnese: but scant favour was accorded to the boastful and greedy Aetolians, who incorporated Phocis and Locris, but were not suffered to extend their power to Acarnania and Thessaly.

Nabis of Sparta obstinately refused to give up Argos to the Achæan league, and only yielded to a powerful display of Roman arms; and, though his banditti were dispersed and Sparta captured, both the city and Nabis himself were left intact, the conquerors only requiring the cession of his foreign possessions and his adherence to the usual stipulations touching the right of waging war and of forming foreign alliances.

Peace was thus, outwardly at any rate, established among the petty Greek states. Flamininus acted with great fairness and patience throughout, and strove as far as possible to mete out justice to the claims of each Greek state. He showed an especially wise and tolerant moderation in his punishment of the rebellious Boeotians, who, in their eagerness to attach themselves again to Macedonia, did not refrain from putting to death isolated bands of Roman soldiers.

In 194 B.C. Flamininus, after holding a conference of all the Greek states at Corinth, withdrew his troops from every fortress and departed homeward, thus giving the lie to the Aetolian calumny that Rome had inherited from Philip "the fetters" of Greece.

We cannot doubt the nobleness and sincerity of the Roman endeavour to set Greece free; the reason of its

failure was the complete demoralization of the Greek nation. In truth, the necessities of the case demanded the permanent presence of a superior power, not the pernicious boon of a fictitious freedom; the feeble policy of sentiment, with all its apparent humanity, was far more cruel than the sternest occupation. "History has a Nemesis for every sin—for an impotent craving after freedom, as well as for an injudicious generosity." The Nemesis in this case was the war with Antiochus of Asia.

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- Flight of Hannibal.*—Liv. xxxiii. 45-49.
- Massinissa.*—Polyb. xxi. 11, 21; xxxii. 2; xxxvii. 10. Liv. xxx. 44; xxxi. 1, 11, 19; xxxii. 27; xxxiv. 62; xxxvi. 4.
- Spain.*—Liv. xxxi. 40; xxxiii. 21, 25, 44; xxxiv. 10-21; xl. 30-34, 39-40, 44, 47-50; xli. 6-7. Appian Sp. 39-43.
- Macedonian wars.*—Polyb. viii. 10-16; ix. 28-41; xv. 20-24; xvi. 1-12, 24-35; xvii. xviii. 1-28, 33-40, 43-48. Liv. xxiii. 33-39; xxiv. 40; xxvii. 29-32; xxviii. 5-8; xxix. 4, 12; xxx. 42; xxxi. 5-8, 14-18, 24-44; xxxii. 4-13, 19-23, 32-38; xxxiii. 3-25. Appian. Maced. 1-9; Syr. 1.
- Egypt.*—Polyb. iii. 2-3.
- Greece.*—Polyb. iv. and v. Liv. xxxiv. 22-41, 48-52. Diod. xxviii. 13. Plut. Flamininus and Aratus.

CHAPTER XVII.

WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA, AND THE THIRD
MACEDONIAN WAR.

Rupture between Rome and Antiochus—Declaration of war, 192 B.C.
—Antiochus in Greece—Scipio in Asia—Battle of Magnesia,
190 B.C.—Settlement of Asia and Greece—Deaths of Hannibal
and Scipio—Anger of Philip—His successor Perseus—War with
Rome, 172 B.C.—Conduct of Perseus and of the Roman generals
—Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C.—Roman treatment of Macedonia and
the Eastern powers—Position of Rome.

ANTIOCHUS had long fixed his eyes upon the Syrian coast, which had been wrested from Asia by the Egyptians, and had seized the occasion of Philopator's death, in 205 B.C., to concert measures with Philip for the partition of the kingdom of the Ptolemies. But he lacked the foresight to make common cause with Philip in repelling Roman interference, and had taken advantage of the second Macedonian war to secure Egypt for himself. At first he attacked the Egyptian possessions in Cilicia, Syria, and Palestine, and by a victory gained in 198 B.C., near the sources of the Jordan, he became absolute master of the two latter countries. He then proceeded with a strong fleet to occupy all the districts on the south and west coasts of Asia Minor, which had formerly belonged to Egypt, but had virtually fallen under the dominion of Philip. Rome had, however, bidden Philip to withdraw from these possessions, and to leave them free and untouched, and now Antiochus came forward to take Philip's place as the oppressor of the Greek cities and free kingdoms in those lands.

Already, in 198 B.C., Attalus of Pergamus had applied to Rome for aid against Antiochus; and in the following year the Rhodians openly protected the Carian cities of Halicarnassus, Caunus, Myndus, and the island of Samos against the attacks of the great king. Other cities, such as Smyrna and Lampsacus, took heart to resist Antiochus, and they, one and all, called upon Rome to give effect to her promise that they should be free, and to prove that neither Macedonian tyrant nor Asian despot should be suffered to endanger Greek life and liberty. Rome, however, was slow to answer such a call; nor did she resort to other measures than those of diplomacy, when Antiochus, in 196 B.C., landed in Europe and invaded the Thracian Chersonese, and took active measures to convert Thrace into a dependent satrapy on the plea that he was merely reasserting his claim to the land conquered by his ancestor Seleucus.

The delay of the Romans in forcibly opposing Antiochus, who plainly showed his designs not only on Asia Minor but also on Greece, may be ascribed partly to their weariness of war, but chiefly to the vain wish of Flamininus to pose as the liberator of Greece and the extinguisher of the war in the East. Flamininus was thus induced to withdraw all the Roman garrisons from Greece in 194 B.C., and to blind the Romans to the fact that the embers of war still smouldered, soon to be rekindled into a flame by his own vanity and by the senate's culpable negligence.

In the year previous to the withdrawal of the Roman troops from Greece, Antiochus had accorded an honourable reception to the exiled Hannibal, which in itself was tantamount to a declaration of war; but Flamininus refused to regard it as such, and contented himself with addressing mere verbal remonstrances and demands to Antiochus. The latter did not fail to profit by the respite unexpectedly granted him by the Roman evacuation of Greece. He gave one daughter in marriage to the young king of Egypt; another to Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia; and offered a third to Eumenes, who had succeeded his father Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, on the condition of his abandoning the Roman alliance: he also adopted conciliatory measures towards the Greek cities in Asia Minor. In Greece itself the Aetolians were eager to join

him ; a plan was even formed on the suggestion of Hannibal by which the Western world was to unite with the East, and war to blaze anew throughout Italy, Africa, and Spain, as well as Greece, Egypt, and Asia. To the vanity and impatience of the Aetolians was due the first spark which ignited the train of war. By their attempt to take Sparta and attach it to their league, and by their failure both there and at Chalcis, they caused almost the whole of the Peloponnese to unite against Antiochus—a result diametrically opposite to that which they wished to produce.

Events had now reached such a pass that a rupture between Rome and Antiochus was inevitable. At length, after some fruitless discussion at Ephesus between the Roman envoys and the great king, war was declared in 192 B.C., and in the summer of that year a Roman fleet appeared to secure Greece in its allegiance, while an army under Marcus Baebius landed at Apollonia in the autumn. About the same time, Antiochus crossed over into Greece with such troops as he could at once collect, and occupied Demetrias. All hopes of success depended on the realization of the coalition planned by Hannibal. But a mean jealousy of the latter's greatness was as fatal in the court of Antiochus as it had been in the councils of Carthage to the execution of his mighty schemes; and the victor of Cannae was entrusted with subordinate and ill-fitting commissions.

The attitude of Philip of Macedon, of Eumenes, of the Achaean league, Rhodes, and Egypt, who all sided with Rome, showed at once how futile would be the attempts of Antiochus in Europe. At first, indeed, Antiochus anticipated the Romans by occupying Euboea, and by an attempt to gain over Thessaly; but he soon wearied of war, and retired to Chalcis, where he spent his time in writing letters to the Greek states and in idle amusement. In the spring of 191 B.C. the Roman general Manius Acilius Glabrio arrived, accompanied by several noted officers and strong reinforcements; in all, the Roman force reached about forty thousand men. Antiochus, whose own forces had suffered considerably from sickness and desertion, and who had been grossly deceived by the Aetolians as to the amount of their contingent, foolishly resolved to en-

trench himself at Thermopylae, and to await there the arrival of the great army from Asia. Owing to the remissness of the Aetolians posted on the heights, and to their surprise by Marcus Cato, Antiochus was easily routed, and escaped to Chalcis, whence he took ship to Ephesus. At once all the strong fortresses, with the exception of Heraclea and Naupactus, where the Aetolians for a while held out, surrendered to the Romans, and all the Greek states tendered their submission.

Thus ended, for the present, all resistance in Greece; but the coming war in Asia, owing to the great distance and difficulty of communications, appeared to the Romans far more dangerous. Gaius Livius, the Roman admiral, gained a signal victory over the enemy's fleet between Ionia and Chios, and cooped up their ships in the harbour of Ephesus; but he was obliged, on the approach of winter, to retire to the harbour of Cane, near Pergamus. In the winter, Smyrna and many Greek cities in Asia Minor welcomed the Romans, and Antiochus made great exertions to equip two fleets supported by a powerful land army, and thus to prevent the Romans from landing in Asia.

Early in the following year, 190 B.C., the Roman admiral proceeded towards the Hellespont, to pave the way for the passage of the land army by the capture of Sestus and Abydus. He had almost effected his purpose when he was recalled by the news that the fleet of the Rhodians, his allies, had been destroyed by the enemy; the latter, however, on the arrival of Livius, shut themselves up in the harbour of Ephesus and refused battle. The Roman fleet now took up its station at Samos, and Livius was replaced by the new admiral Lucius Aemilius Regillus, who for a time effected nothing of importance. The second fleet of Antiochus, led by Hannibal, which had long been detained by unfavourable winds, at last threatened to join the fleet at Ephesus; but at the mouth of the Eurymedon, off Aspendus in Pamphylia, it was utterly defeated by a squadron of Rhodian ships. It was the first naval battle and the last battle fought by Hannibal against Rome. This victory was followed up by another, at the promontory of Myonnesus over the Asiatic fleet stationed at Ephesus, in which

the Romans took or sank forty-two of the enemy's ships, and swept the sea of all opposition to the crossing of the Roman land army.

The conduct of the war on land had been entrusted to the conqueror of Zama, who practically acted as supreme commander in the place of his brother Lucius Scipio, the nominal commander-in-chief, a man of no ability. On landing in Greece the Scipios had at first been detained by a renewal of hostilities on the part of the Aetolians, which inconvenient obstacle was only removed by an armistice for six months. As the Aegean was not yet clear of the enemy's ships, Scipio marched by the coast through Macedonia and Thrace, intending to cross the Hellespont. The victory of Myonesus and the foolish terror of Antiochus proved that Scipio's good fortune had not deserted him. By order of Antiochus the strong fortress of Lysimachia on the Thracian Chersonese was evacuated, and thus no opposition was offered to the crossing of the Hellespont, nor was any preparation made to receive Scipio on the Asiatic coast. Scipio refused to accept the terms of submission proposed by Antiochus, and the Romans met the army of the great king near Magnesia, at the foot of mount Sipylus, not far from Smyrna, in the autumn of 190 B.C. The cumbrous masses of the Asiatic troops proved their own destruction: the flower of their army, drawn up in Macedonian phalanx, was foiled in its efforts to reach the Roman legions by the confusion of their own light troops, and by the absence of the heavy cavalry under Antiochus, which had rushed off in pursuit of a small Roman squadron. At last the phalanx was broken up by its own elephants, and the whole army scattered in utter rout.

The losses of Antiochus have been estimated at fifty thousand, those of the Romans at three hundred foot soldiers and twenty-four horsemen. Peace was concluded on the terms proposed by Scipio before the battle, by which Antiochus was condemned to pay all the costs of the war and to surrender the whole of Asia Minor. Antiochus himself was soon after (in 187 B.C.) slain, while plundering a temple of Bel in Elymais, at the head of the Persian Gulf. "With the day of Magnesia Asia was erased from the list of great states; and never perhaps

did a great power fall so rapidly, so thoroughly, and so ignominiously as the kingdom of the Seleucidae under this Antiochus the Great."

The Celts of Asia Minor who had supplied mercenaries to Antiochus now met with severe punishment. The new Roman commander, Gnaeus Manlius Volso, who had succeeded Lucius Scipio in 189 B.C., turned his arms against the two cantons of the Tolistobigi and the Tectosages. In both cases the mountain heights to which the Celts had retired were scaled, and both cantons were completely broken up and dispersed.

The final settlement of Asia was determined by a commission presided over by Volso. The sum to be paid by Antiochus was fixed at fifteen thousand Euboic talents (£3,600,000); all possessions in Europe, and all the country in Asia Minor west of the river Halys and the mountain chain of the Taurus, were now ceded by the great king; lastly, certain restrictions were imposed upon his rights of waging war and of navigating the sea. Even beyond the boundaries of the Roman protectorate, Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, though mulcted in a light fine for his alliance with Antiochus, retained his kingdom and was practically independent of Antiochus; moreover, the two satrapies of Armenia now rose under Roman influence into independent kingdoms. Prusias, king of Bithynia, was allowed to keep his possessions intact; nor were the Celts ousted from their territory, though bound to refrain in the future from sending out armed bands and levying black-mail from the Asiatic Greeks. The Greek cities, which were free and had joined the Romans, were confirmed in their ancient freedom and exempted from tribute to the various dynasts of Asia Minor; this exemption was not, however, extended to those which paid tribute to Eumenes. Rhodes obtained Lycia and the greater part of Caria as a reward for her zealous assistance. But the largest share of the spoil fell to the king of Pergamus. Eumenes received the Thracian Chersonese and the greater part of Asia Minor west of the Halys, the protectorate over and right of receiving tribute from such Greek cities as were not made absolutely free, and a contribution of nearly five hundred talents from Antiochus. Thus he was nobly recompensed for his

sufferings and devotion to the Roman cause, and thus the kingdom of the Attalids became in Asia what Numidia was in Africa—a powerful state dependent on Rome, capable of acting as a check upon Macedonia and Syria without needing Roman support. Rome thus adhered strictly to its policy of acquiring no transmarine possessions, and in 188 B.C. the fleet and land army evacuated Asia.

The war with Antiochus had naturally agitated the ever quarrelsome and excitable states in European Greece. The Aetolians, who had tried to rekindle the flame of war by attacks on Philip of Macedon, were soon compelled to utter submission by the combined arms of the Roman consul, Marcus Fulvius Nobilior, and the Macedonians and Achaeans. The possessions taken from the Aetolians were divided among the allies of Rome, who reserved for herself nothing but the two islands of Cephallenia and Zacynthus. Neither Philip nor the Achaeans were satisfied with their share of the spoil. The last-named were foolish enough to attempt to display their independence of Rome, and with a quasi-patriotic zeal to desire an extension of their power; though indignant at the advice of Flamininus to content themselves with the Peloponnese, and at the refusal of Rome to enlarge the territory of their league, they proved their incapacity to govern the Peloponnese by constant quarrels with Sparta and Messene. The senate, after vain attempts to arbitrate, at last grew weary of these petty disputes, and left the Achaeans and the Greek states generally to settle such trifles among themselves.

After the defeat of Antiochus, Hannibal had taken refuge with Prusias, the king of Bithynia, and had successfully aided him in his wars with Eumenes. Now he, the only being on earth who was still a source of terror to Rome, was hunted down by his old enemies in a way unworthy of so great a nation, and compelled to take poison, dying in 183 B.C., at the age of sixty-seven.

About the same time died his great rival and lucky victor, Publius Scipio. The favourite of fortune, he had added to the empire of Rome, Spain, Africa, and Asia; and yet he, too, like Hannibal, spent his last years in bitter trouble and disappointment, a voluntary exile from the

city of his fathers, for which he had spent his life, but in which he had forbidden his own remains to be buried. We do not exactly know what drove him from Rome. The charges of peculation brought against him and his brother Lucius were no doubt empty calumnies, but his arrogance and proud belief that he was not as other men had doubtless raised many enemies, while his wish to sacrifice everything to the promotion of his own family caused general distrust of his political aims. "It is, moreover, the distinguishing characteristic of such natures as that of Scipio—strange mixtures of genuine gold and glittering tinsel—that they need the good fortune and the brilliance of youth in order to exercise their charm, and, when this charm begins to fade, it is the charmer himself that is most painfully conscious of the change."

Thus ended this Asiatic war. A significant indication of the feeble and loose organization of the kingdom of the Seleucidae is the fact that it, alone of all the great states conquered by Rome, never after the first conquest made a second appeal to arms. But Rome had not yet done with her troubles in the East; and her unjust treatment of Philip of Macedon in return for his staunch support during the war with Antiochus soon caused another outbreak in that quarter. All the states in Greece now seized the opportunity of damaging their ancient oppressor, and of reviving the anti-Macedonian feeling by constant complaints to the Roman senate; but the irritation and annoyance thus caused to Philip was as nothing compared with the indignation he felt at the extension of the kingdom of Eumenes. The Attalids had ever been the bitterest foes of Macedonia, and, now that their power was revived and increased under the protecting arm of Rome, Philip's thirst for revenge went beyond all limits of prudence. On hearing of some fresh invectives which had been launched against him in the Thessalian assemblies he replied with the line of Theocritus: "Ἦδη γὰρ φράσδει πάνθ' ἄλιον ἄμμι δεδύκειν; ("What! thinkest thou that all my suns are set?"); a reply which showed that he had determined once more to put all to the hazard. In these later days, however, Philip displayed a caution and an earnest perseverance in his preparations which at an earlier date might have changed the world's history. He

even curbed his proud temper so as to pretend complete submission to Rome, and delayed the breaking out of war by the agency of his son Demetrius, who during his residence as a hostage at Rome had won great popularity with the leading Romans. Perseus, the eldest son, fearing that Philip would disinherit him in favour of Demetrius, persuaded his father to put the latter to death, on the false charge that he was intriguing with Rome against Macedonia. Philip learned too late the plot of the fratricide, but died himself, in 179 B.C., before he could punish the crime.

Thus Perseus succeeded to the throne, a man remarkable for his personal prowess and steady perseverance, and incapable of being turned aside, as his father had been, by the vicious allurements of pleasure. He entered on all his father's schemes with resolute determination, and to the outward eye of his countrymen he seemed the man needed for the great work of liberation from the yoke of Rome. But he lacked the genius and elasticity of Philip. He could devise plans and persevere in his preparations for their execution, but when the time came for action he was frightened at his own handiwork. As is the case with all narrow minds, the means became to him the end, when imminent peril demanded the use of the treasures which he had amassed for the war with Rome, Perseus could not find the heart to part with his golden pieces.

The wise measures of Philip, in founding towns, encouraging marriage, and in developing the finances of his country during twenty years of peace, had rendered the power of Macedonia at least twice as strong as it had been at the outbreak of the second Macedonian war. Perseus now possessed an army of thirty thousand troops, independent of auxiliaries, a treasury capable of paying both this army and ten thousand mercenaries for ten years, and, above all, a devoted and loyal people. The attempts, however, to raise a coalition against Rome, and thus carry out the schemes of Hannibal, failed. In Greece it is true that the sentiments of every state were gradually veering round to the side of Perseus, whose name was not stained, as that of his father had been, by atrocious and bloodthirsty deeds. Every Greek now saw the true

meaning of the freedom granted by Rome, and that the restoration of Hellenic nationality by a foreign power involved a contradiction in terms. The efforts of Eumenes, who tried by gifts and favours to conciliate the Greeks in Asia Minor, and to reconcile them to the arrangements made by Rome, were received with every sign of scorn and contempt.

But the support from the Greek cities and states, whether of Greece proper or Asia Minor, was but a broken reed whereon to lean. More important was the success which attended the efforts of Perseus to stir up the barbarian tribes living near the Danube and in Illyria, and the close alliance he formed with the brave Cotys, ruler of the Odrysians and of all eastern Thrace. By public proclamation he gained over to his side all the Greeks who, owing to political and other offences, and still more owing to debt, had been exiled. From these and other causes the whole of Greece was once more in a state of ferment. Rome saw that she could delay no longer; and the advent of Eumenes in person, with a long list of grievances and a true account of the state of affairs in Greece, caused the senate to resolve on war in the autumn of 172 B.C.

Perseus, instead of acting at once and occupying Greece by the aid of the Macedonian party in each state, frittered away his time in discussions with Quintus Marcius Philipus, whose aim was to cause Perseus to delay active operations until the Roman legions arrived. This foolish delay on the part of Perseus ruined his chance of support from the Greek states and confederacies. The Aetolian league chose Lyciscus as its new strategus, a thorough partisan of Rome; and the Boeotian confederacy suddenly collapsed completely on the complaint of a Roman envoy touching two of their cities, Haliartus and Coronea, which had entered into engagements with Perseus.

In June, 171 B.C., the Roman legions landed, and Perseus, owing to his utter remissness, found himself alone. Fortunately for him, the Roman consul, Publius Licinius Crassus, was grossly incompetent, and, had Perseus followed up his first success, gained near Larisa, by assuming the offensive, no doubt all Greece would have at once followed the example of the Epirots and revolted. Crassus signalized his shameful command by forcing the

small Boeotian town of Coronea to capitulate, and by selling its inhabitants into slavery. His successor, Aulus Hostilius, was equally unsuccessful, and was twice easily repulsed in attempting to enter Macedonia; while his colleague, Appius Claudius, commanding the western army, met with nothing but reverses. Moreover, the Roman name, hitherto distinguished in the East by the honourable probity of its political transactions, was now stained by treacherous and underhand dealing with various Greek states. Two campaigns had served to show the completely demoralized and disorganized condition of the Roman army, which was only saved from destruction by the inability of Perseus to change his plan of defensive warfare to one of a vigorous offensive.

The third campaign was opened in 169 B.C., by the new Roman commander, Quintus Marcius Philippus. He succeeded in entering Macedonia by the pass of Tempe, but was prevented from advancing by the entrenched position which Perseus occupied on the stream of the Elpius, and the Roman army remained idle in the extreme corner of Thessaly. Genthins, king of Illyria, was bribed by Perseus to break with Rome, the bribe, however, the miserly Perseus never paid, nor would he part with his beloved gold to hire twenty thousand Celts who volunteered to serve in his army.

In 168 B.C. a very different Roman general appeared on the scene, in the person of Lucius Aemilius Paullus, son of the consul who fell at Cannae,—a man full of vigour despite his sixty years, and utterly incorruptible. He soon turned the position of the enemy and forced them to retreat to Pydna. Here the decisive battle was fought, and the Macedonian phalanx, after dispersing the Roman vanguard and endangering the whole army, lost its formation on the uneven ground, and was cut down to a man; twenty thousand Macedonians fell, and eleven thousand were made prisoners. Perseus fled with his cavalry and treasure to Samothrace, and soon after surrendered, weeping, to the Romans; he died a few years later, at Alba on the Fucine lake.

Thus perished the empire of Alexander the Great, 144 years after his death. Macedonia was henceforth abolished, and the united kingdom was broken up into four republi-

can leagues, which paid to Rome half the former land-tax ; right of intermarriage between the members of different leagues was forbidden, and every measure was taken to prevent a revival of the ancient monarchy. The Romans gained their object, and from that day to this Macedonia has possessed no history.

Illyria, whose king Genthius was taken prisoner, and whose capital Scodra was captured by the praetor Lucius Anicius, was treated in the same way as Macedonia had been. It was split up into three free states ; its piratical fleet was confiscated, and an end was thus put to the depredations of Illyrian corsairs.

In the treatment of the rest of the Greek world, Rome now discarded the sentimental policy of Flamininus, and determined to reduce all Greek states to the same humble level of dependence. It was clear that with the abolition of Macedonia the kingdom of Pergamus, as exercising a check on Macedon, ceased to be a necessity. The Romans therefore proceeded to circulate strange, though utterly unfounded, reports as to the loyalty of Eumenes ; they attempted to set his brother Attalus against him by granting Attalus favours and inciting him to establish a rival throne ; they declared Pamphylia independent, and, when the Galatians overran Pergamus, they, after a pretence of mediation, declared them independent also. Eumenes set sail for Italy to remonstrate ; but the senate suddenly decreed that no kings in future were to come to Rome, and sent a quaestor to meet Eumenes at Brundisium. Eumenes, taking the hint, declared that he was satisfied, and returned home ; he clearly saw that all equality of alliance was at an end, and that the time of impotent subjection to Rome had now come for himself as for all other free states.

The high-spirited Rhodians were the next to suffer. Deluded by the consul Quintus Marcius, who had pretended to wish for their mediation in the war with Perseus, they just before the battle of Pydna sent envoys to the Roman camp and the Roman senate, saying that the Macedonian war was injurious to their commercial interests, and that they would declare war against the side which refused at once to make peace. This miserable republican vanity soon changed to humble entreaty, when

the Romans, after the battle of Pydna, threatened the Rhodians with war. The senate, glad of an excuse to humiliate the haughty merchant city, deprived Rhodes of all her possessions on the mainland, and, by the erection of a free port at Delos, so damaged Rhodian commerce that the yearly receipts from customs sunk at once from £41,000, to £6000.

In Greece itself severe measures were taken. Seventy towns in Epirus were plundered, and the inhabitants, to the number of 150,000, were sold into slavery. Trials for high treason took place in all parts of Greece, owing to the existence of a Macedonian party in every city. A very large number of suspects from Achaia, Aetolia, Acarnania, and Lesbos were deported to Italy, partly, perhaps, to escape the bloodthirsty zeal of such men as the Aetolian strategus Lyciscus.

An opportunity had, moreover, been given Rome to interfere once more in the East. During the third Macedonian war, Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Asia, or, as it was now called, Syria, seized the occasion to carry out the traditional policy of the Seleucidae and to conquer Egypt. When he was on the eve of success, and was lying encamped before Alexandria, a Roman envoy arrived shortly after the battle of Pydna, and drawing a circle round the king, warned him at once to restore all that he had conquered and to evacuate Egypt. With this warning Antiochus was forced to comply; and Egypt at once submitted to the Roman protectorate.

Every state in the world now did homage to Rome, and the most obsequious flattery met the ears of the Roman senate. Nor was the moment ill-chosen; from the battle of Pydna Polybius dates the full establishment of Rome's universal empire. All subsequent struggles were rebellions, or wars with nations beyond the pale of Romano-Greek civilization. The whole civilized world recognized in the Roman senate the supreme tribunal for kings and nations; to acquire its language and manners foreign princes and noble youths resided in Rome. Only once was a real attempt made to get rid of Roman dominion—by Mithradates, king of Pontus.

The battle of Pydna marks the last occasion on which the senate still adhered to the state maxim that Rome

should, if possible, hold no possessions and maintain no garrisons beyond the Italian seas, but should keep in check the numerous dependent states by a mere political supremacy. The treatment of Macedonia and other states after the battle of Pydna shows that Rome had at last recognized the impracticable nature of this protectorate; the necessity of her constant intervention had proved to Rome that the effort to preserve vanquished states, even at the cost of faithful allies, was a failure. Signs were now forthcoming that by gradual steps these client-states would be reduced to the position of subjects. When we review the extension of Rome's power from the conquest of Sicily to the battle of Pydna, it becomes clear that the universal empire of Rome was a result forced upon the Roman government, without, and even in opposition to its wish;—certainly it was not a gigantic plan contrived and carried out by a thirst for territorial aggrandizement. All that the Roman government wished for was the sovereignty of Italy; and they earnestly opposed the extension of this sovereignty to Africa, Greece, and Asia, from the sound view that they ought not to suffer the kernel of their empire to be crushed by the shell. Their blind hatred of Carthage led them into the error of retaining Spain, and of assuming in some measure the guardianship of Africa; their still blinder enthusiasm for Greek freedom made them commit the equal blunder of conferring liberty everywhere on the Greeks.

“The policy of Rome was not projected by a single mighty intellect and bequeathed by tradition from generation to generation, it was the policy of a very able but somewhat narrow-minded deliberative assembly, which had far too little power of grand combination, and far too much of an instinctive desire for the preservation of its own commonwealth, to devise projects in the spirit of a Caesar or Napoleon.”

The universal empire of Rome was, in fact, based on the political development of antiquity in general. In the ancient world, balance of power was unknown, and every nation's aim was to subdue his neighbour or to render him harmless. Though we may sentimentally mourn the extinction of so many richly gifted and highly developed nations by the supremacy of Rome, we must bear in mind

that that supremacy was not due to a mere superiority of arms, but was a necessary consequence of the international relations of antiquity generally; and therefore the issue was not one of mere chance, but the fulfilment of an unchangeable and therefore endurable destiny.

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Illyria.—Appian Illyr. 9-10. Liv. xlii. 26; xlv. 23, 30-32.

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Rhodes.—Liv. xxxviii. 39; xlv. 14-15, 35; xlv. 10, 20-22.

Greece.—Liv. xxxvi. 35; xliii. 19; xlv. 28, 31, 34.

Egypt.—Liv. xlv. 11-13.

Cf. also Plut. Aem. Paullus and Philopoemen.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNED.

New state-parties—Aristocratic character of the senate and equites—The censorship—Usurpation of power by families—Treatment of the Latins—The provinces and their governors—The comitia—Rise of a city rabble—Cato and his reforms—Demagogism—Management of land and of capital—Decline of the population.

AMID the din of arms and constant succession of victories, it is difficult to trace the secret and silent growth of those changes which were fraught with such momentous consequences to the Roman constitution. The new aristocracy, consisting of the old patrician families and of those plebeians who had become united with the old patricians, gradually gathered in its grasp the reins of government. The leaders of the plebeian element of the aristocracy were most zealous in maintaining the barrier of caste, and in assigning a political significance to those outward badges, such as the *ius imaginum*, the *laticlave*, the gold rings, and the *bullæ*, which had originally merely distinguished the higher from the lower patrician families. The senate and the equestrian order were no longer organs of the whole state, but organs of the aristocracy. In each case this change was due to the power of the censorship. Every one who had held a *curule magistracy* had a legal claim to a vote and seat in the senate; but the censor had the power of summoning men to become members of that body, and of striking off the names of such as were unworthy of so high a position. Inasmuch as the election to a *curule office* and the choice of censor really lay in the hands of the senate, it was but natural

that curule magistrates and censors were chosen out of the ranks of the nobility, and thus practically gave a strong aristocratic character to the composition of the senate. So, too, the censors selected the members of the equestrian centuries, and no doubt, as a rule, had regard to the birth and position of the members they selected, rather than to their military capacity. Thus the equestrian order became a stronghold of the aristocracy. The distinction between classes was further rendered more marked by the unwise change introduced by the great Scipio in 194 B.C. This change separated the special seats assigned to the senatorial order from those occupied by the mass of the people at the national festivals.

The office of censor, owing to these changes, became invested with a peculiar glory of its own, as the palladium of the aristocratic order, and great efforts were made to resist attacks on the censorship or judicial prosecution of unpopular censors, and to prevent opponents of the aristocracy from holding this office. An important check, moreover, was placed upon the censor himself by the usage which obliged him to specify the grounds on which he erased the name of senator or knight. The nobility, in order to keep the government in their own hands, was naturally averse from appointing more magistrates than the growth of Roman power rendered unavoidable. The appointment, in 243 B.C., of two praetors in the place of one, and the assignation of all lawsuits between Roman citizens to the city praetor (*praetor urbanus*) and of all law-suits between men who were not Roman citizens to his colleague (*praetor peregrinus*) was manifestly inadequate to the growing needs of the state. Further, the attempt to govern the four transmarine provinces by the appointment of four praetors in 197 B.C., showed a desire to limit the number of magistrates who were outside the immediate control of the senate, rather than a real grasp of the requirements of the new empire. A more serious evil was the election of the twenty-four military tribunes, *i.e.* of the whole military staff, by the *comitia tributa*; thus the choice of officers became subject to the evils of popular election, and every effort was made by the aristocracy to secure the position for members of their own order, and to make the military tribunate the stepping-

stone in the political career of young nobles. In serious wars, *e.g.* in 171 B.C., it was found necessary to suspend this system, and to restore to the general the power of electing his own staff.

Owing to the aristocratic spirit that pervaded every section of the government, the chief magisterial offices of consul and censor not only centred in the hands of a limited number of gentes, but, what was worse, in the hands of particular families. This was markedly the case in the policy of the Scipios and the Flamini. Moreover, a serious laxity began to prevail in the management of the public money; and, although embezzlement was still rare among Roman officials, the corruption prevalent in the provinces could not fail to react with pernicious effect on the praetors and their retinue. The relations of Rome to her allies and dependents, both within and outside Italy, gradually underwent a change. In the first place, such communities as had been passive burgesses of Rome, and had sided with Hannibal, *e.g.* Capua, lost their Roman citizenship, while other communities which had remained true to Rome acquired the full franchise; thus, except in isolated cases, the position occupied by passive burgesses ceased to exist. Admission to the Roman franchise became more and more difficult; and the tendency arose on the part of the Roman citizens to separate themselves, not only from the mass of Italians, but even from their old Latin allies, whose staunch support had saved the state in the war with Hannibal. The chief burdens of war, of garrison duty, and of the Spanish service, now fell upon the allies, while the Roman citizens appropriated most of the spoil and of the honours and advantages that accrued from the successes won by the arms of their allies. Indeed, the Latins, though of course far removed from the servile position held by the Bruttians and other communities, felt that the distinction between themselves and the mass of the Italian confederacy was being abolished, and that they were fast becoming the subjects, instead of the privileged allies, of Rome.

A far graver error was the retention of the old constitution, which Carthage had established in Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain: by retaining the tribute imposed by their predecessors, the Romans renounced their old policy of

having no tributary subjects; and by applying this method to Hither Spain, Macedonia, and Illyria, they clearly adopted the dangerous and demoralizing expedient of making money out of their new possessions. It is true that the governors were legally bound to administer their office with honesty and frugality, and it is equally true that many, like Cato in Sardinia, scrupulously observed the legal injunction. But the temptation was too great; the control exercised by the senate over the governors was of necessity very lax, and the complaints of the governed, unless the severity and rapacity of the praetor had exceeded all ordinary limits, met with but scant attention. Moreover, the governor could not be called to account during his term of office, and the charges laid against him were, as a rule, heard by a jury consisting of men of his own order, and therefore little inclined to visit the offender with severe punishment. We can, then, scarcely doubt that, owing to the feeble control exercised by the senate, and the absolute nature of the governor's provincial office, and, still more, owing to the corrupt servility of those whom he governed, it was a rare thing for governors to return home with clean hands.

A wholesome corrective to the abuse of the senatorial power, theoretically at least, still existed in the assemblies of the people. But this period exhibits to us the growing unimportance, nay impotence, of the popular comitia. The reason is plain. With the extension of the Roman suffrage, not only throughout Latium, Sabina, and a part of Campania, but to the new colonies founded in Picenum and across the Apennines, the burgess-body no longer consisted of farmers living within easy distance of the capital. Thus the decision of the great questions of foreign policy rested with men scattered over Italy, who met together in the capital by mere chance, and who were unable by previous consultation to arrive at some joint course of action and to show an intelligent grasp of the weighty questions submitted to their judgment. As a rule, then, the people played a passive part on such occasions, and ratified without discussion the proposals made to them by the senate.

Again, out of the old clients of powerful houses now arose a city rabble, whose votes in the comitia were

becoming of even more importance than those of the scattered burgesses, and were employed by the aristocracy to counterbalance the independence of the farmers. Systematic corruption began to be practised upon these clients by the sale of grain at low prices, by an increase of festivals and holidays, and by gladiatorial shows, in order that the aristocratic candidate might secure his election to the offices of state at the expense of his poorer rival. The spoils of war were even employed to corrupt the soldiers, and the stern refusal of Lucius Paullus to turn his victory at Pydna to such base uses almost cost him the honour of a triumph. It was but natural that such corruption should work the decay of the old warlike spirit, and that cowardice should stain the honour of the Roman officers and soldiers.

Another sign of the universal degeneration was the miserable love for petty distinctions: triumphs were granted to the victor of Ligurian or Corsican robbers; statues and monuments became so common that it was said to be a distinction to have none; men received permanent surnames from the victories they had won; and among the lower orders equal anxiety was manifested to mark their social grade by trifling badges.

The party of opposition in the state was composed of two elements of widely different character. In the first place, there was the patriotic party, whose cry for reform arose from a genuine distrust and hatred of the prevailing corruption. The moving spirit and typical representative of this party was Marcus Porcius Cato (234-149 B.C.). This rough Sabine farmer had been induced to enter upon a political career by a noble of the old stamp, Lucius Valerius Flaccus. He saw active service throughout the whole of the second Punic war, and in all countries and in every capacity had won equal distinction. "He was the same in the Forum as in the battlefield. His prompt and intrepid address, his rough but pungent rustic wit, his knowledge of Roman law and Roman affairs, his incredible activity and his iron frame, first brought him into notice in the neighbouring towns; and when at length he made his appearance on the greater arena of the Forum and the senate-house in the capital, constituted him the most influential pleader and

public orator of his time. Thoroughly narrow in his political and moral views, and having the ideal of the good old times always before his eyes and on his lips, he cherished an obstinate contempt for everything new. Deeming himself entitled, by virtue of his own austere life, to manifest an unrelenting severity and harshness towards everything and everybody; upright and honourable, but without a glimpse of any duty beyond the sphere of police discipline and of mercantile integrity; an enemy to all villainy and vulgarity as well as to all genius and refinement; and, above all things, a foe to those who were his foes, he never made an attempt to stop evils at their source, but waged war throughout life against mere symptoms, and especially against persons." Not only did he attack the most powerful aristocrats, such as the Scipios and the Flamini, but he never shrank from abusing his own supporters did he deem they deserved it. Still, so staunch were the farmers in their support, that when Cato and his friend and colleague, Lucius Flaccus, stood as candidates for the censorship in 184 B.C., all the exertions of the aristocrats were powerless to prevent their return.

The reforms introduced by Cato and his party were aimed at arresting the spread of decay and at checking the preponderating influence of the aristocracy in politics. In view of the first object, police regulations were enacted to restrict the luxurious style of living, and to introduce a frugal economy into Roman households. More successful and more practical were the efforts made to revive the farmer class by founding Latin colonies in the north, and by large and numerous assignments of the domain land. Although Cato failed to carry his proposal to institute four hundred new equestrian stalls, and thus remedy the decline of the burgess cavalry, the necessities of war had long before compelled the government to reduce the rating, which allowed a man to serve in the army, from £43 to £6, and to abolish the other qualification of free birth. The admission of the poor and of freedmen into the army gave them a new importance in the state, and was one of the chief causes of the changes introduced into the *comitia centuriata*. These changes, accomplished about 241 B.C., at the close of the first Punic war, placed all five classes composing the *comitia* on an equal footing as

regarded number of votes, and took away from the equites their old priority in voting, and gave the freedmen the same power as the freeborn.

This reform was the first victory won by the new democracy over the aristocracy, but its effects were greatly neutralized by the fact that, though priority of voting was taken away from the equites or aristocratic voters, it was still confined to a division chosen by lot from the first or richest class; and further, the equalization of the freedmen with the freeborn was set aside twenty years later, in 220 B.C., by the censor Gaius Flaminius, and the freedmen were excluded from the centuries. A proof that the reform did not at any rate greatly affect the power of the aristocracy is furnished by the fact that the second consulship and second censorship, although in law open to both patricians and plebeians, were almost invariably filled by patricians; the second consulship was held by patricians down to 172 B.C., and the second censorship down to 131 B.C.

Viewed as a whole, the reforms of Cato and his party, distinguished as they were by great energy and a noble wish to counteract the evident evils of the time, were unfortunately marred by a want of clear insight into the source of those evils, and by the failure to devise, in a large and statesmanlike spirit, some comprehensive plan for their remedy.

In the second place, the party of opposition contained a far less reputable element, the outcome of the city rabble. The spirit of demagogism was abroad; men, cursed with a love of empty speechmaking, pretended to be ardent reformers, but in their harangues dwelt only on the excessive powers of the aristocratic government and on the rights of the citizens, not on the urgent need for moral reform in every section of the state. The evils which arose out of this new spirit have already been indicated in the history of the war with Hannibal: the appointment of mere party leaders, such as Flaminius and Varro, to the supreme command; the absurd decree which made Minucius codictator with Fabius in 217 B.C., and which gave the deathblow to the dictatorship; the charge of embezzlement laid against Marcellus in 219 B.C.,—these and other acts all proceeded from the wanton interference

of the demagogues. The citizens were even tempted to interfere with the administration of the finances, the oldest and most important prerogative of the government; and, in 232 B.C., Gaius Flaminius, owing to the fatal obstinacy of the senate, went to the burgesses with his proposal to distribute the domain-lands in Picenum. Nor was this new system of politics confined to its author, Gaius Flaminius; aristocrats, such as Scipio, in their efforts to place themselves and their families in a position superior to that of the rest of the senate, condescended to vie with demagogues in their flattery of the city rabble. We have already pointed out the impotence of the comitia; as a rule, indeed, the burgesses had the good sense and sufficient patriotism to give a hearty support to that senate which had weathered the storm of Hannibal's invasion. But appeals to selfishness and avarice could not fail to demoralize the best citizens; and sudden caprice or violent outbursts of jealousy or hatred from time to time showed that the old foundations of the Republic were being undermined. "To the later generations, who survived the storms of revolution, the period after the Hannibalic war appeared the golden age of Rome, and Cato seemed the model of the Roman statesman. It was in reality the calm before the storm, and the epoch of political mediocrities." The seeming outward stability of the Roman constitution, during the years 266-146 B.C., was a sign, not of health, but of incipient sickness and revolution.

A review of this period would be incomplete unless it presented a brief notice of the economic troubles produced by the system of farming on a large scale, and by the power of capital. The importation of corn from the provinces, and the sale of it at a merely nominal price for the benefit of the idle proletariat of the capital, naturally ruined the market for the growers of Italian corn. The evil was all the worse and all the more inexcusable in a country like Italy, where there were hardly any manufactures, and, consequently, no large industrial population whose needs, as in England, could not be supplied by home-grown grain. On the contrary, agriculture was the mainstay of the Roman state, and the short-sighted policy of the government in this matter sacrificed the soundest to the most

worthless part of the nation. The small farmers were gradually ruined, and their holdings became merged in the large estates of the landlords, who, by cultivating their lands by means of large gangs of slaves, were able to produce at a cheaper rate than the farmer. But even the large landlord was unable to compete with foreign grain, and devoted himself almost entirely to stock-raising and the production of oil and wine: and thus it was that arable land to a great extent was converted into pasture, while, owing to the increased use of slaves, free labour became almost unknown. The power of the capitalist was alike evinced in the speculative management of land, in the increase of money-lenders, and in the enormous extent of all mercantile transactions; and, as in the end the gains from commercial enterprise flowed into Rome, the result was that Rome, compared with the rest of the world, stood as superior in point of wealth as in political and military power. In fact, the whole Roman nation became possessed with the mercantile spirit, and, while money served to create a new social barrier between rich and poor, "that deep-rooted immorality, which is inherent in an economy of pure capital, ate into the heart of society and of the commonwealth, and substituted an absolute selfishness for humanity and patriotism."

Moreover, the very population of Italy began to decline, and Cato and Polybius agree in stating that at the end of the sixth century Italy was far weaker in population than at the end of the fifth; "and although it was, in the first instance, the two long wars with Carthage that decimated and ruined both the burgesses and the allies, the Roman capitalists beyond doubt contributed quite as much as Hamilcar and Hannibal to the decline in the vigour and the numbers of the Italian people."

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Equites.—Liv. xxiii. 48, 49; xlii. 61. Polyb. vi. 20. Momms. R. St. iii. 458, sqq.
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Marq. Stv. ii. 365, sqq.

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Bribery.—Cic. in Verr. ii. 3, 7; iii. 6, 12. Gaius. ii. 7. Liv. Epit. 43.

Cato.—Liv. xxix. 25; xxxii. 7, 8, 27; xxxiii. 43; xxxiv. 2, 8-20;

xxxv. 9; xxxvi. 17-21; xxxviii. 54; xxxix. 40-44; xliii. 2; xlv.

25. Plut. Cato. Cato M. 36, 40, 42. Polyb. xxxi. 24; xxxv. 6.

Sale of imported corn—arable land turned to pasture.—Cic. in Verr.

ii. 2, 5. Liv. xxvi. 40. Pliny, N. H. xviii. 29. Colum. 6, praef.

4. Marq. Stv. ii. 112, sqq.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES DOWN TO THE GRACCHAN EPOCH.

Spain—The Lusitanian and Celtiberian wars—Viriathus—Numantia—The protected states—Cause of the third and last war with Carthage—Preparations of Carthage—Scipio Aemilianus—Capture and destruction of Carthage—Provinces of Africa and Macedonia—The Achaean war—Destruction of Corinth—State of the East—The Parthian empire—Piracy—General result.

BEFORE we enter upon the period of change which takes its name from the family of the Gracchi, it is necessary to present a picture of the state of things in the subject countries. Trivial and dreary as the separate conflicts in these remote lands between weakness and power may seem, yet collectively they are of great historical significance; and the reaction which the provinces exercised on the mother country alone renders intelligible the condition of Italy at this period.

At first the only two recognized provinces of Rome, if we except what may be regarded as the natural appendages of Italy, *i.e.* Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia, were the two Spains; and they were the scene of many wars and the cause of much trouble to Rome. In 154 B.C. the peaceful state of the Spanish provinces, which had lasted for nearly thirty years, was broken by the successful invasion of the Lusitanians. The complete defeat of the praetor Lucius Mummius, governor of Further Spain, in 153 B.C., emboldened the Celtiberians to join against the common foe; and the successes achieved by the powerful tribe of the Arevacae over the consul Quintus Fulvius Nobilior even eclipsed the previous victories of the Lusitanians. But the advent of

Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who combined skilful generalship with humane treatment, terminated the Celtiberian war in 151 B.C. His peaceful and honourable arrangement with the Arevacae did not, however, suit the ideas of the new consul, Lucius Lucullus, who made a sudden and unprovoked assault on the friendly tribe of the Vaccaei, and enslaved or massacred the inhabitants of the unoffending town of Cauca. This new method of warfare found an apt disciple in the praetor Servius Sulpicius Galba, who made a treaty with three Lusitanian tribes under the promise of giving them better settlements, and, having separated them into three divisions, either put to the sword or carried off into slavery seven thousand men. Despite the unequalled perfidy, cruelty, and avarice with which these two generals waged war, they were able to purchase immunity from condemnation on their return to Rome.

The outbreak of the fourth Macedonian and the third Punic war, in 149 B.C., caused the withdrawal of all special Roman forces from Spain. The Lusitanians at once renewed their invasions of Turdetania, and, when about to capitulate after a defeat by the governor Gaius Vétilius, they were roused to fresh vigour by the eloquence and example of the famous Viriathus. It seemed as if at last Spain had found a champion able to break the fetters of Rome; general after general, army after army, both in northern and southern Spain, recoiled in utter discomfiture before the ability and enthusiasm of the Spanish leader. For about ten years (148–139 B.C.) Viriathus was the acknowledged king of the Lusitanians, though never distinguished by any badge from the meanest soldier;—a true hero, remarkable alike for his physical and mental qualities. In the end his brilliant and noble career was, as often happened in Spain, cut short by the hand of the assassin, three of his intimate friends having sold the life of their lord to the Roman consul, Quintus Servilius Caepio, in return for their own safety. With the death of Viriathus the war in Lusitania came to an end. But the successes of Viriathus had once more ignited the torch of war in the North, and the Celtiberian Arevacae again revolted, in 144 B.C. The ability of the consul Quintus Caecilius Metellus reduced the northern province to obedience in two years.

Far more serious was the struggle with the town of Numantia. The incapable consul, Quintus Pompeius, after several severe defeats, agreed to come to terms with its invincible inhabitants; but, in fear of the reckoning that awaited him at home for thus concluding peace, he at the last moment took refuge in a base falsehood, and denied the agreement he had made. The matter was referred to the senate, who supported their guilty consul, and ordered his successor Marcus Popilius Laenas to continue the war. The total incompetence of the Roman generals and the demoralized condition of their armies caused the war to drag on, amid disgrace and disaster, from 137-134 B.C. In the latter year Scipio Aemilianus, the first general in Rome, was sent out, and, after reorganizing the Roman army by treatment alike severe and contemptuous, he set about the task of subduing the brave Numantines. After a heroic defence, the city, utterly exhausted by famine and pestilence, fell, in the autumn of 133 B.C., and its fall re-established the supremacy of Rome in Hither Spain. A senatorial commission was shortly after sent to Spain, and the provinces were reorganized. Thanks to the efforts of Scipio and other governors Spain gradually became exceedingly prosperous, and, despite the guerilla warfare ever waged by the half-subdued native tribes, it was the most flourishing and best-organized country in the Roman dominions.

Far more insupportable was the condition—intermediate between formal sovereignty and actual subjection—of the African, Greek, and Asiatic states. These had neither independence nor peace. In Africa there was constant war between Carthage and Numidia; in Egypt the rulers of that country and Cyrene were ever disputing for the possession of Cyprus; in Asia almost every petty kingdom was torn by intestine struggles, and several were at war with one another. The interference of Rome, constantly invoked, only made matters worse. Rome neither resigned its authority nor displayed sufficient force to bring the ruled into subjection. "It was the epoch of commissions." Commissioners went to and fro, reporting and giving orders, to which the Asiatic states, feeling secure from their very remoteness, as a rule paid no attention. The Roman government conferred neither the blessings of

freedom nor of order. It was clear that this state of things must be put an end to, and that the only way to do so was by the conversion of the client states into Roman provinces. The only question was whether the Roman senate would perceive the necessity of the task, and would put its hand to the work with the requisite energy.

In Africa we have to record the last act of the terrible Carthaginian drama. The Romans saw with ill-concealed envy the increasing prosperity of their old rival, though hampered in every way by the encroachments of Massinissa. At the head of the second commission, sent from Rome in 161 B.C., to settle points of dispute between the Numidian king and Carthage, was the aged Cato, whose inveterate hatred of Carthage was aroused afresh by the sight of her great commercial prosperity. Opposed though he was by the larger-minded Scipio Nasica, Cato had no difficulty in finding men at home ready to support his view that Rome could know no security until Carthage was destroyed; and among his most ardent supporters were the bankers and rich capitalists of Rome, who saw that the wealth of Carthage must revert to themselves.

An opportunity for putting the policy of Cato into effect soon arose. In 154 B.C. Massinissa appealed to Rome to act once more as arbiter between him and Carthage, and pointed out that the leaders of the patriotic party in Carthage, Hasdrubal and Carthalo, were amassing stores and collecting troops in violation of the treaty with Rome. The Carthaginians were ordered to destroy their naval stores and dismiss their troops; but the spirit of the people was roused, and the demand was rejected and preparations made to wage war against Massinissa. In 152 B.C. hostilities began, and, owing to the miserable incapacity of Hasdrubal, Massinissa gained a complete victory.

The Romans now conceived that the hour had come to deal the deathblow to their old antagonist. By making war upon Massinissa, an ally of Rome, Carthage had broken one of the stipulations of their treaty, and had thus given Rome a plausible pretext for war, and from the feeble display of arms she had made against Massinissa, Carthage seemed a certain and easy victim. In

vain the Carthaginians made every submission to avert the threatened blow, and war was declared in 149 B.C. After dallying with the wretched envoys sent from Carthage, and after making the severest demands, the Roman consul Lucius Marcius Censorinus, who had landed at Utica, at last revealed the dire purpose of the senate, and bade the envoys tell the Gerusia that Carthage must be evacuated and surrendered to destruction. At this the frenzied enthusiasm of the Phoenician race once more blazed forth. The most marvellous efforts were made to secure the defences of the city, and to repair the blunder which had surrendered all the arms and dismantled the battlements in obedience to the Roman demands.

Meanwhile, the Roman consuls were deluded by pretended embassies, and, though but a few miles distant, had no idea what was happening in the Phoenician capital. The precious respite was turned to good account: day and night the work of forging arms and catapults never flagged. Young and old, women and children, were all fired with the same zeal and the same hatred. With incredible speed the work was finished, and the city and its inhabitants ready for the struggle. Art had rendered the naturally strong site of Carthage well-nigh impregnable; and the two consuls, Manius Manilius and Lucius Censorinus, on realizing their blunder and attempting to prosecute the siege, soon found out how utterly incompetent they were for the task. After losses by assaults and disease the Romans were compelled, by the death of Massinissa in 149 B.C., to suspend all offensive operations. The youthful Scipio, who was serving as a military tribune, alone retrieved the honour of the Roman name, both by his personal bravery and his politic dealings with the native Numidians; and to him the aged Cato, who died the same year, applied the Homeric line, *οἷος πέπνυται, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσσουσιν* ("He only is a living man, the rest are gliding shades").

The following year saw two new commanders, Lucius Piso at the head of the land army, and Lucius Mancinus in charge of the fleet: they achieved even less than their predecessors, and neglected the siege of Carthage for attacks on smaller towns, which as a rule were unsuccessful. A Numidian sheik passed over to the Cartha-

ginian side with eight hundred horse, and negotiations were entered into with the kings of Numidia and Mauretania. At this juncture the Romans adopted the extraordinary measure of giving the command to Scipio Aemilianus, and thus made him consul without his having held the preliminary office of aedile. His arrival, in 147 B.C., completely changed the aspect of affairs. Mancinus was rescued from a position of great danger on an isolated cliff, and the siege of Carthage was once more begun in real earnest. Scipio first constructed a large camp across the isthmus which connected Carthage with the mainland, and then blocked up the entrance to the harbour by a mole of stone ninety-six feet in breadth. This latter operation the Carthaginians neutralized by cutting a new canal, thus gaining a new outlet into the harbour. But Scipio at last succeeded in his object, and completely blockaded the city by land and sea, leaving famine and pestilence to complete what he had begun.

In the spring of 146 B.C. the city wall was scaled, and for six days the famished inhabitants continued a terrible but hopeless struggle from house to house and street to street. Even then the steep citadel-rock, held by Hasdrubal and the remnant of the garrison, remained; to clear the approaches, Scipio ordered the city to be set on fire and the ruins to be levelled. The garrison at last capitulated, and life was granted to the survivors, a bare tenth part of the former population. Hasdrubal, to whose gluttony and bragging incapacity the fall of Carthage was in no small measure due, gained the boon of life for which he prayed Scipio on his knees; but his wife scorned to survive her city's destruction, and plunged with her children into the flames of a burning temple. Despite the protests of Scipio, the senate ordered the consul to raze Carthage to the ground, to pass the plough over its site, and to curse the ground for ever. "Where the industrious Phoenicians had bustled and trafficked for five hundred years, Roman slaves henceforth pastured the herds of their distant masters. Scipio, however, whom nature had destined for a nobler part than that of an executioner, gazed with horror on his own work; and, instead of the joy of victory, the victor himself was haunted by a presentiment of the retribution that would

inevitably follow such a misdeed." The Carthaginian territory, as possessed by the city in its last days, became a Roman province under the name of Africa, and the boundaries of the enlarged Numidian kingdom were clearly defined. Utica was the capital of the new province, and thither Roman merchants flocked to turn to account the new acquisition.

About the same time, Macedonia also experienced the common fate. The four small confederacies, into which Roman wisdom had parcelled out the ancient kingdom, soon showed how impracticable such an arrangement was. A pretender, calling himself Philip the son of Perseus, met with support from Thrace and Byzantium, and was accepted as king by the Macedonian nation. He even extended his rule over Thessaly by a victory over the Roman praetor Juventius in 149 B.C., but in the following year he was crushed by Quintus Caecilius Metellus. Macedonia was now converted into a Roman province, and this province, including as it did the Roman protectorate over Greece proper, covered much the same area as had formerly been subject to Macedonian sway. One more movement was made by Alexander, another pretended son of Perseus, to break the Roman yoke, but it was easily quelled in 142 B.C.

In Greece itself all Roman efforts at conciliation failed, and at last, despite the warnings of the Roman envoys, the Achaean league declared war against Sparta about 146 B.C. This action, combined with the insulting attitude of the Greeks towards Rome, caused the senate to send Lucius Mummius to crush the pretensions of Critolaus, the Achaean strategus. A battle at Leucopatra was utterly disastrous to the Achaeans, and was followed by the conversion of Greece into the province of Achaia. On the whole, Mummius seems to have acted with justice and moderation in his administration of Greek affairs; but the Roman senate showed a hideous severity in the destruction of Corinth, the first commercial city in Greece, and the last precious ornament of a land once so rich in cities. Doubtless this barbarous act was due to the political influence of the Roman merchants, who gladly seized the opportunity to rid themselves of a commercial rival.

In Asia Minor, the bequest of Pergamus to the Romans by the last of the Attalids, in 133 B.C., gave Rome a new province, though she had to vindicate her right by the sword, as Aristonicus, a natural son of one of the former kings of Pergamus, succeeded for a time in making good his claim to the throne. Most of the small states and cities in western Asia remained unchanged, but both Cappadocia and Pontus received some additional territory on the dissolution of the Attalid kingdom. Roman authority in Syria and Egypt became weaker and weaker, owing to the negligent and spasmodic manner in which the senate attempted to settle the various disputes that arose. Many causes had combined to destroy the once huge empire of Asia: the battle of Magnesia had wrested western Asia from the great king; the two Cappadocias and the two Armenias had become independent kingdoms; lastly, Antiochus Epiphanes (175-164 B.C.) had adopted the course, equally foolish and fatal, of introducing Roman and Greek ideas both in manners and religion throughout his dominions. This step, enforced as it was by religious persecution and plundering of temples, drove the Jews to revolt in 167 B.C., and the successful issue of their rebellion was mainly due to the brave and prudent conduct of the house of the Maccabees.

A still more important result of the folly of Antiochus was the founding of the Parthian kingdom, the outcome of a reaction on the part of the native religion and manners against Hellenism. Mithradates I. (175-133 B.C.) laid the foundations of this empire by his successes over the Bactrian kingdom, and in all the countries west of the great desert. Aided by the internal dissolution of the kingdom of the Seleucidae, from which Persia, Babylonia, and Media were for ever severed, this new empire reached from the Oxus and the Hindu Khush to the Tigris and the desert of Arabia. The foundations of its strength rested not merely on the revival of the wild physical forces of the East, on the bow and arrow and the whirlwind rush of the cavalry of the desert, but far more on the revival of the national customs and national religion; on the old Iranian language, the order of the Magi and the worship of Mithra. From the founding of the Parthian empire dates the ebb of that great Hellenic movement which had reached its

height under Alexander the Great. The East once more reasserted itself, and re-entered the world of politics: the world had again two masters. Thus "the Roman senate sacrificed the first essential result of the policy of Alexander, and thereby paved the way for that retrograde movement whose last offshoots ended in the Alhambra of Granada and in the great Mosque of Constantinople."

If we glance at the maritime relations of this period, we find that practically no naval power existed. Rome had no fleet, and her maritime police, once so effective, ceased to control the piracy everywhere prevalent. A check no doubt was kept on the buccaneers of the Adriatic and Tyrrhene seas; but Crete and Cilicia became the recognized home of organized bands of pirates. The Roman government merely looked on, and the Roman merchants kept up a friendly traffic with the pirate captains, who furnished them with that marketable commodity—slaves.

We have now reviewed Rome's position in and dealings with the outer world. The problem of governing this new empire was not wholly misunderstood, though it was by no means solved. The idea of Cato's time that the state should not extend beyond Italy, and that outside that limit a mere protectorate should be exercised, had proved untenable; the necessity of substituting a direct sovereignty, that should preserve the liberties of the various communities, was generally recognized. But this policy was not adopted firmly and uniformly: provinces were annexed from time to time, according as convenience, caprice, interest, or chance suggested; but the majority of dependent states remained in the intolerable uncertainty of their former position, or, as was the case with Syria, even withdrew entirely from Roman influence. Showing themselves often stern masters where leniency was needed, and lenient where sternness was required, the Romans governed from one day to another with feeble and selfish hands, merely transacting the current business of the hour. Senators had learnt to despise the old maxim that office was its own reward, and that such office was a burden and duty rather than a privilege and benefit; and we find that foreign powers constantly bribed influential senators by enormous gifts. The Roman fleet was allowed to go to

ruin; the decay of the old military spirit and prestige was no less marked. The better classes had begun to disappear from the army, and officers for the Spanish wars were found with great difficulty. In truth the Roman senate had solved the problem of acquiring the sovereignty of the world, but had broken down under the more difficult task of its government.

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- Fleet.*—Marq. Stv. ii. 500, sqq.

CHAPTER XX.

THE REFORMS OF THE GRACCHI.

Spread of decay—Attempts at reform—Public elections—Social crisis—Slavery and slave-wars—Italian farmers—Scipio Aemilianus—Tiberius Gracchus—Tribune, 134 B.C.—His agrarian law and further plans—His death—Criticism of his measures and methods—Suspension of the land commission—Murder of Scipio Aemilianus—The democratic leaders—War with Fregellae—Gaius Gracchus tribune—His measures and objects—The Livian laws—Overthrow and death of Gaius Gracchus.

WE have now reached the epoch in Roman history for ever rendered famous by the revolutionary reforms of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus. It is our duty to trace the causes which called for those reforms, and to form some judgment both of the measures and their authors. In the preceding chapter we have sketched the evils underlying the outward calm which pervaded the whole Roman empire for a full generation after the battle of Pydna. Cato's question as to the future of Rome, when she no longer had a state to fear, had a profound significance now. The younger generation of aristocrats thought no more of foreign foes, but of maintaining and, if possible, of increasing the privileges they had usurped. The various measures of the opposition—*e.g.* (a) the institution of a standing senatorial commission by Lucius Calpurnius Piso, in 149 B.C., to try the complaints of provincials touching the extortion of Roman governors; (b) the introduction of the vote by ballot in the burgess assemblies, primarily adopted for the election of magistrates by the Gabinian law in 149 B.C., then applied to the law courts, in 137 B.C., by

the Cassian law, and finally applied to all legislative proposals, in 131 B.C., by the Papirian law; (c) the exclusion, a little later, of the senators from the equestrian centuries,—failed entirely to emancipate the electors from aristocratic influence, and to restore to the comitia the power and independence they had once possessed. The Romans lacked what alone compensates for the evils of party life, the free and common movement of the masses to some definite aim. Politics were, as a rule, merely partisanship for individuals, not for great principles, and the people arrayed itself now on the side of this aristocratic coterie, now on the side of that. Hence sprang that despicable canvassing of the mob by an aspirant for public office; hence, too, those demagogic cries for reform and attacks on eminent persons to catch the popular ear; hence, again, arose the necessity for providing costly popular amusements, the long recognized duty of any candidate for the consulship. A still graver evil was the miserable position which the government, by thus cringing for the favour of the mob, was forced to occupy towards the governed. The burgesses became used to the dangerous idea that they were exempt from all direct taxation, and they were no longer forced to enter the hateful military service across the sea. The two factions, which now became known by the names of Optimates and Populares, fought alike for shadows, being completely destitute of political morality and political ideas. It would have been better for Rome had the Optimates substituted hereditary rotation for election by the burgesses, or had the Populares developed a real democratic government.

The crisis with which the Roman revolution opened arose from the old evil, the land question. The warfare which had for centuries been waged between the small farmer and the capitalist had at last produced the most disastrous results; and as formerly the farmer had been ruined by the chain of debt, so now he was crushed by the competition with transmarine and slave-grown corn. The ultimate result was in both cases the same: Italian farms sank in value; small holdings became merged in large estates; agriculture gave place to stock-raising and the growing of olives and vines; and, finally, free labour was supplanted in Italy, as in the provinces, by that of

slaves. The new and huge system of slavery now introduced owed its rise to the all-powerful capitalist. In earlier days captives taken in war and the hereditary transmission of slavery had sufficed; but the demand now exceeded the supply, and, as in America, man was hunted down on a regular system. The "negro-land" of that period was western Asia, and the Cretan and Cilician corsairs, the professional slave-hunters and slave-dealers, robbed the coasts of Syria and the Greek islands. Their example was imitated by the Roman revenue-farmers, who instituted similar human hunts to such an extent that they well-nigh depopulated certain provinces. At the great slave-market at Delos it is said that as many as ten thousand slaves were disembarked in the morning and sold before the evening of the same day. We have previously shown that every financial arrangement, every speculation, and every trade, were carried on by means of slaves. Pastoral husbandry, now so common, was almost entirely performed by armed and often mounted slaves. But far worse than any previous form of slavery was the plantation system proper—the cultivation of fields by chained gangs, who worked under overseers and were locked up together at night in the common labourers' prison. This system, introduced from the East into Carthage and thence into Sicily, was developed in that island earlier and more fully than in any other part of the Roman dominions. In fact, for the present, Italy was still substantially free from this worst form of slave husbandry, though the Roman government was soon aroused to the danger which the system developed elsewhere.

It requires but little imagination to picture the hideous sufferings of the slaves themselves, far exceeding the sum of all negro misery. Slave wars and slave insurrections now became frequent, not only in the provinces but in Italy itself, but, as was natural, it was in Sicily that the evil results of slavery were most conspicuous. At Enna, the slaves rose *en masse*, murdered their masters, and crowned a Syrian juggler as king. His general Achæus, a Greek slave, traversed the island, and united under his standard both slaves and free labourers. Agrigentum was seized by another band, under Cleon, a Cilician slave;

and the united forces utterly defeated the praetor Lucius Hypsaeus, and reduced the whole island under their sway. It was not until three successive consuls and armies had been despatched from Rome (134–132 B.C.) that the servile war was ended by the capture of Tauromenium and Euna, the latter stronghold being reduced by famine rather than by Roman arms, after a siege of two years. Such results were due partly to the lax control of the Roman police-system as worked by the senate and its officials in the provinces, partly to the disinclination of the government to disoblige Italian p'anters, to whom revolted slaves were often surrendered for punishment.

The real remedy for these evils doubtless was to be found, not in the severe repression of such revolts, but in the elevation, by the government, of free labour, a natural consequence of which would be the restriction of the slave proletariat. But the difficulty of this measure was beyond the capacity of the senate. In the first social crisis the landholder had been forced by law to employ a number of free labourers in proportion to the number of his slaves. Now the government caused a Punic treatise on agriculture to be translated for the use of Italian speculators, the solitary instance of a literary undertaking suggested by the senate! The same wisdom was shown in the matter of colonization. It was quite clear that the only real remedy against an agricultural proletariat consisted in a comprehensive and regular system of emigration. Hitherto the constant assignations of land and the establishment of new farm allotments had proved a fairly effective remedy for the evil. But after the founding of Luna in 177 B.C., no further assignations took place for a long time, for the simple reason that no new territory was acquired in Italy, with the exception of the unattractive Ligurian valleys. Therefore there was no other land for distribution except the leased or occupied domain land, with which the aristocracy was as loth to part now as it had been three hundred years before. For political reasons it was deemed impossible to distribute the land in the provinces: Italy was to remain the ruling country, and the wall of partition between the Italian masters and the provincial servants was not to be broken down. The result was inevitable—the ruin of the farmer-class in Italy. Even as early as

134 B.C. not a free farmer existed in Etruria, where the old native aristocracy combined with the Roman capitalist ; and in the very capital one could hear it said that the beasts had their lairs but the burgesses had nothing left but air and sunshine, and that the so-called masters of the world had no longer a clod they could call their own. The census list supplies a sufficient commentary. From the close of the war with Hannibal down to 159 B.C. the numbers of the burgesses steadily rose, owing to the distributions of the domain land ; while from 159 to 131 B.C. they declined from 324,000 to 319,000—an alarming result for a period of profound peace at home and abroad.

The urgent need of reform was patent to every eye ; and no one seemed more directly called to the task of reformation than Publius Scipio Aemilianus, the adopted grandson of the great Scipio. He resembled his father Aemilius Paullus in his temperate and healthy mode of life. Passionately devoted to hunting, yet he did not neglect to steep his mind in the highest Greek culture, and his thorough probity and noble simplicity of life contrasted with the mercantile spirit of so many of those around him. His military ability had been proved in his successful conclusion of the third Punic war, in which, moreover, as an officer he had gained the wreath bestowed upon those who saved a fellow-countryman's life at the risk of their own. Though no genius, he seemed from his moral worth the man needed for the work of reform ; all the more significant is the fact that he did not attempt it. Nor was this from want of courage ; for he supported Lucius Cassius against the Optimates in carrying his law for the introduction of the ballot into the law-courts, and he showed the greatest severity in restoring the old military discipline before the walls of Carthage and Numantia. But, as to the land question, the remedy, proposed and then withdrawn by his friend Gaius Laelius, of distributing the unallotted domain land in Italy among the farmers was in Scipio's opinion worse than the disease ; and so he held a middle course between the two parties of state, and on his death was claimed as champion by both sides.

When laying down the censorship in 142 B.C., Scipio called on the gods to deign to preserve the state, whereas

all his predecessors had prayed for increased glory to Rome. "His whole confession of faith lies in that painful exclamation." But, where he despaired, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, a youth unmarked by any achievement, dared to hope. His father had been the true model of a Roman aristocrat, and had given proof of his noble and generous feelings both as consul and censor, but, above all, had by his strict integrity and humane governorship of the province of the Ebro not only rendered service to his country but also endeared himself to the subject Spaniards. His famous mother, Cornelia, was the daughter of the conqueror of Zama, and had been given in marriage to Gracchus in return for his generous intervention on behalf of his political opponent, Scipio, when a petty and miserable charge had been got up against the Scipionic house. Thus Tiberius, who had taken part in the storming of Carthage under his cousin and brother-in-law Scipio Aemilianus, had been brought up in all the political ideas and social and intellectual refinement of the Scipionic circle. Nor were he and his brother Gaius the only members of that circle who regarded the abandonment by Laelius of his scheme of reform as weak rather than judicious. Appius Claudius, consul in 143 B.C. and censor in 136 B.C., the father-in-law of Tiberius, censured the Scipionic circle for their desertion of the state with bitter vehemence; the pontifex maximus Publius Crassus Mucianus, father-in-law of Gaius Gracchus, the revered warrior Quintus Metellus, and other men of note were known to favour the cause of reform. Tiberius brooded over the lofty ideals of statesmanship which he had imbibed in the atmosphere around him, and public placards often summoned the grandson of Africanus to think of the poor people and of the deliverance of Italy. He was elected tribune in 134 B.C., at a time when one of the consuls had met with disaster in his attempt to quell the rebellion of the Sicilian slaves, and when a small Spanish town had defied for months the efforts of Scipio Aemilianus. Not only had Tiberius the support and counsel of his father-in-law, but he also hoped for the influence of the new consul, Publius Mucius Scaevola, the founder of scientific jurisprudence in Rome, and a man whose abstinence from party conflict gave his opinion the greater weight.

At the outset Tiberius proposed what was in a certain sense but the renewal of the Licinio-Sextian law of 367 B.C. Under it all the state lands held and enjoyed without remuneration were to be resumed on behalf of the state, with the restriction that each occupier should reserve for himself 500 jugera and for each son 250 (so as, however, not to exceed a total of 1000 jugera) in permanent and guaranteed possession; moreover, compensation was to be given to an ejected occupier for any improvements executed by him. The domain land thus resumed was to be broken up into lots of 30 jugera, and to be distributed among burgesses and Italian allies on permanent lease at a moderate rent, and the new holders were bound to use the land for agriculture. A board or "college" of three men, regarded as ordinary state magistrates and annually elected by the people, was intrusted with the work of confiscation and distribution; and, later, the same board had the difficult and important task of determining what was domain land and what private property.

This permanent executive, the absence of which had chiefly caused the Licinian rogations to remain in abeyance, was the special point of difference between the Sempronian and the older proposals. War was thus declared against the great landholders, whose organ now, as three centuries ago, was the senate. The old plan was adopted of silencing Tiberius. His colleague Marcus Octavius interposed his veto when the measure was about to be put to the vote; Gracchus replied by suspending all public business and administration of justice. Gracchus again brought his law to the vote, Octavius again vetoed it. The senate now induced Gracchus to discuss the matter further in the senate-house, but no fruit came or could come of such discussions. Gracchus, now feeling that all constitutional means were exhausted, began a revolution by proposing to the burgesses that they should vote whether he or Octavius should retire from office. Such deposition was impossible according to the Roman constitution; but Gracchus persevered, and was, of course, backed up by the almost unanimous vote of the assembled multitude. Gracchus then had his opponent removed from the tribunes' bench, and, amid great rejoicing, the law was carried.

The first three commissioners elected were Tiberius

Gracchus, his brother, and his father-in-law Appius. Such a family selection only irritated the aristocratic party still more, and the strife was carried into every district where the commissioners' task lay. Gracchus' very life was in danger, and he appeared in public with a retinue of 3000 men—a step possibly necessary, but the cause of bitter words from senators as well disposed to him as Metellus. He clearly saw that he was a lost man unless he continued indispensable to the people, and that his only course lay in forming fresh plans and introducing still wider reforms. So he proposed that the treasures of Pergam^{us}, which had just been bequeathed to Rome, should be divided among the new landholders for the purchase of the necessary farming implements and stock. What his other proposals were we do not know, but it is certain that he was well aware that re-election to the tribunate could alone secure his safety. At the meeting of the tribes to elect tribunes, the aristocratic party opposed its veto with the effect that the assembly broke up on the first and second day without accomplishing its object, though on both occasions the first divisions voted for Gracchus. To attain his object at the second meeting of the tribes Gracchus had resorted to every art, and even employed force to expel his opponents: they, in their turn, spread abroad that he had deposed all the other tribunes and was aiming at sole power. On the assembling of the senate, the consul Scaevola refused the urgent request for the death of Tiberius; whereupon Publius Scipio Nasica, at the head of an aristocratic following armed with legs of benches and clubs, began the civil bloodshed. Tiberius was struck down on the slope of the Capitol, and his body, with the corpses of three hundred adherents, was thrown into the Tiber. Such a day had never before been seen in Rome. The more moderate aristocrats had not only to acquiesce in but even to defend the deed of blood, as was the case with Publius Scaevola and even Scipio Aemilianus; and official sanction was given to the assertion that Gracchus had aimed at the crown.

It remains for us to form some judgment touching events so momentous. In the first place, the appointment of an official commission, though a sign of the unhealthy state of things, was a judicious and necessary step. In the second place, the distribution of the domain lands was not

in itself a question affecting the existing constitution or the government of the aristocracy ; nor, seeing that the state was admitted to be the owner of the occupied land, was it a violation of rights. But, inasmuch as many of these lands had been in private hereditary possession for as long as three centuries, the state's proprietorship in the soil had virtually lost its character of private right and become extinct. Therefore, though legally defensible, the resumption of these lands by the state was regarded as an ejection of the great landholders for the benefit of the agricultural proletariat. Still, strong as the objections to such a course might be, the fact remains that no other plan seemed capable of checking the extinction of the farmer-class in Italy. But, whatever view wise men took of the aims of Tiberius Gracchus, none could approve of his method. He practically began a revolution with regard to the spirit of the constitution when he submitted his agrarian proposals to the people ; and it was a revolution with regard to the letter, when he destroyed for all time the tribunician veto, by which the senate rid itself of interference with its government, by the unconstitutional deposition of his colleague. Yet even this was not the moral and political mistake of Gracchus ; for a revolutionist may be at the same time a sagacious and praiseworthy statesman. The essential defects of the Gracchan revolution lay in the nature of the burgess assemblies at that time. The sovereign assembly of Rome was what it would be in England, if, instead of sending representatives, the electors of England were to meet together in Parliament. Not only was the assembly a chance conglomeration of men assembled in the capital, incapable of intelligent action and agitated by every interest and passion, and, therefore, as a rule, ready to accept and ratify the decree of the proposing magistrate ; but it was also, in no small degree, under the influence of the opinion of the street. Although the contiones, or meetings of the street populace, had legally no power, and consisted of the lowest rabble, of Egyptians, Jews, street boys, and slaves, yet the opinion of the masses, evinced by the loud shouts of approval or disapproval, began to be a power in Rome. It was bad enough that the demoralized and disorganized comitia should be made use of for the elections and legislation ;

but when they were allowed to interfere with the government, and when the senate lost the instrument to prevent such interferences—when they could decree themselves lands, and when a single person by his influence with the proletariat could thus play the part of ruler and dictate to the senate—then Rome had reached the end of popular freedom, and had arrived, not at democracy, but at monarchy. For that reason, all such questions had hitherto been discussed in the senate alone; and even the very supporters of Gracchus, who afterwards carried out his policy of distribution, abandoned its author to his fate. The very fact that Tiberius Gracchus never harboured the thought of deposing the senate and making himself sole ruler, but was the victim of events which irresistibly urged him into the career of demagogue tyrant, was only a fresh ground of charge against him rather than a justification. The infamous butchery which slew him condemns the aristocratic party, and has cast a halo of martyrdom round his name—a glory undeserved both in the opinion of his mother and of Scipio Aemilianus, the latter of whom uttered the words of Homer, ὧς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε βέροι.

Though Tiberius was dead, his two works, the land distribution and the revolution, survived their author. Indeed, the moderate party in the senate, headed by Metellus and Scaevola, in combination with the adherents of Scipio, gained the upper hand; and, in the place of Tiberius Gracchus, Publius Crassus Mucianus, the father-in-law of Gaius Gracchus, was appointed on the commission. In 130 B.C., owing to the death of Appius Claudius and the defeat and death of Mucianus by the Thracian bands of Aristonicus, Gaius Gracchus was left triumvir, with Marcus Flaccus and Gaius Carbo as coadjutors, two of the most active leaders of the reform party. The census furnishes the strongest evidence that the distribution of the domain lands went on very vigorously, an increase of 76,000 burgesses being noted in six years (from 131–125 B.C.). No doubt in some cases acts of injustice occurred and private property was confiscated, but the senate did not interfere, albeit loud complaints arose as to the manner of the distribution. But the commissioners, in their ardour, overreached themselves. They attacked that part

of the lands which had been assigned by decrees to Italian communities, or which had been occupied with or without permission by Latin burgesses. The senate could not disregard the complaints of those communities who were already smarting under other wrongs; and the Latins appealed for protection to the most prominent man in Rome, Scipio Aemilianus. Through his influence the people, in 129 B.C., decreed that the commissioners' jurisdiction should be suspended, and that the consuls should decide what were domain lands and what private property. Thus practically the land distribution ceased, and the reform party were bitterly indignant at Scipio's intervention. Shortly afterwards Scipio was found dead in his bed, murdered, no doubt, by some assassin, at the instigation of the Gracchan party. The matter was hushed up as far as possible, both parties in the state being glad to let it rest; but all men of moderate views were horrified at so atrocious a crime.

Thus perished a man to whose character Roman history presents no parallel, in the utter absence of political selfishness, in generous love of country, and in the tragic part assigned him by destiny. "Conscious of the best intentions and of no common abilities, he was doomed to see the ruin of his country carried out before his eyes, and to repress within him every serious attempt to save it, because he clearly perceived that he could only thereby aggravate the evil." Yet due to him, as much as to Tiberius Gracchus, was the increase of nearly 80,000 new farm allotments; and that he put a stop to the distribution at the right moment is shown by the fact that Gaius Gracchus never attempted to recur, after Scipio's death, to those lands which might have been but were not distributed under his brother's law.

The revolution still went on under the leadership of the orator Carbo, Flaccus, and Gaius Gracchus. The first-named nearly carried a proposal that the same person might hold the office of tribune two years in succession; and this was carried a few years later. The chief object of the revolution party was to revive the allotment commission, and to this end they proposed to confer the rights of citizenship on the Italian allies. Marcus Pennus, tribune in 126 B.C., and member of the aristocratic party,

carried his proposal that all non-burgesses should leave the city. Flaccus, consul in 125 B.C., made a counter-proposal that every ally should take the vote of the comitia on the subject of his request to be entitled to Roman citizenship. But Carbo had ratted, and joined the aristocratic party; and Gaius Gracchus was away as quaestor in Sardinia; so Flaccus' proposal found no support, and he left Rome to take command against the Celts. Still, his action bore fruit in the revolt of Fregellae, at that time the second city in Italy and the mouthpiece of the Latin colonies, situated on the borders of Latium and Campania at the chief passage of the Liris. This was the first instance, for one hundred and fifty years, of a serious insurrection in Italy against Rome, without the instigation of foreign powers. But, before it spread, Fregellae was surprised, owing to the treachery of a native, and was seriously punished by the loss of its walls and all its privileges, in 124 B.C. The democratic party was regarded as implicated in the revolt of Fregellae, and Gaius Gracchus, who had returned from Sardinia, was tried but acquitted. He now threw down the gauntlet, and, by being elected tribune in 123 B.C., declared open war upon the aristocracy.

Gaius resembled his brother only in his dislike for vulgar pleasures and pursuits, in his culture and personal bravery, but was decidedly his superior in talent, character, and passion. His ability as a statesman was evinced in his clearness and self-possession, in his grasp of details and practical powers. His lovable nature was proved by the devotion of his intimate friends. Disciplined by suffering, he masked the terrible energy of his nature and the bitter indignation he felt against the aristocracy by a compulsory reserve. At times, indeed, his passion mastered him, and caused his brilliant oratory to become confused and faltering; but he was one of the greatest speakers Rome ever saw. He had none of the sentimental good-nature of his brother; fully and firmly resolved, he entered on the career of revolution with vengeance as his goal and aim. To attain this end he counted not too great the price of his own fall and the ruin of the state. His mother's creed, that the country should at all cost be saved, was nobler; but posterity has been right in

rather lamenting than blaming the course taken by her son.

The proposals now made by Gracchus were nothing less than a new constitution, the foundation-stone of which rested upon the legal right of the same man to be elected tribune for two or more years in succession. This having been carried, the next object was to attach the multitude of the capital to the holder of the tribunate. This was first of all effected by distributions of corn. Gaius enacted that every burgess, on personal application, should receive a monthly allowance of five modii ($1\frac{1}{4}$ bushels) at the extremely low rate of three-pence per modius; this measure would both attract into the capital the whole mass of the burgess proletariat, and would make them dependent on the tribune, and supply him with a body-guard and a firm majority in the comitia. He also changed the method of voting in the comitia centuriata, according to which the five property classes in each tribe voted one after the other, and made the order of voting depend upon lot. Yet, though thus securing his position in Rome, he did not neglect to legislate for the existing social evils. His agrarian law only revived that of his brother, and he did not proceed any further in the distribution of domain land. But by establishing colonies at Tarentum and Capua, he rendered that land, which had been let on lease by the state and had been exempt from distribution, liable to be divided; and no doubt he intended these colonies to aid in defending the revolution to which they owed their existence. He also opened a new outlet for the Italian proletariat by sending six thousand colonists to the site of Carthage—colonists chosen from Italian allies as well as Roman citizens. Moreover, he introduced several modifications of the military system, by reviving the law which enacted that no one should be enlisted before his seventeenth year, and by restricting the number of campaigns requisite for full exemption from military duty: the state also supplied the soldiers, for the future, with their clothing free of charge. Further, Gracchus attempted to restrict capital punishment as far as possible, by withdrawing the cognizance of such crimes as poisoning and murder from the popular assemblies and intrusting it to permanent judicial commissions. These

tribunals could only sentence a man to exile, and their sentence could not be appealed from, nor could they, like the tribunals of the people, be broken up by the intercession of a tribune.

In order to work the ruin of the aristocracy, Gracchus took advantage of the already existing elements favourable to a rupture in that body. The aristocracy of the rich consisted of two classes: (1) of the governing senatorial families, who bore some resemblance to our peers, and whose capital was invested in land; (2) of the wealthy merchants and speculators, who conducted all the money transactions of the empire, and who had gradually risen to take their place by the side of the older aristocracy. At the present time this class was generally known as the equestrian order, which title had gradually come to be used of all who possessed an estate of at least 400,000 sesterces, and, as such were liable to cavalry service. Already senators had been marked off from this body by a law passed in 129 B.C.; but many members of senatorial families, not yet members of the senate, were included in the equites. The natural antipathy between the aristocrats of blood and those of wealth was adroitly increased by Gracchus, until the equestrian order ranged itself on his side. Partly by conferring on them various insignia, but still more by offering them the revenues of Asia and the jury-courts, Gracchus won over the class of material interests. Hitherto the direct taxes of each province had been farmed by the provincials themselves, and thus the Roman publicani had been kept at a distance. Gracchus now enacted that Asia should be burdened with the heaviest taxes, both direct and indirect, and that these taxes should be put up for auction in Rome; he thus excluded the provincials from participation, and gave the capitalists an opening for the farming of these various taxes, of which they did not fail to avail themselves.

Having thus opened up a gold-mine for the merchant princes, Gracchus gave them a sphere for public action in the jury courts. Most processes, alike civil and criminal, were up to this time decided by single jurymen or by commissioners, whether permanent or extraordinary; and in both cases the members had been exclusively taken from the senate. Gracchus now transferred the functions of

jurymen, both in strictly civil processes and in the various commissions, to the equestrian order, and directed a new list of judges to be made out annually from all persons of equestrian rating. The result of these measures was that not only was the moneyed class united into a compact and privileged order on the solid basis of material interests, but that also, as a judicial and controlling power, it was almost on a footing of equality with the ruling aristocracy. All the old antipathies found expression in the sentences of the new jurymen; and the senator, on his return from governing a province, had no longer to pass the scrutiny of his brother peers, but of merchants and bankers.

For the complete overthrow of the senate, Gracchus not only had to deprive it of the substance of its powers by legislative changes, but also to ruin the existing aristocracy by more personal and less permanent measures. He did both. For not only did he deprive the senate of administrative power by settling questions by comitial laws, dictated as a rule by the tribune, but also by taking the business of the state into his own hands. He had meddled with the state finances by his distributions of corn; with the domain lands by sending out colonies, not at the decree of the senate, but of the people; with the provincial administration by overturning the provincial constitution of Asia and substituting his own for that of the senate. The marvellous activity Gracchus showed in all his new functions quite threw into the shade the lax administration of the senate, and began to make it clear to the people that one vigorous man could control the business of the state better than a college of effete aristocrats. Still more vigorous was his interference with the jurisdiction of the senate. He forbade their appointing any extraordinary commission of high treason, such as had tried his brother's adherents; and he even planned to reinforce the senate by three hundred new members, to be elected by the comitia from the equestrian order.

Such was the political constitution projected and carried by Gaius Gracchus, as tribune, in 123 and 122 B.C., without any serious resistance or recourse to force. It is clear that he did not wish to place the Roman Republic on a new democratic basis, but that he wished to abolish it and introduce in its stead an absolute despotism, in the form of

an unlimited tribuneship for life. Nor can he be blamed for it; as, though an absolute monarchy is a great misfortune for a nation, it is a less misfortune than an absolute oligarchy. Still, it is clear that his whole legislation was marred by the fact that it was pervaded by conflicting aims, now seeking the public good, now ministering to the personal objects and personal vengeance of its framer. "On the very threshold of his despotism he was confronted by the fatal dilemma, moral and political, that the same man had at one and the same time to hold his ground as a captain of robbers, and to lead the state as its first citizen—a dilemma to which Pericles, Caesar, and Napoleon had also to make dangerous sacrifices." Besides this, he was fired with the passion for a speedy vengeance, and was in fact a political incendiary,—the author not only of the one hundred years' revolution, which dates from him, but the founder of that terrible urban proletariat which, utterly demoralized by corn-largesses and the flattery of the classes above it, and at the same time conscious of its power, lay like an incubus for five hundred years on the Roman commonwealth, and only perished with it.

Many of the fundamental maxims of Roman monarchy may be traced to Gracchus. He first laid down that all the land of subject communities ~~was to be~~ regarded as the private property of the state—a maxim first applied to vindicate the right of the state to tax the land and then to send out colonies to it, afterwards established as a fundamental principle of law under the Empire. He invented the tactics by which ~~his successors broke down~~ the governing aristocracy, and substituted strict and judicious administration for the previous misgovernment. He first opened the way to a reconciliation between Rome and the provinces; and his attempt to rebuild Carthage and to give an opportunity for Italian emigration to the provinces was the first link in the chain of that beneficial course of action. "Right and wrong, fortune and misfortune, were so inextricably blended in this singular man and in this marvellous political constellation, that it may well beseem history in this case—though it beseems her but seldom—to reserve her judgment."

Having thus established his new constitution. Gracchus

turned to the task of enfranchising the Italian allies, which had been proposed and rejected in 125 B.C. But a considerable section of the mob, thinking that their own interests would be seriously injured by a new influx of men to share the profits they were enjoying, combined with the senate in rejecting the proposal, made by Gracchus in 122 B.C., that the Latins should receive the full franchise. This encouraged the senate to work his ruin. The method of attack was the clumsy one of offering the proletariat more than Gracchus had done. At the instigation of the senate, Marcus Livius Drusus proposed to release those who received land under the law of Gracchus from their rent, and to declare their allotments free and inalienable property, and to give relief to the proletariat by planting twelve Italian colonies, each of three thousand men. Probably, owing to the non-existence elsewhere in Italy of domain land to the extent required, this plan would have to be carried out at the expense of the Latins; and Drusus passed several enactments conferring privileges on the Latins with the intention of indemnifying them for their losses. Drusus himself refused to be nominated as an executor of his own laws, perhaps knowing well that no such extent of domain land existed, even if those assigned to the Latins were confiscated. But the clumsy bait took. Gracchus was away at the time in Africa, founding the Carthaginian colony, and the incapacity of his lieutenant, Marcus Flaccus, made all easy for his opponents. The people ratified the Livian laws as readily as they had the Sempronian, and then declined to re-elect Gracchus, when he stood for the third time candidate for the tribunate of 121 B.C. Lucius Opimius, one of the most pronounced chiefs of the aristocratic party, was also elected consul, and the time had now come when a blow might safely be struck at the democratic despot. On the 10th of December, 122 B.C., Gracchus ceased to be tribune of the people; on the 1st of January of the ensuing year Opimius entered on his consular office.

The first attack was directed against the most unpopular measure of Gracchus, the restoration of Carthage. National superstition was invoked, and the senate proposed a law to prevent the planting of the colony of Junonia. Gracchus, attended by an armed crowd of partisans, appeared on the

day of voting at the Capitol, to procure the rejection of the law. The sight of his armed adherents, and the intense excitement which prevailed, could hardly have failed to result in a collision between the two sides. Quintus Antullius, the attendant of Lucius Opimius during the usual ceremony of sacrifice, ordered all bad citizens to quit the porch of the Capitoline temple, and seemed even to threaten Gracchus himself; whereupon a Gracchan cut him down. A fearful tumult arose, and Gracchus, by addressing the people, broke an old statute, which forbade any one to interrupt a tribune while speaking to the people, on pain of the severest penalties. The consul Lucius Opimius took vigorous measures to put down the insurrection by force of arms, and next day was attended by a large armed force, including all the aristocracy, and commanded by Decimus Brutus, an officer trained in Spanish warfare. The senate-house was crowded with senators, and outside its doors lay the corpse of Antullius stretched upon a bier. The Gracchan party, under the command of Flaccus, entrenched itself upon the Aventine. Gracchus was averse to resistance, but Flaccus hoped to come to a compromise with his foes. But the aristocrats rejected all his proposals, and arrested his son Quintus, who was sent to mediate, and ordered an attack on the Aventine. The defenders of the mount were speedily dispersed, and Flaccus was killed after vainly seeking concealment. Gracchus was persuaded to fly, but sprained his foot in the attempt. The devotion of two of his attendants, who sacrificed their lives to give him time to escape, enabled him and his slave to cross the Tiber; here, in a grove, both he and his slave were found dead. The Gracchan party was hunted down by prosecutions, and three thousand are said to have been strangled in prison. The memory of the Gracchi was officially proscribed, and Cornelia was forbidden to put on mourning for the death of her son; but, despite the precautions of the police, the common people continued to pay a religious veneration to the spots where the two leaders of the revolution had perished.

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CHAPTER XXI.

THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION.

Social state of Italy and the provinces—Second slave-war in Sicily—War of the Numidian succession—Capture of Cirta by Jugurtha—The Jugurthine war—Its political results—Transalpine relations of Rome—Conquest of the Arverni and Allobroges—Province of Narbo—Conflicts with tribes in the North-East—The Cimbri—Their movements—Battle of Arausio—Victories of Marius at Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae.

GRACCHUS had fallen, and with him the structure he had reared; nor was there any one left fit to take the lead of the Gracchan party. But, though the aristocracy once more ruled, it was the rule of a restoration, which is always in itself a revolution; and in this case it was not so much the old government as the old governor that was restored. The senate practically continued to govern with the constitution of the Gracchi, though no doubt resolved to purge it in due time from the elements hostile to its own order. The distributions of grain, the taxation of Asia, and the new arrangements as to jurymen and tribunals remained as before; nay, the senate exceeded Gracchus in the homage it paid to the mercantile class, and, more especially, to the proletariat. But the noble scheme of Gracchus to introduce legal equality, first between the Roman burgesses and Italy, and then between Italy and the provinces, and also his attempt to solve the social question by a comprehensive system of emigration, were alike disregarded by the aristocrats. They still held fast to the principle that Italy ought to remain the ruling land, and Rome the ruling city in Italy. The

colony of Narbo, founded in 118 B.C., was the sole exception to the success of the government in preventing assignations of land outside Italy. So also the Italian colonies of Gracchus were cancelled, and, where already planted, were again broken up; those who had received domain lands, not by virtue of being members of a colony, retained their possessions. With regard to those domain lands, which were still held by the right of occupation, and from which to a great extent the thirty-six thousand new allotments promised by Drusus were to have been formed, it was resolved to maintain the rights of the present occupier, so as to preclude the possibility of future distribution.

The allotment commission was abolished in 119 B.C., and a fixed rent imposed on the occupants of the domain land, the proceeds of which went to benefit the populace of the capital.

The final step was taken in 111 B.C., when the occupied domain land was converted into the rent-free private property of the former occupants. It was added that in future domain land was not to be occupied at all, but was either to be leased or lie open as public pasture; thus too late the injurious character of the occupation system was officially recognized, when the state had lost almost all its domain lands. The aristocracy thus converted all the occupied land they still held into private property, and pacified the Italian allies by preserving their rights with regard to the Latin domain land, though they did not actually confer it upon them.

But practically the restored government was powerless in the presence of the dread forces evoked by Gracchus. The proletariat of the capital continued to have a recognized claim to being kept by largesses of corn; and the attempt by the consul Quintus Caepio in 106 B.C., to transfer the *judicia* back again to the senatorial order, resulted in failure. The miserable condition of the senate at this period is only too apparent: its rule rested on the same basis as that of Gracchus, and its strength lay only in its league with the city rabble or with the mercantile order; confronted with either, it was powerless. "It sat on the vacated throne with an evil conscience and divided hopes, indignant at the institutions of the state which it ruled,

and yet incapable of even systematically assailing them, vacillating in all its conduct except where its own material advantage prompted decision, a picture of faithlessness towards its own as well as the opposite party, of inward inconsistency, of the most pitiful impotence, of the meanest selfishness—an unsurpassed ideal of misrule.” Moral and intellectual decay had fallen upon the whole nation, and especially on the upper classes. The aristocracy returned to power with the curse of restoration upon it, and it returned neither wiser nor better. Incompetency marked alike its leaders in the world of politics and on the field of battle. Social ruin spread apace; small farm-holders quickly disappeared; and in 100 B.C. it was said that among the whole burgesses there were scarce two thousand wealthy families. Slave insurrections became almost annual in Italy, the most serious of which was in the territory of Thurii, headed by a Roman knight named Titus Vettius, whom his debts had driven to take this step in 104 B.C. Piracy was practised in the Mediterranean by the magisterial and mercantile classes of Rome as well as by professional freebooters. At last the government was forced to despatch a fleet, in 102 B.C., and occupy stations on the coast of Cilicia, the main seat of the pirates, and this was the first step to the establishment of the province of Cilicia; but piracy flourished in spite of these precautions.

Throughout the provinces slaves constantly rose in insurrection; and the most terrible tumults occurred, as usual, in Sicily, which swarmed with slaves brought from Asia Minor to work on the plantations. Practically, too, the free natives were little better than slaves, and many had become enrolled as such. Publius Nerva, the governor of Sicily, in 104 B.C. was ordered by the senate to hold a court at Syracuse, and to investigate the cases of those who applied for freedom. Numbers were declared free, and, in alarm, the planters succeeded in causing Nerva to suspend the court and to order the rest of the applicants to return to their former masters. This set ablaze the smouldering embers of revolt. A band of slaves defeated part of the garrison at Enna, and thus supplied themselves with arms; they placed a slave at their head with the title of king Tryphon. The open country

between Enna and Leontini was overrun by their forces, and they defeated a hastily collected force of militia under the Roman governor with ridiculous ease.

On the west coast a still more serious revolt arose under the leadership of Athenion, who had been a robber captain in Cilicia, and was alike versed in military tactics and in the superstitious arts so necessary for gaining a hold on vulgar minds. He avoided jealous quarrels by submitting to king Tryphon, and the two ruled all the flat country in Sicily and laid siege to many towns, Messina itself being all but captured by Athenion. Rome was at that time engaged with the war against the Cimbri, but in 103 B.C. it sent a large force under Lucullus, who gained a victory but did not follow it up. Nor was his successor Servilius any more fortunate; and, on the death of Tryphon, Athenion, in 102 B.C., stood sole ruler of the greater part of the island. In 101 B.C., Manius Aquillius, who had gained distinction in the war with the Teutones, arrived, and, after two years of hard struggles, quelled the revolt and killed Athenion, thus terminating the war after five years.

A clear proof of the gross incompetency of the senate is furnished by the origin and conduct of this second Sicilian slave-war. If we turn our eyes to Africa, this is still more clearly proved by the fourteen years' insurrection and usurpation successfully achieved by Jugurtha. Numidia included the greatest portion of the territory held by Carthage in its days of prosperity, as well as several old-Phoenician cities, and thus embraced the largest and best part of the rich seaboard of northern Africa. The three sons of Massinissa had, by Scipio's arrangement, divided the functions of sovereignty between them. At this time Micipsa, the eldest, reigned alone, a feeble and peaceful old man. As his sons were not grown up, Jugurtha, an illegitimate nephew, practically ruled. Naturally gifted, Jugurtha was, both on the field of battle and in the council chamber, no unworthy grandson of Massinissa. Micipsa arranged that he with his own two sons should govern the kingdom. On Micipsa's death, in 118 B.C., a quarrel arose as to the division. Hiempsal was assassinated by Jugurtha's orders, and a civil war arose between Adherbal, the remaining brother, and

Jugurtha, in which all Numidia took part. Jugurtha was victorious, and seized the whole kingdom, while Adherbal escaped and made his complaints in person at Rome. Jugurtha's envoys, however, bribed the senators, and, notwithstanding the disgust of the leading men in Rome, the senate divided the kingdom equally between the two, and sent Lucius Opimius to arrange the division. An unfair distribution gave Jugurtha far the best half of the kingdom. But Jugurtha, not content, tried to provoke Adherbal to war, and, finding this impossible, made war upon him, and laid siege to Cirta, which was defended more vigorously by the resident Italians than by Adherbal's troops. In answer to Adherbal's complaints, the senate sent a commission of inexperienced youths, whose demands Jugurtha contemptuously rejected. At last, when matters were getting desperate at Cirta, Rome sent another commission, headed by the chief man of the aristocracy, Marcus Aemilius Scaurus; but the conference at Utica ended without any result. In the end, Cirta capitulated, and Jugurtha put all the males, whether Italian or African, to the sword, in 112 B.C. This was too much for the people in Italy; a storm broke out against the government, headed by Gaius Memmius, tribune designate for the next year, and war was declared against Jugurtha. A Roman army was sent to Africa, and Bocchus, the father-in-law of Jugurtha and king of Mauretania, took the Roman side, but he neglected to bribe the Roman commanders, and so his alliance fell through. Jugurtha, on the other hand, more wisely made free use of the treasures left by Massinissa, and gained a peace on most favourable terms, being merely condemned to pay a moderate fine and give up his war elephants. On this the storm again broke out in Rome; all men now knew that even Scaurus, who was serving in Africa, was amenable to bribes, and Gaius Memmius pressed for the appearance of Jugurtha to answer the charges made against him. The senate yielded, and granted a safe-conduct to Jugurtha; but his gold was as powerful as ever, and the colleague of Memmius interposed his veto, when the latter addressed his first question to the king. Endless discussions took place in the senate as to the validity of the peace, and Massiva, a grandson of Massinissa,

living in Rome, was induced to claim the throne of Numidia. He was at once assassinated by Bomilcar, one of Jugurtha's confidants. This new outrage caused the senate to cancel the peace and dismiss Jugurtha from the city, at the beginning of 110 B.C. War was resumed under the command of the consul Spurius Albinus; but, owing to the utterly demoralized state of the African army, and, possibly, to the gold of Jugurtha, Albinus could effect nothing. His brother, however, rashly conceived the plan of storming the town of Suthul, where Jugurtha kept his treasures. The attack failed, and the Roman general pursued the troops of Jugurtha, who purposely decoyed him into the desert. In a night attack the Roman army was utterly routed, and the terms dictated by Jugurtha were accepted, 109 B.C., which involved the passing of the Romans under the yoke, the evacuation of Numidia, and the renewal of the cancelled peace.

On news of this peace, the fury of the popular party, allied for the time with the mercantile classes at Rome, swept away by public prosecutions many of the highest aristocrats. But the chief of sinners, Scaurus, was too powerful and too prudent to be attacked, and was both elected censor and chosen as one of the presidents of the extraordinary commission of treason, instituted to try those who were guilty of the disgraceful conduct of the African war. The second treaty of peace was cancelled, and Quintus Metellus, an aristocrat inaccessible to bribes and experienced in war, had the conduct of the campaign in Africa. Gaius Marius accompanied him as one of his lieutenants.

Metellus speedily reorganized the army in Africa, and in 108 B.C., led it over the Numidian frontier. He returned an evasive answer to Jugurtha's proposals for peace, and tried to end the war by having Jugurtha assassinated. The latter prepared to await the Romans on a ridge of hills, which intersected a plain eighteen miles in breadth extending to the river Muthul. Despite the skilful dispositions of Jugurtha, the Roman infantry utterly scattered the Numidians, and Jugurtha restricted himself to a guerilla warfare. Numidia was occupied by Metellus, but his object was not gained, and the Roman army had to retire into winter quarters. Proposals of peace were

made and almost agreed to, had it not been for the treachery of Bomilcar, the chief adviser of Jugurtha, who promised to deliver up his king, alive or dead, into the hands of the Romans: this plot and others were discovered by Jugurtha, and only leave a stain on the name of Metellus. The capture of Jugurtha was all-important. Vaga, one of the Numidian cities occupied by the Romans, revolted early in 107 B.C., and put to death the whole Roman garrison; and, although Metellus surprised the town and gave it over to martial law, such a revolt sufficiently indicated the difficulty of the Roman enterprise.

In 107 B.C. the war in the desert went on, but Jugurtha nowhere withstood the Romans; now here, now there, he was perpetually appearing and then vanishing from the scene. Metellus took Thala, a city situated on the edge of the great desert and only to be reached with great difficulty, where Jugurtha had placed his treasures, children, and the flower of his troops. But Jugurtha escaped with his chest, and, though Numidia was virtually in the hands of the Romans, the war only seemed to extend over a wider area.

Bocchus seemed again disposed to aid his son-in-law. He received him at his court, and, by his power over Jugurtha's person, held the key of the position. Probably he was undecided whether to play the traitor or side against Rome, but his ambiguous position had its advantages.

Metellus had now to resign the command to his lieutenant Marius. The latter had gained his consulship, in spite of the sneers of Metellus and the whole aristocratic party, by appealing to the credulity of the Roman mob and by misleading them with the most unfair and absurd misrepresentations of the conduct by Metellus of the African war. He succeeded Metellus in 106 B.C. In spite of his boast that he would deliver Jugurtha bound hand and foot, he seemed to abandon all hope of his capture, and turned his attention to storming towns and strongholds. Still more aimless was his expedition to the river Molochath, by which, as he almost entered Mauretanian territory, king Bocchus was roused to give active aid to his son-in-law. Indeed, on his return from that

river, Marius found his army surrounded by immense swarms of cavalry, and, had it not been for the skill and bravery of Lucius Sulla, he might never have reached his winter quarters at Cirta in 105 B.C. Sulla manifested his bravery and adroitness still more conspicuously in the negotiations which followed between Marius and Bocchus, and at last induced the latter to make his choice between the Romans and his son-in-law. By an act of treachery the traitor fell, and Jugurtha was given up to Sulla; and thus the war which had lasted for seven years came to an end. Jugurtha was brought to Rome on the first of January, 104 B.C., and perished in the old tullianum in the Capitol, which the Numidian king grimly termed the bath of ice.

There can be little doubt that Marius cuts but a sorry figure, when contrasted with either his predecessor, Metellus, or his still more brilliant officer, Sulla. The fatal consequences produced by the praise lavished on both these men at the expense of Marius bore bitter fruit in succeeding history.

Contrary to the usual policy, Numidia was not converted into a province, probably because a standing army would have been necessary to protect its frontier. The most westerly district was annexed, and the kingdom of Numidia was handed over to the last surviving grandson of Massinissa, a man feeble alike in mind and body. But politically the results of the Jugurthine war were more important. It had made clear to all, not only the utter baseness and venality of the restored senatorial government, but also the complete nullity of the opposition. "It was not possible to govern worse than the restoration governed in 117-109 B.C.; it was not possible to be more defenceless and forlorn than was the senate in 109 B.C.: had there been in Rome a real opposition, that is to say, a party which wished and urged a fundamental alteration of the constitution, it must at least have made an attempt to overturn the restored senate; but no such attempt took place." The so-called popular party, as such, neither could nor would govern, and the only two possible forms of government were a despotism or an oligarchy. The appearance of Marius on the scene indicated clearly the danger which threatened the oligarchy. Probably he was

unaware of the real significance of his action when he canvassed the people for the supreme command in Africa ; but there was evidently an end of the restored aristocratic government when the *comitia* began to make generals, or when every popular officer could legally nominate himself as general. As might be expected, the new element introduced into politics was the part played by military men. It could now be foreseen that the new despot would not be a statesman like Gaius Gracchus, but a soldier like Gaius Marius. "The contemporary reorganization of the military system—which Marius introduced when, in forming his army destined for Africa, he disregarded the property qualification and allowed even the poorest burgess to enter the legion as a volunteer—may have been projected by its author on purely military grounds ; but it was none the less a momentous political event, that the army was no longer, as formerly, composed of those who had much, no longer even, as in the most recent times, composed of those who had something, to lose, but became gradually converted into a host of people who had nothing but their arms and what the general bestowed on them. The aristocracy ruled in 104 B.C. as absolutely as in 134 B.C. ; but the signs of the impending catastrophe had multiplied, and on the political horizon the sword had begun to appear by the side of the crown."

Let us now for a while turn our attention outside Rome and its political crises, and consider what was taking place to the north of Italy. Behind the mighty mountain screen, nations were moving uneasily to and fro, and reminding the Græco-Roman world that it was not the sole possessor of the earth. In the country between the Alps and Pyrenees Rome found her chief mainstay in the powerful city of Massilia, whose mercantile and political connections extended in all directions. Ligurian tribes were defeated and placed under tribute by the Massiliots in 154 B.C. ; and again a tribe, named the Salassi, was conquered by Appius Claudius in 143 B.C., and forced to surrender the gold mines of *Victimulae*. But Marcus Fulvius Flaccus, consul in 125 B.C., was the first to systematically and seriously enter on a career of Trans-alpine conquest. At that time the Arverni, under their brilliant and almost civilized ruler, Luerius, had reached

a high state of military power and wealth, and between them and the Aedui lay the hegemony of the various Celtic races. At first Flaccus subdued minor Celtic tribes; and then the Allobroges, who came from the Isère valley to aid these tribes, were drawn into the struggle in 122 B.C. The Arverni at the outset, under Betuitus, son of Luerius, remained spectators of the conflict, but at last sided with the Allobroges, while their rivals, the Aedui, embraced the cause of Rome. Near the confluence of the Isère with the Rhone, in 121 B.C. the Arvernian king was utterly defeated by the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus: and the Allobroges at once submitted. The Arverni once more met the Roman troops under Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, and were again discomfited.

The result of these wars was the creation of the province of Narbo between the Alps and the Pyrenees, Narbo being the seat of the governor of this province, in which several Roman settlements were formed at Aquae Sextiae and elsewhere. The policy which gave rise to this new field for colonization was checked by the death of Gaius Gracchus, but the mercantile class at Rome proved strong enough to protect the colony of Narbo from the narrower policy of the restored optimates.

A similar problem had to be solved in the north-east of Italy, but there Rome contented herself with taking the strong town of Delmum, and subduing the Dalmatians, in 155 B.C. The conversion of Macedonia into a province in 146 B.C., and the acquisition of the Thracian Chersonese in 133 B.C., brought Rome into close relations with the various tribes of the north-east, but also gave her the double basis of the Po valley and the province of Macedonia, from which she could now advance in earnest towards the Rhine and Danube. Of the various Celtic tribes in these regions, the Helvetii, who occupied both banks of the Upper Rhine, were the most powerful; near them were the Boii, settled in Bavaria and Bohemia. To the south-east came the Taurisci, next to whom were the Iapydes, partly Illyrian, partly Celtic; while in the interior the powerful and cruel Celtic tribe of the Scordisci roamed hither and thither, leaving a path marked by crime and bloodshed.

Although Roman expeditions against Alpine tribes were

frequent, no adequate scheme of conquest was attempted, so as to create a barrier strong enough to ward off the constant inroads of barbarism. Marcus Aemilius Scaurus was the first to cross the eastern Alps, in 115 B.C., and to compel the Taurisci to a friendly alliance with Rome; the first Roman general to reach the Danube was Marcus Livius Drusus, in 112 B.C.; and, two years later, Marcus Minucius utterly defeated the Scordisci and reduced them to harmless insignificance.

But these victories only brought upon the scene a still more terrible foe in the Cimbri, or "champions." Whence this people really came and the causes of their migration, are matters of which we cannot be certain. That they were in the main of German race, as were their brothers-in-arms the Teutones, is shown (*a*) by the existence of two small tribes of the same name, left behind, probably, in their primitive seats—the Cimbri in Denmark and the Teutones in the north-east of Germany, near the Baltic; (*b*) by the insertion of the Cimbri and Teutones in the list of Germanic peoples among the Ingaevones, by the side of the Chauci; (*c*) by the judgment of Caesar, who first showed the difference between Celts and Germans, and who includes the Cimbri among the Germans; (*d*) by their names and the account given of their physical appearance and habits.

No doubt a number of Celts joined these hordes, and thus men of Celtic name directed their armies, and the Celtic tongue was spoken among them. The invasion was not one of mere plunder, but that of a whole nation seeking a new home, with their wives and children drawn along in wagons, which served as house and means of locomotion. Their army was accompanied by priestesses—a truly Germanic custom. They came like lightning, like lightning they vanished; and in that dull age no observer traced this marvellous meteor. Thus the first Germanic movement that came in contact with civilization passed away unnoticed till it was too late to have any accurate knowledge of it. Owing to Roman attacks on the Danubian Celts the Cimbri broke through the barrier which had prevented their advance, and reached the passes of the Carnian Alps in 113 B.C., where the consul Gnaeus Papirius Carbo was posted to meet

them, not far from Aquileia. He ordered them to evacuate the territory of the Taurisci, and they complied and followed his guides into an ambush. But the betrayed utterly worsted the betrayer, and then they turned westward, and reached the left bank of the Rhine and passed over the Jura. There, some years after the defeat of Carbo, they again threatened Roman territory. In 109 B.C., Marcus Junius Silanus appeared with an army in southern Gaul, and replied to the Cimbrian request for land to settle in by an attack; he was completely defeated.

The Cimbri now occupied themselves with subduing the neighbouring Celtic cantons, and for a time left the Romans unmolested. But, fired by the example of the Cimbri, the Helvetii rose, under their leader Divico, and sought new and more fertile settlements in western Gaul. The consul Longinus with most of his army was decoyed by the Helvetii into an ambush, and fell fighting, in 107 B.C. Then for a time all was quiet, but in 105 B.C., under their king Boiorix, the Cimbri again moved onwards, this time with the serious purpose of invading Italy.

Their first assault fell on Marcus Aurelius Scaurus, whose corps was easily overthrown. Then, owing to the foolish discord between the two Roman commanders, Gnaeus Maximus and the proconsul Caepio, and through the rash haste of the latter, the battle of Arausio (Orange), on the left bank of the Rhone, took place. Both Roman armies were utterly annihilated. Such a calamity materially and morally far surpassed the day of Cannae. Allia and the burning of Rome recurred to men's minds, and every Italian capable of bearing arms was bound by oath not to leave Italy. But, happily for Rome, the Cimbri turned upon the Arverni, and then set out to the Pyrenees.

As after the African defeats, so now, the storm of popular indignation at Rome fell upon individuals, not on the rotten system of senatorial government. Quintus Caepio barely escaped with his life. Gaius Marius was now, in defiance of the law, nominated as consul, and given the chief command not merely for one year, but was re-invested with the consulship for five years in succession (104–100 B.C.). The traces of this unconstitutional step remained visible for all time.

Owing to the disappearance of the Cimbri from the

stage, Marius had time to reduce revolted tribes and to reassure the wavering. At last the wave of the Cimbri, having broken itself on the resistance of the brave Celtiberians, flowed back over the Pyrenees. Near Ronen they received reinforcements from the Helvetii, and were also joined by their kinsmen the Teutones. Having failed to overcome the brave Belgae, they now resolved to invade Italy. But for some reason they broke up again into two hosts, one of which, the Cimbri, was to recross the Rhine and invade Italy by way of the Rhaetian Alps, while the other, the Teutones, together with some of the bravest Cimbrian troops, was to invade Italy by way of Roman Gaul and the western passes of the Alps.

In 102 B.C., the latter host attacked the camp of Marius at the confluence of the Isère and Rhone, for three days, but in vain; they then marched onward to Italy, occupying six days in defiling past the Roman camp. Marius followed them to the district of Aquae Sextiae, and defeated the rear-guard. On the third day after this success, Marius drew up his army on a hill; the barbarians rushed up with hot impatience. For a long while the struggle was terrible, but, owing to the heat of the sun and a false alarm raised in the rear by Roman camp-boys, the barbarian ranks broke and were utterly cut to pieces.

The Cimbri, meanwhile, owing to a panic which seized the army of the consul Quintus Lutatius Catulus, had passed the Alps and reached the plain between the Po and the Alps in the summer of 102 B.C., when their brethren were annihilated at Aquae Sextiae. Fortunately for Rome, they remained in the rich land for the winter, and thus gave the Romans time to prepare for the coming struggle. Marius, having refused a triumph for his first victory, returned in the spring and crossed the Po with his army. On the invitation of the Cimbri he named the Raudine plain as the place for battle. There, in a dense morning mist, the Celtic cavalry of the barbarians were driven back on to the infantry; and thus taken by surprise and thrown into disorder, the whole Cimbrian host fell an easy victim. Thus the battle of Vercellae, in 101 B.C., ended the dreaded invasion of these Germanic peoples. Marius was justly regarded as the conqueror of the Cimbri, although Catulus, a polished art-critic and member of the

aristocracy, had overthrown the centre of the Cimbrian hosts and captured thirty-one standards, while Marius took but two. But the victory of Vercellae was only rendered possible by that of Aquae Sextiae. With the victories of Marius were associated hopes of the overthrow of the detested government. Could it be that the rough farmer of Arpinum was destined to be the avenger of Gracchus, and to continue the revolution which he had begun?

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CHAPTER XXII.

MARIUS AS REVOLUTIONIST, DRUSUS AS REFORMER.

Marius—His army reform and its significance—His political position and alliance with Glaucia and Saturninus—The Appuleian laws—Rupture between Marius and his colleagues—Overthrow of Saturninus and his party—Action of the equestrian jury-courts—Reform proposals of Livius Drusus—His murder.

SUCH were the fears and hopes that moved the people in the capital on the news of the final overthrow of the Germanic invaders. These hopes were raised afresh when the saviour of Rome himself returned, late in 101 B.C., by far the first man in Rome, and yet a mere tyro in politics. Born in 155 B.C., Gaius Marius had, as a poor day-labourer's son, schooled his frame to bear hunger and thirst, cold and heat. His early training had fitted him to rise rapidly from the ranks and to gain distinction, first as a mere soldier, and then as governor of Further Spain. His subsequent military career in Africa and Gaul has been already described. Success in speculation had given him wealth, and a union with one of the ancient Julian gens had given him powerful connections. But he never rid himself of the taint of his plebeian origin. No one was ever so popular with the masses, either before or after, both on account of his thorough honesty and disinterestedness, and of his boorish uncouthness.

The time had now come to test the power of the rustic soldier to realize the expectations of the people, and to justify the extravagant joy manifested at his return. The newly organized army might prove a formidable weapon in his hand, though the day was hardly yet come

for the sword to achieve what it afterwards did in the world of politics. His military revolution was as follows. Before his time the old Servian constitution had undergone considerable relaxation; and the minimum census, which bound a man to serve in the army, had been lowered from eleven thousand to four thousand asses (from £43 to £17). The cavalry was still drawn from the wealthiest and the light-armed troops from the poorest citizens, but the arrangement of the infantry of the line was no longer determined by property, but by duration of service in the three divisions of *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*. Moreover, the Italian allies had long taken part in the military service. Still, the primitive organization was in the main the basis of the Roman military system, and it was no longer suited to the altered circumstances of the state. The better classes held aloof more and more from service, and the middle class of both Romans and Italians was fast disappearing; while the allies and subjects outside Italy, as well as the Italian proletariat, were available to fill up the gaps thus caused. The cavalry formed of the wealthiest burgesses had acted as a guard of honour in the Jugurthine war, and thenceforth it ceases to appear. In ordinary circumstances it was a very difficult task to fill up the legions with properly qualified persons; in times of emergency, as after the battle of Arausio, it was impossible. Already the cavalry, as a rule, came from Thrace and Africa, while the light Ligurian infantry and Balearic slingers were employed in daily increasing numbers. Moreover, owing to the dearth of properly qualified citizens, non-qualified and poorer men pressed into the service, nor could it be hard to find plenty of volunteers for so lucrative a profession. Thus it was a necessary result of the social and political changes that the old system of the burgess levy should give place to that of contingents and enlisting, that the cavalry and light troops should mainly consist of subject contingents, and that every free-born citizen should be admitted to the line service, as was, in fact, first allowed by Marius in 107 B.C.

Marius also abolished all the old aristocratic distinctions, whether of definite rank and place or of standards and equipments, which had hitherto obtained among the four

divisions of the army. All were uniformly trained under the new method of drill devised by Publius Rufus, consul in 105 B.C., and borrowed from the gladiatorial schools and thus the infantry of the line were reduced to a common level. The thirty maniples, or companies, of the legion were now replaced by ten cohorts, each cohort having its own standard and being formed of six or five sections of one hundred men apiece. The light infantry were suppressed, but the numbers of the legion were raised from 4200 to 6000 men. Although the custom of fighting in three divisions was retained, yet the general could distribute his cohorts in the three lines as he thought fit. The old four standards of the wolf, the ox with a man's head, the horse, the boar, gave place to the new standard of the silver eagle, given by Marius to the legion as a whole. Thus all the old civic and aristocratic distinctions were abolished, and all future distinctions were purely military. The praetorian cohort, or body-guard of the general, owed its existence to a pure accident. In the Numantine war Scipio Aemilianus had been obliged, owing to the insufficiency and unruly nature of the soldiers with which he was supplied, to form out of volunteers a band of five hundred men, into which he afterwards admitted his ablest soldiers. This cohort had the duty of serving at the praetorium, or headquarters, and was exempt from encamping and entrenching service, and enjoyed higher pay and greater prestige.

This revolution in the military system probably saved the state, in a military point of view, from destruction, but it involved a complete political revolution, the effects of which time could alone develop. "The republican constitution was essentially based on the view that the citizen was also a soldier, and that the soldier was, above all, a citizen; it was at an end, so soon as a soldier class was formed." Under the new system of drill, the military service became gradually a profession. The admission, though at first restricted, of the proletariat to the service speedily took effect, the more so as the general had a right to reward the successful soldier and give him a share in the spoil. To the burgess in old times the service had always been a burden and duty, but little alleviated by the rewards it might give him. To the proletarian this was far from

the case. All his hopes, both of pay, rewards, and citizenship lay in his success in war and in his general; thus the camp became his only home and hope. Marius defended his action in giving Roman citizenship to two Italian cohorts on the Raudine plain, by saying that amid the din of battle he could not distinguish the voice of the laws. So, if once the interests of the general and army concurred in producing unconstitutional demands, it was unlikely that any law would be of much avail amid the clashing of arms.

"They had now the standing army, the soldier class, the body-guard: as in the civil constitution, so also in the military, all the pillars of the future monarchy were already in existence; the monarch alone was wanting. When the twelve eagles circled round the Palatine hill, they ushered in the kings; the new eagle which Gaius Marius bestowed on the legions proclaimed the advent of the emperors."

Marius, in the eyes of the populace, who still mourned the death of Gaius Gracchus, was the one man capable alike from his military and political position of averting the ruin of the state, and of substituting in the place of the effete oligarchy a new and vigorous administration. It remains for us to see how he realized the expectations so confidently formed of him. Two methods of operation were apparently open to him: one, to overthrow the oligarchy by means of the army; the other, to follow the example of Gracchus and effect his object in a constitutional manner. The first plan, perhaps, he never entertained, relying, maybe, on his immense popularity and on the support of his discharged soldiers, but still more on the weakness of his opponents, whose downfall he probably thought could be more easily compassed than proved to be the case. Moreover, the army was still in a state of transition, and as yet ill adapted for effecting a *coup d'état*, and at the beginning of this crisis the use of such an instrument might well have recoiled upon the user. Having therefore discharged his army, Marius depended for further action upon the leaders of the popular party, which now once more sprang into active existence. This party had much deteriorated during the interval between Gaius Gracchus and Marius; much of the enthusiasm, faith, and purity of aim had been rubbed off in the years of confusion and turmoil; and the popular leaders were, for the most part, either political novices, or

men who had nothing to lose in respect of property, influence, or even honour, and who, from personal motives of malice or a wish to attract notice, busied themselves with inflicting annoyance and damage on the government. To the first class belonged Gaius Memmius and the noted orator, Lucius Crassus; to the second, and these were the most notable leaders, belonged Gaius Glaucia, the Roman Hyperbolus, as Cicero called him, and his better and abler colleague, Lucius Appuleius Saturninus. The latter, owing to a personal slight at the senate's hands, had joined the ranks of the opposition. As tribune of the people in 103 B.C. he excited popular indignation by his public speeches touching the briberies practised in Rome by the envoys of Mithradates, and also by his invectives against Quintus Metellus, when he was a candidate for the censorship in 102 B.C. Moreover, he had carried the election of Marius as consul for 102 B.C. in the teeth of a fierce opposition. His violence and unscrupulousness marred his very considerable powers both as a politician and orator, but he was the most prominent and dreaded enemy of the senate. He and Glaucia now entered into partnership with Marius, and it was agreed that the latter should become a candidate for his sixth consulship, Saturninus for a second tribunate, and Glaucia for the praetorship, for the year 100 B.C., in order to carry out the intended revolution.

Despite all the opposition of the senate, they succeeded in effecting their object—partly by craft, partly by violence. The laws of Saturninus, known as the Appuleian, revived the chief objects of Gaius Gracchus. Marius was called upon to conduct the assignations of land which had been promised his soldiers, firstly in Africa, and then in all provincial land, and even in that beyond the Alps, which was still occupied by independent Celtic tribes. As the Italian allies were to receive these assignations together with Roman burgesses, this was practically a first step to placing them on an equality with Romans; and thus not only the extensive schemes of transalpine and transmarine colonization, as sketched by Gaius Gracchus, were revived, but also his project of gradually giving first the Italians and then all Roman subjects the same political privileges. For this work of land distribution it was, doubtless,

necessary that Marius should have his consulship annually renewed, and thus practically be king of Rome. The main difference between his case and that of Gracchus was that he occupied a military as well as civil position. Following the example of Gracchus, Marius and his confederates made advances to the equites and the proletariat. They extended the powers of the former as jurymen, and gave them greater control over the extortions of provincial magistrates; while to the latter they now sold grain at the merely nominal price of five-sixths of an as, instead of six asses and a half, per modius. Still their real power lay in the discharged Marian soldiers, and this fact lent a strong military colour to their attempt at a revolution.

In spite of the vehement opposition of the aristocrats, by means of the tribunician veto, the invocation of portents, and the armed interference of the urban quaestor Quintus Caepio, the Appuleian laws were ratified. This was partly due to the firmness of Saturninus, and still more to the appearance of the dreaded soldiers of Marius. Quintus Metellus, rather than take the oath which bound every senator to observe the new laws, went into exile, but that was only a gain to his opponents. When, however, the plans came to be executed, it was soon clear that a politically incapable general, and a violent street demagogue could not long be allies. In the first place, Marius, from his utter incapacity as a statesman, was unable either to keep his own party in check or to gain over his opponents. The wealthy classes had no liking for Saturninus and his street-riots; nay, the equites had skirmishes with his armed bands, and he was only with difficulty elected tribune in 100 B.C. Thus this powerful body began to side with the aristocracy, when they saw that Marius was practically the tool of his more violent associates.

But the attitude of Marius not only alienated those who should have been his most powerful supporters, but, what was more important, caused Saturninus and Glaucia to lose all trust in him. His refusal to go the lengths that they went, his negotiations with his own party and the senate at one and the same time, his reservation when he swore as a senator to observe the Appuleian laws, "so far as they were really valid," soon caused a total rupture between himself and the most violent democrats. But

Saturninus and Glaucia had gone too far to recede; they now resolved to grasp the sovereignty for themselves. They arranged that the former should again seek the tribuneship, the latter the consulship, for which he was not legally eligible till two years had elapsed. For the latter office Gaius Memmius was the government candidate; he was suddenly murdered. Hereupon the senate called upon the consul Marius to interfere: he complied, and a hasty levy of young men was drawn up in array, while the senators appeared armed in the Forum, led by Marcus Scaurus. The democrats saw their danger, and set free all the slaves in prison; on the 10th of ~~December~~, 100 B.C., a great battle took place in the market-place, the first ever fought within the walls of the capital. It ended in the utter overthrow of the popular party. Saturninus was stoned to death with a number of other prisoners, who were shut up in the senate-house. Glaucia was likewise put to death; and thus, without sentence or trial, perished on one day four Roman magistrates, a praetor, quaestor, and two tribunes, together with a number of other notable men, in some cases of good family. The victory of the government was complete. Not only were its noisiest opponents dead, but the one man who might have proved really dangerous had publicly and completely effaced himself; and, what was perhaps still more important, the two chief elements of the opposition—the capitalists and the proletariat — emerged from the struggle bitter enemies.

Thus the force of circumstances, and, still more, the incapacity of Marius, had completely destroyed the fabric reared by Gaius Gracchus. Pitiful, indeed, was the position of the great general; he retired to the East so as not to witness the return of his rival Metellus. When he came back to Rome his counsel was not sought, and the continuance of profound peace rendered vain his hopes that the time would come when his strong arm would be needed. But his superstitious soul ever kept in mind the oracular promise of seven consulships, and, though in the eyes of all insignificant and harmless, he brooded over his schemes of vengeance, and in moody sullenness bided his time. In addition to this, the current of popular feeling now set in strongly against the remnants of the

party left behind by Saturninus. The tribunals of the equites condemned with the utmost severity every one who professed the views of the Populares; nay, they even assailed men on the ground of injuries years old against the aristocrats. Moreover, abroad the Roman arms were everywhere successful. In Spain, a serious rising of the Lusitanians and Celtiberians was quelled by the consuls, Titus Didius and Publius Crassus, in the years 98-93 B.C. In the East, too, much greater energy was displayed than had been shown for many years. At home the government was more popular and secure than it had ever been since the restoration. The laws of Saturninus were, of course, cancelled, and the transmarine colonies of Marius dwindled down to a small settlement in Corsica. When the tribune Sextus Titius reintroduced and carried the Appuleian agrarian law in 99 B.C., the senate annulled it on religious grounds, and the equites punished Titius for bringing it forward.

In 98 B.C., the two consuls passed a law which made an interval of seven days between the introduction and passing of a bill obligatory, and forbade the combination in a single proposal of several enactments differing in their nature. Thus the government was protected from being taken by surprise by new laws, and some restriction was placed on the initiative power in legislation.

It was clear that the Gracchan constitution, which had rested on the union of the multitude and the moneyed aristocracy, was on the eve of perishing, and that the hour had come to re-establish the governing oligarchy in undisputed possession of political power. All depended on the recovery by the senate of the nomination of jurymen; for of late the governors of provinces had administered them, not for the senate, but for the order of capitalists and merchants. But the latter fiercely resisted all attempts to wrest their power from them; and even Quintus Mucius Scaevola, one of the most eminent jurists and most noble-minded men of the time, was rewarded for his stern repression of all crime, and for his scrupulous justice in administering the province of Asia, by seeing his legate, Publius Rufus, brought to trial before the equites on the most absurd charge of maladministration. Rufus refused to submit to the moneyed lords, and was condemned and

had his property confiscated. He retired to the province which he was accused of plundering, and was there welcomed with every honour by all men, and there spent the rest of his life. Soon after, Marcus Scaurus, seventy years of age, and for twenty years the chief of the senate, was tried for unjust extortions; and it was evident that neither nobility of descent, blamelessness of life, nor age itself were any screen against the wildest charges preferred by men who made a regular profession of reckless accusation. The very commission touching exactions, became the scourge instead of the shield of the provincials; the vilest scoundrel, provided that he satisfied the claims of his fellow-robbers, went unpunished; while those who trusted to their innocence, and attempted to do their duty by the provinces they governed, were found guilty by the juries whom they neglected to bribe.

Marcus Livius Drusus, tribune in 91 B.C., son of the overthower of Gaius Gracchus, a conservative of the conservatives, the proudest and noblest of the aristocrats, vehemently earnest, pure of life, and an object of respect to the humblest citizen, felt that the time had come to attack the equestrian jury-courts. He was aided by Marcus Scaurus and Lucius Crassus, the famous orator; but against him were not only the consul Lucius Philippus and the reckless Quintus Caepio, but also the more corrupt and cowardly mass of the aristocracy, who, sooner than lose all chance of plunder, were quite content to share the spoils of the provinces with the equites. Drusus proposed to take away the functions of jurymen from the equestrian order, and to restore them to the senate, and to add three hundred new members to the senate, in order to enable it to meet its increased obligations. Moreover, a special criminal commission was to be appointed to try all jurymen who had been or should be guilty of taking bribes. But he also had a wide and well-considered scheme of reform. He proposed (1) to increase the largesses of corn and to cover the increased expense by the permanent issue of copper-plated by the side of the silver denarii; (2) to reserve all the still undistributed arable land of Italy, and the best part of Sicily, for the settlement of burgess colonists; (3) lastly, he bound himself to give the Italian allies the Roman franchise.

There is a marked similarity of means and aims in the cases of Drusus and Gaius Gracchus; both relied on the proletariat, and both had practically the same measures of reform in view. The great difference was as to who should be the governing power in the state; in all other points the best men of both political parties had much in common, widely different as often were the processes of reasoning by which they arrived at such views.

In order to carry his laws, Drusus wisely kept in the background his proposal touching the Italian franchise, and embodied all his other measures in one law; thus he caused those interested in largesses of corn and distributions of land to also carry the proposal touching the transference of the jury-courts. He was stoutly opposed, especially by the consul Philippus, whom he caused to be imprisoned. Though the Livian laws were carried, the consul summoned the senate to reject them. On its refusal, Philippus declared he would seek another state council, and seemed to meditate a *coup d'état*. Many of the senate now began to waver, and their fears were still further aroused by the sudden death of Lucius Crassus in September, 91 B.C. Gradually the connections of Drusus with the Italians became known, and a furious cry of high treason was raised. The opposition grew more powerful, and the senate at last issued a decree cancelling the Livian laws on the ground of informality. Drusus refused to interpose his veto, and thus the senate once more became subject to the yoke of the capitalists.

Shortly after, Drusus perished by the hand of an assassin, who escaped undetected; nor was the crime investigated. Thus the same end which swept away the democratic reformers was the fate of the Gracchus of the aristocracy. The weakness of the aristocracy frustrated reform, even when the attempt came from their own ranks.

"Drusus had staked his strength and his life in the attempt to overthrow the dominion of the merchants, to organize emigration, to avert the impending civil war; he himself saw the merchants ruling more absolutely than ever, found all his ideas of reform frustrated, and died with the consciousness that his sudden death would be the signal for the most fearful civil war that ever desolated the fair land of Italy."

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CHAPTER XXIII.

THE SOCIAL OR MARSIC WAR, AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION.

91 B.C. Death of Drusus.—90 B.C. First year of the war—Lex Julia and Lex Plautia Papiria.—89 B.C. Second year of the war—Latin rights conferred on the Transpadani.—88 B.C. Outbreak of the Mithridatic war—The Sulpician laws—Occupation of Rome by Sulla.—87 B.C. Departure of Sulla for the East.

JUST as the failure of the previous attempt of Flaccus, in 125 B.C., to confer the citizenship on the Italians was followed by the revolt of Fregellae, so the despair of the subjects of Rome after the death of Drusus broke forth in a revolt of all Italy.

The Italian allies had two inducements to revolt; they wished to obtain the enjoyment of certain privileges; they wished also to free themselves from many disabilities and wrongs. The voting power was perhaps the chief, but by no means the only privilege which they sought. There were others, such as immunity from taxation and flogging. On the other hand, they were subject to vexation and oppression in many forms from which Roman citizens were exempt. The rigour of martial law, largely modified for the burgess soldiers, remained unsoftened for them. Italian officers of any rank might be condemned and executed by sentence of court-martial, while the meanest burgess-soldier could appeal to the civil courts at Rome. The contingent furnished by the allies to the army was disproportionate to their number, and the disproportion was increasing. In civil matters the general superintendence of the Roman government over the dependent

communities was extended till the allies were at the mercy of the caprice of any Roman magistrate. At Teanum Sidicinum, the chief magistrate had been scourged by order of the Roman consul for supposed remissness in gratifying a whim of the consul's wife. In the Latin colony of Venusia a free peasant was whipped to death for a laugh at the passing litter of a young Roman holding no office. Incidents like these must have been frequent; and all non-citizens, from Latins downwards, became united by the bond of a common oppression. Since the completion of the Roman conquests the Roman citizenship had become the one thing worth having; it alone could give protection from tyranny and a status in the world; for the Roman empire by this time embraced all civilization, and to be outside the Roman state was to be outside the world.

The privilege was thus more valuable than it had ever been before; but it was also becoming more and more difficult to acquire. The tendency of the body of Roman citizens was to close their ranks. The practice of bestowing the franchise on whole communities had ceased; the right of individuals to acquire it by residence at Rome was curtailed; and in 126 B.C. all non-burgesses were expelled from the city by decree of the senate.

It might have been thought that the senate and the conservative party objected, not to the demands of the Italians, but to the revolutionary schemes of those by whom these demands were supported; but in 95 B.C. the deliberate policy of the oligarchy was made clear by a consular law (*Lex Licinia-Mucia*) which prohibited under penalties any non-burgess from laying claim to the franchise. With Drusus hope arose once more for the Italians; Drusus accomplished nothing but his own destruction, and now no resource was left but an appeal to arms.

The chief difficulty with which rebellions always have to contend is want of organization. They have to contend against an established government completely equipped and organized, and to create their own organization during the course of the struggle. The Italian peoples were not entirely unprepared in this respect. In the first place, a secret league had been formed in connection with the

attempt of Drusus, with members in all the most important Italian towns, bound by oath to be faithful to each other and to the common cause. Again, each allied town furnished a contingent to the Roman army, and these trained troops formed a valuable nucleus for the allied army. Thirdly, there were the old Roman confederacies of the various Italian peoples—of the Marsians, Paelignians, and others,—which had of course lost all political significance after the conquest by Rome, but which still existed for purposes of common sacrifice.

The revolt broke out prematurely at Asculum in Picenum, where all the resident Romans were massacred. The flame spread rapidly through all central and southern Italy. The Marsians were the first to declare war, and round them gathered the Paeligni, the Marrucini, the Frentani, and the Vestini, while the Samnites were the centre of the southern group of peoples, from the Liris to Apulia and Calabria.

On the other hand, the Romans had many adherents where the richer classes were influential. Thus the whole of Umbria and Etruria, where the middle class had entirely disappeared, remained faithful: so also many isolated communities in insurgent districts, such as Pinna in the Vestini. Lastly, many of the most favoured of the allied communities, such as Nola, Nuceria, and Neapolis in Campania, and Rhegium; and Latin colonies, such as Alba and Aesernia remained steadfastly loyal. The strength of the revolt was in the middle classes and the small farmers; the moneyed and aristocratic classes held with Rome.

After the first blood had been shed at Asculum the insurgents still made an attempt at negotiation: they offered even now to lay down their arms if Rome would grant them the citizenship. Instead of complying, the Roman government instituted a commission (*quaestio Varia*), on the proposal of the tribune Varius, to investigate the conspiracy set on foot in connection with the agitation of Drusus. The result was the banishment of many members of the moderate senatorial party who were favourable to compromise, including Gaius Cotta and Marcus Scaurus. Great preparations were made for the struggle. Officers of all parties, including both Sulla and Marius, offered themselves to the government. The largesses of corn

were curtailed in order to husband supplies; and all business, except military preparations, was at a standstill.

The Italians on their side were preparing not merely to secede from Rome, but to crush her and form a new state. Corfinium, a town of the Paeligni, was to be the head of the new government, under the new name of Italica. All burgesses of insurgent communities were declared citizens of Italica. A new forum and senate-house were made; a senate, consuls, and praetors appointed. The Latin and Samnite languages were placed on an equality as the official tongues; and the imitation of the Roman constitution was carried out in the minutest details. The most important feature of the new organization is this—that Italica, like Rome, was to remain merely a governing city-state. The Italians, like Rome itself, were unable to rise above the conception of the *πόλις*. No idea occurred to them of any means, such as modern representative institutions, by which a vast population could be welded into a united nation.

Their plan of campaign was settled for the Romans by the character and extent of the revolt. They had to relieve the many fortresses which held out for them in various parts of the insurgent districts, and they had to combat a numerous enemy at widely distant points. Accordingly, two consular armies were formed, one under Publius Rutilius Lupus, to confront the Italian consul, Quintus Silo, in the northern group of insurgent states; the other under Lucius Julius Caesar, who commanded against the Samnite, Gaius Papius Mutilus, in the southern districts. Under each consul on both sides were several lieutenant-generals, who were responsible for particular districts.

The war was begun in the south by the attack of Mutilus on the important Latin fortress of Aesernia in Samnium, which offered the most obstinate resistance. Caesar, after securing Capua, advanced to its relief, but was driven back with severe loss. The town of Venafrum and its garrison was taken by the Italians and the road to Aesernia blocked against the Roman advance. Aesernia accordingly fell by famine at the end of the season.

In Lucania, Caesar's lieutenant, Publius Crassus, was shut up in the town of Grumentum, which fell after a long siege.

In Campania, Nola and almost all the country except Nuceria fell before Mutilus. The Numidian troops of Caesar deserted to the enemy. An attack upon Caesar's camp was victoriously repelled, but his army was soon after disastrously defeated by Marius Egnatius, and had to retire to Teanum. Acerræ was closely besieged by the Samnite army.

The war in central Italy was most favourable to the Romans. Their main army, under Lupus, was massed on the Marsian frontier to protect the capital, separated from the enemy by the stream Tolennus. Lupus crossed the stream in two divisions, and was himself destroyed with eight thousand of his troops; but the other division, under Marius, occupied the enemies' camp, and was able to prevent them from gaining further successes. Quintus Caepio, who was associated with Marius in the command, was drawn into an ambush and cut to pieces. But Marius, now sole commander, gradually pressed the enemy back, and finally defeated them in two important engagements.

In Picenum, a corps under Strabo advanced to threaten Asculum, but was defeated and shut up in Firmum, while a portion of the Italian army entered Apulia, and induced Canusium and Venusia to join the revolt. But another Roman division, under Servius Sulpicius, after defeating the Paeligni advanced to the relief of the Romans. The insurgents were taken front and rear, and driven to take refuge in Asculum, which was closely besieged by the Romans.

The course of the war had induced many communities in Umbria and Etruria to declare against Rome, but here the Roman divisions maintained a decided superiority.

The campaign was, on the whole, adverse to the Romans. They had lost the important towns of Nola and Venusia; the Umbrians and Etruscans had joined the revolt, and communications with the southern army could only be maintained by a chain of posts from Cumæ to Rome, which strained to the utmost the resources of the city.

The change in popular feeling at Rome was shown in the law of the tribune Marcus Plautius Silvanus with regard to the Varian commission. This body had sent into exile many prominent men of the party favourable to

concession. The equites of whom it was composed were now dismissed, and a new commission elected by the tribes without class distinction.

The new commission became a scourge of the extreme non-concession party, and, amongst others, its original author, Quintus Varius, who was charged with the murder of Drusus, was banished.

About the same time a policy of concession was adopted. The *Lex Julia* of the consul Lucius Julius Caesar (end of 90 B.C.) granted the citizenship to all Italian communities which had not declared against Rome. The *Lex Plautia Papiria* (December, 90 or beginning of 89 B.C.) granted the citizenship to all allies who presented themselves before a Roman magistrate within sixty days.

At the same time, the effect of these concessions was largely nullified by the restriction which allowed the new citizens to be enrolled in eight only of the thirty-five tribes. These laws applied to all Italy south of the Po, while the Celts between the Po and the Alps were invested with the inferior privileges which had hitherto belonged to Latin towns. The aim of these measures was to secure the loyalty of the allies who had hitherto remained faithful, and to draw over deserters from the enemy. But they by no means constituted a complete capitulation; only "so much of the existing political institutions had been pulled down as seemed necessary to arrest the progress of the conflagration."

In the second year of the war, Lucius Porcius Cato commanded against the Marsians, Lucius Sulla in the south, while Gnaeus Strabo retained his command in Picenum. The insurgents began their northern campaign by an attempt to send a body of fifteen thousand men to aid the insurrection in Etruria, but it was totally defeated by Strabo.

Cato invaded the Marsian territory, but was defeated and slain; and the whole central command now fell upon Strabo. A great battle was fought at Asculum, where the garrison sallied out to meet a relieving army under Judacilius. Victory remained with the Romans, and, after a protracted siege, Asculum was compelled to surrender. The Marrucini, Apulia, the Marsi, were successively subdued, and in the next year the Vestini and Paeligni. The

revolt in central Italy was at an end, and Italica once more became the country town of Corfinium.

In Campania, Stabiae and Herculaneum were captured, and Sulla totally defeated the Samnite general, Cluentius. He then invaded Samnium, surrounded and defeated the Samnite army under Mutilus, and compelled the capital Bovianum to surrender. Thus, at the close of the second year, the revolt was on the whole overpowered. Venusia in Apulia and Nola in Campania still held out; but besides these isolated towns, only the Samnites and Lucanians remained unsubdued. The Samnites made great efforts to continue the struggle; a fresh army was raised with the Marsian Silo in command, and Aesernia became the head-quarters of the final campaign.

In Apulia, Venusia was captured by Q. Metellus Pius. In Samnium, Bovianum was recaptured by Silo, but he was soon defeated and slain by Mamercus Aemilius. In Campania, Nola was invested and smaller towns captured. In Lucania the Roman general was defeated, and a desultory warfare was still carried on; the siege of Nola, too, was unfinished: but with these exceptions the war was at an end.

While the war was progressing favourably to Rome, the internal condition of the city was becoming more and more critical. At the end of 89 B.C. it had become necessary to declare war against Mithradates, and Rome was by no means prepared. The treasury was exhausted; no new army could be raised, but that of Sulla was destined to embark as soon as it could safely be spared; money was raised by the sale of unoccupied sites within the city. In Rome and in Italy all classes were seething with discontent. The Varian prosecutions had embittered the strife between the moderate and the extreme parties. The former was dissatisfied with the concessions already made to the Italians, the Italians themselves were dissatisfied with an enfranchisement which limited their influence to eight tribes—a limitation all the more galling that it found a precedent in the restriction of the freedmen to four tribes. The revolted communities who had been subdued were in the position of *dediticii*—that is, in the eye of the law they were as prisoners of war, absolutely at the mercy of their con-

querors; they were not yet admitted to the citizenship, and they had forfeited their ancient treaties; where these treaties had been restored they had been made revocable at the will of the Roman people. It was desirable to recall the men exiled by the Varian commission, who included many of the best men of the senatorial order; but the cancelling of a legal verdict by a decree of the people was seen to be a most undesirable precedent. Lastly, Marius was thirsting for a fresh command to recover his lost influence, and was ready to go to any length to accomplish his purpose.

To all these elements of disorder must be added the decay of military discipline and an economic crisis. The social war had necessitated the enrolment of every available man in the army, and had carried party spirit into the ranks. The result was an appalling slackness of discipline; and more than one Roman division had put its commander to death and escaped all punishment.

At the same time the old cry of the oppression of capital was heard again. Debtors unable to pay the interest on their loans had applied to the urban praetor Asellio for time to realize their property, and were trying to get the obsolete laws against usury enforced. Asellio sanctioned actions to recover interest under these laws, and was murdered by the offended creditors under the leadership of the tribune Lucius Cassius. The debtors now clamoured for *novae tabulae*—the cancelling of all existing debts.

At this critical point the tribune Publius Sulpicius Rufus came forward and proposed three laws: (1) That every senator who owed more than two thousand denarii (c. £82) should be expelled from the senate. (2) That those who had been exiled by the Varian commission should be recalled. (3) That the new burgesses and the freedmen should be distributed among all the tribes.

Sulpicius was no revolutionary; by these laws he attempted simply to carry out the traditional policy of the moderate senatorial party, of the party of Crassus and Drusus. During the early period of his office he had been a supporter of constitutional forms, had opposed the recall of the Varian exiles, and had vehemently resisted an attempt of Gaius Caesar to stand for the consulship before he had been praetor. Nor was the tendency of his pro-

posals towards revolution. The first was necessary on account of the venality of the senate and the dependence of the poorer senators upon their richer colleagues. The second was necessary if there was to be a moderate party at all. The third, so far as it concerned the allies, was merely a measure of justice, and necessary to render the Roman concessions a reality; and the admission of the freedmen into all the tribes would extend the influence of a class largely dependent on the great aristocratic houses. But though the proposals of Sulpicius need not have alarmed the senate, he became exasperated by opposition, kept a hired bodyguard in his pay, and carried on the struggle with great violence.

The proposals were strongly resisted by the senate; and the consuls, Sulla and Pompeius Rufus, suspended all popular assemblies on pretence of extraordinary religious observances. Sulpicius replied by a violent tumult. The consuls then yielded, and the proposals became law. But Sulpicius could not yet feel secure; Sulla had departed to the army in Campania, and Sulpicius feared lest he might lead his legions to overthrow the recent laws. Accordingly a fourth *Lex Sulpicia* was brought forward, and by decree of the people the supreme command against Mithradates was transferred from Sulla to Marius.

On the arrival of two tribunes from Rome to take over the command of the army, Sulla refused to submit. The command had been conferred upon him legally and constitutionally, he knew that he could count upon the devotion of the legions, and he had no scruple about using force against his country. He laid the matter before the troops, and hinted to them that Marius would raise a fresh army for service in the East. The superior officers held aloof, but the common soldiers tore the tribunes in pieces, and clamoured to be led to the city. Sulla availed himself of their enthusiasm, and for the first time a Roman army was led against Rome. The city was reached by forced marches, and troops posted at the bridge over the Tiber and at the gates; the sacred boundary was crossed by two legions in battle array. Stones were thrown from the roofs, but Sulla brandished a blazing torch and threatened to fire the city, and the legions

steadily advanced. The forces of Marius and Sulpicius were overcome; when they summoned the slaves to arms, not more than three appeared, and in a few hours Sulla was master of Rome.

Sulla's first step was to declare the Sulpician laws null and void; his next, to proscribe Sulpicius and twelve of his most strenuous adherents. Sulpicius was captured at Laurentum, and put to death, and his head was exposed in the Forum before the rostra. The adventures of Marius are well known. After escaping successively the cavalry of Sulla, the magistrates of Minturnæ, and the treachery of the Numidian king, he found a temporary rest in a small island off the coast of Tanis.

The legislation which Sulla now undertook aimed at relieving the debtors and strengthening the power of the senate. His chief measures were (1) A *lex unciaria*, which probably revived the old law fixing the maximum of interest. (2) Schemes for a number of new colonies were set on foot. (3) The reduced numbers of the senate were filled up by the addition of three hundred new members. (4) The old Servian arrangement for voting in the *comitia centuriata* was restored, giving nearly one half of the votes to the first class alone, consisting of those who possessed an estate of a hundred thousand sesterces. (5) The full *probouleutic* power of the senate was restored; no proposal could henceforth be submitted to the people, unless it had first been approved by the senate.

Formally these laws of Sulla appeared revolutionary in the extreme. The proscription of Sulpicius and his adherents was a violation of the sacred laws of appeal. The initiative in legislation was taken from the magistrates and given to the senate, which had legally no privilege but that of giving advice. The old voting arrangements in the centuries, now revolutionized by Sulla, had existed unchanged for a century and a half. But in substance these changes contained little which violated the spirit of the constitution. In occupying Rome and in proscribing the adherents of Sulpicius, Sulla merely accepted actual facts and repelled violence with violence. The extension of the power of the senate was but giving legal sanction to a power which it had always exercised until recent times by means of the tri-

bunician or augural veto; and the later practice, according to which any magistrate proposed a law to the tribes without previous deliberation in the senate, was already seen to be fraught with great inconvenience and danger. The measures with regard to interest and colonization show that Sulla was not indifferent to the wrongs of the poorer classes, and they were proposed by him after the victory, and of his own free will. Lastly, it is important to remember not only what he changed, but what he left unchanged. The principal foundations of the Gracchan constitution, the corn largesses and the equestrian jury courts, were left untouched.

Meanwhile, affairs in the East grew more threatening every day, and Sulla could no longer postpone his departure. He endeavoured to insure the permanence of his measures by procuring the election of consuls favourable to the restored government, and by transferring the army of the north from the doubtful Strabo to his own devoted friend, Quintus Rufus.

But one of the new consuls was Cinna, a most determined opponent of Sulla, and Rufus had no sooner taken over his command than he was murdered by the soldiers, and Strabo resumed the leadership. Sulla himself, on the expiration of his consulship, was summoned to appear on his defence before the people.

Notwithstanding these ominous incidents, Sulla merely exacted an oath from the consuls to maintain the existing constitution, and immediately embarked for the East (beginning of 87 B.C.).

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CHAPTER XXIV.

THE MITHRADATIC WAR.

89 B.C. Declaration of war by Rome.—88 B.C. Occupation of Asia Minor by Mithradates—Massacre of Roman citizens.—87 B.C. Pontic invasion of Greece—Arrival of Sulla—Siege of Athens and the Piræeus.—86 B.C. Battle of Chaeronea.—85 B.C. Battle of Orchomenus.—84 B.C. Conclusion of Peace.

EVER since the beginning of the revolution under Tiberius Gracchus, Rome had been too much occupied with her internal affairs to bestow much attention upon the provinces. During this period important changes had taken place in the East. The two kingdoms of Armenia, which dated their existence from the war with Antiochus, had been united under Tigranes, originally king of the north-eastern portion; and to him the title of Great King and the titular supremacy of Asia now passed. Phrygia became, in the time of Gaius Gracchus, an independent kingdom in connection with the Roman province of Asia; but otherwise Asia remained unchanged, except for the oppression of the Roman tax-farmers, which was ever growing more merciless and more intolerable.

The ruler of the kingdom of Pontus was, at that time, Mithradates VI., surnamed Eupator. After the death of his father he became a fugitive and a wanderer for seven years. Eastern legend ascribed to him a stature more than human, strength and swiftness surpassing that of all other men, and a constitution inured alike to any fatigue or excess. He collected Greek and Persian antiquities and works of art, and kept Greek poets and philosophers in his train.

As a ruler he does not rise beyond the ordinary

Eastern sultan: "of higher elements—desire to advance civilization, earnest leadership of national opposition, special gifts of genius—there is no distinct trace." His government is marked by all the ruthless crime usual to an Eastern despot—by the execution or life-long captivity of mother, brothers, daughters, sons, and of his most confidential servants. What really distinguishes Mithradates is his boundless activity and energy. He extended the limits of his dominions in every direction, founded a new empire on the northern shores of the Black Sea, and, alone among the princes of the East, was able seriously to contend with the Roman power.

His ancestral dominion was Pontus, or Cappadocia on the Black Sea, between Bithynia on the west and Armenia on the east. It was a rich and fertile country, producing large quantities of grain and fruit, but almost entirely destitute of towns properly so called, though there were numerous fortresses where the peasants might take refuge, and where the king's treasure was deposited. The real basis of his wealth and power lay in the flourishing Greek seaports of Trapezus, Amisus, and Sinope.

Instead of developing the resources of his dominions, Mithradates devoted himself to extending them. His first conquest was the district of Colchis with the Greek town of Dioscurias, east of Pontus. His next enterprise, which was begun though not completely executed before the first Roman war, was the foundation of the Bosporan kingdom in the region of the modern Crimea.

The country north of the Caucasus and the Black Sea was inhabited by Scythian and Sarmatian tribes, who led a pastoral life and fought on horseback with sword, lance, and bow, the ancestors of the modern Cossacks. It was the relations of the Greek settlements in the Tauric Chersonese with these barbarians which gave Mithradates his opportunity. The most important of the Greek cities were Chersonesus, a free town at the south of the peninsula, and Panticapaeum on the European side of the Cimmerian Bosporus, which ruled the eastern division of the peninsula, together with Phanagoria and the district of Sindice on the opposite coast. The inhabitants of these cities purchased peace from the barbarians by payment of a tribute, but the exactions and oppressions to which

they had to submit grew heavier and heavier, and they were glad to be delivered by the arms of Mithradates, and to acknowledge his supremacy. The new kingdom, based, like Pontus, on a number of Greek cities, was called the Bosporus. It embraced the peninsula and the opposite coast, and paid an annual tribute of two hundred talents (£48,800), besides enormous quantities of grain, to the king. The barbarian tribes acknowledged some sort of dependence upon Mithradates, and supplied a valuable recruiting ground.

At the same time Lesser Armenia was annexed to Pontus. Mithradates gave his daughter in marriage to Tigranes, king of Greater Armenia, and it was by his help that Tigranes established his supremacy in Asia.

The king now turned his attention to Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, and it was his conduct with regard to these countries which made Roman interference at length inevitable.

Paphlagonia was claimed by Mithradates as having been left to his father, Mithradates Euergetes, by will. He gained over the king of Bithynia by allowing him to occupy the western half of the kingdom. Cappadocia had once been united with Pontus, and after the murder of the Cappadocian king Ariarathes, brother-in-law of Mithradates, and of his young son, the reunion was practically accomplished. Nominally the country was ruled by a pseudo-Ariarathes, actually by Gordius, a Cappadocian instrument of Mithradates.

The Roman senate had been entirely passive during all these aggressions. Their first interference was in the wrong direction. In response to an appeal of the Tauric chieftains, they had ordered Mithradates to restore these to their old supremacy over the Greek cities—so far were they from fulfilling their duties to the Hellenic name. The reunion of Cappadocia at last aroused them to energy. Paphlagonia was declared independent, and Mithradates was commanded to evacuate Cappadocia. No army was sent to enforce these decrees, but the energy of Sulla, the governor of Cilicia, compelled Mithradates to submit at all points. The Cappadocian Ariobarzanes was elected king by the people. Sulla marched to the Euphrates, and gained great fame by a conference in which, as repre-

sentative of Rome, he arranged the relations between Tigranes and the Parthians. This was the first time that the Romans came into contact with the great nation with which they were destined to dispute the sovereignty of the world. Thus the *status quo* in the East was restored (B.C. 92).

But Sulla had no sooner retired than Mithradates' ally Tigranes expelled Ariobarzanes from Cappadocia. This was followed by fresh disturbances in Bithynia. In 91 B.C. Nicomedes III. had been recognized as legitimate king by the Romans; but his younger brother, Socrates, displaced him and assumed the throne. In Paphlagonia the sea-coast was still occupied by Mithradates, and in the Bosphorus he even extended his dominions. Again order was restored by the commissioner Manius Aquillius, with the aid of the small Roman force in Asia and the native levies. Mithradates made no resistance, though he did not furnish the contingents of troops required of him (B.C. 90).

Though the Italian insurrection was at its height, Mithradates did not use the opportunity to make open war on the Romans; none the less did he prosecute his schemes of territorial conquest. He seems to have fluctuated between a sense of his own weakness and a greedy desire of aggrandizement. He gave ample excuse for war to the Romans had they desired it, but yielded at the first show of energy.

Aquillius was determined to put an end to this unsatisfactory condition of things; he resolved to make use of Nicomedes of Bithynia to compel his government to declare war. Accordingly Nicomedes was instigated to attack; he occupied the frontier districts of Pontus, and his ships closed the Bosphorus against those of Mithradates. The latter contented himself with appealing to the Romans. He was ordered, in any case, to refrain from war against Nicomedes. Then the king's decision was taken. His son Ariobarzanes was ordered to invade Cappadocia, and envoys were sent to the Roman envoys to demand their ultimatum. War now ensued as a matter of course (B.C. 89).

Mithradates made the most energetic preparations: he obtained a promise from Tigranes of an auxiliary army; to the Greeks he presented himself, like Philip of Mace-

don, as a deliverer from an alien yoke ; and he had hopes of the revolt of Numidia and Syria, of risings in Thrace and Macedonia. The Mediterranean swarmed with Pontic privateers : a foreign corps, composed chiefly of Italian refugees, was formed in Asia, armed and equipped in the Roman fashion. The king's infantry is said to have amounted to 250,000, and his cavalry to 40,000, while his fleet numbered 400 vessels.

For the Romans the moment was most unfavourable. The Italian insurrection was yet unsubdued, and it was impossible for a Roman army from Italy to arrive, at earliest, till the summer of 88 B.C. Besides the native levies there was but a small Roman force in Asia ; but the Roman officers hoped to protect the Roman province and maintain their present positions. The Bithynian fleet still blockaded the Bosphorus.

The war began in 88 B.C., and the first operations were all in favour of Mithradates. He defeated the Bithynians and captured their military chest. The Roman officers were everywhere worsted, and had to shut themselves up in fortified towns—in Apamea, in the Phrygian Laodicea, and in Pergamus. To conciliate the inhabitants, all Asiatic prisoners were immediately dismissed by the king. The whole country, to the Maeander, was in his hands. The only hope of the Romans was in Sulla, and now news arrived of the Sulpician revolution and of Sulla's march upon Rome. The Asiatics everywhere sided with Mithradates ; the Roman officers, Quintus Oppius and Aquillius, were delivered into his hands. In the hour of conquest the savagery of the king broke forth in a stupendous crime. Orders were issued from Ephesus that on one and the same day all Italians, bond and free, should be put to death. Severe penalties were threatened against any who should shelter the proscribed, and while one half of their property was to go to the royal treasury, the other half was given over to the murderers. The orders were strictly carried out, and by the smallest computation eighty thousand persons perished in the massacre. The act was one of brutal and impolitic revenge. By striking not merely at Romans but at all Italians the king alienated his most important allies.

The new conquests were now organized. Pergamus became the new capital, the old Pontus was given over to

the sons of Mithradates, and the other provinces of Asia Minor became Pontic satrapies. All arrears of taxes were forgiven, and exemption from all taxes for five years was promised. Besides the petty ruler of Paphlagonia, the only communities still adhering to Rome were the city leagues of Caria and Lycia and the cities of Rhodes and of Magnesia on the Maeander, which successfully withstood all attempts to reduce them.

The king now determined to carry war into Europe and to occupy Hellas. During the last few years there had been several inroads of Thracian tribes into Macedonia, with which Mithradates was probably not unconnected. His son now advanced by land, subduing the country before him, and parcelling it into Pontic satrapies. Abdera and Philippi were made the principal bases for operations, and the whole Aegean was occupied by the Pontic fleet. All the islands were occupied and the mainland was soon attacked. At Athens, Aristion, a philosopher by trade, persuaded the people to renounce Roman rule; the Piraeus became a Pontic harbour; and the other free states—Achaia, Boeotia, Laconia—followed the example of Athens.

The position of the Roman government was critical: three armies were required to keep down Rome, Italy, and Asia; only one, that of Sulla, was available. Sulla had to choose between these three tasks. He chose Asia, and in the spring of 87 B.C., he landed in Epirus—but with only thirty thousand men: he was without a single ship and his treasury was empty. But his action was none the less vigorous: as soon as his proposals for peace on the basis of the *status quo* before the war were rejected, he advanced into Boeotia, defeated the Pontic generals, and quickly possessed himself of the whole of the mainland except Athens and Piraeus, which he failed to carry by assault. He then established camps at Eleusis and Megara, and proceeded to besiege the city and port of Athens. The siege of Athens was long and tedious. The Pontic relieving army was overthrown under the walls of the city; but abundant supplies arrived at the Piraeus by sea, and considerable quantities even reached Athens. The winter passed without result: all the Roman assaults on the Piraeus were repulsed, and the siege was turned into a blockade. Athens at length made overtures of

surrender; but when there was delay in accepting Sulla's terms, the city was captured by escalade. It was plundered and the ringleaders of the insurrection executed; but the Athenians were allowed to retain their liberty and their possessions, including Delos, just presented to them by Mithradates. Thus once more was Athens "saved by its illustrious dead" (86 B.C.).

The Piraeus still held out, and a fleet became imperatively necessary to prevent supplies from entering by sea. Lucullus had been despatched to raise ships, but the Egyptian court refused his request for aid. Sulla was compelled to confiscate the temple treasures to supply his needs, and compensated the gods by devoting to them one half of the territory of Thebes. The worst blow was the news of the democratic revolution at Rome, and the transference of the Eastern command from Sulla to Flaccus.

From these difficulties Sulla was extricated by the rashness of Mithradates, who forbade his generals to act on the defensive, and ordered them to crush Sulla at once. An army of over 100,000 men, under Taxiles, arrived at Thermopylae; Archelaus evacuated the Piraeus and joined the main army. In the plain of the Cephissus the great battle of Chaeronea was fought. The Pontic forces were three times as numerous as the Roman, and were especially superior in cavalry, so that Sulla had to protect his flank by trenches; and in front, between his first and second lines, palisades were erected.

The battle began with the advance of the Pontic war chariots; the Roman first line immediately retired behind the palisade, while the Roman slingers and archers poured their missiles on the enemy, and drove them back upon their own line, which was thus broken. Archelaus hurriedly brought up his cavalry from the flanks and made them charge, to give time for the infantry to recover. The Roman line was broken, but still offered stubborn resistance. At this moment Sulla, on the right, charged with his cavalry the exposed flank of the enemy; the confusion into which their infantry were thrown spread to the cavalry, and the Roman infantry seized the moment for a general charge. The rout was complete; the Pontic camp was captured and the remnant of the army pursued to the Euripus.

The effect of the victory was slight—partly for want of a fleet, partly because of the approach of Flaccus, who was now in Thessaly. For some days the two Roman armies were encamped opposite to each other; but the soldiers of Flaccus began to desert, and he turned northwards, intending to march through Thrace to Asia. Sulla, from whatever motives, remained at Athens for the winter.

In the spring of the next year a second Pontic army reached Boeotia by way of Euboea, where it was joined by the relics of the army of Archelaus; the latter general was suspected of treason by his master, and the most peremptory orders were given to fight a decisive battle. The armies met in the same plain of the Cephissus—near Orchomenus. The Pontic cavalry caused the Roman line to waver by the fury of its charges; but Sulla rallied his soldiers in person,—the horse were driven back and the defeat of the infantry was then an easy task. The Pontic camp was stormed on the next day; the army was almost annihilated. The Boeotian communities were severely punished for their defection, many being almost totally destroyed. The way was now open through Macedonia and Thrace; Philippi and Abdera were occupied, and the winter, 85–84 B.C., was consumed by Sulla in preparing a fleet for the next year's campaign in Asia.

During the course of the war in Europe circumstances had greatly changed in Asia Minor. The hopes with which the Asiatic communities had hailed their deliverer were bitterly disappointed: the Roman whips were as nothing to the Pontic scorpions, and even the long-suffering Asiatics were driven to revolt. The most anarchical decrees were issued by the new sovereign, giving independence to the revolting communities, full remission of debts to debtors, lands to the poor and liberty to slaves. All manner of outrage and violence was the consequence. The most important mercantile cities, Smyrna, Ephesus, Sardes, revolted from the king. At Adramyttium the whole of the senate were put to death by his orders. The Chians, suspected of disloyalty, were first heavily fined, and then deported to the coast of Colchis. A massacre of Celtic chiefs in Asia was planned and carried out, in order to convert Galatia into a Pontic province. But those who escaped raised the powerful Celtic tribes and expelled the Pontic governor.

At the same time, the king was hard pressed by the Romans by sea and land. Lucullus had at length succeeded in raising a considerable fleet, and had wrested several islands from the enemy. The army of Flaccus had reached Chalcedon in 86 B.C., but a mutiny had deposed Flaccus and placed Fimbria in command, and the new general had defeated the younger Mithradates and dislodged the king himself from Pergamus; and it was only through the refusal of the Optimates Lucullus to co-operate with the democrat Fimbria that Mithradates was enabled to escape to Mitylene. Thus, by the end of 85 B.C., Europe was entirely lost to Mithradates; and of Asia Minor the greater part was in revolt or occupied by the Romans. The fleet of Lucullus fought two successful engagements off the Trojan coast, and, when joined by the fresh vessels equipped by Sulla in Thessaly, completely commanded the Hellespont.

Mithradates now opened negotiations for peace. He applied to both Sulla and Fimbria, but he knew well that it was Sulla with whom he had really to reckon.

The king offered Sulla his aid against the democratic party at Rome in return for the cession of Asia to himself. But Sulla refused to cede one foot of ground, and would take nothing but the following terms: (1) Restoration of all the king's conquests, both continental and insular. (2) Surrender of prisoners and deserters, and of the Pontic fleet. (3) Pay and provisions for the army, and a war indemnity of three thousand talents (£732,000). (4) The Chians to be restored to their homes, and the Macedonian refugees, friendly to Rome, to be allowed to return.

These negotiations were carried on at Delium, but Archelaus could not at first persuade his master to agree. Sulla meanwhile proceeded to settle Macedonian affairs, and set out with fleet and army for the Hellespont. At last Mithradates was brought to consent. But Sulla's march was still continued; he crossed the Hellespont, and at Dardanus concluded peace, orally, with Mithradates. At length he encamped close to Fimbria, at Thyatira, near Pergamus. Fimbria's troops refused to attack the Sullan army, and an attempt to assassinate Sulla failed. When Sulla refused a conference, Fimbria gave up all for lost, and fell upon his sword; the main body of the troops

joined Sulla, while those who were most deeply compromised repaired to Mithradates.

The settlement of Asia was now proceeded with. Two legions were left under command of Lucius Licinius Murena, and their interference was, in some cases, necessary to enforce the Sullan regulations. The most important of these were as follows: (1) The revolutionary decrees of Mithradates were cancelled. (2) The most prominent adherents of the king and the authors of the massacre of the Italians were put to death. (3) The arrears of tithes and customs for the last five years were exacted, together with a war indemnity of twenty thousand talents (£4,880,000) (4) The few faithful communities—Rhodes, the province of Lycia, Magnesia on the Maeander—were rewarded, and compensation was made to the Chians and to the people of Ilium for the exceptional cruelty with which they had been treated.

During the winter of 84–83 B.C. Sulla allowed his troops to enjoy luxurious winter quarters in Asia, and in the spring transferred them across the Aegean and the Adriatic to Brundisium.

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Settlement of Asia.—Appian Mithr. 61, 62.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND ITS OVERTHROW BY SULLA.

- 87 B.C. Cinnan revolution—Return of Marius—Reign of terror.—86–84 B.C. Despotism of Cinna—Most of the provinces adhere to the senate.—83 B.C. Sulla lands at Brundisium—His moderation and military successes.—82 B.C. Further Sullan successes—Battle of the Colline Gate.—82–80 B.C. Remaining opposition to Sulla crushed in various quarters.

THE departure of Sulla left Italy full of the discontented elements from which revolution might be expected to arise. The Italian revolt still smouldered dangerously in many quarters, and the principal army was in the hands of a general whose loyalty to the senate was doubtful. The capitalists had suffered greatly through the severe financial crisis. The insurgents who had laid down their arms since the expiration of the sixty days appointed by the *Lex Plautia et Papiria* were in the position of *dedicicii*—that is of subjects entirely destitute of rights. The new citizens and the freedmen were exasperated by the cancelling of the Sulpician laws; while the large class of those who adhered to the men outlawed by Sulla after the revolution of Sulpicius were bent on obtaining the recall of their banished friends.

So far as the malcontents had a common aim, they were united upon this last point of the recall of the exiles; but the movement was mainly one of pure discontent, and had no distinct political object. Its aimlessness is shown by the character of the person chosen to lead it—Lucius Cornelius Cinna. He was unknown except as an officer in the social war; he had no political aim but that of vulgar

selfishness, and is said to have been bought over by the party of Marius merely because the restriction of the power of tribunes made it necessary for the conspirators to have a consul as their instrument. There were abler men in the second rank of the conspiracy—Gnaeus Papirius Carbo, a powerful popular orator, and Quintus Sertorius, a man of the highest ability and integrity.

Immediately on Sulla's departure (87 B.C.) the conspirators took action. Cinna, supported by the majority of the tribunes, proposed two laws: (1) the re-enactment of the Sulpician law permitting the enrolment of the freedmen and the new citizens in any of the tribes: (2) that the Sulpician exiles should be recalled and restored to their rights.

On the day of voting both sides appeared in arms. The senatorial tribunes vetoed the new law. When swords were drawn, the bands of the other consul, Octavius, cleared the Forum, and committed the most frightful atrocities on the assembled multitude. Ten thousand persons are said to have been slain. There was no legal means of proceeding against the conspirators, but a prophet opportunely gave out that the banishment of Cinna and of six tribunes was necessary for the peace of the country, and a decree of outlawry was accordingly passed by the senate against these persons. Lucius Cornelius Merula was chosen consul in place of Cinna.

But the senate omitted to expel the new exiles from Italy, and they appeared in Tibur, in Praeneste, and in all the new burgess communities of Latium and Campania, asking money and arms for the common cause. The army besieging Nola, induced partly by their own democratic leanings, partly by the bribes of the exiles, made common cause with Cinna, and furnished a valuable nucleus for the recruits who soon flocked in. Cinna now moved towards Rome, and was soon joined by fresh forces from the north. Marius and the refugees of the previous year had landed in Etruria with a body of five hundred horse. He now ordered the ergastula, or prisons in which the slaves were confined at night, to be broken open; and soon gathered round him a force of six thousand men; he also contrived to collect a force of forty ships, with which he intercepted the corn supply of Rome. He placed himself at the

disposal of Cinna, though the wiser leaders, like Sertorius, saw the imprudence of associating themselves with so dangerous a man.

The democratic forces gathered round the city, and the senate appealed to Strabo for protection. He pitched his camp at the Colline Gate, but refrained from battle, and allowed the insurgents to invest the city. Cinna was posted on the right bank of the river, opposite the Janiculum; Sertorius on the left bank, by the Servian wall. Marius increased his fleet and his army, and gained possession of Ostia, which was plundered. Strabo, though he resisted the attack of the insurgents, remained inactive, and demanded the consulship for the next year. But this the senate refused, and sought help elsewhere. A decree was passed conferring the franchise on all the Italian allies who had forfeited their old treaties. This was meant to gratify one large and important class of malcontents, but the concession did not produce more than ten thousand men. Negotiations were opened with the Samnites, in order to make the troops of Metellus in that quarter available for the defence of the city; but the Samnite terms were too humiliating, and when Metellus marched to Rome, leaving behind him a small division, the latter was at once attacked and defeated. Moreover, Cinna and Marius granted all that the Samnites required and were reinforced by a Samnite contingent.

The insurgents were already in possession of the sea, and the land communications were soon cut off by the capture of Ariminum, which shut off the supplies of food and men expected from the region of the Po; they also held Antium, Lanuvium, and Aricia, which closed all approaches from the south. At the same time a terrible pestilence broke out among the troops of the city, by which seventeen thousand men perished. The sudden death of Strabo was, no doubt, a relief to the government; his troops were incorporated with those of Octavius, but their temper was such that the consul dared not fight. The Optimates were at variance with each other: Octavius opposed all concession, while Metellus was in favour of compromise. The soldiers first besought Metellus to take over the command, then, on his refusal, deserted in large numbers. At length the government was compelled to think of surrender.

Envoys were sent to Cinna, but, while the negotiations dragged on, Cinna moved close up to the city gates, and desertions became so common that the senate was reduced to unconditional surrender. Cinna promised, at the entreaty of the senate, to abstain from bloodshed; but Marius kept an ominous silence.

Marius scoffingly refused to set foot in the city till his sentence of exile had been revoked; and a hurried assembly was held in the Forum, and the necessary decree passed. The old man at length entered, and the work of bloodshed began. The gates were closed, and the slaughter was uninterrupted for five days, but, for months afterwards, individuals who had escaped at first were put to death. Gnaeus Octavius was the first victim, others of the illustrious slain were Lucius Caesar, consul in 90 B.C., and the victor of Acerræ; Marcus Antonius, the first pleader of his time, Lucius Merula, Cinna's successor; and Quintus Catulus, Marius' colleague in the Cimbrian wars. The fury of Marius amounted to madness; he could scarce be restrained from hunting out the bitterest of his enemies and slaying them with his own hand; he forbade the burial of the bodies, and had the corpse of Gaius Caesar stabbed afresh at the tomb of Quintus Varius. The man who presented to him, as he sat at table, the head of Antonius was publicly embraced. His own associates were appalled at his frenzy, but none had the courage or the power to oppose him, and he was even elected consul with Cinna for the following year. He lived to enter upon his seventh consulship; the few remaining days of his life were passed in a delirium which ended in a burning fever. He expired on the 13th of January, 86 B.C. "He died in full possession of what he called power and honour, and in his bed, but Nemesis assumes various shapes, and does not always requite blood with blood. Was there no sort of retaliation in the fact that Rome and Italy now breathed more freely on the news of the death of the famous deliverer of the people, than at the tidings of the battle on the Raudine plain?"

With the death of Marius the massacre ceased; though there were individual instances of murder. Thus Fimbria attempted to kill the revered pontifex maximus, Quintus Scaevola, whom even Marius had spared; but Sertorius

secured the public tranquillity by calling together the Marian slaves, to the number of four thousand, and having them cut down by his Celtic troops.

During the next three years Cinna enjoyed a power as absolute and despotic as any ever exercised by the tyrant of a Greek city. He was consul each year, and nominated himself and his colleague without going through the form of consulting the people. During this period he gave no sign of any definite political plan or aim: no attempt was made to reorganize the constitution and to place the new government on a firm basis. Only the reactionary measures of Sulla were annulled, and a few laws passed as the exigencies of the moment demanded.

1. The law of Sulpicius, granting to the new burgesses and to the freedmen equality with the old citizens, was revived and confirmed by the senate, and censors were appointed to distribute the Italians among the thirty-five tribes.

2. It was at this time probably that the restrictions on the largesses of corn, introduced on the outbreak of the Social war, were removed.

3. The old design of Gracchus for the colonization of Capua was carried out.

4. All debts were reduced to one-fourth of their nominal amount.

No steps were taken to secure the support of either senate or equites, or to regulate the position of the Samnites, who, though nominally Roman citizens, were really Rome's bitterest enemies, and whose one aim was still their country's independence. The real strength of the government lay in the new citizens, with whose privileges its existence appeared bound up; while many of the old citizens acquiesced, because they saw that a restoration of the Sullan constitution meant a fresh reign of terror under the opposite party.

Most of the provinces adhered to the oligarchy. Quintus Metellus and the young Marcus Crassus attempted to hold Africa for the same party; but were compelled to submit to the revolutionary governor. Most of the senatorial refugees fled to Macedonia, which was to some extent in Sulla's power. Sulla, like many of the refugees, was outlawed and deprived of his command; but the govern-

ment took no adequate steps to enforce its decrees, so that Sulla was enabled to finish his work in the East without serious opposition. In 84 B.C. he addressed a letter to the senate, announcing his return to Italy. He promised to respect the rights of the new burgesses, and that the inevitable punishment should fall, not on the rank and file, but on the leaders of the revolution. On the arrival of this letter, Cinna hastily set out for Ancona, intending to cross the Adriatic, but his troops mutinied and he himself was killed. His colleague, Carbo, abandoned the idea of carrying war into Greece, and went into winter quarters at Ariminum. Meanwhile the moderate party had tried to bring about a compromise, but without success, Sulla's envoys were not admitted into the city, and he was summoned to lay down his arms. For the year 83 B.C. consular elections were once more held: the choice fell upon Lucius Scipio and Gaius Norbannus—neither of them men of capacity. The delay caused by Sulla's crossing into Asia was utilized at Rome in making energetic preparations for war, and 100,000 men are said to have been under arms at Sulla's landing.

Against this force Sulla had barely forty thousand men, all of them veterans, it is true, and devoted heart and soul to their leader and to him alone. But still Sulla saw that these numbers would be powerless against a united Italy, and he took measures to gain over the strength of the nation—the mass of respectable men who desired nothing but peace and quiet, and the new burgesses who feared for their new privileges. Accordingly he offered unconditional pardon to all who would break off from the revolutionary government; he made the most binding declarations to maintain the privileges of the new citizens, and caused his soldiers to swear singly to welcome all Italians as friends and fellow-citizens.

In the spring of 83 B.C. Sulla landed at Brundisium without opposition; the town opened its gates to him, and all Apulia followed its example. Many members of the oligarchical party, like Quintus Metellus and Marcus Crassus, and some deserters from the democratic ranks, repaired to Sulla's camp, but brought no appreciable increase to his numbers.

By far the most important accession was that of the

young Gnaeus Pompeius, by whose exertions the district of Picenum was induced to declare for Sulla. Pompeius had made his peace with the revolution, but the part which his father, Strabo, had played against Cinna was not forgotten: an indictment, charging him to give up the booty said to have been embezzled by his father at Asculum, threatened his ruin, from which he was only saved by the protection of Carbo. As soon as Sulla landed in Italy, Pompeius repaired to Picenum, raised the oligarchical standard at Auximum, and gathered round him a force of three legions, with which he skilfully effected a junction with Sulla in Apulia. Sulla received him with great honour, and rebuked the slackness of the rest of his partisans by greeting the young commander with the title of *Imperator*.

Thus reinforced, Sulla advanced into Campania; the army of Norbanus was at Capua, that of Scipio was advancing along the *Via Appia* from Rome. But before its arrival Norbanus had been crushed, and the remnants of his army were blockaded in Capua and Neapolis. Sulla hurried to Teanum, where Scipio was posted, and made proposals for peace; an armistice was concluded, and a personal conference took place between the two generals, while the soldiers of the two armies mingled as they pleased. An agreement was almost concluded, and envoys were sent to procure the opinion of Norbanus at Capua; but the negotiations, after all, fell through, and Scipio denounced the armistice. Sulla hereupon maintained that the agreement had already been actually concluded. The imprudence of allowing the common soldiers to fraternize was now forcibly demonstrated, and Scipio's soldiers passed over to Sulla in a body. The consul was required to resign his office, and was escorted to a place of safety. Sulla and Metellus took up winter quarters in Campania, and maintained the blockade of Capua.

Thus the first campaign had ended in the submission of Apulia, Picenum, and Campania, and the discomfiture of both consular armies. The Italian communities already began to negotiate with Sulla, and had their rights secured to them by separate formal treaties. Sulla boasted that in the next year he would march into Rome, and overthrow the revolutionary government.

The government made the greatest preparations for the next campaign. The consuls were Carbo and the younger Marius; Sertorius was sent to raise new levies in Etruria; the gold and silver in the temples was melted down; new divisions came from Umbria and the Po. But, most important of all, the most strenuous exertions were made in Samnium and Lucania. It was well understood that Sulla would not, like the Cinnan government, acquiesce in the independence of these districts, and they made ready for a renewal of their old struggle against the hated Latin race.

For the campaign of 82 B.C. the army of the Optimates was divided: Metellus, resting on Picenum, advanced towards Upper Italy, the main body, with Sulla, marched straight upon Rome. Near Signia he came upon the enemy under Marius, who retired to Sacriportus and drew up his line of battle. The issue was not long doubtful, and was made certain by the desertion of one of the divisions of Marius. By this battle the capital was lost, and Marius sent orders to the praetor Lucius Brutus Damasippus to evacuate it, after putting to death all the notable men of the other party. Among the victims of this latest massacre were the pontifex maximus, Quintus Scaevola, who had so narrowly escaped the vengeance of Fimbria. Sulla left behind Quintus Ofella to blockade Praeneste, into which Marius had thrown himself, and pushed on to Rome, which offered no resistance; he then hurried on to Etruria.

This march of Sulla northward altered the position of affairs, and three Sullan armies, from Gaul, Umbria, and Rome, were now advancing upon Carbo in Etruria. On the side of Gaul, Metellus sailed with the fleet to Ravenna, cut off the communications of the enemy with Ariminum, and sent forward a division to Placentia. Pompeius and Crassus penetrated from Picenum into Umbria, and shut up the lieutenant of Carbo at Spolegium, whence however he subsequently escaped to join Carbo. Lastly, Sulla, advancing from Rome in two divisions, fell in with Carbo near Clusium, but was so far unsuccessful that he was unable to continue his advance.

Meanwhile the democratic party were making every effort to relieve Praeneste, but without success; help was

sent from Sicily and from Carbo, but did not reach the town. In the south, however, a large force of Samnites and Lucanians, which, with reinforcements from Capua, is said to have amounted to seventy thousand men, could not be prevented from marching to the relief; and Sulla was obliged to hurry from Etruria, and take up a strong position south of Praeneste to intercept them; and in this position both sides for the present remained.

In the region of the Po the Sullans had gained great successes. Marcus Lucullus, the lieutenant of Metellus, was at first shut up in Placentia, while Norbanus advanced upon Metellus himself. But Norbanus was completely defeated, and deserted by his Lucanian troops; and Lucullus was emboldened to make a sally in which he defeated the troops left behind to blockade him. Ariminum was occupied by Metellus, and the whole country from the Apennines to the Alps was reduced to submission.

The troops of Metellus were now available for service in Etruria; but Carbo, on receiving the news, departed secretly and embarked for Africa. His abandoned troops either dispersed or were destroyed by the enemy; only a small remnant joined the army of Praeneste.

The democratic army of Praeneste was now in danger of being caught in a net—by the arrival of Metellus it might be completely surrounded. In his desperation, Pontius of Telesia, the Samnite general, resolved to throw himself upon Rome, which was but one day's march distant. From a military point of view the step was ruinous; even if successful the democratic army must be crushed at Rome, wedged in between the armies of Sulla and of Metellus. But the measure was dictated, not by policy, but by revenge; it was the last outbreak of revolutionary fury and of Samnite hatred.

On the 1st of November, Pontius, with the Lucanian general Lamponius, and the democratic commanders Damasippus and Carrinas, encamped close to the Colline Gate. The force which sallied from the city was scattered like chaff, and the citizens gave way to despair. But before morning a body of horse appeared, which proved to be Sulla's advanced guard under Balbus, and before noon Sulla arrived in person. He had set out imme-

diately on hearing of the departure of the Samnites, and, in spite of his forced march, immediately drew up his army in line, and ordered the attack. The battle lasted the whole night through, and into the following morning. The left wing, under Sulla, was driven back, and the battle was reported to be lost; but the right wing, under Crassus, routed its opponents and pursued them to Antemnae, and gradually the left wing likewise gained ground. The defection of a division of three thousand of the enemy decided the issue, and Rome was saved. The insurgents were all but extirpated. The three or four thousand prisoners who were taken—including Damasippus, Carrinas, and Pontius—were, on the third day after the battle, massacred by Sulla's orders, in the Campus Martius.

Praeneste surrendered on the news of this disaster, and the leaders put themselves to death. Of the twelve thousand prisoners, all the Roman senators, all the Samnites, and most of the Praenestines were slaughtered, and the town was given up to pillage. Capua was voluntarily surrendered, but other towns made the most obstinate resistance. Nola was not evacuated till the year 80 B.C. As to Samnium, Sulla declared that the very name ought to be extirpated; he invaded the country, and made it a waste, as it has remained to this day. In Etruria a long resistance was offered by some towns. Volaterrae stood a siege of nearly three years, and the garrison was massacred after a free departure had been granted to it.

Of the provinces there still remained Sicily, Spain, and Africa to be subdued. Gnaeus Pompeius was sent to Sicily with six legions, and the island was immediately evacuated by the governor Perpenna (82 B.C.). Pompeius then proceeded to Africa where he defeated the forces of the governor Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, and Hiarbas the usurping king of Numidia, and captured their camp. Hiempsal was restored to the kingdom of Numidia, and various Gaetulian tribes, hitherto independent, were made subject to him. In forty days the war in Africa was at an end (80 B.C.).

In Spain, Sertorius was too weak to resist the Sullan officers, and, on his departure, both provinces willingly submitted (81 B.C.).

At the close of the African campaign Pompeius had

been ordered to break up his army—a command at which both general and soldiers were discontented. Pompeius desired a triumph, though, as an extraordinary officer, he had no legal claim to the honour. Sulla, however, yielded to his wish, and Pompeius could boast of having been the first Roman who had enjoyed a triumph before he was a senator. It was now that Pompeius was saluted by Sulla by the surname of Magnus.

In the East there had been no cessation of warfare; the carrying out of Sulla's regulations had in many cases to be accomplished by force; and fresh difficulties had arisen with Mithradates. The king was preparing an expedition into his Bosporean kingdom, and Murena, the governor of Asia, perhaps fearing lest the preparations were really directed against Rome, had crossed the Pontic frontier. Mithradates complained to the Roman government; and Sulla had sent envoys to dissuade the governor, who nevertheless continued his advance. Mithradates now resolved to repel him by force, and Murena was driven over the frontier with great loss (82 B.C.).

Peace was now renewed with Mithradates; and at last the ten years of war and insurrection which had convulsed the whole Roman world were at end.

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CHAPTER XXVI.

THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION.

Sulla's office—Measures of punishment and reward—Constitutional changes—The senate—The comitia—The magistrates—Reform of criminal jurisdiction—Reform of the municipal system—Sulla's retirement—His character and career—His work—His death.

THE problem which lay beyond Sulla after his victories was vast beyond conception—it was the reconstruction of a whole state in ruins. “About the time,” says Mommsen, “when the first pitched battle was fought between Romans and Romans, in the night of the 6th July, 83 B.C., the venerable temple which had been erected by the kings, dedicated by the youthful republic, and spared by the storms of five hundred years,—the temple of the Roman Jupiter in the Capitol,—perished in the flames. It was no augury; but it was an image of the state of the Roman Constitution. That, too, lay in ruins, and needed reconstruction.” The mass of the aristocratic party had no idea of the magnitude of the task. They imagined that now, when the revolution had been suppressed, it would be enough to return to the old lines, taking precautions against similar outbreaks in future. Hence it was that Sulla chose his instruments, with the exception of Quintus Metellus, from the moderate party, or from the deserters from the democratic camp—Lucius Flaccus, Lucius Philippus, Quintus Ofella, Gnaeus Pompeius. Sulla was quite in earnest about restoring the old constitution; but he alone saw the enormous difficulties of restoration. He saw clearly that comprehensive concession and energetic repression were

alike necessary. He also saw that the senate would mutilate every measure of either kind, and that it was necessary to accomplish the work by his own hand, without check or hindrance. At the same time, even Sulla was far from grasping the whole truth about the condition of the empire; otherwise he must have given up the work in despair. In fact, the constitution was past reconstruction; the ancient polity had broken down irretrievably; economic causes had corrupted or destroyed every class in the state—aristocracy, middle class, and lower class; and where no class in the state remained sound, absolute rule by the authority and intelligence of a single man alone remained possible. But not for another generation was this truth to be brought home in all its remorseless fatality.

The authority with which Sulla was at present provided was the purely military proconsulship. It was necessary that he should be endowed with an office which should preserve as far as possible constitutional forms, and yet be powerful enough to coerce both friends and foes. Sulla accordingly requested the senate to place the regulation of the state in the hands of a single man with unlimited powers, and intimated that he considered himself qualified for the task. The senate directed the interrex Lucius Valerius Flaccus to propose a law to the people, conferring upon Sulla the "dictatorship for the making of laws and the regulation of the commonwealth," and approving, retrospectively, of all his acts as consul or proconsul. His office was unlimited in point of time, and included absolute power to dispose of the lives and property of the citizens and of the state lands. He might alter the boundaries of the city, of Italy, or of the empire; dissolve or establish communities in Italy; regulate the provinces and dependencies; confer the imperium on whom he pleased, and nominate proconsuls and propraetors. Lastly, he might regulate the state by new laws. This new office took its name from the old dictatorship, obsolete since the Hannibalian war. The boundlessness of its power recalled the old decemviri legibus scribundis; but in reality it was nothing but the monarchy. "The protector of the oligarchic constitution had himself to come forward as a tyrant, in order to avert the ever-impending tyrannies.

There was no little of defeat in this last victory of the oligarchy."

The work of punishment was first taken in hand. Sulla was not of a vindictive temperament;—even after his landing in Italy he had shown himself ready to forget and forgive,—but the democrats had used their last moments of power to set on foot fresh massacres, and henceforth Sulla showed no mercy. He immediately outlawed all civil and military officers who had taken part in favour of the revolution after the convention with Scipio, and any other citizens who had actively aided the cause. A reward of twelve thousand denarii (£488) was offered to the murderer of any of these outlaws; sheltering them was forbidden under the severest penalties; their property was forfeited to the state, their children and grandchildren excluded from a political career; and this confiscation was also extended to the property of those who had fallen during the war. Sulla caused a list of the proscribed to be posted up, and fixed the 1st of June, 81 B.C., as the day for closing it. It was said at last to have amounted to 4700 names.

The fury of the persecution fell primarily upon the Marians. The tomb of Marius himself was broken open, and his ashes scattered. His nephew was executed with torments at the tomb of Catulus. Of the leaders of the first rank few remained; but other classes suffered severely. Sixteen hundred equites who had speculated in the Marian confiscations were upon the list, and the professional accusers were largely represented. The heads of the slain were publicly piled at the junction of the Vicus Jugarius with the Forum. Bands of soldiers ravaged all Italy to earn the rewards of murder, and many, even of the oligarchy, fell victims to private revenge.

In the disposal of the confiscated property the greatest abuses prevailed. Sulla himself, and his immediate dependents and connections, bought largely, and had the purchase-money wholly or partially remitted. If there was any difference between the Marian and the Sullan reign of terror, it was that Marius murdered to satisfy his personal vengeance, while Sulla showed no personal feeling, but regarded the work almost as a political necessity.

With regard to the new citizens, the general rule was laid down that every citizen of an Italian community was *ipso facto* a citizen of Rome; all distinctions between citizens and allies—between citizens old and new—were abolished. But the freedmen were restricted, as before, to their old four tribes. There were, however, exceptions to the general rule; particular communities were punished, or, less frequently, rewarded. For instance, Brundisium obtained exemption from customs; but, of the guilty communities, many had to pay fines, to raze their walls, or to forfeit a part or the whole of their lands. Praeneste and Spoletium, Florentia, Faesulae, Arretium, Volaterrae, all fell under the last penalty. The dispossessed burgesses were placed in the position of Latins of the lowest class, with the additional hardship that they were attached to no particular community, but were without either home or city.

The lands thus confiscated were mainly utilized in settling the soldiers of the victorious army, mostly in Etruria, Latium, and Campania; and in many cases, as in the Gracchan colonies, the settlers were attached to existing communities. The number of allotments is stated at 120,000. This arrangement was made by Sulla with varied objects. Firstly, he redeemed the pledge given to his soldiers; secondly, he carried out the idea of the moderate conservative party of strengthening the class of small proprietors in Italy—an idea which he had attempted to realize in 88 B.C. To accomplish this object the settlers were forbidden to sell their allotments. Lastly, and this was no doubt the strongest reason, the new colonists formed standing garrisons, as it were, for the support of the restored constitution; and for this reason, where they were attached to an old community, as at Pompeii, the new citizens were not amalgamated with the old, but formed a separate body within the same enclosing wall. Very similar in its aim was the object of another act of Sulla's—the manumission of a body of ten thousand of the slaves of the proscribed, who formed a body-guard in support of the oligarchy, and a garrison for the capital.

Sulla now destroyed at one blow the constitution so carefully built up by Gaius Gracchus, and restored in all its plenitude the rule of the senate. Gracchus had bribed

the mob of the capital into quiescence by introducing free distributions of corn; these were now completely abolished. Gracchus had organized the order of equestrians, and tried to give them a definite place in the constitution by introducing the system of farming the taxes of the provinces, by entrusting to them the functions of jurymen, and by assigning them a special place in the theatre at popular festivals. Sulla abolished the farming system, and converted the former taxes into fixed tributes; the jurymen were now taken from the senatorial order alone; and the equites were deprived of their seats of honour in the theatre, and relegated to the ordinary benches. The senate was henceforth to be the only privileged order.

In order to fill up the fearfully reduced numbers of the senate, probably also with the intention of permanently increasing the number of its members, three hundred new senators were nominated by the tribes from men of equestrian census—chiefly from the younger men of the senatorial houses, and from Sullan officers whom the late events had brought into prominence. At the same time, the mode of admission to the senate was changed. Hitherto, men had entered the senate either by summons from the censors, or by holding one of the curule magistracies—the consulship, the praetorship, or the aedileship: the tribunate and quaestorship gave no right to a seat, but the choice of the censors was generally directed towards men who had held these offices. The censorial functions of appointing to the senate and of deleting from its roll were now set aside; the senatorial seat was taken from the aediles and given to the quaestors, who were now raised from eight to twenty in number. Several important results followed from these regulations. In the first place, the abolition of the censorial deletion made the senator irremovable. Secondly, the number of members was considerably increased: hitherto the average number had probably been something below three hundred; in Cicero's time a full meeting consisted of 417 members. Thirdly, as both the new extraordinarily nominated senators and the augmented body of quaestors were nominated by the *comitia tributa*, the senate was now thoroughly based on popular election.

The *comitia tributa* remained, as before, formally sovereign; but the initiative of the senate in all legislation was solemnly enacted. This was sufficient to exclude the people from interference in administration, or in criminal jurisdiction, and the voice of the people was confined practically to giving assent to alterations in the constitution.

The right of the people to elect magistrates in the *comitia centuriata* was not interfered with by Sulla, nor did he even attempt, as in 88 B.C., to restore the old Servian voting arrangements; but the election to the priestly offices was entirely taken from the tribes, and the right of co-optation restored to the sacerdotal colleges. At the same time, various restrictions were imposed or confirmed afresh with regard to the qualifications for office. The limit of age for holding each office was strictly enforced; and the first step in the gradation of offices was in future to be the quaestorship instead of the aedileship, so that the quaestorship was now the necessary step to the praetorship, and the praetorship to the consulship. Two years at least must elapse between the holding of any office and of the next above it; while a ten-years interval was required before re-election to the same office.

The senate was originally, and was still in theory, a council, from which the magistrates might seek advice; but it had gradually acquired the right, not merely of advising, but of controlling the magistrates. It was Sulla's aim to consolidate this power, and, accordingly, all magistracies emerged from his hands with diminished rights.

The heaviest blow fell upon the tribunate, an office naturally most independent of the senate. The original right of the tribunes to veto the official acts of magistrates, and the further right to fine and punish all who disregarded their veto, were still left to them; but the abuse of the right of *intercessio* was punished by a heavy fine. At the same time the power and influence of these magistrates were heavily fettered by two ordinances, which forbade them to consult the people or submit laws to them without permission from the senate; and made the holding of the tribunate a bar to the holding of any *curule* magistracy.

The power of the consuls and praetors was restricted by the complete separation of their civil and military functions,

—an arrangement for which the practice of recent times had formed a precedent. Hitherto there had devolved upon the two chief magistrates, besides the proper consular functions, all official duties for which no special magistrates were appointed. The administration of justice in the capital, and the government of the four transmarine provinces, Sicily, Sardinia, and the two Spains, was provided for by the six praetorships, and with these functions the consuls had nothing to do. There remained the non-judicial business of the capital, and the military command in the continent of Italy. At times, when these eight magistrates did not suffice, and when there were extraordinary commands to be provided for, there were two usual expedients: a particular military command was prolonged after its term had expired, or non-military functions were combined; as, for instance — the two judicial departments at Rome might be managed by one praetor instead of two, or the duties of the consul in the capital might be performed by the praetor urbanus, and so one magistrate set at liberty for extraordinary duties. But in such cases the senate merely defined the sphere and function of the extraordinary office; the particular person who was to fill it was left to the magistrates themselves to decide by agreement or by lot.

Within the last century six new official departments had been created,—the governorships of the five new provinces Macedonia, Africa, Asia, Narbo, Cilicia, and the presidency of the quaestio de repetundis of Calpurnius; and yet the number of magistrates had not been increased. The senate preferred to fill up vacancies by prolonging the term of office; for this prolongation might be granted or refused, and thus the senate kept a hold over the magistrates. Usually those magistrates who during their year of office were confined to the city were appointed for a second year to a transmarine command.

This expedient of prolongation was seized upon by Sulla as the basis for a complete separation between the political authority of the magistrate over Roman citizens and his military authority over non-citizens. The consulship and praetorship were in future uniformly extended for a second year; the first year was devoted to civil, the second to military functions. Moreover, as the Roman citizen body

now embraced all Italy south of the Rubicon, the military jurisdiction of the magistrate did not extend south of that river, and it was a fundamental principle of the constitution that there should ordinarily be no troops and no commandant within that district.

The praetors were now increased from six to eight; and according to the new arrangement the ten chief magistrates devoted themselves in the first year of their office to the business of the capital; the two consuls to government and administration; two praetors to the administration of civil law—the other six to the administration of the newly organized criminal justice. During the second year, they were invested with the command of the ten chief governorships, Italian Gaul having been added to the list of provinces.

The effect of these regulations was very largely to increase the power of the senate over the magistrates. In the first place, all offices, whether at home or abroad, were for the future strictly limited to one year, whereas in former times the same man had held the same office for two or even more years. Secondly, by the arrangement as to military commands, no one could in future be, as Marius had been, both commander-in-chief and supreme civil magistrate. Thirdly, the whole military power became, formally at least, dependent on the senate; the people chose the consuls and praetors, but it was the senate that conferred on them the military authority by prolonging their term of office for a second year as proconsuls or *propraetors*.

The censorship was not formally abolished, but its chief functions were taken from it. The new arrangement as to the quaestorship provided for the filling up of the senate, and the register for purposes of taxation and military service was unnecessary now that Italy was tax free, and the army was raised by enlistment; there remained only the financial functions, which were in future to be performed by the consuls.

The finances of the state were largely affected by three of Sulla's acts: the first, the conversion of the Asiatic taxes into a fixed tribute, certainly produced no gain to the state, though the tax-payers were greatly benefited: but the resumption of the Campanian domain lands to the state,

and the abolition of the corn largesses, secured an ample revenue for the future.

But the most important and enduring part of Sulla's work was the reform of the criminal law.

As Sulla found it the judicial system was threefold. The whole citizen body formed a court of appeal from sentences of the magistrate affecting the caput of a citizen. Then there was the ordinary procedure for all cases civil or criminal, except crimes directed against the state. In these cases, one of the two praetors investigated the general character of the case, and determined the law under which it was to be tried; he then nominated a single judex, who decided the case on the lines laid down by the praetor. Thirdly, there was the extraordinary procedure applicable to particular cases or groups of cases of importance, whether civil or criminal. For such cases, not a single judex, but a special body of judices was appointed by a special law. Such were the special tribunals appointed in 110 B.C. for the investigation of the alleged treason in connection with Numidian affairs, and in 103 B.C. with regard to the treason of the Roman generals in Gaul, in 105 B.C. Such also were the standing commissions for the investigation of special crimes, the earliest of which was the quaestio Calpurnia de repetundis of 149 B.C., and the court of the centumviri, or spear-court (*hasta*), (so called from the shaft of a spear used as a symbol in processes affecting property, and really consisting of 105 men—three being elected by each of the thirty-five tribes), for dealing with cases with regard to inheritances. Special provision was made for the presidency of each of these courts, in the law constituting them,—to some a praetor was assigned, to others an *ex-aedile* or *ex-quaestor*.

The reforms introduced by Sulla were also threefold. First, he largely increased the number of standing commissions or jury-courts. Henceforth there were at least eight of these quaestiones, called respectively, *quaestio de repetundis* (exaction), *de majestate* (treason), *de vi et injuriis* (injuries to person or honour), *inter sicarios* (murder), *de ambitu* (bribery at elections), *de falsis* (fraud), *de peculatu* (embezzlement), *de adulteriis* (adultery). By these reforms the judicial power, both of the citizen body and of the ordinary courts, was curtailed,

since the crime of *majestas* was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the former, and many of the most serious crimes from that of the latter.

Secondly, the presidents of these new courts were six of the praetors and other specially appointed officers. The power to appoint special commissions for special cases of course still remained.

Thirdly, the jurymen (*judices*) were in future drawn, not from the *equites*, but from the senate. The constitution of the spear-court remained unchanged.

The political aim of these measures was, of course, to exclude the *equites* from any share in the government; but they also constituted a most valuable system of legal reform. From this time dates the distinction, hitherto unknown, between civil and criminal causes; the former were now such as came before a single *judex*, the latter such as came before a jury. Moreover, Sulla's legislation may be regarded as forming the first Roman code since the Twelve Tables, and the first criminal code which had ever been issued at all. Among other noteworthy results of Sulla's arrangements were these: that capital punishment fell into abeyance; for the whole body of citizens could alone pronounce sentence of death, and the cognizance of cases of high treason was now withdrawn from it, and given to a special commission, which could sentence neither to death nor imprisonment: and that the appointment of special commissions for particular cases of high treason, such as the *quaestio Varia* during the social war, was minimized, now that there was a special court for trying the offence.

It may be added that new sumptuary laws were enacted, to restrain luxury at funerals and banquets, so that the law now attempted to perform what had formerly been the functions of the censors.

To the Sullan period, though perhaps not to Sulla, belongs an important development of the municipal system of Italy. Hitherto the government of Italy had been completely centralized in Rome; but from this period dates a great advance in the direction of local self-government by each particular community. "Antiquity was certainly as little able to dovetail the city into the state as to develop of itself representative government and

other great principles of our modern state life; but it carried its political development up to those limits at which it outgrows and bursts its assigned dimensions, and this was the case especially with Rome, which in every respect stands on the line of separation between the old and the new intellectual worlds." The social war was a sufficiently striking proof that the old Roman polity was outgrown, and the subsequent arrangements were a great stride in the advance from the city-state to the nation.

Before the social war the dependent communities were either allowed to keep their municipal constitution by being formally declared sovereign independent states of non-citizens, or, if they obtained the franchise, they were deprived of all local municipal rights, so that even the administration of justice and the charge of building devolved upon the Roman praetors and censors. The utmost concession ever made was that the most urgent law cases might be settled on the spot by a deputy nominated from Rome. After the social war, when all Italy became one civic community by the extension of the franchise, it was necessary to form smaller communities within the larger; it was impossible that the local affairs of all Italy should be settled by the magistrates of the city of Rome. These new communities were formed very much on the model of Rome; there were the same institutions but with different names, and names such as implied inferiority to the institutions of the capital. There was a citizen-assembly, which passed laws and chose the local magistrates, and a council of one hundred members representing the Roman senate. The duumviri corresponded to the Roman consuls; two quaestors managed the local funds, and there were the local colleges of pontifices and augurs.

The imperial authority of Rome, however, existed side by side with the municipal constitution. Taxation might be imposed or public buildings set on foot by the Roman authorities as well as by those of the town; and in event of collision the town, of course, gave way. It is probable that in judicial matters a formal division of functions was made to avoid the extreme inconvenience of a collision of authority. The more important cases, both civil and

criminal, would probably be reserved for the Roman authorities, while minor suits, or such as were most urgent, were decided on the spot.

Such was the constitution which Sulla now presented to the Roman state. He had used the power which he had gained by the sword to introduce really valuable reforms, and to compel all classes in the state, and especially the soldiery, to submit once more to civil authority. The mass of the community, if they did not welcome the Sullan arrangements, at any rate acquiesced in them without open opposition. But not so the military officers. The two most trusted lieutenants of Sulla, Gnaeus Pompeius and Quintus Ofella, were the first to rebel. The former had resisted the command of the senate to disband his army, and had only been conciliated by the concession of the honour of a triumph. The latter, in defiance of the new ordinance, became a candidate for the consulship without passing through the inferior magistracies. In his case no lenience was shown. Sulla had him cut down in the Forum, and then explained to the assembled citizens his reasons for the act.

On the completion of his work, Sulla abdicated the extraordinary office conferred on him by the Valerian law. Although endowed with absolute power, he had, in the case of many of his enactments, consulted the people or the senate. Consuls had been elected for 81 B.C.; and for the next year Sulla himself was consul with Quintus Metellus, retaining the regency but without exercising it for the time. For 79 B.C. the elections were left entirely free, and early in that year he resigned the regency, dismissed his lictors, and invited any citizen who wished to call him to account to speak.

The family to which Sulla belonged had remained for many generations in comparative obscurity, and his character at first gave no promise of an extraordinary career. Personally he was blue-eyed and of a fair complexion, with piercing eyes. His tastes made him incline to a life of cultivated luxury, sometimes descending to debauchery. He was a pleasant companion in city or in camp, and even in the days of the regency would unbend after the business of the day. One of the most curious traits in his character was a vein of cynicism, which

showed itself in the playful but dangerous irony of many of his acts. Thus he ordered a donation from the spoil of the proscribed to be given to a wretched author, who had written a panegyric upon him, upon condition of never singing his praises again. When he seized the treasures of the Greek temples he declared that the man could never fail whose chest was replenished by the gods themselves. He displayed great vigour both of body and mind; even in his last years he was devoted to the chase, and, after the conquest of Athens, he could remember to bring with him the writings of Aristotle to Rome. In religion he followed the general tendency of the age towards unbelief and superstition. He flattered himself that he was the chosen favourite of the gods, and believed that he held intercourse with them in dreams and omens. When at the summit of his power, he formally adopted the surname of Felix, and used it from that time forward.

Sulla's brilliant career seemed to come to him rather by caprice of fortune than by any seeking of his. He passed, like the ordinary aristocrat, through the usual routine of office; and in 107 B.C. the quaestorship under Marius in Africa fell to his lot. He soon made himself master of the military art, and, after the close of the Jugurthine war, performed the task of organizing supplies for the Roman army in the war with the Cimbri. During his praetorship, in 93 B.C., the first Roman victory over Mithradates and the first treaty with the Parthians took place. He took a prominent part in the social war, and, as consul, suppressed the Sulpician revolution with startling energy. Wherever Sulla and Marius had come into competition the result had always been loss of renown to the elder general, and increase of reputation to the younger; and the revolution of 88 B.C., which ended in the outlawry and flight of Marius, gave to Sulla the most important position within the empire. Then came the Mithradatic war and the Cinnan revolution,—and it was Sulla who crushed the enemies of Rome abroad, and put down anarchy at home. Now absolute autocrat of the state, he abolished the Gracchan constitution which had fettered the oligarchy for forty years, and compelled all orders and classes to yield a common obedience to the law; he established the oligarchy with all the stability

that laws and constitution can give, and provided it with a body-guard and an army. He was one of the few generals who never lost a battle, nor in his political career was he ever compelled to retrace a single step. "The capricious goddess of fortune seemed in his case to have exchanged caprice for steadfastness, and to have taken a pleasure in loading her favourite with successes and honours whether he desired them or not.

There is nothing original in the character of Sulla's constitution; and the reason is to be found in the very nature of his work. His task was to restore, not to create: the germ at least of every one of his institutions existed before; they had grown up out of the previous régime, and were merely regulated and fixed by Sulla. Even the horrors attaching to his work are but a larger edition of the doings of Nasicæ, Opimius, Cæpio,—the traditional oligarchic mode of getting rid of opponents. Sulla was but the instrument of the oligarchy to which he belonged, and for the Sullan restoration, not Sulla alone, but the body of the Roman aristocracy and its government in the past must be held responsible. When the work was done, Sulla readily gave back the power which had been conferred upon him; and if his motive was rather *ennui* than public spirit, he at any rate must be acquitted of the charge of political self-seeking. His constitution could not last, because of the worthlessness of the aristocracy. Sulla might "erect a fortress," but could not "create a garrison." The gratitude of posterity is due to the man who, in the course of his hopeless task, carried out such admirable isolated reforms as those of the Asiatic revenue system and of criminal justice.

Sulla's worst fault was the unscrupulous and cynical violence with which his work is defiled. The public posting of the lists of the proscribed; the exposure of heads in the public streets; the public auction of confiscated goods, as though of the spoils of an enemy; the cutting down of a refractory officer in the Forum,—these things surpassed all that previous revolutions had known. Uncertainty and frivolity marked many of his public acts. He could be culpably lenient or brutally severe, as his personal likes or dislikes prompted; the worst enormities which were perpetrated in his name were permitted through indiffer-

ence and carelessness; he punished with the same non-chalance with which he pardoned.

The short remainder of his life was passed in the strictest retirement; in a little more than a year he died, at the age of sixty, in full vigour of body and mind. Immediately after his death, voices were raised in opposition to the proposal of a public burial; but his memory was still too fresh, and he was honoured with, perhaps, the grandest funeral procession Italy had ever seen.

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Cisalpine Gaul.—Momm. iv. c. 10, note.

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CHAPTER XXVII.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE EMPIRE DURING THE REVOLUTION PERIOD.

Revenue: from Italy; from the provinces.—*Expenditure*: for military purposes; for public works.—Agriculture—Trade and commerce—Social life.

THE general tendency and result of the revolution period are evident from the history of the time and from the legislation of Sulla. The financial condition of the empire is worth more particular attention, and will furnish valuable evidence on many points with regard to the social and political relations of the time.

Revenue.

I. From Italy. The land-tax, with other minor imposts upon Italians, had for some time been in abeyance; so that from Italy, including Cisalpine Gaul, the Roman exchequer drew nothing but (1) the produce of the state-lands, chiefly those in Campania, and of the gold mines in the north; (2) customs dues on goods imported for trading purposes; (3) taxes levied on the manumission of slaves.

II. From the provinces.

(i.) State lands. These were either the lands belonging to cities destroyed by martial law, such as Leontini, Carthage, Corinth; or domain lands which had belonged to former rulers dispossessed by the Romans, such as the lands of the kings of Macedonia, Pergamus, Cyrene, and the mines in Spain. All such property was leased, like the state lands in Italy, by the state to tenants, and the rents formed a large part of the public revenue.

(ii.) Taxation. Within the bounds of the empire there were some states, like the kingdoms of Numidia and Cappadocia, which were recognized as fully sovereign and independent; there were others, like Rhodes, Massilia, Gades, which enjoyed a free and equal alliance by special treaty with Rome, (*civitates foederatae*). Both classes were exempt from ordinary taxation, and were merely bound to supply ships and men at their own expense in time of war. Besides these there were a few scattered cities, like Narbo, on which the Roman franchise had been specially conferred; and others such as Centuripa in Sicily (*civitates immunes*), which were specially exempted from taxation; but with these four exceptions the whole extent of the empire contributed to the Roman exchequer.

The taxes fall under three principal heads:—

1. *Decumae* and *scriptura*. The first was a tenth of the produce of arable land; the second, a corresponding tax upon pasture land. Of these kinds were the taxes levied in the fertile islands of Sicily and Sardinia.

2. *Stipendium*, or *tributum*—i.e. a fixed sum paid annually by a community to the Roman exchequer; amounting, for Macedonia, to about £24,000 of our money; for Gyaros, a small island near Andros, to about £6 4s. This tax was usually lower than that paid by the community to its former rulers before the Roman conquest: the amount was fixed by the Roman authorities, while the magistrates of each community were responsible for collecting and paying over the amount to the Roman treasury.

3. *Customs*. The Romans recognized the right of each community to levy its own customs at its own ports and frontiers, and made no attempt to set up a general tariff for the whole empire. Dues were levied by the Romans themselves at all the ports of Italy; most of the subject communities in the same way levied dues on their own frontiers, which would have to be paid even by Roman citizens, unless special exemption was secured by treaty. But in the provinces proper, like Sicily and Asia, where the Roman state was sole ruler and sovereign, the customs, of course, went into the imperial coffers. The amount raised was five per cent. on all imports or exports in Sicily, and two and a half in Asia. The

customs, like the *decumae* and *scriptura*, were invariably leased to tax-farmers.

These, with the unimportant item of tolls from roads, bridges, canals, etc., were the only regular taxes imposed upon the provincials by the Roman government. But they are far from representing the full amount of the burdens borne by the provinces.

In the first place, the expenses of collection were large; so that the amount paid by the contributors was much greater than that received by the government. Collection by middlemen is well known to be the most expensive system of all; and at Rome the lettings were so large that only a few capitalists could undertake them, and consequently the competition was small, and the profits of the lessees large.

Secondly: there were the military requisitions in time of war, frequently, also, in time of peace. Legally, all transport pay and provisions for the soldiers were provided by the Roman government; the provincial communities had only to furnish housing, wood, hay, and such things. But in time of war the governor demanded from them grain, ships, money, or anything he required; and though such requisitions were considered as advances to be made good by the government, yet practically they became a serious burden. This is proved by frequent laws restricting requisitions, fixing their maximum amount and the rate of compensation. At extraordinary times of course requisitions assumed the form of a punishment, as when Sulla compelled the subjects of Asia to give forty-fold pay to every common soldier among them, and seventy-five fold to every centurion.

Thirdly: there were all kinds of extortions, legal or illegal, for which the Roman official had ample opportunity. The right of requisition, the free quartering of soldiers and of the clerks and lictors and innumerable officials in the train of a Roman governor, gave him sufficient pretext for amassing a princely fortune. The existence of a standing commission for the trial of such offences shows their frequency.

Lastly, it must be remembered that Rome undertook the military expenses only of her subjects: all other burdens—the maintenance of roads and buildings, the pay

of fleets and of the local contingent to the Roman army—were supported by the subject community, and must have formed a considerable addition to their taxation. For instance, in Judea, the Jews paid a tenth to their native princes in addition to the temple tribute and to their payments to Rome.

The general conclusion at which we must arrive with regard to provincial taxation is, that, though moderate in theory, it must have been extremely oppressive in practice.

Expenditure.—I. Military and administrative expenses. The taxation of the Roman empire, like the tribute paid to Athens by her subject allies, was in the main meant to defray the expense of the military system alone. Hence its comparatively small amount, 200,000,000 sesterces (£2,055,000),—only two-thirds of the annual revenue of the King of Egypt. Hence, too, it may be guessed that the surplus revenue after payment of expenses was small, and that provinces like the Spains and Macedonia, which required a large garrison, cost more than they yielded. Still, in the times before the revolution, the surplus was large enough to defray the expenses of public buildings and to form a reserve fund. But the old principle, that the Roman hegemony should not be treated as a privilege from which profit might be derived, was infringed upon in the latter portion of this period in several ways: the customs in conquered territories were appropriated by Rome, and the mode of levying them was oppressive. By Gaius Gracchus Roman citizenship was treated as a privilege conferring a right to a certain amount of corn; and to provide the money for these largesses the soil of Asia was declared to belong absolutely to the Roman state, and was taxed accordingly.

II. Public works. The earlier portion of this epoch was an era of vast public undertakings. A new road was made, in 132 B.C., from Capua to the Straits of Sicily—branching from the great road which led from Rome through Capua to Tarentum and Brundisium. The coast road on the east was completed by extension southwards to Brundisium and northwards to Aquileia. About Rome itself, the Mulvian bridge over the Tiber was rebuilt of stone. In North Italy the Via Postumia was constructed in 148 B.C., from Genua to Aquileia through Placentia, Cremona, and Verona, thus

connecting the two seas. Gaius Gracchus provided for the maintenance of the roads by assigning pieces of ground by the side of them to which was attached the duty of keeping them in repair.

To the same period belong the great provincial highways: the Via Domitia, connecting Italy with Spain; the Via Egnatia and the Via Gabinia, connecting the ports of the East coast of the Adriatic with the interior. The draining of the Pomptine marshes was undertaken in 160 B.C. The two ancient aqueducts were thoroughly repaired, and two new ones, the Marcia and the Calida, constructed. Not only were these stupendous works carried out, but paid for in cash; the Marcian aqueduct, which cost two millions of our money, was paid for in three years. Nor did these costly undertakings prevent the accumulation of a reserve, which at the very beginning of the period amounted to £860,000.

At the same time, it must be said that, even in the early part of this epoch, before the revolution, other duties of the government at least as imperative as these were entirely neglected. Brigands infested the frontier countries, and even the valley of the Po. There was no Roman fleet, and the vessels raised by the provincials were not numerous enough to check piracy, much less to carry on a naval war. The traffic of Rome had still to depend upon the old wooden Janiculan bridge over the Tiber, and the roadstead of Ostia was allowed to become blocked with sand.

But from the time of the revolution the picture is far worse. Public works were at a standstill; either because the corn largesses drained the treasury, or because the oligarchy were bent upon accumulating a large reserve fund in self-defence. (The reserve is said to have reached its highest point in 91 B.C.) The Social war was the first severe strain to which the Roman state had been subjected since the Hannibalic war. During the latter the reserve was not touched till the tenth year, when the resources of taxation were exhausted; the Social war was supported from the first from the reserve, and when this was exhausted the government preferred to sell the public sites in the city to imposing a tax upon the citizens.

Agriculture.—During this epoch the forces previously at

work are visible in increased activity, and already produced startling results. The smaller holdings were absorbed by the large estates, "as the sun absorbs the drops of rain." The senatorial government rather favoured than opposed this process, which the opposition constantly endeavoured to counteract. The two Gracchi gave 80,000 new farmers to Italy, and Sulla settled 120,000 of his veterans on the land, but the process still went on; the small farms were constantly being absorbed, while the creation of new farmers was only intermittent. In the provinces the same evils existed, and not the slightest attempt was made to check them; while they were attended with this additional disadvantage, that the rents were of course sent out of the country to Italy.

In *Trade and Commerce*, there is little but inactivity to record; the Romans destroyed the industries of Corinth, and created nothing in their place. Building was, perhaps, an exception to the general stagnation, but produced little benefit to the commonwealth, as only slave labour was employed.

Commerce was exclusively in the hands of the Romans, and the political ascendancy of Rome was unscrupulously used to favour this monopoly. Usury was one of the most lucrative of trades: for instance, the indemnity imposed by Sulla upon the province of Asia was advanced by the Roman capitalists, and swelled in fourteen years to six times the original amount; public buildings, works of art, even their children, had to be sold by the unfortunate communities to meet their claims. Next in importance to money dealing came the export of wine and oil from Italy to all parts of the Mediterranean, and the import of all kinds of articles of luxury. The importation of slaves was enormous, especially from Syria and Asia Minor. The chief emporia for the reception of imports were Ostia and Puteoli, which traded chiefly with Alexandria and the cities of Syria, in the valuable commodities of the East.

Thus, side by side with the political oligarchy of senatorial families, there was a financial oligarchy of capitalists. These men absorbed the rents of the soil of Italy, and of the richest parts of the provinces; the usury and the commerce of the whole empire were in their hands, and even of the state revenue itself they drew a considerable

share by their profits as lessees. Their influence in the state is clearly seen in the destruction of Corinth and Carthage, the commercial rivals of Rome; and it is to be remembered that their wealth was based, not upon sound economic principles, but upon the political supremacy of Rome; hence every political crisis was attended by a financial crisis.

One important result of the commercial monopoly of Rome was an interchange of population, greatly to the disadvantage of the Roman state. Everywhere in the provinces there were large numbers of Italians temporarily settled, mostly for commercial reasons. We have seen that 80,000 Italians perished in a single day in Asia Minor, and 20,000 in Delos. Again, the population of Italy suffered enormous diminution during the Social wars, when 300,000 persons are said to have perished. In return for the loss of these citizens Italy received vast numbers of provincials, chiefly oriental Greeks, who acted as physicians, schoolmasters, and priests, or who came to her ports as traders and mariners; while the proportion of slaves to freemen was continually increasing. The servile insurrections—the appeals to slaves, in times of disturbance, to take up arms against their masters, are plain enough signs of the times. “If we conceive of England with its lords, its squires, above all its city, but with its freeholders and farmers converted into proletarians and its labourers and sailors converted into slaves, we shall gain an approximate image of the population of the Italian peninsula in those days.”

Social Features.—Socially, no less than politically or financially, the period is one of decadence, and is marked by growing extravagance and frivolity. Enjoyment lost all freshness and spontaneity, and became a laborious and pedantic study. Animal hunts and gladiatorial games became the chief feature in the public festivals. Huge sums were expended at every great funeral on public games—Marcus Aemilius Lepidus left strict injunctions to his children to avoid empty show, and not to spend more at his obsequies than 1,000,000 asses (£10,200). Houses and gardens reached fabulous prices; gambling and extravagance in dress were fashionable foibles; but the favourite mode of expenditure was on the luxuries of the table.

Every villa along the coast had its tanks for securing a

constant supply of fish. At the best entertainments, not whole birds, but only the most delicate portions were served up; and the guests were expected merely to taste of the multitude of dishes presented to them. There were sumptuary laws totally prohibiting certain delicacies, regulating the price of meals and the amount of plate, but of all the Roman nobles only three are said to have kept these laws, and that on account of regard for the principles of Stoic philosophy, not for the law. A century earlier, few houses contained any silver plate beyond the traditional salt dish, but in Sulla's time there were 150 silver dishes at Rome of 100 lb. weight. Some of it was of such exquisite workmanship as to be valued at eighteen times its weight of metal, and Lucius Crassus gave 100,000 sesterces (£1050) for a pair of silver cups.

Perhaps the most significant mark of the corruption of the age is the frequency of divorce and the general aversion to marriage. Even Metellus Macedonicus, censor in 131 B.C., a man renowned for his honourable domestic life, urged the duty of marriage upon his fellow-citizens in the following terms: "If we could, citizens, we should indeed all keep clear of this burden. But as nature has so arranged it that we cannot either live comfortably with wives or live at all without them, it is proper to have regard rather to the permanent weal than to our own brief comfort." These facts are important, for it is only by trying to realize the ignoble private life of the time that we can comprehend the political corruption which prevailed. There were exceptions, especially among the rural towns, but immorality was the rule. One of the censors of 92 B.C. publicly reproached his colleague with having shed tears over a pet murena; the other retaliated on the former that he had buried three wives and shed tears over none of them.

In 161 B.C., an orator in the Forum gave the following description of the senatorial juryman:—

"They play hazard, delicately perfumed, surrounded by their mistresses. As the afternoon advances, they summon the servant and bid him make inquiries at the comitium, what has occurred in the Forum, who has spoken in favour of or against the new project of law, what tribes have voted for and what against it. At length they go themselves to the judgment seat, just early enough not to bring

the process down on their own neck. Reluctantly they come to the tribunal and give audience to the parties. Those who are concerned bring forward their cause. The jurymen orders the witness to come forward; he himself goes aside. When he returns, he declares that he has heard everything, and asks for the documents. He looks into the writings—he can hardly keep his eyes open for wine. When he thereupon withdraws to consider his sentence, he says to his boon companions, ‘What concern have I with these tiresome people? Why should we not rather go to drink a cup of mulse mixed with Greek wine, and accompany it with a fat fieldfare, and a good fish—a veritable pike from the Tiber island?’

“All this was, no doubt, very ridiculous; but was it not a very serious matter that such things were subjects of ridicule?”

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Taxation generally.—Marq. Stv. 182–203, 247–252, 298–301.

Manumission tax.—Cic. ad Att. ii. 16. Liv. xxvii. 10.

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—Cic. in Verr. ii. iii. 6, 8, 9, and passim; Caes. de B. Afr. cap. ult.

Scriptura.—Fest. saltum, scriptuarius. Varro R. R. ii. i. Cic. in Verr. ii. 2; ad Fam. xiii. 65; pro L. Manil. 6. Plin. N. H. xix. 3, 15.

Tributum.—Cic. in Verr. ii. 53, 55, sqq.; ad Att. v. 16; ad Fam. iii. 8. Appian B. C. v. 4.

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Societates.—Tac. Ann. iv. 6. Cic. in Verr. ii. 3, 64, 70; iii. 41: ad Att. i. 17; xi. 10: ad Fam. xiii. 9, 65; Bruns, pt. i. c. v. 6, SC. De Oropiis.

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Amount of revenue.—Plut. Pomp. 45.

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Usury.—In Verr. iii. 70. Hor. Sat. I. ii. 14.

Social features.—Cic. ad. Att. ii. 19; xi. 23; xii. 35, 36; ad. Fam. viii. 7; pro Mur. 18; de Orat. 40, 56; de Legg. ii. 24; de Off. ii. 16; Seneca de Brev. Vit. 20; Liv. Epit. 48. Gell. i. 6; ii. 24 and passim. Macrobi. ii. 13 and passim. Plut. Sulla 35. Cic. 41. Val. Max. iii. 10, 15; ix. 1, and passim. Suet. Aug. 89. Nero, 2. Plin. N. H. x. 50, s. 71; xxxvi. 3; viii. 16, s. 20; xvii. 1. Aelian. Hist. Anim. viii. 4. Cic. speeches and letters passim, esp. pro Cluent. pro Cael.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

MARCUS LEPIDUS AND SERTORIUS.

Classes which composed the Opposition, and characters of its leading men, after the death of Sulla.—Insurrection of Lepidus (78-77 B.C.).—Sertorian war (80-72 B.C.).

SULLA'S arrangements had been acquiesced in by all the chief classes in the state, and on his death his constitution had nothing to fear from any organized body of opponents. There was, however, a large but heterogeneous body of malcontents opposed to the present condition of things for widely different reasons.

1. There were the jurists—men of strict legal training, who detested Sulla's arbitrary mode of procedure, and who even during his life had ventured to disregard several of his laws; for instance, those depriving certain Italian communities of the franchise.

2. There was the liberal minority in the senate, who had always favoured reform and compromise with the democratic party and the Italians.

3. The thorough-going democrats, who clung to the traditional watch-words of the party, and whose special aim was the restoration of the tribunician power. Besides these, there were many important classes of men, whom Sulla's enactments had either injured or left unsatisfied.

4. The population who lived between the Po and the Alps (Transpadani), upon whom Latin rights had been conferred, and who were eager for the full Roman franchise.

5. The freedmen, who swarmed in the capital, and whose political influence had been annihilated by their relegation to the old four city tribes.

6. The capitalists, chiefly of equestrian rank, for whose grievances see p. 303.

7. The populace, who had been deprived of their free corn.

8. All that numerous class of burgesses whose property had been curtailed or confiscated to furnish allotments for Sulla's veterans.

9. The proscribed and their children and connections. It was a point of honour with the friends of these to procure the recall of the living, and the removal, in the case of the dead, of the stigma attaching to their memory.

10. To all these classes one more remains to be added—the men of ambition and the men of ruined fortunes. The latter included alike the aristocratic lords, who had lost their patrimony by riotous living, and the Sullan colonists, who refused to settle down to a life of husbandry and were eager for fresh spoil. The former included men, outside the senatorial circle, who were eager to force their way into office by popular favour; and men of more daring ambition, who might perhaps emulate Gaius Gracchus.

It is most necessary, for the understanding of the history of the following years, that all these elements of opposition should be fully grasped; and it may be well here to recall to mind the two great and constant difficulties of the Roman government—the difficulty of controlling its military governors in the provinces; and the difficulty of managing the masses of slaves and freedmen in the capital, without either police or troops at its disposal.

It was, perhaps, the greatest misfortune of all that there was everywhere at this period a dearth of political leaders. The management of parties was in the hands of political clubs, or *hetaeriae*, a system which had existed for centuries at Rome, but which was now seen in its worst and most aggravated form. These clubs were formed among optimates and populares alike; and even the mass of burgesses was formed into societies according to voting districts, under the direction of officers called *divisores tribunum*. "Everything with these political clubs was bought and sold; the vote of the electors above all, but also the votes of the senator and the judge; the fists, too, which produced the street riot, and the ring-leader who directed it. The associations of the upper and

of the lower classes were distinguished only in the matter of tariff. The hetaeria decided the elections; the hetaeria decreed the impeachment; the hetaeria conducted the defence; it secured the distinguished advocate; and it contracted, in case of need, respecting an acquittal with one of the speculators who prosecuted on a great scale the lucrative traffic in judges' votes." One of the most expert wire-pullers of these caucuses was Publius Cethegus.

Among the Optimates the most notable men were Quintus Metellus Pius, consul in 80 B.C.; Quintus Lutatius Catulus, son of the victor of Vercellae; Lucius and Marcus Lucullus, who had shown considerable military talents. But none of these men had any conception of the greatness of the crisis; their political creed did not go beyond the maintenance of the oligarchy and the suppression of demagogism; their ambition was satisfied by a consulship and a triumph.

Three men alone are worth a longer consideration. The first is Gnaeus Pompeius, born 106 B.C. He had raised troops and fought for Sulla in the second civil war, and had enjoyed the titles of imperator and triumphator before his age permitted him to stand for any office. Already he began to be known by the title of Magnus. He was an able soldier but no genius; cautious to timidity, and averse to strike till he had established an immense superiority over his opponent. In culture, as well as in integrity of character, he was at least up to the level of the time; he was a good neighbour, a good husband and father. His temperament was kind and humane; and he was the first to depart from the custom of putting to death captive kings and generals after a triumph. Yet he sent a divorce to the wife whom he loved, at the command of Sulla, because she belonged to an outlawed family. For politics he had little aptitude. He was awkward and stiff in public; easily managed by his freedmen and clients; eager for power, but affecting to despise it. His relations to the parties of the time was peculiar. Though a Sullan officer he was opposed to Sulla personally. Nor was he in sympathy with the senatorial government; for his family was not yet fully established among the aristocracy, and Pompeius himself had once been a Cinnan adherent. He had no political sagacity,

and little political courage. "He might have had a definite and respectable position, had he contented himself with being the general of the senate—the office for which he was from the beginning destined. With this he was not content, and so he fell into the fatal plight of wishing to be something else than he could be. He was constantly aspiring to a special position in the state, and when it offered itself he could not make up his mind to occupy it. He was deeply indignant when persons and laws did not bend unconditionally before him, and yet he bore himself everywhere with no mere affectation of modesty, as one of many peers, and trembled at the mere thought of undertaking anything unconstitutional. . . Constantly tormented by an ambition which was frightened at its own aims, his deeply agitated life passed joylessly away in a perpetual inward contradiction."

Marcus Crassus was famed for his boundless activity, especially in the acquisition of wealth: he was contractor, builder, banker, and usurer, and carried on numerous other trades through his freedmen. Unlike Pompeius, he was unscrupulous in the means he employed. He was proved to have committed a forgery in the matter of the Sullan proscription lists; he did not refuse a legacy because the will which gave it him was known to be forged; and he allowed his bailiffs to dislodge the small farmers adjoining his estates by force and by fraud. He soon became the richest man in Rome; and at his death, after expending enormous sums, he was still worth 170,000,000 sesterces (£1,700,000). But his wealth was only a means to the gratification of his ambition; he extended his connection by every possible means; he could salute every burgess of the capital by name; never refused his services as an advocate, and, though without any gift of oratory, overcame all obstacles by his pertinacity in speaking. He advanced money on loan to influential men without distinction of party, and thus acquired a power which none dared to provoke. His ambition knew no bounds; while he stood alone the crown of Rome was beyond his grasp, but it was not impossible that with the aid of a suitable partner he might attain to supremacy in the state.

In the ranks of the democrats the revolution had made

such havoc that scarcely a man of note survived. Of the rising generation, Gaius Julius Caesar was now only twenty-four years of age, but was already perhaps the third most important man in Rome. His family connections naturally inclined him towards the democratic party; for his father's sister had been the wife of Marius, and his own wife was the daughter of Cinna; while his own early career had so far been one of opposition to the senatorial rule. He had refused to divorce his wife at the bidding of Sulla, and with difficulty escaped proscription at the intercession of his relatives. ✓

But Caesar could only be the hope of the future, and the actual leadership of the democratic party fell into the hands of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who had been an optimiate, but had joined the opposition to escape impeachment for extortion during his government of Sicily. He was a vehement orator, but had none of the qualities of a leader, whether in the council or in the field. However, he was elected as the democratic leader to the consulship of 78 B.C.

Thus the death of Sulla found the opposition leader in possession of the chief magistracy; while, by a train of events to be shortly described, the important province of Spain was practically abandoned to the enemies of the senate.

Lepidus resolved to strike an immediate blow. An outbreak at the very funeral of the regent was hardly prevented by the influence of Pompeius, and by fear of the Sullan veterans; and preparations were at once begun for a new revolution. The conspirators aimed at the overthrow of Sulla's constitution; at the revival of the free distributions and of the tribunician power; at the recall of the banished, and the restoration of confiscated lands. The exiles already began to return. Many noted Marians, such as Gaius Perpenna and Lucius Cinna, joined the plot, but Caesar more prudently abstained. All this went on under the very eye of the senate, which was too indolent to take the advice of the other consul, Catulus, and crush the plot at its birth. They allowed a limited corn-law to be enacted, probably permitting a definite number only of poorer citizens to purchase corn at a low rate—a measure which emboldened without satisfying the opposition.

The war broke out first in Etruria, where the dispossessed Faesulans resumed their estates by force, several of the Sullan veterans being slain in the tumult. The senate adopted the worst possible course of sending both consuls to Etruria to raise an army—a proceeding which was scarcely likely to be efficacious when they thought it necessary to bind them over by a solemn oath not to turn their arms against each other. Lepidus, of course, armed for the insurrection, not for the senate, and evaded the efforts of the latter to induce him to return. When at length, in 77 B.C., he was peremptorily ordered to proceed to Rome, he refused, and demanded (1) that the tribunician power should be restored; (2) that those who had been deprived of their rights of citizenship or of their property should be reinstated; (3) his own re-election as consul for the current year.

The senate could rely upon the Sullan veterans and upon the army raised by Catulus; and the latter was entrusted with the defence of the capital and the conduct of the war in Etruria, while Pompeius was sent to crush the democrats under Marcus Brutus in the valley of the Po. Lepidus meantime advanced upon the capital, and made himself master of the right bank of the Tiber, and was even able to cross the river. A battle followed in the Campus Martius, in which Lepidus was defeated. He retreated to Etruria, while another division of his army shut itself up in Alba. By this time Pompeius had accomplished his work in the north, and was marching southward, so that Lepidus was enclosed between two armies. He succeeded in reaching Sardinia with most of his army, but soon afterwards died. The flower of his troops, under Perpenna, joined Sertorius in Spain.

Spain was now the only province of the empire where opposition to the senate still existed. It only remains to trace the steps by which Sertorius had there established a power which taxed the whole strength of the government to subdue it. Sertorius was a native of Nursia, in the Sabine land, a man of tender sensitive nature, and at the same time of the most chivalrous courage. Although untrained in speaking, he had considerable oratorical gifts; and in the revolutionary war his military talent and his genius for organization presented a striking contrast to the

incapacity of the other democratic leaders. His Spanish followers called him the New Hannibal, and indeed his adroitness and versatility, in politics and in war, savour far more of the Phœnician than of the Roman genius. On being driven from Spain, he led a life of adventure, chiefly along the African coasts. Among his other exploits he besieged and took Tingis (Tangiers), though the native prince was aided by the Romans. His fame spread abroad, and he was soon invited to Spain by the Lusitanians, who in spite of nominal submission maintained a practical independence. Sertorius was well acquainted with the resources of the country, and accepted the invitation, though he had to fight his way through the Roman squadron which commanded the straits.

80 B.C.—Upon his arrival, Sertorius found that he had only 2600 men armed in Roman fashion. He immediately raised his force to a full legion by levying four thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry, and, accompanied by swarms of Lusitanian auxiliaries, gave battle to the Roman governor Lucius Fufidius, who was defeated with the loss of two thousand men on the Baetis.

79 B.C.—In this year Quintus Metellus was sent to relieve Fufidius; but further misfortunes awaited the Roman arms. Calvinus, governor of the Ebro province, was defeated and slain by Hirtuleius, the lieutenant of Sertorius; and Lucius Manlius, governor of Transalpine Gaul, who had crossed the Pyrenees, had to return to his province after suffering a disastrous defeat. Metellus himself in Further Spain penetrated into Lusitanian territory, and besieged Longobriga, near the mouth of the Tagus; but one of his divisions was lured into an ambush, and the siege had to be raised; another division was defeated during the retreat, and great damage was inflicted on the main army by the harassing tactics of Sertorius.

Sertorius had been careful always to act, not as ring-leader of the Lusitanian revolt, but as Roman governor of the province; and he had already begun to organize the country in the same spirit, though the work was probably carried out chiefly in later years. He formed the chief men of the exiles into a senate to conduct affairs and to nominate magistrates. The officers of the army were exclusively Roman; to the Spaniards he was the Roman

governor who levied troops by virtue of his office. At the same time he endeavoured to attach the provincials to Rome and to himself. After the custom of the country, numbers of the noble Spaniards swore to stand by him to the death, and formed the life-guard of the general. Even superstition was enlisted on his side, and he allowed it to be believed that he received counsel from the gods through the medium of a white fawn. The strictest discipline was maintained in the army, and the inhabitants were relieved from all fear of outrage on the part of the soldiers. The tribute of the province was reduced, and the soldiers were made to build winter barracks for themselves, to avoid the necessity of quartering them on the inhabitants. The children of the noble Spaniards were educated in an academy at Osca, where they learned to speak Latin and Greek, and adopted the Roman dress—the first attempt to Romanize the provinces by Romanizing the provincials themselves.

78 B.C.—By the end of this year Further Spain was completely in the hands of Sertorius, except the places actually occupied by the troops of Metellus. In Hither Spain there was no Roman army, and the agents of Sertorius roamed through Gaul, urging the communities to revolt. The passes of the Alps became insecure, and the sea was commanded by the insurgents through their alliance with the pirates in the western Mediterranean; these corsairs had a fixed station on the coast whence they intercepted supplies, and maintained communications with Italy and Asia Minor.

77 B.C.—After the suppression of the revolt of Lepidus, it was absolutely necessary to send a capable general to Spain. This office Pompeius demanded for himself, and as there was no one else fit for the command, and Pompeius was at the head of an army, the senate resolved to yield. The first task of Pompeius was to quiet the disturbances which had already begun in Gaul, and to lay out a new road over the Alps, in order to secure a shorter communication with Italy. In the autumn he crossed the Pyrenees. Meanwhile Sertorius, leaving Hirtuleius to keep Metellus in check, had been completing the subjection of Hither Spain, and had reduced one after another the towns adhering to the senate. Perpenna, who had hitherto

maintained his command independently of Sertorius, was forced at the approach of Pompeius to put himself under the orders of his colleague.

76 B.C.—Perpenna with a strong force stood ready to oppose Pompeius if he should attempt to cross the Ebro, and to march southwards. Herennius was in command of another division to support Perpenna, while Sertorius continued to subdue the districts friendly to Rome. Pompeius, however, forced the passage of the Ebro, defeated Herennius, and took Valentia. Sertorius now appeared on the scene, and besieged Lauro, south of Valentia, which had declared for Pompeius. The latter, at the moment when his efforts to relieve the town seemed on the point of success, was outmanœuvred by Sertorius, and saw the town captured and the inhabitants carried off before his eyes—an event which confirmed many wavering towns in their adherence to the insurgents.

Meanwhile, Metellus had defeated Hirtuleius at Italica, near Seville, and driven him into Lusitania.

75 B.C.—The next year, Metellus marched to join Pompeius at Valentia, and defeated and killed Hirtuleius, who endeavoured to intercept him. But Pompeius, anxious to wipe out the disgrace of Lauro before Metellus arrived, gave battle on the Sucro to Sertorius. Pompeius was defeated on the right wing, while his lieutenant, Afranius, was victorious on the left. The latter, however, was suddenly attacked by Sertorius while occupied in pillage, and compelled to retreat. By the next day, Metellus had overthrown Perpenna and joined Pompeius, who was now too strong to be attacked.

For a time the fortune of Sertorius languished, and his army melted away; but he soon appeared with a new army south of Saguntum, while his privateers prevented supplies from reaching the Romans. There was a long and doubtful battle in the plains of the river Turia (Guadalaviar), the result of which was unfavourable to Sertorius. His army melted away, and Valentia was taken and razed to the ground. The general himself was besieged at Clunia (on the Upper Douro), but escaped, and at the end of the year was once more at the head of an army.

As the result of the campaign, southern and central

Spain had been recovered by the Romans, and their conquests were secured by the occupation of the towns of Segobriga and Bilbilis. But the country was so exhausted that Metellus had even to spend his winter quarters in Gaul.

74 B.C.—With two fresh legions from Italy, the Romans again took the field; but Sertorius confined himself entirely to guerilla warfare. Metellus reduced the Sertorian towns in southern Spain, and carried away the male population with him.

In the province of the Ebro Pompeius was prevented by Sertorius from taking Pallantia, and was defeated before Calagurris.

73 B.C.—During this year the warfare was of the same uneventful character; but Pompeius succeeded in inducing many communities to withdraw from the insurrection.

The war had now continued for eight years. The losses of the state in men and treasure are difficult to estimate: not only were the Spanish revenues lost, but vast sums had annually to be sent for the support of the army in Spain. The province itself was devastated; whole communities had frequently perished, and the towns which adhered to Rome had countless hardships to endure. Gaul suffered scarcely less from the constant requisitions of men and money, and from the burden of providing winter quarters. Generals and soldiers were alike dissatisfied; the former because victory was difficult and of a kind that brought no fame; the latter because the booty was poor, and even their pay irregular. At the same time the government was contending against its enemies all over the Mediterranean; on the sea, in Macedonia and in Asia Minor; while Sertorius was already in open league with the pirates, and was negotiating with Mithradates on the basis of mutual assistance.

But the position of Sertorius was even less enviable. His influence waned as he was compelled more and more to stand on the defensive. The Spanish militia was unstable as water, melting away at the first disaster; and the Roman emigrants were insubordinate and stubborn. It was difficult to maintain an adequate force of cavalry, the training of which required considerable time. The best of his lieutenants and the flower of his troops had

perished in the war, and the most trustworthy communities showed signs of wavering. Like Hannibal, Sertorius knew that one day he must fall, and was always ready to lay down his command, if he might be allowed to live peaceably in Italy. Soon projects were formed against his life, and Sertorius withdrew the custody of his person from Romans and entrusted it to select Spaniards, while the suspected were punished with fearful severity. A second conspiracy was quickly formed among his own staff, and only partially discovered, and the conspirators were induced to hurry on the catastrophe. At the instigation of Perpenna a great victory was announced to the general, and a banquet was held to celebrate it. At the banquet an altercation took place, and a wine-cup was dashed on the floor—the signal for assassination. Sertorius and his faithful attendants were slain (72 B.C.). “History loves not the Coriolani; nor has she made any exception even in the case of this, the most magnanimous, most gifted, most worthy to be regretted of them all.”

Perpenna succeeded to the command, but at the first encounter the despondent ranks of the insurgents were broken, and Perpenna with many other officers captured. The correspondence of Sertorius, which implicated many of the leading men at Rome, was burnt by Pompeius unread. The emigrants dispersed—many to join the pirates; but soon the Plotian law allowed them to return. The Sertorian towns surrendered or were captured by force, and the two provinces were regulated anew. The tribute of the most guilty communities was increased, and others lost their independence. One band of Sertorians was settled by Pompeius near Lugdunum as the community of the *Convenae*.

At the close of 71 B.C. Metellus and Pompeius returned to Rome. “The good fortune of Sulla seemed still to be with his creation after he had been laid in the grave, and to protect it better than the incapable and negligent watchmen appointed to guard it. The opposition in Italy had broken down owing to the incapacity and precipitation of its leader, and that of the emigrants from dissension within their own ranks. . . . The curule chairs were rendered once more secure.”

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- Sertorius*.—Liv. Epit. 90–94, 96; frag. bk. 91. Plut. Sertor. 8–end; Pomp. 17–21. Flor. iii. 22. Vell. ii. 29, 30. Eutrop. vi. 1. Appian B. C. i. 108–115. Hisp. 101. Orosius v. 19, 23. Frontin. i. ii. 13. Caes. B. G. iii. 20. Sall., frag. lib. iii.
- Disregard of Sulla's laws*.—Cic. pro Dom. 30; pro Caec. 33–35.
- Hetaeriae*.—Cic. pro Plauc. 15, 18, 23, 37, and passim; pro Cluent. 26; ad Att. i. 16; ad Q. F. ii. 3; Ascon. in Corn. 75 (Bruns, pt. iii. 4).
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Note on Caesar's age.—The year of Caesar's birth is usually given as 100 B.C., because Suetonius (Jul. 88), Plutarch (Caes. 69), Appian (B. C. ii. 149) all state that he was at his death (15 Mar. 44 B.C.) in his fifty-sixth year. But this account would make him enter upon the three offices of aedile, praetor, and consul, which he held in 65, 62, and 59 B.C. respectively, in his thirty-fifth, fortieth, and forty-third years, that is, in each case, two years before the legal time. The fact that this irregularity is nowhere noticed, suggests that the statements of Suetonius, Plutarch, and Appian are errors derived from a common source, especially as such errors must have been common before the commencement of the *acta diurna*. The date 102 B.C. would agree better than 100 B.C. with the statement of Velleius, that Caesar was appointed Flamen Dialis when *paene puer*; since the latter date would make him thirteen years six months old, i.e., not almost, but actually a boy. Further, the number LII. on the coins struck by Caesar about the outbreak of the civil war would agree with the years of his life if he was born in 102 B.C.

CHAPTER XXIX.

RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION.

1. Subjection of Thrace and Dalmatia.—ii. Rise of Tigranes in the East; third Mithradatic war (74–65 B.C.); war with Tigranes; invasion of Armenia.—iii. The pirates: their organization, and the Roman attempts to destroy them.—iv. The Servile war (73–71 B.C.).

THE Sullan constitution had thus survived the dangers which beset it on the death of its author. It remains to be seen how the senate fulfilled the duties of government during its new lease of power. In order to do this it is necessary to go back a little, and to review the condition of other parts of the empire during the last years of Sulla's regency and the first years after his death in 78 B.C. The condition of Spain had thrown all other questions into the shade: but there were other serious dangers threatening—especially from Thrace and Macedonia, from the East, and from the pirates of the Mediterranean.

In Thrace and the adjacent regions there was warfare for the space of twelve years, the result of which was that the pirates of the Dalmatian coast and the tribes between Macedonia and the Danube were subdued, while Thrace became a portion of the province of Macedonia.

The most important feature in the history of the East, during the years succeeding the settlement of Sulla, was the rapid increase of the power and territory of Tigranes, king of Armenia, and son-in-law of Mithradates. The Parthians, who were at this time torn by internal dissensions, were deprived by him of several of their dependent kingdoms—Corduene, Atropatene, and

Nineveh: of Mesopotamia the northern half was subject to him. But it was on the west that his proceedings necessarily affected the Romans. He took Melitene from Cappadocia; and after Sulla's death he advanced into Cappadocia itself, and carried off the inhabitants of the capital and of other towns. Even by 83 B.C. he had subdued eastern Cilicia, reduced Upper Syria and the greater part of Phoenicia, and threatened the Jewish state. Antioch became one of the residences of the great king. It was the aim of Tigranes to become supreme monarch of the East; and it is always as an Oriental sultan, not as a Western ruler, that he appears. His conquests were accomplished by huge heterogeneous hosts gathered from all parts of his dominions. The inhabitants of many of the conquered cities were carried off to found a new great city, Tigranocerta, near the frontier of Mesopotamia, in the most southern province of Armenia. "In other respects, too, the new great king proved faithful to his part. As amidst the perpetual childhood of the East the childlike conception of kings with real crowns on their heads has never disappeared, Tigranes, when he showed himself in public, appeared in the state and costume of a successor of Darius and Xerxes, with the purple caftan, the half-white purple tunic, the long plaited trousers, the high turban, and the royal diadem,—attended, moreover, and served in slavish fashion, wherever he went or stood, by four 'kings.'"

Mithradates had been careful to give the Romans no provocation, but at the same time he strengthened himself by every means not forbidden by treaty. He greatly extended his dominions in the Black Sea, and devoted himself to arming and training his troops in the Roman fashion, in which he was aided by the Roman emigrants at his court.

But the Romans were anxious to avoid interference in the East. In 81 B.C., King Alexander II. died, leaving by will his kingdom of Egypt to the Romans; but Ptolemy Auletes and Ptolemy the Cyprian were allowed to assume the kingship in Egypt and in Cyprus, though these princes had notoriously no legal claim. Nor did the Romans interfere with the conquests of Tigranes, and if they did not recognize his title, they did nothing

to deprive him of his provinces. There were special reasons why they should not interfere in Egypt, but, in allowing an Asiatic king to establish himself on the Mediterranean, they abandoned the very basis of the Roman power.

Thus there was no desire for war on either side; but the third Mithradatic war, like the first, grew out of mutual suspicion and distrust. It was the policy of Rome to pursue every war, not merely to the conquest, but to the annihilation of her opponents; and the Romans were discontented with the peace of Sulla, as they had been discontented with the terms granted by Scipio Africanus to the Carthaginians. It was ominous, too, that the new preparations of Mithradates coincided with a serious civil war, and with difficulties in other parts of the empire. In 77 B.C. it was declared in the senate that the king was only waiting his opportunity, and the garrisons of Asia and Cilicia were reinforced.

Mithradates, on his side, felt that a war between the Romans and Tigranes was inevitable, and that he would not be able to remain neutral; and his suspicions were roused by the fact that he was unable to obtain from the Romans the documentary record of the terms of the last peace. If there was to be war no moment could be more favourable, the Sertorian war was at its height, and the king knew that instead of a single-handed struggle against the whole Roman power, he would have the alliance of an important section within it. Just at this time—75 B.C.—Bithynia was occupied by the Romans, in virtue of the will of King Nicomedes III., who died heirless; and Cyrene, which had also been bequeathed, was made a Roman province. The fears of the king lest the Romans meant henceforth to pursue an aggressive policy turned the scale, and he yielded to the persuasions of the Roman emigrants, and declared war in the winter of 75–74 B.C.

Tigranes declined the overtures of his father-in-law; but an alliance was at once concluded with Sertorius and with the pirates. From the former, the king obtained officers for his army; from the latter, a large force of ships; as for stores, the royal granaries contained two million medimni of grain.

74 B.C.—The war began with the advance of Diophantus

into Cappadocia to close the road to Pontus against the Romans, while agents were sent to rouse the Roman province and Phrygia to revolt. The main army of 100,000 infantry and 16,000 cavalry advanced along the coast to occupy Paphlagonia and Bithynia.

On the Roman side, the consul Lucius Lucullus, with thirty thousand infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry, was ordered to invade Pontus : his colleague, with the fleet and a body of troops, was sent to the Propontis, to cover Asia and Bithynia. A general arming of the coast was ordered, and the task of clearing the seas of the pirates was entrusted to Marcus Antonius, praetor for the year.

Fortunately for the Roman government the power of Sertorius began from this moment to decline, and it was able to devote itself exclusively to the Asiatic war. At first, many cities opened their gates to the officers of Mithradates ; the Roman families in them were massacred ; and the Pisidians, Isaurians, and Cilicians took up arms. Something was done by individual energetic men like Gaius Caesar, who hurried from Rhodes and raised volunteers to oppose the insurgents ; and Deiotarus, tetrarch of the Tolistoboi, fought against them with success ; but still Lucullus was delayed for some time in restoring order in the province before he could advance.

Meantime Cotta was besieged by Mithradates in Chalcedon, and, anxious to distinguish himself before his colleague could arrive to relieve him, was not only repulsed in a sally which he made by land, but suffered the loss of all his ships, which were burnt in the harbour by the enemy. On the approach of Lucullus, Mithradates moved towards the Hellespont and besieged Cyzicus. The citizens defended themselves with heroic vigour. The town is on an island connected with the mainland by a bridge ; but though the royal army was able to occupy the Dindymene heights on the island itself, all efforts to storm the town were in vain. Meanwhile Lucullus established himself in the rear, and the besieging army was itself blockaded, and could only procure supplies by sea. A storm destroyed a large portion of the siege works, and the scarcity of provisions became intolerable. The greater part of the cavalry, which was sent to convoy some of the beasts of burden, was cut to pieces as it attempted to make its

way out of the lines, and another body was forced to return to the camp, which suffered fearfully from famine and disease.

73 B.C.—In the spring the besieged redoubled their exertions, and the king could only try to escape and save a portion of his army. He went in person with the fleet to the Hellespont. The land army under Hermaeus and the Roman Marius succeeded in retreating, after considerable losses, to Lampsacus, which was in the hands of the king. Here the army and all the citizens embarked and sailed away.

The enemy had lost 200,000 men, but their fleet still commanded the sea. With it they besieged Perinthus and Byzantium on the European coast, pillaged other towns, and established their head-quarters at Nicomedia. A squadron of fifty sail, with ten thousand men on board, destined, it is said, to effect a landing in Italy, sailed into the Aegean. But Lucullus had by this time collected some new ships, and captured the whole squadron at the island of Neae, between Lemnos and Scyros. At the same time the legates of Lucullus continued the war in Bithynia, and after capturing many towns attacked the king himself at Nicomedia. The king hastily fled by sea and occupied Heraclea, which was betrayed to him; but a storm sank sixty of his ships and destroyed the rest, and he arrived at Sinope almost alone.

Lucullus now assumed the offensive. Leaving his lieutenants to blockade the Hellespont and besiege Heraclea, he advanced into Pontus. The king retired in order to draw Lucullus into the interior, but the Romans rapidly followed him, leaving detachments to blockade the towns which they passed.

72 B.C.—Winter stopped the advance of the army, but not the blockades, which were continued in spite of the murmurs of the soldiery. In the spring, Lucullus immediately advanced against Cabira, where a considerable army under Diophantus and Taxiles had assembled. The Romans, with only three legions, were too weak to attack; and the two armies lay fronting each other, both in great straits to procure supplies. Mithradates had organized a flying column under the two generals mentioned above, to scour the country and intercept the Roman convoys; but

the lieutenant of Lucullus, Marcus Fabius Hadrianus, who was escorting a store-train, not only defeated the band which lay in wait for him, but, when reinforced, defeated the whole column. This defeat determined the king to retreat from Cabira; but on his determination becoming known a panic seized his troops, during which Lucullus attacked and massacred them, as they scarcely offered resistance. Had the legions been less eager for plunder, not a man could have escaped. The great king escaped through the mountains, and finding himself pursued, took refuge with his son-in-law in Armenia, where he remained in a sort of honourable captivity.

All the flat country of Pontus and Lesser Armenia was now overrun by the Romans, and the treasure and stores of the king fell into their hands. But the towns, especially those on the coast, offered an obstinate resistance, many of them holding out for two years. Amisus, Sinope, Amastris, and Heraclea, not only defended themselves desperately, but even sent out ships, which did great damage by cutting off Roman supplies; partly because they were attached to the king, who had protected their free Hellenic constitution,—partly overawed by the pirates, who fought for the king. The reduction of these towns was left to lieutenants, while Lucullus devoted himself to the task of reorganizing the province of Asia. The cause of Mithradates appeared hopeless. Tigranes showed no intention of restoring him to his kingdom, the best of the Roman emigrants had fallen, or had made their peace with Lucullus, and were serving in his army; Sertorius was killed in the year of the battle of Cabira (72 B.C.); the king's ships, as they returned from Crete and Spain, were attacked and destroyed by the Romans, and even his son Machares, governor of his Bosporan kingdom, deserted him and made a separate peace with the Romans. Lucullus applied himself to redressing the grievances of the provincials of Asia, and only awaited the arrival of a commission from the senate to reduce the Pontic kingdom into a province.

A far more difficult question presented itself in the relations between the kingdom of Armenia and Rome. Lucullus saw clearly that the aggressions of the new great king must be stopped, and the dominion of Rome

over the Mediterranean re-established. Moreover, as a Philhellene, he felt that, as the heritage of Alexander in the East had at length come to the Romans, so they could not escape the obligation of being, like Alexander, the shield and sword of the Greeks in the East. But he knew that the timid and incapable government at home would not, unless compelled, undertake an expedition so costly and so vast. Antiochus Asiaticus and his brother, the representatives of the Seleucidae, had already implored interference in the affairs of Syria, but without result. If the war was to be undertaken, it must be over the head of the home government.

There were pretexts enough for a declaration of war; but, as the mission of Lucullus had reference to Mithradates alone, he preferred to take the preliminary step of sending an officer to Tigranes to demand the surrender of Mithradates. The resolution was bold to rashness. In the first place, Lucullus had but thirty thousand men; and he must leave behind him a large force to hold Pontus, and to secure his communications. Nor, under the circumstances, could he ask for reinforcements from home; so that after incorporating in his army some of the Pontic mercenaries, he found himself compelled to cross the Euphrates with not more than fifteen thousand men. Secondly, the temper of the soldiers was most dangerous. The general himself was of a haughty aristocratic demeanour, unpopular with the soldiers on account of the strict discipline which he maintained and the tremendous toils which he imposed upon them. Moreover, many of his best troops had served continuously ever since their arrival in the East under Flaccus and Fimbria in the first Mithradatic war (86 B.C.), and justly demanded their discharge. Thirdly, Lucullus had made himself widely unpopular in the province of Asia by the stern justice with which he checked the usury of the Roman capitalists.

69 B.C.—The demand for the surrender of Mithradates was of course refused, and in the spring of 69 B.C. the Euphrates was crossed. Lucullus marched direct for Tigranocerta, "whither the great king had shortly before returned from Syria, after having temporarily deferred the prosecution of his plans of conquest on the Mediterranean on account of the embroilment with the Romans.

He was just projecting an inroad into Roman Asia from Cilicia and Lycaonia, and was considering whether the Romans would at once evacuate Asia, or would previously give him battle, possibly at Ephesus, when a messenger interrupted him with the tidings of the advance of Lucullus. He ordered him to be hanged, but the disagreeable reality remained unaltered; so he left his capital and resorted to the interior of Armenia to raise a force—which had not yet been done—against the Romans." Lucullus held the newly raised forces of the king in check with a division of his troops, and himself vigorously prosecuted the siege of the city.

Mancaeus, the governor, held out bravely till Tigranes had raised a huge army of relief from all parts of his empire, with which he advanced to the city. Taxiles, the old general of Mithradates, advised him to avoid battle and starve out the enemy; but Tigranes, seeing the ridiculously small number of the Romans—not much more than ten thousand men,—resolved to accept the engagement which Lucullus offered him. As the Armenians were forming line, Lucullus noticed that they had omitted to occupy a height which commanded the position of their cavalry. He hastened to occupy it, diverting attention from the movement by a flank attack with his cavalry. As soon as the height was reached, he threw this division of his troops on the rear of the enemy's cavalry. They broke, and were driven upon the infantry who were not yet formed, and who fled without striking a blow. The bulletin of Lucullus announced that 100,000 Armenians and five Romans had fallen; and that the king had thrown away his diadem and galloped off unrecognized.

Tigranocerta and all the conquests of Tigranes immediately passed into the power of the Romans. Envoys arrived even from the Red Sea, Hellenes, Syrians, Jews, Arabs, to do homage to their new sovereigns. But Guras, brother of Tigranes, maintained himself in Mesopotamia. Lucullus restored Antiochus Asiaticus to Syria, and sent back the forced settlers of Tigranocerta to their homes. The immense stores and wealth which were captured defrayed all the expenses of the war, and furnished a present of 800 denarii (£33) for each soldier. The great king was

completely humbled, and peace would probably have been made but for the influence of Mithradates. To him the continuance of the war was the only hope of safety. He represented to Tigranes that by war he had everything to gain and nothing to lose, and persuaded him to entrust himself with the whole management. Great exertions were made to rouse the whole East against the Romans, and to represent the struggle not merely as national—the East against the West—as it certainly was, but also as religious; and the Asiatics flocked to the standard to defend their gods against the impious invaders. Mithradates spared no pains to make his cavalry irresistible, and in the new army half the force was mounted, while the infantry were carefully selected and trained by his Pontic officers. Armenia proper was to be the theatre of the war, which was to be entirely defensive.

68 B.C.—The position of Lucullus became more difficult every day. The senate resented his arbitrary conduct, and appointed two new governors to the provinces of Cilicia and Asia, restricting him to the military command. The capitalists were against him to a man, and did everything to procure his recall; while discontent grew louder and louder in the camp, and was fostered by several of the general's own officers. But Lucullus, nothing daunted, resolved, like a desperate gambler, to double his stakes, and to march for Artaxata, the capital of Armenia proper, hoping thus to compel the king to fight. The difficulties were tremendous. Troops had to be summoned from Pontus to hold Tigranocerta, and, as the Armenian summer lasted but four months, the whole campaign must be completed in that short period.

Lucullus set out at midsummer, 68 B.C., crossed the Euphrates, and at length reached the table-land of Armenia, after a march continually harassed by the enemy's cavalry. Winter had set in before Artaxata was reached, and when the troops saw snow and ice around them they mutinied, and compelled Lucullus to retreat. On reaching the plain, where the season still permitted operations, the Romans crossed the Tigris and besieged Nisibis, the capital of Mesopotamia; the city was stormed, and the army went into winter quarters.

Meanwhile the weak Roman divisions in Pontus and at

Tigranocerta had fared hardly. Mithradates once more overran Pontus, and raised the country against the Romans. Hadrianus, the Roman commander, after a battle lasting two days, was only just able to shut himself up in Cabira, and the other lieutenants of Lucullus met with no better success.

67 B.C.—These disasters, and the insubordination of his troops, which had increased during the winter, compelled Lucullus to recross the Euphrates; but he was too late to save the troops in Pontus, which had been defeated and almost annihilated at Ziela.

At this very time, news arrived from Rome that the people had resolved to grant discharge to those soldiers whose term of service had expired, and to entrust the conduct of the war to Manius Acilius Glabrio, consul for the year. This news dissolved all the bonds of authority just when Lucullus needed them most; for, at the moment, he was confronted by the Pontic army, while the main army under Tigranes was advancing upon him from Armenia. He tried to procure aid from the new governor of Cilicia, but in vain; while Glabrio, who had landed in Asia Minor, refused to take over the command. When the soldiers were ordered to advance into Armenia against Tigranes, they took the road to Cappadocia and the province of Asia instead, and the Fimbrians were with difficulty dissuaded from disbanding at once; but, when the winter arrived, and no enemy confronted them, they dispersed.

Thus the eight-years' war left the Romans exactly in the same position as at the beginning. Mithradates regained his old dominions and Tigranes his conquests. When we consider the means with which Lucullus accomplished all that he did, his achievements are unsurpassed by those of any Roman general. His retreat from Armenia to Asia Minor excels the celebrated retreat of the Ten Thousand; and, if the name of Lucullus is less known than the names of other Roman generals, it is probably because in war, more than in any other department of human action, the judgment is awarded almost solely by the final result; and because no tolerable narrative of his campaigns has come down to us.

The remissness of the senatorial government is most

strikingly seen in the extraordinary growth of piracy. The whole Mediterranean was infested with corsairs, so that all traffic by sea was at an end. The import of corn into Italy ceased, while the cornfields of the provinces could find no vent for their produce. Romans of rank were carried off for the sake of the ransom paid for their liberation; merchants and even troops put off their voyages till the winter season, preferring the risk of storm and tempest to that of capture. Worst of all were the outrages on the islands and coast towns of Asia Minor, which were either sacked or compelled to purchase safety by the payment of large sums. All the rich temples of this region were plundered, and even towns one or two days' march from the coast were no longer safe.

The pirates of this day were no longer mere free-booters or slave-catchers, but formed a regular state, with an organization, a home of their own, and at least the germs of a political league. They called themselves Cilicians, but drew their recruits from all sources—discharged mercenaries, citizens of destroyed communities, soldiers from the Sertorian or Fimbrian armies, the refugees of all vanquished parties. The motto of the new state was vengeance upon civil society; its members were bound together by a strong sense of fellowship—by a determination to be true to each other, and by loyalty to their chosen chiefs. They regarded their plunder as military spoil, and as in case of capture they were sure of the cross, they too claimed the right of executing their prisoners. Their ships were small, open, and swift—mostly light “myoparones,” and they sailed in squadrons under regularly appointed admirals. Their home was the whole Mediterranean; but their special haunts, where they kept their plunder and their wives, were Crete and the southern coast of Asia Minor. Here the native leagues were weak, and the Roman station was inadequate for the guardianship of the whole coast; while the Armenian king troubled himself little about the sea. In the prevailing weakness of the legitimate governments of the time the pirates gained a body of client states among the Greek maritime cities, which made treaties and carried on an extensive trade with them. The town of Side in Pamphylia, for instance, allowed them to

build ships on its quays and to sell their captures in its market.

This pirate state even formed alliances with Mithradates and with the Roman emigrants; it fought battles with the fleets of Sulla, and some of its princes reigned over many coast towns.

Evidently the Romans had shamefully neglected all the duties of maritime police. Instead of keeping up a fleet to guard the whole sea, they left each province and each client state to defend itself as it could. Though the provincials paid tribute to the Romans for their defence, there was no Italian fleet. The government depended on ships furnished by the maritime towns at the expense of the provinces, which were even called upon to contribute to the ransom of Roman captives of rank.

Though no systematic and continuous efforts were made to meet the evil, there were many expeditions, which were more or less successful for the time. Sulla had left instructions for the raising of a fleet which were never carried out.

In 79 B.C., one of the consuls, Publius Servilius, defeated the pirate fleet and destroyed the pirate towns on the south coast of Asia Minor, including Olympus and Phaselis, which belonged to the prince Zenicetes. He next led an army over the Taurus, captured Isaura, and subdued the Isaurians in the north-west of rough Cilicia. His campaigns lasted for three years, and were not without fruit; but, naturally, the main body of the pirates simply betook itself to other regions—especially Crete. Nothing but the establishment of a strong maritime police could meet the case; and this the Romans would not undertake.

In 74 B.C. they did entrust the clearance of the seas to a single admiral in supreme command. But such appointments were managed by the political clubs: and the choice fell upon the praetor Marcus Antonius, who was quite unfit for the post. Moreover, the government did not furnish supplies and money adequate for the purpose, so that the requisitions of the admiral were more burdensome to the provincials than were the pirates themselves. The expedition came to nothing: the Roman fleet was defeated off Cydonia by the pirates and the

Cretans combined; Antonius died in Crete in 71 B.C.; and the government fell back upon the old system of leaving each state to protect itself.

The defeat of Cydonia roused even the degenerate Romans of that day from their lethargy; yet the bribes of the Cretan envoys would probably have bought off Roman vengeance, had not the senate decreed the loans to the envoys from Roman bankers at exorbitant interest not recoverable—thus incapacitating itself for bribery. The most humiliating terms were now offered to the Cretans, and on their rejection Quintus Metellus, the proconsul, appeared, in 68 B.C., in Cretan waters. A battle was fought under the walls of Cydonia, which the Romans with difficulty won; but the siege of the towns lasted for two years. With the conquest of Crete the last spot of free Greek soil passed under the power of the Romans. "The Cretan communities, as they were the first of all Greek commonwealths to develop the free urban constitution and the dominion of the sea, were also to be the last of all the Greek maritime states formerly filling the Mediterranean, to succumb to the Roman continental power."

Metellus assumed the surname of Creticus, as Servilius had become Isauricus; but the power of the pirates in the Mediterranean was never higher than now. The coast towns paid taxes for defence to the Roman governor, and blackmail to the pirates at the same time; the admiral of the Cilician army was carried off, as well as two praetors with all their retinue and insignia; the Roman fleet, equipped to clear the seas, was destroyed by the pirates in the port of Ostia itself: and so things went on, from bad to worse, until Pompeius put an end to the pest in 67 B.C.

The rule of the restored oligarchy in Macedonia, in the East, and on the sea has already been reviewed; we have now to see how it fulfilled its duties within the confines of Italy.

Politically and economically slavery was the curse of all ancient states; and it is to be remembered that, where this institution exists, the richer and more prosperous the state, the greater the proportion of slaves to the free population becomes. There had already been serious servile wars, and the evil had grown with the growth of

the plantation system; but the decade after the death of Sulla was "the golden age of buccaneers" by sea and land. Violence of all kinds was rife in the less populated parts of Italy; but the crime of abduction both of men and of estates was peculiarly dangerous to the state. For it was frequently perpetrated by the overseers and slaves of great land-owners, who did not disdain to keep what their officious subordinates had thus acquired for them; and, of course, bands of slaves and proletarians were ready enough to learn their lesson, and to carry on the business of plunder on their own account. Thus Italy was full of inflammable material, and a spark was not long wanting to set it ablaze.

In 73 B.C., a number of gladiators broke out from one of the training schools of Capua, and took up a position on Mount Vesuvius, under the leadership of two Celtic slaves, Crixus and Oenomaus, and of Spartacus, a Thracian of noble, perhaps even of royal lineage. At first only seventy-four in number, they quickly increased, until aid had to be sought from Rome to repel them. A hastily collected army of three thousand men blockaded the mountain, but when attacked by the robbers it at once fled. This success of course increased the number of the insurgents, and the praetor Varinius found them encamped like a regular army in the plain.

The Roman militia soon became sorely weakened by disease, and undermined by cowardice and insubordination. The greater number refused to obey the order to attack, and when at length Varinius advanced, the enemy had retreated southwards out of his reach. He followed, but was disastrously defeated in Lucania. The robber band soon rose to the number of forty thousand men; Campania was overrun, and many strong towns were stormed. The slaves naturally showed no more mercy to their captives than was shown to themselves by their masters; they crucified their prisoners, and, with grim humour, compelled them to slaughter each other in gladiatorial combat.

72 B.C.—For the next year both consuls were sent against the slaves. The Celtic band under Crixus, which had separated from the rest, was destroyed at Mount Garganus in Apulia; but Spartacus won victory after victory in the north, and overcame both consuls and every

Roman commander who opposed him. Still the insurgents remained a mere band of robbers, roaming aimlessly in search of plunder; and all the efforts of Spartacus to restrain the mad orgies of his followers, and to induce them to carry on a systematic war, were in vain. Nor was the band united in itself, but separated into two parts; the one consisting of half-Greek barbarians, the other of Celts and Germans. It is said that Spartacus wished after his victories to cross the Alps, and lead his followers to their old homes, but was unable to persuade them; and that he then turned south to blockade Rome, which again was too arduous an enterprise to suit the wishes of slaves.

The supreme command was now entrusted by the Roman government to Marcus Crassus, the praetor. He raised an army of eight legions, and restored discipline by decimating the first division which ran away. Spartacus was defeated and marched south to Rhegium, where he attempted to throw a corps into Sicily, but without success. Crassus followed, and made his troops build a wall across the whole peninsula of Bruttium: but Spartacus broke through, and in 71 B.C. appeared again in Lucania. But their own disunion and arrogance were more fatal to the robbers than the Roman armies. Once more the Celts and Germans broke off from the rest, and though after a narrow escape they once more pitched their camp for safety near that of Spartacus, Crassus managed to compel them to a separate engagement, and slaughtered the whole body. Spartacus even now gained a slight success over the Roman vanguard, but his men compelled him to lead them into Apulia and to fight a decisive battle. Crassus gained a dearly bought victory; and, being joined by the troops of Pompeius from Spain, he hunted out the refugees in every part of southern Italy: six thousand crucified slaves lined the road from Capua to Rome.

If the events of the ten years after the death of Sulla are viewed as a whole, what must be the judgment on the senatorial government? The most striking fact about all the movements of that period is, that though none of them—neither the insurrection of Lepidus, nor the Sertorian war, nor the wars in Asia and Macedonia—any more than the

risings of the pirates and of the slaves constituted a really great and serious danger, yet they were allowed to grow by neglect into struggles in which the very existence of the empire was at stake. "It was no credit to Rome that the two most celebrated generals of the government party had, during a struggle of eight years, marked by more defeats than victories, failed to master the insurgent chief Sertorius and his Spanish guerillas; and that it was only the dagger of his friends that decided the Sertorian war in favour of the legitimate government. As to the slaves, it was far less an honour to have conquered them than a disgrace to have been pitted against them in equal strife for years. Spartacus, too, as well as Hannibal, had traversed Italy with an army from the Po to the Sicilian straits, beaten both consuls, and threatened Rome with blockade. The enterprise which it required the greatest general of antiquity to undertake against the Rome of former days, could be undertaken against the Rome of the present by a daring captain of banditti."

The external wars produced a result less unsatisfactory, but quite disproportionate to the expenditure of money and men. The Romans were driven from the sea; and in Asia, in spite of the genius of Lucullus, the result was tantamount to defeat. And though, to some extent, every class in the Roman state is responsible for this deplorable state of affairs, as "every rotten stone in the building helps to bring about the ruin of the whole," yet, in great part, it can be distinctly traced to the mismanagement of the governing body. For instance, the failure of the Asiatic war was due to the remissness of the government in abandoning their client states in the first instance, and to their neglect to support their general after the war had begun; while the power of the pirates was due to the culpable reluctance of the government to deal with the evil in the comprehensive manner by which alone it could be met. To sum up: "The material benefits which a state exists to confer—security of frontier, undisturbed peaceful intercourse, legal protection, and regulated administration—began, all of them, to vanish for the whole of the nations united in the Roman state; the gods of blessing seemed all of them to have ascended to Olympus, and to have left the miserable earth at the mercy of official

or volunteer plunderers and tormentors. Nor was this decay of the state felt as a public misfortune by such only as had political rights and public spirit; the insurrection of the proletariat, and the prevalence of brigandage and piracy carried the sense of this decay into the remotest valley and the humblest hut of Italy, and made every one who pursued trade or commerce, or who bought even a bushel of wheat, feel it as a personal calamity."

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Eastern war.—Liv. Epit. 93-98. Flor. iii. 5. Vell. ii. 33. Eutrop. vi. 8-11. Justin. xxxvii. 2, 3; xxxviii. 1-3, 5. Plut. Lucull. 5-37. Appian Mithr. 67-91. Memn. 37-57. Oros. vi. 2. Strab. xii. 546, 547. Sall. Hist. frag. lib. iv., vi. Cic. pro L. Manil. 2, 5, 8, 9; pro Murena, 15; ad Att. xiii. 6. Dio. xxxv. 1-17.
Pirates.—Liv. Epit. 90, 93, 98-100. Flor. iii. 6, 7. Vell. ii. 31, 32. Eutrop. vi. 12. Appian Mithr. 91-93; Sic. 6. Oros. v. 23. Strab. xiv. 667, 671. Frontin. iii. vii. 1. Val. Max. viii. 5, 6. Tac. Ann. xii. 62. Cic. in Verr. ii. 3; iii. 91. Plut. Pomp. 24. Suet. Jul. 4. Dio. xxxvi. 3-7.
Spartacus.—Plut. Pomp. 21. Crass. 8-11. Liv. Epit. 95-97. Appian B. C. i. 116-120. Vell. ii. 30; iii. 20. Flor. iii. 19.

Note on the will of Alexander, king of Egypt.—Mommsen ascribes this document to Alexander II., who died in 81 B.C., not, as most authorities, to Alexander I., ob. 88 B.C. His chief argument is that Alexander II. was the last of the genuine Lagidae, and the similar testaments of the kings of Pergamus, Cyrene and Bithynia were all executed by the last representative of the ruling family. The fact that the treasure bequeathed was deposited at Tyre is accounted for by the fact that Alexander was killed only nineteen days after his arrival in Egypt (Letronne, Inscr. de l'Égypte, ii. 20); and the words of Cicero (De L. Agr. i. 4, 15, 16) are not inconsistent with the assignment of the will to the year 81 B.C.

CHAPTER XXX.

FALL OF THE OLIGARCHY—RULE OF POMPEIUS.

Abuses of the senatorial rule : powerlessness of the aristocrats—
Coalition of Pompeius and Crassus with the democratic party—
Pompeius becomes practically Regent of the Empire by means
of the Gabinian and Manilian laws.

THE new government had survived the danger of external war and of insurrection in Italy. We have now to consider its relations with parties in Rome during the same decade of years. With characteristic want of energy it had not even completed the half-finished arrangements of Sulla. The lands destined by him for distribution had not been parcelled out; even domain lands were again occupied in the old arbitrary fashion which prevailed before the Gracchan reforms. Whatever in the new constitution was inconvenient to the optimates was ignored, such as the disfranchisement of particular communities and the prohibition against conjoining the new farms.

Still the Gracchan constitution remained formally abolished, and it was the aim of the democratic party to restore it in its main features, so the old watchwords were heard again—the corn-largesses, the tribunician power, and the reform of the senatorial tribunals. The government consented, in the year of Sulla's death (78 B.C.), to a limited revival of the corn distributions; and in 73 B.C. a new corn-law regulated the purchases of Sicilian grain for this purpose.

The agitation regarding the tribunician power was begun as early as 76 B.C., and continued in later years, though without result. But for the reform of the tribunals the

cry was louder and the need more pressing. The crime of extortion had become habitual, and the condemnation of any man of influence could scarcely be obtained. Not only was there a fellow-feeling with the accused on the part of the senatorial jurymen, many of whom had either been guilty or hoped some day to be guilty of a similar offence, but the sale of the votes of the jurymen had become an established custom. A specially flagrant case might provoke an outcry for the time, but, generally speaking, bribery was so universal that "the commission as to extortions might be regarded as an institution for taxing the senators returning from the provinces for the benefit of their colleagues that remained at home." Even Roman citizens in the provinces, unless senators or equites, were no longer safe from the rods and axes of the Roman magistrates. The opposition did not fail to avail itself of this state of things; for the prosecution of a powerful opponent in the law courts was the only weapon left to it. So Caesar prosecuted Gnaeus Dolabella and Gaius Antonius, and Cicero made himself famous by his indictment of Verres; while the whole party loudly demanded the restoration of the tribunician power and of the equestrian tribunals, and the renewal of the censorship as the only means of purifying the governing board.

With all this no progress was made; the restoration of corn distributions had conciliated the mob of the capital, and the senate could afford to be resolute on the other points. Some slight concession was made with regard to the exiles of the insurrection of Lepidus; and the influence of Gaius Cotta, leader of the moderate reform party in the senate, abolished the provision which forbade the tribunes of the plebs to stand for other magistracies; but the other restrictions remained, and neither party was satisfied.

The present condition of affairs, so happy for the government, was completely changed by the return of Pompeius from Spain in 71 B.C. Pompeius belonged to the optimates, but he was very little at home in his own party. He had ambition above that of the ordinary aristocrat, and could not be content with passing through the regular routine of office, with nothing before him but a luxurious and indolent retirement. Yet this was all that his own

party could offer. The command in the Mithradatic war, which he ardently desired, he knew the senate would never give him. The interests of the oligarchy could not permit him to add fresh laurels to those he had already gained in Africa and Europe; they dared not entrust the Eastern command to any but the most approved and stanchest aristocrat. And there were other grounds of dissension. It was only with reluctance that the senate had conferred upon him the Spanish command; while, in return, the general accused the government of neglecting the Spanish armies and endangering the expedition. Moreover, he demanded for himself a triumph and the consulship, and for his soldiers assignments of land. But Pompeius had never filled any of the subordinate magistracies, and therefore could not legally be consul. Nor could he triumph, for, in spite of his extraordinary commands, he had never been invested with the ordinary supreme power. There were but two courses open to him: he could either make his demands openly at the head of his army and intimidate the senate into compliance, or he could ally himself with the democrats. The timid nature of Pompeius and his want of political adroitness inclined him to the latter course; he thus gained for himself able political adjutants like Gaius Caesar, while the forlorn democratic party were only too glad of the alliance—they knew that the government could refuse no demand presented by so formidable a combination.

There was still one man whose influence, though it might not be able to give victory to either side, was yet considerable. This was Marcus Crassus, who was at the head of the army with which he had crushed the servile rising, and who, moreover, was the richest man in Rome, and had great influence in the political clubs. He, like Pompeius, was a Sullan, but had personal aims, quite outside the ordinary constitutional routine. He chose the safer course of joining the coalition, and was welcomed by the democrats, who were not unpleased to find in him a possible counterpoise to the now all-powerful Pompeius. This, the first coalition, took place in the summer of 71 B.C. The terms were simple. The generals adopted the democratic programme, while they were to have the consulship for the following year. Pompeius, in addition, was to get his triumph and

the allotments promised to his soldiers, and Crassus the honour of a solemn entrance into the capital. The senate had nothing to oppose to the coalition, for Metellus had already disbanded his troops. They granted the necessary dispensations, and Pompeius gave formal adherence to the democratic proposals in an assembly of the people.

The Sullan constitution was now speedily abolished. 1. Pompeius himself, as consul, introduced a law restoring to the tribunes all their old prerogatives, especially the right of initiating legislation. 2. The law-courts were reformed by the *lex Aurelia* of Lucius Cotta, the praetor, and brother of Gaius Cotta (p. 355); and this fact, taken together with the provisions of the law itself, seems to show that the moderate senatorial party lent its support to the coalition: for the senators were not altogether excluded from the roll of jurymen, who in future were to be composed one-third of senators, two-thirds of equestrians; but, of the latter, one-half must have filled the office of *tribuni aerarii*, or district presidents. As these officers were elected by the tribes, one-third of the jurymen were now indirectly elective. 3. The farming system was reintroduced for the taxes of the Asiatic province; this, of course, was to conciliate the capitalists at the expense of the provincials. 4. The censorship was restored—probably without the earlier limitation which restricted the term of office to eighteen months. The two first censors under the new law were two consulars who had been removed by the senate from their commands against Spartacus. They now revenged themselves by expelling eighty-four senators (one-eighth of the whole).

The constitution of Sulla had been based on a monopoly of power by the senate, and on the political annihilation of every other class in the state; but under the new arrangement the senate was held in check by fear of the censors and of the equestrian jurymen. The tribunes of the people could propose new laws and overturn any existing arrangements at will, while the moneyed classes, as farmers of the revenue and as judges of the provincial governors, again raised their heads beside the senate.

The democrats had further aims, such as the recall of the proscribed and the punishment of the murderers of the Sullan proscriptions; but the generals had been too

intimately connected with these events to take any part in such measures, and nothing was done beyond the collection of the outstanding purchase-money for estates confiscated by Sulla.

Meanwhile the armies of the two generals still lay before the walls of Rome, and the danger was great lest Pompeius should yield to the temptation of making himself absolute master of the city and of the empire. The coalition had only one bond of union—the desire to destroy the Sullan constitution; that work was now accomplished, and the combination was in reality dissolved. Crassus had throughout played an inferior part, and his terror became so great that he began to make advances to the senate and to attempt to gain over the mob by immense largesses. But Pompeius really lacked the courage to take a decisive step; he wished to be master of Rome and loyal citizen at the same time. The adroit leaders of the democratic party plied him with flatteries, urged him to surpass his former services to the state by a still greater victory, and to banish the fearful spectre of civil war. Crassus was induced to make the first overtures for disbandment, and at length the great general yielded, and the troops dispersed. The Mithradatic war appeared now at an end (70 B.C.), and as Pompeius would not accept a province he retired at the expiry of his consulship wholly from public affairs.

During the next few years the condition of parties was very much what it had been before the time of Sulla. The direction of affairs lay with the senate, while the constitution through which it governed was pervaded by a hostile spirit. The democrats were impotent without a leader; and the chief feature of the period is the increase of the influence of the capitalist party, which, though courted by both sides, on the whole drew closer to the senate. Their influence is seen in the law of the year 67 B.C., which restored to them the fourteen special benches in the theatre, and in the fact that the senate withdrew, at their instance, the administration of Asia from Lucius Lucullus.

But the course of the war in the East soon brought about a change (see p. 346). All the conquests in the East were lost, and the sea was given up to the undisputed sway of the pirates. The democrats eagerly seized the opportunity of settling accounts with the senate, and

Pompeius saw once more before him an opportunity of gratifying his ambition. Accordingly, in 67 B.C., two projects of law were introduced in the assembly of the tribes at his instigation.

1. The first measure decreed the discharge of the soldiers in the East who had served their term ; and the substitution of Glabrio, one of the consuls of the year, for Lucullus in the command.

2. The second proposed a comprehensive plan for clearing the seas from pirates. The terms of the proposal are extraordinary, and require close attention.

(a) A generalissimo was to be appointed by the senate from the consulars, to hold supreme command over the whole Mediterranean and over all the coasts for fifty miles inland, concurrently with the ordinary governors, for three years.

(b) He might select from the men of senatorial rank twenty-five lieutenants with praetorian powers, and two treasurers with quaestorian power.

(c) He might raise an army of 120,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry, and a fleet of 500 ships ; and for this purpose might dispose absolutely of all the resources of the provinces. Besides this, a large sum of money and a considerable force of men and ships were at once handed over to him.

By the introduction of this law the government was practically taken out of the hands of the senate ; it was the final collapse of the oligarchic rule. But it was more than this—it was practically the institution of an unlimited dictatorship.

1. Like all extraordinary commands, this new office no doubt required the confirmation of the people ; but it was an undoubted prerogative of the senate to define the sphere of every command, and, in fact, to control and limit it in all ways. The people had hitherto interfered only on the proposition of the senate, or at any rate of a magistrate himself qualified for the office of general. Even during the Jugurthan war, when the command was transferred to Marius by popular vote, it was only to Marius as consul for the year. But now a private man was to be invested by the tribes with extraordinary authority, and the sphere of his office was defined by themselves.

2. The new commander was empowered to confer praetorian powers—that is, the highest military and civil authority—upon adjutants chosen by himself, though hitherto such authority could only be conferred with the co-operation of the burgesses.

3. The office of general was usually conferred for one year only, with strict limitations as to forces and supplies; but now the whole resources of the state were committed almost without reserve to one man.

Thus at one stroke the government was taken out of the hands of the senate, and the fortunes of the empire committed for the next three years to a dictator. The step, no doubt, was in accordance with the wishes of Pompeius, for it would naturally lead in the end to the command against Mithradates, and it gave him an extraordinary position in the state without violating constitutional forms. Still, it was probably due immediately to the instigation of his bold adherents, in particular of Aulus Gabinius, the tribune, who proposed the law, who grasped the situation more completely than Pompeius himself, and took the decision out of his hands. The senate and the moneyed aristocracy alike were furious, while the democrats, though they could not but dislike a bill which threatened to annihilate all parties, dared not break with their ally; accordingly, Caesar and Lucius Quinctius supported the measure. The scarcity of corn, and the rumours as to the conduct of Lucullus were enough to secure the support of the multitude.

On the day of the voting, the Forum and even the roofs of the buildings around were covered with men. All the colleagues of Gabinius had promised to veto the measure; but only one, Lucius Trebellius, had the courage to keep his pledge. Gabinius immediately proposed to deal with him as Tiberius Gracchus had dealt with Octavius, but after seventeen tribes had voted, Trebellius withdrew his veto. All was now lost; attempts were made to secure the appointment of two generals instead of one, and to make the twenty-five lieutenant-generals eligible by the tribes, but the bill passed without alteration.

Pompeius and Glabrio immediately set out. The success of Pompeius was rapid and complete; indeed, such was the confidence in his powers that the price of grain had fallen

to the ordinary rate as soon as the law was passed. But in Asia the condition of affairs passed from bad to worse; Glabrio, instead of taking command of the forces, contented himself with fomenting the discontent of the soldiers against Lucullus, who, of course, was powerless. It seemed the most natural course to appoint Pompeius to the Asiatic command, which he was known to ardently desire. But no party in the state was willing to increase his already enormous authority. At this juncture, Gaius Manilius, a tribune, who was without influence in either party, wishing to force himself into the favour of the great general, brought forward a proposal to recall Glabrio from Pontus and Bithynia, and Marcius Rex from Cilicia, and to confer both their offices—apparently without limit of time—together with free authority to conclude peace and alliance, upon the proconsul of the seas and coasts. (Early in 66 B.C.) The proposal was repugnant to every party, and yet was passed almost unanimously. The democrats concealed their fears, and openly supported it; the moderate optimates declared themselves on the same side; they saw that resistance was hopeless, and that their best policy was to try to bind Pompeius to the senate. Marcus Cicero made his first political speech in support of it, and the only opposition was from the strict aristocratic party headed by Quintus Catulus. Thus, by the action of an irresponsible demagogue, Pompeius, in addition to his former powers, obtained command of the most important Eastern provinces, and the conduct of a war of which no man could foresee the end. “Never since Rome stood had such power been united in the hands of a single man.”

The two laws of Gabinius and Manilius terminate the struggle between the senate and the popular party, which was begun sixty-seven years before by Tiberius Gracchus. The first breach in the existing constitution was made when the veto of Octavius was disregarded by Tiberius Gracchus; and the last bulwark of senatorial rule fell in like manner with the withdrawal of Trebellius. But the struggle, which was begun by men of high ideals and of noble personal character, was brought to a close by venal and intriguing demagogues. And the contrast was but an indication of the change which the whole state had undergone; everything—law, military discipline, life and

manners—had changed. A comparison between the Gracchan ideal and its later realization could only provoke a painful smile.

But the end of the first struggle was but the beginning of a second—of a new struggle between the allies who had overthrown their common enemy the senate, between the democratic civil opposition and the military power. The exceptional position of Pompeius was incompatible with a republican constitution: he was not general, but regent of the empire. If, at the close of his Eastern campaign, he should stretch forth his arm and seize the crown, who was to prevent him? “‘Soon,’ exclaimed Catulus, ‘it would be necessary once more to flee to the rocks of the Capitol, in order to save liberty.’ It was not the fault of the prophet that the storm came not, as he expected, from the East, but that, on the contrary, fate, fulfilling his words more literally than he himself anticipated, brought on a destroying tempest a few years later from Gaul.”

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- Restoration of free corn.*—*Licin.* frag. *Cic.* in *Verr.* iii. 70, 136; v. 21, 52. *Momms.* V. i. note. *Sall. Hist.* iii. 61.
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- Publicani restored.*—*Marq. Stv.* 185.

CHAPTER XXXI.

POMPEIUS AND THE EAST.

67 B.C. The Mediterranean cleared of pirates—Command against Mithradates conferred on Pompeius. — 66–64 B.C. War with Mithradates—His death.—61–62 B.C. Pompeius regulates the affairs of Syria and Asia.—59 B.C. Ptolemy Auletes acknowledged king of Egypt by Rome.—58 B.C. Annexation of Cyprus.

POMPEIUS began the work of subjugating the pirates by dividing the whole field of operations into thirteen districts, each of which was assigned to a lieutenant, who equipped vessels, searched the coast, and captured the ships of the freebooters. He himself, with the best of his ships, swept the Sicilian, African, and Sardinian waters, while his lieutenants dealt with the coasts of Spain and Gaul. Within forty days the western Mediterranean was free, and the dearth at Rome relieved. The general now repaired, with sixty of his vessels, to Lycia and Cilicia. The pirates everywhere disappeared from the sea on his approach, and many even of the mountain strongholds of Lycia accepted the terms offered to them, and opened their gates. But the Cilicians, after placing their families and their treasures in their strongholds, awaited the Romans, with a large fleet, off the western frontier of Cilicia. Pompeius gained a complete victory; landed and subdued the strongholds, and in forty-nine days after his first appearance in the eastern seas brought the war to a close. The whole affair was, of course, rather an energetic and skilful police-raid than a victorious war; but the rapidity of the achievement was astounding, and made a great impression on the public mind. Thirteen hundred pirate vessels

are said to have been destroyed; ten thousand pirates perished, and more than twenty thousand were captured, while numerous captive Romans, among them Publius Clodius, regained their liberty (67 B.C.).

An interlude of the pirate war in the island of Crete shows the indescribable weakness and disorganization of the central government at the period. In the year 67 B.C. Quintus Metellus was in Crete, completing the subjugation of the island; the command of Pompeius extended over the whole island, as it was nowhere more than eighty miles broad (see p. 359). Out of consideration for Metellus, Pompeius did not assign it to any lieutenant; but the Cretan towns, seeing that Pompeius was acting with the greatest clemency, preferred to make their surrender to him. He accepted their submission, and sent Lucius Octavius to take over the towns. Metellus, however, ignored these negotiations, and continued the sieges; and when Octavius summoned troops from Achaia formal conflicts took place, several towns were stormed by Metellus, and in one of them Octavius was taken prisoner, but afterwards released. The island was at last subdued by Metellus, and nothing came of these scandalous proceedings beyond a bitter correspondence between the two generals! In fact, the new civil war had already begun.

Meanwhile, Pompeius remained in Cilicia, ostensibly preparing for a Cretan campaign, but really waiting for a pretext to interfere in the affairs of Asia Minor. At length the Manilian law gave him the desired authority; but in the midst of more important matters the pirates were not forgotten. Pompeius caused a fleet to be maintained to protect the Asiatic coasts, and on his return to Rome persuaded the senate to take similar measures for Italy; and though there were subsequent expeditions in 58 B.C. and in 55 B.C., piracy never regained its old predominance in the Mediterranean.

As soon as Pompeius was invested by the Manilian law with the command he had so long desired, he began strenuously to prepare for his new campaign. At the outset a great piece of good fortune befell him. A son of the great king Tigranes, who bore the same name as his father, rebelled, and took refuge at the Parthian court, and by his influence determined that power to

adhere to the Roman side and to renew with Pompeius the agreement formed with Lucullus to accept the Euphrates as the boundary of the two empires. At the same time the great king suspected Mithradates of secretly encouraging his rebellious son, and the good understanding between the two monarchs was disturbed. Meanwhile Pompeius completed his preparations, and collected a force of from 40,000 to 50,000 men, many of whom were discharged Fimbrian veterans who had enlisted again as volunteers.

In the spring of 66 B.C. Pompeius took over the command of the legions from Lucullus, but the meeting of the two generals, from which a reconciliation had been hoped for, ended in bitter recriminations. The Roman army then invaded Pontus, where they were opposed by a force of 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry under Mithradates. The king refused to surrender unconditionally, and retreated slowly, seizing every opportunity to inflict damage upon the Romans. At length Pompeius, weary of the pursuit, desisted, and began to subdue the country. He reached the Upper Euphrates, and crossed it, but was intercepted by Mithradates in the Acilisenian province at the castle of Dasteira. Pompeius now retreated into Pontic Armenia, and waited the arrival of the troops expected from Cilicia; with these he once more took the offensive and blockaded the Pontic army in its camp. When the king escaped secretly by night, Pompeius followed, and finding himself drawn further and further into an unknown country, made a circuit unknown to the enemy, and occupied a defile in front of them, on the southern bank of the river Lycus. At the close of the next day's march, the Pontic army encamped in this very valley, the heights of which were commanded by the Romans. In the silence of the night the terrible battle-cry of the legions broke forth, and missiles were showered on the Asiatic host, scarcely one of which failed to take effect upon the dense mass. A charge of the legions followed, by which the whole army was annihilated. The king escaped with but three attendants to the fortress of Sinoria, whence he hastened, with what stragglers he could bring together, towards Armenia. But the moment was unfavourable. Tigranes had just succeeded in ridding his kingdom of the

Parthian corps which had invaded it and besieged Artaxata, and was negotiating with the Romans for a separate peace. A price of one hundred talents (£24,000) was set upon the head of Mithradates, and the old king had to fly northwards towards his Bosporan kingdom, while Pompeius turned aside to settle matters with Tigranes. The latter was resolved to purchase peace at any price, and hastened to throw himself at Pompeius' feet, and to place in his hands the diadem and tiara in token of unconditional surrender. He had to pay a fine of six thousand talents (£1,400,000) besides a present of fifty denarii (£1 16s.) to each of the Roman soldiers; and to cede all his conquests in Syria, Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Cappadocia, besides Sophene and Carduene, east of the Euphrates. He thus became once more merely king of Armenia. In one campaign Pompeius had utterly routed the mighty monarchs of Pontus and Armenia; and his army wintered on Armenian soil, in the country between the Upper Euphrates and the river Kur.

During the winter, and before starting to cross the Caucasus in pursuit of Mithradates, Pompeius had to repel the attacks of the Iberians and Albanians—two tribes which had preserved their independence from time immemorial in the country watered by the Kur, at the foot of the Caucasus range, and who fought chiefly with arrows and light javelins, which they often discharged, like the North American Indians, from lurking places in the woods or from behind trees. He then led his army down the Phasis to the Black Sea, where the fleet awaited him. But the long march over the mountains, through unknown country peopled by hostile tribes, appeared too dangerous an enterprise to be undertaken on the mere chance of capturing Mithradates; an insurrection of the Albanians gave a pretext for retreat, and, ordering the fleet to blockade the Bosporus, Pompeius returned to the Albanian plain. The force of the Albanians and their allies was said to amount to sixty thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry. With this they attacked the Roman cavalry, not knowing that the masses of the infantry were drawn up behind the horsemen; the legions soon drove the enemy into a wood, which was set on fire. After this engagement the Albanians, Iberians, and other neigh-

bouring tribes made peace, and thus, for a time at least, were brought into relations of dependence upon Rome.

In the mean time Mithradates had reached Panticapaeum, where he drove his rebellious son Machares from the throne, and forced him to commit suicide. He knew the deep hatred with which Orientals regarded the Roman domination, and was well acquainted with the laxity of the senatorial rule; hence he was not without hopes of establishing some day his old dominion. For the present he sent envoys, asking that his paternal kingdom should be restored to him, and offered to pay tribute as a vassal to Rome. But Pompeius insisted upon personal submission; and Mithradates immediately began to strain every nerve to raise a new army. He had collected a force of thirty-six thousand men, armed and disciplined after the Roman fashion, and a war fleet. It was rumoured that he intended to march through Thrace, Macedonia, and Pannonia, and, carrying with him the Scythians and the Celts from the Danube, to throw himself like an avalanche upon Italy from the north. But these preparations had caused the severest suffering to his subjects, whose houses had been destroyed and their oxen slaughtered to furnish beams and sinews for the engines of war; moreover Mithradates had never possessed the gift of calling forth the affection and fidelity of his servants; and, lastly, the Roman emigrants and deserters, for reasons of their own, were extremely disinclined for the rumoured expedition into Italy. Treason was everywhere rife, and the standard of insurrection was raised at Phanagoria by Castor, who delivered up the sons of Mithradates to the Romans. Pharnaces, the favourite son of the king, headed the insurrection, the troops and the fleet joined it, and at last the city of Panticapaeum opened its gates and delivered over the king, shut up in his castle. The latter in vain entreated Pharnaces to spare his life; he then compelled his wives and daughters and concubines to swallow the poisoned draught, after which he drained it himself, and then, too impatient to wait for death, presented his neck to the stroke of a Celtic mercenary. He was in the sixty-eighth year of his life and the fifty-seventh of his reign. For years he had sustained an unequal contest with a superior foe, without success indeed, but yet with

honour: and the Romans regarded his death as a victory, just as Scipio had triumphed even more over Hannibal than over Carthage.

Pompeius had completed the reduction of Pontus, and in the summer of 64 B.C. set out to regulate the affairs of Syria. The Syrian provinces were now in the hands of three powers—the Bedouins, the Jews, and the Nabataeans. The Bedouins, who were masters of northern Syria, had their home in the desert which stretches from the peninsula of Arabia up to the Euphrates, where they lived under their emirs, the most noted of whom were Abgarus and Sampsicramus. The Jews, under Jannaeus Alexander, who died in 79 B.C., had extended their dominion southwards to the Egyptian frontier, and northwards to the Lake of Gennesareth, including a considerable stretch of coast. Their further expansion was checked by internal dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees. Their fierce religious and political contentions broke out with violence after the death of Jannaeus, and a civil war ensued, in which the Pharisees supported one of his sons, Hyrcanus, and the Sadducees another, Aristobulus, a strong and able prince. These divisions gave an opportunity to the Nabataeans, who were settled in the region of Petra, to obtain a footing in southern Syria. At the invitation of the Pharisees, the Nabataean king Aretas advanced with a large force and besieged Aristobulus in Jerusalem.

To put an end to the anarchy Pompeius resolved to annex Syria, and in the person of Antiochus Asiaticus, who had been acknowledged by the senate and by Lucullus, the house of Seleucus was ejected from the throne it had held for two hundred and fifty years. At the same time, Pompeius advanced with his army into the province, and enforced his regulations, where necessary, by arms. The Jews alone refused to obey, and when Aristobulus, after much hesitation, resolved to submit, the more fanatical portion of his army would not comply with his orders, and sustained a siege of three months on the steep temple rock. The Nabataeans still remained. King Aretas retired from Judaea, but retained the city of Damascus, and would not acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. The expedition against him was entrusted to Marcus Scaurus;

it obtained only trifling successes, but ultimately Aretas was persuaded to purchase for a sum of money a guarantee for all his possessions, including Damascus, from the Roman governor.

Thus the work begun by Lucullus was completed by Pompeius. The system of protectorate had been exchanged for that of direct sovereignty over the more important dependent territories—Bithynia, Pontus, and Syria; while to the indirect dominion of Rome were added Armenia and the district of the Caucasus, and the kingdom of the Cimmerian Bosphorus. The town of Phanagoria was, for its important services declared free.

In his settlement with the Parthians Pompeius was true to the old Roman policy of favouring the humbled foe at the expense of the powerful ally. The younger Tigranes and his family were arrested and taken to Rome to grace the general's triumph. The province of Corduene, which was claimed by both Phraates and Tigranes, was occupied by Roman troops for the latter. What was most serious of all was the fact that the Romans did not respect the agreement by which the Euphrates was fixed as the boundary. Oruros, a point between Nisibis and the Tigris, and 220 miles east of the Euphrates, was fixed as the limit of the Roman dominion. When, in 64 B.C., Phraates declared war upon Tigranes on the question of the frontier, it seemed certain that he had resolved to defy the power of Rome, but he yielded and acquiesced in the Roman award.

From the new territories four new provinces were formed: Bithynia with Pontus; Cilicia, which was an enlargement of the old province of that name, and which now embraced Pamphylia and Isauria; Syria; Crete. The government of the mass of countries now added to the empire probably remained substantially as before, only Rome stepped into the place of the former monarchs; and the new dominion included a number of kingdoms, prince-doms, and lordships of various kinds, all in different relations of dependence upon Rome. Such were the kingdoms of Cappadocia and Commagene; the tetrarchies ruled by Deiotarus and Bogodiatarus; the territories of the high priest of the mother of the gods at Pessinus, and of the two high priests of the goddess Ma in Comana.

There were also leagues, like that of the twenty-three Lycian cities, whose independence was secured by charter.

Both Lucullus and Pompeius did everything in their power to protect and extend the urban communities in the East. They were centres of Romanization, of the civilization of trade and commerce as opposed to the Oriental military despotism. Cyzicus, Heraclea, Sinope, and Amisus, all received a number of new inhabitants and extensions of territory, and everything was done to repair the devastation they had suffered in the late war. Many of the captured pirates were settled in the desolated cities of Plain Cilicia, especially at Soli; and many new towns were founded in Pontus and Cappadocia; the most famous of which were Nicopolis in Pontus, Megalopolis on the Cappadocian frontier, and Ziela. In fact nearly the whole of the domain land of these provinces must have been used for these settlements. At the same time, many existing cities obtained an extension of rights: autonomy was conferred upon Antioch on the Orontes, upon Seleucia in Pieria, upon Gaza, Mytilene, and Phana-goria.

Pompeius had done good work for Rome, but he had not performed miracles, and had done nothing to call forth the absurd exaggerations of his triumph or the fulsome adulation of his adherents. His triumphal inscriptions enumerated twelve millions of people as subjugated, 1538 cities and strongholds taken, while his conquests were made to extend from the Palus Maeotis to the Caspian and to the Red Sea, not one of which he had ever seen. Coins were struck in his honour, exhibiting the globe itself surrounded by triple laurels plucked from three continents, and surmounted by the golden chaplet which was conferred upon him by the citizens. On the other hand, there were voices which affirmed that he had only worn the laurels which another had plucked, and that the honours belonged of right to Lucullus. What really deserves praise in the conduct of Pompeius is his rare self-restraint. The most brilliant undertakings against the Bosphorus, or the Parthians, or Egypt, offered themselves on all sides, but he had resisted all temptations, and had turned to the less glorious task of regulating the territories already acquired. But his conduct towards

the Parthians deserves grave censure: he might have made war upon them, but when once he had decided against this course he should have loyally observed the agreement to regard the Euphrates as the boundary, instead of, by his silly perfidy, sowing seeds of hatred which were to bear bitter fruit for Rome at a later time.

The financial gain to Rome from the arrangements of Pompeius was immense, and her revenues were raised by one-half. And if the exhaustion of Asia was severe, and if both Pompeius and Lucullus brought home large private fortunes, the blame falls rather upon the government at home and on the system by which the provinces were regularly plundered for the benefit of Rome, than upon the generals themselves.

After the departure of Pompeius peace was on the whole maintained in the East; but the governors of Cilicia had constantly to fight against mountain tribes, and those of Syria against the tribes of the desert. There were also dangerous revolts among the Jews which were with difficulty suppressed by the able governor of Syria, Aulus Gabinius, and after which the Jews were subjected to a specially heavy taxation.

Egypt with its dependency of Cyprus now remained the only independent state in the East. It had indeed been formally bequeathed to Rome (pp. 338, 353), but was still governed by its own kings, who were themselves controlled by the royal guard which frequently appointed or deposed its rulers. The isolation of Egypt, surrounded as it is by the desert and the sea, and its great resources, which gave its rulers a revenue almost equal to that of Rome even after its recent augmentation, made the oligarchy unwilling to entrust the annexation of the kingdom to any one man. Propositions were frequently made at Rome for its incorporation in the empire, particularly by the democratic party, but the Egyptian ruler succeeded always in purchasing a respite by heavy bribes. Cyprus was annexed by decree of the people in 58 B.C., and the measure was carried out by Cato without the interference of an army. But in 59 B.C. Ptolemy Auletes purchased his recognition from the masters of Rome—it is said, for the sum of six thousand talents (£1,460,000). On account of the oppression which the payment of this money brought upon the people

the king was chased from his throne, but after the conference of Luca in 56 B.C., and on the promise of a further sum of ten thousand talents (£2,400,000), Aulus Gabinius was ordered to restore him. Victory was secured by a decisive battle on the Nile, and Ptolemaeus once more sat on the throne. The sum promised could not possibly be paid in full, though the last penny was exacted from the miserable inhabitants. At the same time the praetorians were replaced by a force of regular Roman infantry, with Celtic and German cavalry.

AUTHORITIES.

- Eastern Provinces.*—Marqt. i. p. 333. Plut. Pomp. 25–45. Liv. Epit. 100–103. Flor. iii. 5, 6. Entrop. 12–14. Vell. ii. 37–40. Appian Mithr. 94–121. Syr. 49, 50, 70. Strab. xi. 496, 497; xii. 555. Dio. xxxvi. 28–37; xxxvii. 1–20. Oros. vi. 4, 5. Aur. Vict. De V. I. 76, 77. Val. Max. ix. 2.
- Egypt.*—Cic. frag. de R. Alex.; ad Fam. i. 1–7; ad Q. Fr. ii. 2, 3; de Leg. Agr. i. 1, ii. 16, 17. Plut. Cato Min. 35–38; Pomp. 49. Appian Syr. 51. Suet. Julius, 54.

Note.—Mommsen ascribes the speech of Cicero, *de Rege Alexandrino*, to 65 B.C., not to 56 B.C., on the grounds (1) that the question dealt with by Cicero is the assertion of Crassus that Egypt had been rendered Roman property by the will of Alexander—a question which had lost significance since the Julian law of 59 B.C.; (2) that in 56 B.C. the discussion related to the restoration of the king, a transaction in which Crassus took no part; (3) that after the conference of Luca, Cicero was not in a position to seriously oppose one of the triumvirs (Momm. Hist. of R. v. 5, note).

CHAPTER XXXII.

STRUGGLE OF PARTIES AT ROME DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS IN THE EAST.

Isolated successes of the democratic party.—66 B.C. First Catilinarian conspiracy.—64 B.C. Servilian rogation.—63 B.C. Cicero and Antonius consuls—Second Catilinarian conspiracy.—62 B.C. Defeat and death of Catilina.

AFTER the departure of Pompeius the optimates remained nominally in possession of the government; that is, they commanded the elections and the consulate. But the consulship was no longer of primary consequence in the face of the new military power; and the best of the aristocrats—men like Quintus Metellus Pius, and Lucius Lucullus—retired from the lists, and devoted themselves to the elegant luxury of their private life. The younger men either followed their example or turned to court the favour of the new masters of the state.

There was one exception—Marcus Porcius Cato. Born in 95 B.C., he was now about thirty years of age. He was by nature a man of great courage and firmness, and of the strictest integrity, but dull of intellect, and destitute of imagination or passion. The two influences which moulded his character were Stoicism, the principles of which he adopted with the greatest ardour, and the example of his great-grandfather, the famous censor. Like him he went about the capital rebuking the sins of the times, a living model of the *prisca virtus* of the good old days—the “Don Quixote of the aristocracy.” In a corrupt and cowardly age, his courage and integrity gave him an influence which was warranted by neither his age nor his

capacity, and he soon became the recognized champion of the optimates. He did good work in the region of finance, checking the details of the public budget, and waging constant war with the farmers of the taxes; but he had none of the higher qualities of a statesman, he failed completely, if indeed he ever tried, to grasp the political situation. All his policy consisted in steadfastly opposing every one who appeared to deviate from the traditional aristocratic creed.

During the next few years the activity of the democrats showed itself in two ways: by attacks upon individuals of the senatorial party, and upon the abuses of which the senate was guilty; and by efforts to complete the realization of the democratic ideas which had been in the air ever since the time of the Gracchi.

Various abuses of the senatorial rule were restrained by the following measures. The senate was obliged to give audiences to foreign envoys on fixed days; before this regulation audiences were frequently postponed in order to extort bribes from the envoys. This kind of bribery was also rendered more difficult by declaring loans to foreign ambassadors at Rome non-actionable (67 B.C.) The power of the senate to grant dispensation from the laws in particular cases was restricted in the same year.

In 63 B.C. restrictions were placed upon the abuse of the fiction by which a Roman noble, wishing to travel, got himself invested with the character and privileges of a public envoy (*libera legatio*). The penalties for corruption at elections were increased; and the custom by which a Roman praetor bound himself to administer justice according to the rules which he laid down on entering office was enforced by law (67 B.C.).

At the same time, individual senators were subjected to prosecutions or insults. Marcus Lucullus was prosecuted by Gaius Memmius. Lucius Lucullus was compelled to wait three years for his triumph outside the city; Quintus Rex and Quintus Metellus were similarly treated. In 63 B.C. Gaius Caesar defeated two leading aristocrats in the contest for the supreme pontificate; the heirs of Sulla were threatened with an action for the recovery of moneys alleged to have been embezzled by the regent; and even Cato demanded back their rewards

from the murderers of the proscribed, as property illegally alienated from the state. Gaius Caesar, as president of the commission concerning murder, treated as null and void the ordinance of Sulla which declared the killing of a proscribed person no murder; and some of the more notorious executioners were condemned.

At the same time the democratic restoration was pressed on. The election of pontiffs and augurs by the tribes was restored in 63 B.C. An agitation was begun for the complete restoration of the corn-laws. The Transpadani were taken under the protection of the populares, and an agitation was set on foot for conferring upon them the full franchise, just as Gracchus had supported the enfranchisement of the Latins. In a quite contrary spirit the democratic leaders discountenanced the movement for allowing the freedmen to be enrolled in all or any of the tribes, and, when a law was passed to this effect, they allowed it to be cancelled by the senate on the same day (Dec. 31, 67 B.C.). Again, all strangers not possessing burgess-rights were expelled from Rome by decree of the people in 65 B.C. It is clear that the policy of the democrats was radically inconsistent. With one hand they aided the political liberation of the distant Transpadani; with the other they restricted the rights and liberties of the freedmen and foreigners of the capital: in effect they attempted both to maintain and to destroy the system of exclusive rights.

That ancient palladium of the Roman people, the criminal jurisdiction of the Comitia, was once more restored by the trial of Rabirius. This man was alleged to have slain the tribune Saturninus, thirty-eight years before, and was brought before the people by the tribune Titus Labienus in 63 B.C. This jurisdiction had not been abolished by Sulla, but was practically superseded by the commissions for high treason and murder. No one seriously meant to restore it; the accuser and his supporters were content with their assertion of the ancient right of appeal, and acquiesced when the assembly was dissolved on some pretext by their opponents.

Lastly, the long proscribed heroes and martyrs of the democracy were rehabilitated in the public memory: Saturninus by the means just described; Gaius Marius by the audacity of his nephew Gaius Caesar. The latter

had dared to display the features of his uncle in spite of prohibitions at the burial of the widow of Marius in 68 B.C., and now the emblems of victory erected by Marius and thrown down by Sulla were restored to their old places in the Capitol.

Such were the successes of the democrats, but, after all, they did not amount to much. In their contest with the aristocracy the democrats had conquered, and it was but natural that they should insult the prostrate foe. But they knew that the real reckoning was to come,—not with the vanquished oligarchy, but with the too-powerful ally by whose aid they had conquered. Their schemes were directed ostensibly against the optimates, but really against Pompeius. If direct proofs of this are few it is because both the present and the succeeding age had an interest in throwing a veil over the events of this period; but such proofs are not wanting. It is stated by Sallust (*Cat.* 39) that the Gabinian and Manilian laws inflicted a grievous blow on the democracy. Again, the Servilian Rogation (see p. 378) was directed against Pompeius, as is clear from the character of the bill itself, and from the statements of Sallust (*Cat.* 19), and Cicero (*De Lege Agr.* ii. 17, 46). Finally, the more than suspicious attitude of Caesar and Crassus towards the Catilinarian conspiracies is proof enough in itself. The object of the democratic party during the years 67–63 B.C. was to possess themselves of the reins of government by securing the return of one or more members of the conspiracy for the consulship, and then to entrust one of their leaders with the conquest of Egypt, or some such commission, which would give an opportunity for raising a military power capable of counterbalancing that of Pompeius.

First Catilinarian Conspiracy, B.C. 66.—The first object of the democratic leaders was the overthrow of the existing government by means of an insurrection in which they would not themselves appear. Materials for such a conspiracy existed in abundance in the capital. There were the slaves; there was the herd of free paupers who lived by the corn distributions and who were always ready for any scheme which promised anarchy and license. Again, there were numbers of young men of rank, ruined in fortunes, ruined in body and mind by a life of fashionable

debauchery, who sighed openly for a return of the times of Cinna and for release from their burden of debt. Among them two men were marked out as leaders by their superior ability—Gnaeus Piso and Lucius Catilina. The latter, in spite of a dissoluteness conspicuous even in that dissolute age, had courage, military talent, and a certain criminal energy which gave him an ascendancy over other men. He had been one of Sulla's executioners, and had hunted down the proscribed at the head of a band of Celts; but he had now a special quarrel with the aristocracy because they had opposed his candidature for the consulship. A secret league was formed, numbering more than four hundred members and including associates in all the urban districts of Italy.

In December, 66 B.C., the two consuls elect for 65 B.C. were rendered ineligible for office by conviction for electoral bribery. They immediately joined the association, and it was determined to procure the consulship for them by force. On the 1st of January, 65 B.C., the senate house was to be assailed and the new consuls were to be killed; Crassus was to be invested with the dictatorship, Caesar with the mastership of the horse. But the signal was never given and the plot was foiled. A similar plan for the 5th of February also failed, and the secret became known. Guards were assigned to the new consuls, and Piso was got rid of by a mission to Hither Spain with praetorian powers; but farther the government dared not go.*

Second Catilinarian Conspiracy, 63 B.C.—For the present no further attempt was made by the conspirators; but in 64 B.C. Pompeius was in Syria, and approaching the conclusion of his task; and it was therefore resolved to set up as candidates for the consulship of 63 B.C. Catilina and Gaius Antonius—an ex-Sullan and an ex-senator, who was willing to lend himself to the conspiracy. The

* That this account is true as to the main point—the participation of Caesar and Crassus—is rendered probable by the following facts, which show that they were at any rate heartily in accord with the democratic policy. (1) Crassus, censor in this year, attempted arbitrarily to enrol the Transpadani in the burgess list; (2) he prepared to enrol Egypt and Cyprus in the list of Roman domains; (3) Caesar, in 65 B.C. or 64 B.C., got a proposal submitted to the burgesses to send him to Egypt to reinstate King Ptolemaeus.

plan was, to seize the children of Pompeius, and to arm in Italy and in the provinces against him. Piso was to raise troops in Hither Spain; and to secure communications with him, negotiations were entered into with the Transpadani and with several Celtic tribes.

The optimates had no one of their own order who possessed the requisite courage and influence to defeat the democratic candidates; they therefore supported Marcus Cicero, who as yet belonged properly to no political party, but was always a supporter of the party of material interests. The result was the election of Cicero and Antonius; and for the moment the conspiracy was checked. A little before this, Piso had been put to death by his escort in Spain; and now Cicero gained over Antonius by voluntarily giving up to him the lucrative governorship of Macedonia, instead of insisting on his privilege of having the provinces determined by lot.

Meanwhile the settlement of Syria proceeded rapidly, and it was more than probable that Pompeius would soon advance into Egypt. Caesar's attempt to get the settlement of Egypt entrusted to himself was foiled. A bold stroke was imperatively necessary, and as soon as the new tribunes entered on their office the Servilian rogation was brought forward.

The nominal object of this bill was the founding of colonies in Italy; the Campanian domain land was to be parcelled out, and other land was to be acquired by purchase. The money necessary for this purpose was to be provided in various ways: (1) by the sale of all the remaining domain land both in and out of Italy (including the royal domain lands in Macedonia, Bithynia, Pontus, and other provinces: and the territories in Spain, Africa, Sicily, Hellas, and Cilicia belonging to cities which had fallen to Rome by right of conquest). (2) By the sale of all other state property acquired since 88 B.C.—a provision which was aimed at Egypt and Cyprus. (3) All taxable subject communities were to be burdened with heavy taxes and tithes. (4) By the produce of the new provincial revenues opened up by Pompeius, and by the sums found in his hands.

The execution of this measure was to be entrusted to decemviri armed with special jurisdiction and with the

imperium, who were to remain in office for five years, and to choose two hundred subordinate officers from the equestrian ranks. All candidates were to announce themselves personally; and only seventeen tribes were to vote.

The real object of the bill was to create a power which might counterbalance that of Pompeius: but it pleased no class; the mob preferred to subsist on the corn largesses rather than by tilling the soil; the mass of the democrats were afraid to offend Pompeius, and the measure was withdrawn by its author (January 1, 63 B.C.).

Catilina now determined to strike a decisive blow. All through the summer preparations for civil war went on. Faesulae was to be the head-quarters of the insurrection—thither arms and money were sent, and troops were raised by Gaius Manlius, an old Sullan captain. The Transpadani seemed ready to rise; bodies of slaves were ready for insurrection in the Bruttian land, on the east coast, and in Capua. The plan of the conspirators was to put to death the presiding consul and the rival candidates on the day of the consular elections for 62 B.C. (October 20), and to carry the election of Catilina.

But on the day fixed Cicero denounced the conspiracy in full senate; and Catilina did not deny the accusation. On the 21st the senate invested the consuls with the exceptional powers usual in such crises. On the 28th, to which day the elections had been postponed, Cicero appeared in the Campus Martius with an armed body-guard, and the plots of the conspirators again failed.

But on the 27th, the standard of insurrection had been raised by Manlius at Faesulae, and proclamations had been issued demanding the liberation of debtors from their burdens, and the reform of the law of insolvency, which still, in some cases, permitted the enslavement of the debtor. But the rising was isolated. The government had time to call out the general levy, and to send officers to various regions of Italy in order to suppress the insurrection in detail. Meantime the gladiatorial slaves were ejected from the capital, and patrols were kept in the streets to prevent incendiarism.

Catilina was now in a difficult position. The outbreak in the city, which should have been simultaneous with the rising at Faesulae, had miscarried. He could hardly

remain longer in Rome, and yet there was no one among his associates who could be trusted to carry out his design with courage and capacity, or who could command sufficient influence to induce the conspirators in the city to strike an effective blow at once. So he remained, brazening out the situation with the most audacious insolence. The spies of the government had made their way into the circle of the conspirators, and kept it informed of every detail of the plot. An attempt to surprise Praeneste failed. On the night of November 6-7 a conference was held, and in accordance with the resolution passed by those who met, an attempt was made early in the morning to murder the consul Cicero. But the men selected found the guard round his house reinforced—the consul was already aware of the result of the conference.

On the 8th, Cicero convoked the senate and acquainted them with the events of the last few days. Catilina could not obtain a hearing, and departed at once for Etruria.

The government declared Catilina, Manlius, and such of their followers who should not lay down their arms by a certain day, to be outlaws, and called out new levies, which, with incredible folly, were placed under the command of Antonius.

It had been arranged, before Catilina's departure, that Cethegus should make another attempt to kill Cicero in the night, and that Gabinus and Statilius should set fire to the city in twelve places. Meanwhile Catilina was to advance toward Rome. But now that their leader was gone the conspirators seemed incapable of action, though the government took no measures against them.

At last the decisive moment came. Lentulus had entered into relations with the deputies of the Allobroges—a Celtic canton, which was deeply in debt—and had given them letters to carry to his associates. On the night of December 2-3 the envoys were seized as they were leaving the city—probably in accordance with a pre-conceived plan; and from their evidence and from the documents they carried, full details of the plot were furnished to Cicero. Some of the conspirators saved themselves by flight; but Lentulus, Cethegus, Gabinus, and Statilius were arrested. The evidence was laid before the senate; the prisoners and other witnesses were heard;

and other proofs, such as deposits of arms in the houses of the conspirators and threatening expressions used by them, were afterwards procured. The most important documents were published, to convince the public of the facts of the plot.

The plans of the conspirators were now made bare, and their leaders arrested. In a well-ordered commonwealth there would have been an end of the matter. The military and the legal tribunals would have done the rest. But the government of Rome was so disorganized that for the moment the most difficult question for settlement was the custody of the prisoners. These had been given into the keeping of certain eminent private men—two of whom were Caesar and Crassus—who were responsible for their safety. But the freedmen of the prisoners were stirring; the air was full of rumours of schemes for liberating them by force, Rome was full of desperadoes, and the government had no efficient force of military or of police at its disposal. Finally, Catilina was near enough to attempt a *coup de main*. Accordingly the idea was suggested of executing the prisoners at once. By the constitution of Rome, no citizen could be put to death except by sentence of the whole body of citizens; and as such sentences had fallen into disuse, capital punishment was now no longer carried out. Cicero shrank from the step; he convoked the senate and left to it the decision, although it had even less title to act than the consul, and therefore could not possibly relieve him of the responsibility. All the consulars and the great majority of the senate had already declared for the execution, when Caesar, in a speech full of covert threats, violently opposed the proposal; and probably the limits of the law would have been observed had not Cato, by throwing suspicion upon those who were for milder measures, and by throwing the waverers into fresh alarm, secured a majority for the immediate execution of the prisoners.

On the night of the 5th of December the prisoners were conducted under strong guards to the Tullianum, a dungeon at the foot of the Capitol. No one knew the object of their removal, until the consul, from the door of the prison, proclaimed over the Forum, in his well-known voice, "They are dead." And now the first men of the

nobility—Cato, and Quintus Catulus—saluted for the first time the author of the deed with the proud title of “father of his country.” “Never perhaps had a commonwealth more lamentably declared itself bankrupt than did Rome through this resolution . . . to put to death in all haste a few political prisoners, who were no doubt culpable according to the laws, but had not forfeited life; because, forsooth, the security of prisons was not to be trusted, and there was no sufficient police.”

There still remained the insurrection in Etruria. Catilina had now under him nearly ten thousand men, of whom scarcely more than a fourth were armed. On the news of the failure at Rome, the mass of them dispersed, and the remnant of desperate men determined to cut their way through the passes of the Apennines into Gaul. But on their arrival at the foot of the mountains near Pistoria, they were confronted by the troops of Quintus Metellus, who had come up from Ravenna and Ariminum. In their rear was Antonius, and there was nothing left but to throw themselves upon his army. The battle took place in a narrow rocky valley where superiority of numbers was of small avail. The forces of Antonius were, for the day, commanded by the veteran Marcus Petreius. The battle was long and bloody; and quarter was neither given nor received. At length Petreius broke the centre of the enemy, and attacked the two wings from within. The Catilinarians covered with their corpses the ground on which they had fought; the officers, with their general, had sought death by charging into the thickest of the enemy (early in 62 B.C.). Antonius was “branded” by the senate with the title of imperator, and then thanksgivings were ordered by the senate for this victory over the civil foe.

The plot was suppressed; but the blow had fallen, not merely on the conspirators themselves, but on the whole democratic party. If the complicity of the democratic leaders, Caesar and Crassus, is not an ascertained fact, they are at any rate open to the gravest suspicion. That they were accused of complicity by Catulus, and that Caesar spoke and voted against the judicial murder of the prisoners, is of course no proof; but there are other facts of greater weight. (1) Crassus and Caesar supported the candidature of Catilina for the consulship. (2) When

Caesar, in 64 B.C., indicted the Sullan executioners for murder, he allowed Catilina alone to be acquitted. (3) In his revelations to the senate, Cicero did not indeed include the names of Caesar and Crassus; but it is known that he erased the names of many "innocent persons," and in later years he named Caesar as among the accomplices. (4) The fact that Gabinius and Statilius were intrusted to the custody of Crassus and Caesar, is probably to be explained by the wish of the government to place them in a dilemma. If they allowed the prisoners to escape, they would be regarded as accessories; if they detained them, they would incur the hatred and vengeance of their fellow-conspirators. (5) After the arrest of Lentulus, a messenger from him to Catilina was arrested and brought before the senate; but when, in his evidence, he mentioned Crassus as having commissioned him, he was interrupted, his whole statement was cancelled at the suggestion of Cicero, and he was committed to prison until he should confess who had suborned him. The senate were clearly afraid to allow the revelations to go beyond a certain limit. The general public were less scrupulous, and Caesar narrowly escaped with his life, when he left the senate on the 5th of December. (6) When Caesar had made himself head of the state, he was in close alliance with Publius Sittius, the only surviving Catilinarian, the leader of Mauretanian banditti. (7) The facts that the government offered no serious hindrance to the conspiracy until the last moment; that the chief conspirator was allowed to depart unmolested; that the troops sent against the insurrection were put under the command of Antonius, who had been deeply concerned in the plot,—all point to the suspicion that there were powerful men behind the scenes, who threw their protection over the conspiracy while they kept in the background themselves.

That the evidence is not more abundant is no matter for surprise. The government were too weak to provoke the democratic party *à outrance*; and, after the failure of the plot, the democratic leaders naturally made every effort to conceal their participation in it; and when Caesar had got the upper hand the veil was only drawn all the more closely over the darker years of his life.

The close of this period found the democratic party at

its lowest ebb. By its alliance with anarchists and murderers it had alienated, not only the party of material interests, but even the city mob, who, "although having no objection to a street riot, found it inconvenient to have their houses set on fire over their heads."

In 63 B.C. the full restoration of the Sempronian corn largesses was carried out by the senate, on the motion of Cato; the oligarchy were taking advantage of the movement to draw over the masses to their side. Worst of all, Pompeius was warned by the course of events, and his eyes were opened to the folly and weakness of his allies, if not to their treachery and designs against himself: at the present moment the identity of his own interests with those of the optimates was plain. The popular leaders felt the hopelessness of their position. Crassus prepared to carry his family and his riches to a safe refuge in the East; and even Caesar declared, in 63 B.C., as he left his home on the morning of the election for the office of pontifex maximus, that, if he failed in this too, he would never cross the threshold again.

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Loans forbidden—dispensing power—praetor's edicts.—Asc. in Cic. pro Cor. Ad. Att. v. 21.

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Bribery laws.—Dio. xxxvi. 21; xxxvii. 29. Cic. pro Mur. 23.

Sullan executioners condemned.—Suet. Jul. 11.

Lex Domitia restored.—Dio. xxxvii. 37. Suet. 13.

Transpadani.—Suet. Jul. 8. Dio. xxxvii. 9.

Expulsion of foreigners.—Dio. xxxvii. 9. Cic. de Off. iii. 11; pro Balb. 23; pro Arch. 5; de L. Agr. i. 4; ad Att. iv. 16.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

RETURN OF POMPEIUS—THE SECOND COALITION OF POMPEIUS, CAESAR, AND CRASSUS.

63 B.C. Quintus Metellus Nepos arrives in Rome as the emissary of Pompeius.—62 B.C. Pompeius lands at Brundisium and disbands his army.—60 B.C. Coalition between Pompeius and the democrats.—59 B.C. Consulship of Caesar—Lex Vatinia passed.

RECENT events had fully demonstrated the impotence of both the senate and the democratic party; neither was strong enough to defeat the other or to govern the state. There was no third party—no class remaining out of which a government might be erected: the only alternative was monarchy—the rule of a single person. Who the monarch would be was still uncertain; though, at the present moment, Pompeius was clearly the only man in whose power it lay to take up the crown that offered itself. The new *régime* presented one great advantage, obvious to the dullest perception: no government can rule unless it has military power at its command, and, amidst the disorganization which prevailed, the control of the military was vested absolutely in the general—only to him could the state look for the maintenance of social order. For the moment the question which agitated all minds was whether Pompeius would accept the gift offered him by fortune, or would retire and leave the throne vacant. It was possible, indeed, that all parties should combine against the general in one last struggle for what they deemed their liberty; but in face of the victorious legions of Pompeius any combination of parties could be of little avail.

In the autumn of 63 B.C., Quintus Metellus Nepos arrived in the capital from the camp of Pompeius, and got himself elected tribune with the avowed purpose of procuring for Pompeius the command against Catilina by special decree, and afterwards the consulship for 61 B.C. Everything depended upon the reception which parties at Rome might give to these proposals. It must be remembered that, whatever cause Pompeius might have to be discontented with the conduct of Caesar and his partisans, no open rupture had taken place. The coalition of 70 B.C. was still formally in existence. The democracy still treated Pompeius with the greatest outward respect, and this very year had granted him, spontaneously and by special decree, unprecedented honours (see p. 370). At the same time nothing had occurred to bridge over the chasm which the coalition had created between Pompeius and the optimates. The senate had decreed him no exceptional honours, and two of its most influential members, Lucullus and Metellus, were his bitterest personal enemies (see pp. 364-5). Lastly, the aristocracy were at present under the guidance of the uncompromising pedant Cato; while the democracy were led by "the most supple master of intrigue"—Caesar. Accordingly the aristocracy at once showed their hostility to the proposals of Metellus, and Cato had himself elected tribune expressly for the purpose of thwarting him. But the democrats were more pliant, and it was soon evident that they had come to a cordial understanding with the general's emissary. Metellus and his master both adopted the democratic view of the illegal executions; and the first act of Caesar's praetorship was to call Catulus to account for the moneys alleged to have been embezzled by him in rebuilding the Capitoline temple, and to transfer the superintendence of the works to Pompeius. By this stroke Caesar brought to light a disgraceful abuse of public money, and threw odium upon the aristocracy in the person of one of its most distinguished members; while Pompeius would be delighted at the prospect of engraving his name upon the proudest spot in the capital of the Roman state.

On the day of voting, Cato and another of the tribunes put their veto upon the proposals of Metellus, who dis-

regarded it. There were conflicts of the armed bands of both sides, which terminated in favour of the government. The senate followed up the victory by suspending Metellus and Caesar from their offices. Metellus immediately departed for the camp of Pompeius; and when Caesar disregarded the decree of suspension against himself, the senate had ultimately to revoke it.

Nothing could have been more favourable to the interests of Pompeius than these late events. After the illegal executions of the Catilinarians, and the acts of violence against Metellus, he could appear at once as the defender of the "two palladia of Roman liberty"—the right of appeal, and the inviolability of the tribunate,—and as the champion of the party of order against the Catilinarian band. But his courage was unequal to the emergency; he lingered in Asia during the winter of 63–62 B.C., and thus gave the senate time to crush the insurrection in Italy, and deprived himself of a valid pretext for keeping his legions together. In the autumn of 62 B.C. he landed at Brundisium, and, disbanding his army, proceeded to Rome with a small escort. On his arrival in the city in 61 B.C. he found himself in a position of complete isolation; he was feared by the democrats, hated by the aristocracy, and distrusted by the wealthy class.*

He at once demanded for himself a second consulship, the confirmation of all his acts in the East, and the fulfilment of the promise he had made to his soldiers to furnish them with lands. But each of these demands was met with the most determined opposition. From the senate, led by Lucullus, Metellus, and Cato, there was no hope of obtaining dispensation from the Sullan law as to re-election (see p. 304). As to the arrangements of Pompeius in the East, Lucullus carried a resolution that they should be voted upon separately, thus opening a door for endless annoyances and defeats.

His promise of lands to his soldiers was indeed ratified, but not executed, and no steps were taken to provide the necessary funds and lands. When the general turned from the senate to the people, the democrats, though they

* *Cic. ad Att.*, i. 14: "Prima contio Pompei non jucunda miseris (the rabble), inanis improbis (the democrats), beatis (the wealthy), non grata, bonis (the aristocrats) non gravis; itaque frigebat."

offered no opposition, did nothing to assist him, and when the proposal for the grant of lands was submitted to the tribes, it was defeated (early in 60 B.C.). To such straits was he reduced, that he had to court the favour of the multitude by causing a proposal to be introduced for abolishing the Italian tolls; but he had none of the qualifications of a demagogue, and merely damaged his reputation without gaining his ends.

From this disagreeable position Pompeius was rescued by the sagacity and address of Caesar, who saw in the necessities of Pompeius the opportunity of the democratic party. Ever since the return of Pompeius, Caesar had grown rapidly in influence and weight. He had been praetor in 62 B.C., and, in 61, governor of Further Spain, where he utilized his position to free himself from his debts, and to lay the foundation of the military position he desired for himself. Returning in 60 B.C., he readily relinquished his claim to a triumph, in order to enter the city in time to stand for the consulship. At last the democracy seemed on the eve of realizing its hopes, and of seeing one of its own leaders invested with the consulship and a province where he might build up a military position strong enough to make it independent of external allies. But it was quite possible that the aristocracy might be strong enough to defeat the candidature of Caesar, as it had defeated that of Catilina; and again, the consulship was not enough; an extraordinary command, secured to him for several years, was necessary for the fulfilment of his purpose. Without allies such a command could not be hoped for; and allies were found where they had been found ten years before, in Pompeius and in Crassus, and in the rich equestrian class. Such a treaty was suicide on the part of Pompeius, for he owed his strength entirely to his position as the only leader who could rely on a military force; but he had drifted into a situation so awkward that he was glad to be released from it on any terms. The capitalists were at the moment all the more inclined to join the coalition because of the severity with which they were being treated with regard to their tax leases by the senate, at the instigation of Cato.

The bargain was struck in the summer of 60 B.C.

Caesar was promised the consulship and a governorship afterwards; Pompeius, the ratification of his arrangements in the East, and land for his soldiers; Crassus received no definite equivalent, but the capitalists were promised a remission of part of the money they had undertaken to pay for the lease of the Asiatic taxes. The parties to the coalition were the same as in 70 B.C., but their relative positions were entirely changed. Then the democracy was a faction without a head, now it was a strong party with leaders of its own, and could demand for itself, not merely concessions to democratic traditions, such as the restoration of the tribunician power, but office and authority, the consulship and the supreme military command, while it conceded nothing material to its allies.

Caesar was easily elected consul for 59 B.C. All that the exertions of the senate could do was to give him an aristocratic colleague in Marcus Bibulus. Caesar at once proceeded to fulfil his obligations to Pompeius by proposing an agrarian law. All remaining Italian domain land, which meant practically the territory of Capua, was to be given up to allotments, and other estates in Italy were to be purchased out of the revenues of the new Eastern provinces. The allotments were to be small, and to be given to poor burgesses, fathers of three children. The soldiers were simply recommended to the commission, and thus the principle of giving rewards of land for military service was not asserted. The execution of the bill was to be intrusted to a commission of twenty.

This proposal, together with that for the ratification of Pompeius' arrangements collectively, and the petition of the tax farmers for relief, were first of all laid before the senate, which had now opportunity to reflect on its folly in driving Pompeius and the equites into the arms of Caesar. The agrarian law, moderate and statesmanlike as it was, was rejected without discussion, and also the decree as to the acts of Pompeius. Caesar could now go to the people and ask them to pass these rational and necessary decrees which the senate in its levity had refused. When the aristocracy seemed inclined to push the matter to open violence, Pompeius called upon his veterans to appear on the day for voting with arms under their dress; and when Bibulus tried to prevent the vote by proclaiming

that he was observing the heavens, Caesar disregarded him, as he had disregarded the tribunician veto, and Bibulus had to be content with shutting himself up in his own house and intimating by placard that he intended to watch the signs of the sky on all days appropriate for public assemblies throughout the year. At length all these proposals were passed by the assembly, and the commission of twenty, with Pompeius and Crassus at their head, began the execution of the agrarian law.

Now that the first victory was won, the coalition were able to carry out the rest of its programme without much difficulty. Caesar had loyally fulfilled his obligations to Pompeius, and the most important question now to be considered was his own future position. The senate had already selected for the year of his proconsulship two provinces where nothing but the work of peaceful administration could be expected; but it was determined by the confederates that Caesar should be invested by decree of the people with a special command resembling that lately held by Pompeius. Accordingly the tribune Vatinius submitted to the tribes a proposal which was at once adopted. By it Caesar obtained the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul, and the supreme command of the three legions stationed there, for five years, with the rank of *propraetor* for his adjutants. His jurisdiction extended southwards as far as the Rubicon, and included Luca and Ravenna. Subsequently the province of Narbo was added by the senate, on the motion of Pompeius. Since no troops could be stationed in Italy, it was evident that such a command as Caesar's dominated both Italy and Rome. The coalition had succeeded; it was master of the state. It kept its adherents in good humour by the most lavish exhibitions of games and shows, and kept the exchequer filled by selling charters and privileges to subject communities and princes: for instance, the king of Egypt at last obtained recognition by decree of the people, in return for a large sum. The permanence of the present arrangement was assured by securing the return of Aulus Gabinius and Lucius Piso for the consulship of the ensuing year. Pompeius watched over Italy while he executed the agrarian law, and Caesar's legions in North Italy were a guarantee against all opposition. Caesar and Pompeius

were at present kept united by community of interest, and the personal bonds between them were cemented by the marriage of Pompeius with Julia, the only daughter of Caesar.

The aristocracy were in despair. "On all sides," wrote one of them, "we are checkmated; we have already, through fear of death or of banishment, despaired of 'freedom;' every one sighs, no one ventures to speak." Nevertheless Caesar had hardly laid down his consulship when it was proposed, in the senate, to annul the Julian laws; there were clearly some among the optimates who would not be content with the policy of sighing and silence. The regents determined to make examples of some of the most determined of their opponents, and to drive them into exile. An infamous attempt was made to involve the heads of the aristocracy in a charge of conspiring to murder Pompeius on the evidence of a worthless informer named Vettius; but the scheme was too hollow, and the whole matter was allowed to drop.

Ultimately they were content with a few isolated victims. Cato openly proclaimed his conviction that the Julian laws were null and void, and, to get rid of him, he was entrusted by special decree with the regulation of the municipal affairs of Byzantium, and with the annexation of the kingdom of Cyprus. Cicero was abandoned to the vengeance of the thorough-going democrats, who could not leave unpunished the judicial murder of December 5th. And so the tribune Publius Clodius, his bitter private enemy, proposed to the tribes a resolution declaring the execution of a citizen without trial a crime punishable with banishment. Both this decree and that relating to Cato were passed without opposition, and, though the majority of the senate put on mourning, and Cicero besought Pompeius on his knees for mercy, he had to go into exile even before the passing of the law. Cato accepted his commission, and set out for the East; and Caesar could now safely leave Italy, to face the heavy task he had imposed on himself in Gaul.

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CHAPTER XXXIV.

CAESAR IN GAUL.

Political and social organization of Gaul.—58 B.C. First campaign—Defeat of the Helvetii and of Ariovistus.—57 B.C. Second campaign—The Belgian League subdued.—56 B.C. Third campaign—Defeat of the Aremoricans; of the Morini, Menapii, and Aquitani.—55 B.C. Fourth campaign—Massacre of Usipetes and Tencteri—The Rhine crossed—First expedition to Britain.—54 B.C. Fifth campaign—Second invasion of Britain—Attacks on Sabinus and Cicero during the winter.—53 B.C. Sixth campaign—General insurrection crushed by defeat of the Nervii, Senones, Carnutes, Treveri, and Menapii—The Rhine again crossed.—52 B.C. Seventh campaign—Great national rising under Vercingetorix—Sieges of Avaricum, Gergovia, and Alesia.—51 B.C. Eighth campaign—Remains of the insurrection stamped out.

It has been too generally assumed that Caesar regarded Gaul merely as a parade ground on which to exercise himself and his troops for the impending war; but though the conquest of Gaul was undoubtedly for him a means to an end, yet it was much more—"it is the special privilege of a statesman of genius that his means themselves are ends in their turn. Caesar needed, no doubt, for his party aims a military power, but he did not conquer Gaul as a partisan." It was necessary that Italy should be protected by a barrier against the ever-threatening invasions of the Germans; and it was also necessary, now that Italy had become too narrow for its population, that a fresh field of expansion should be provided elsewhere. The Roman state remained a chaotic mass of countries which required to be thoroughly occupied, and to have their boundaries fixed and defined: the senate had done

little or nothing to carry out this great work ; it was only when the democracy assumed the reins in 67 B.C. and in 66 B.C. that the Roman sovereignty over the Mediterranean was restored, and the dominion in the East consolidated by the annexation of Pontus and Syria. Now that the democracy and its leaders were supreme, another and even more important section of the work was at last taken in hand.

Something had been accomplished by Caesar towards the subjugation of the West during his governorship in Spain in 61 B.C. : the Lusitanians and Gallaeci were subdued, the tribute of the subjects was reduced, and their financial affairs were regulated.

The term *Gallia* has been applied, since the age of Augustus, to the country bounded by the Pyrenees, the Rhine, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean. The Roman province which had been constituted for sixty years, and which corresponded pretty nearly to the modern Languedoc, Dauphiné, and Provence, had seldom been in a state of peace. Pompeius had had to fight his way through the insurgent tribes in order to reach Spain in 77 B.C. ; while the connection of the Allobroges with the Catilinarian conspiracy is but one indication of the perpetual ferment in which the more remote cantons lived. Still the bounds of the province were not extended, Lugdunum Convenarum (the colony of Sertorians), Tolosa, Vienna, and Genava remained the most remote Roman townships towards the west and north

But the importance of *Gallia* was continually increasing ; its glorious climate, the fertility of the soil, the commercial routes stretching northwards as far as Britain, the easy communication with Italy, the civilization and luxury which were to be found in the city of Massilia, all combined to make *Gallia* the most attractive of the Roman provinces. Ten years before Caesar's arrival it was swarming with Roman burgesses and merchants, with Roman farmers and graziers, while a large proportion of the land was owned by Roman nobles, who lived in Italy and cultivated their estates by means of stewards.

This region had for a long time been under the influence of Hellenism, spreading from the great Greek colony of Massilia ; and even in the Roman period Greek physicians

and rhetoricians were employed in the Gallic cantons: but, as elsewhere, Hellenism was superseded by the mixed Latino-Greek culture. The Celtic and Ligurian populations gradually lost their nationality, were compelled to exchange the sword for the plough, which they were forced to use in the service of a foreign master, and they attested by many insurrections the hardness of the bondage into which they had fallen. But the towns flourished and grew; Aquae Sextiae, Narbo, and, above all, Massilia, might be mentioned in comparison with the most prosperous Italian towns.

But as soon as the Roman frontier was crossed, Roman influence practically ceased. North of the Cevennes the great Celtic race was found in all its native freedom. The great body of this people had settled in modern France, in the western districts of Germany and Switzerland, and in the south of England; but there were Celts in modern Austria and Spain, though cut off from their kinsmen by the barriers of the Alps and the Pyrenees. Little can be known of the development of this great people; we have to be content with a mere outline of their culture and political condition in the time of Cæsar.

The population of Gaul appears to have been comparatively dense. From the numbers of the Belgic levy against Caesar it may be computed that in those regions the proportion was about 200 persons to the square mile—about the same rate which holds at present for Wales; in the canton of the Helvetii it was about 245: hence in the more cultivated districts of the Haedui and Arverni it was probably higher. Agriculture was no doubt known in Gaul, and a kind of beer was made from the barley which was grown there. But the pursuit was despised, and, even in the south, was held unbecoming for a free Celt. Pastoral husbandry was much more esteemed. The Romans availed themselves of the Celtic breed of cattle, and of the skill of Celtic slaves in the rearing of animals; Gallic oxen and ponies were much used, and in the northern districts the rearing of cattle was almost universal. In the north-east, between the sea and the Rhine, dense woods covered the ground, and on the plains of Flanders and Lorraine, the Menapian and Treverian shepherd fed his half-wild swine in the impenetrable oak forests. In

Britain there was hardly any agriculture, and the culture of the olive and the vine did not extend beyond the Cevennes.

The Gauls lived mainly in open villages, of which the Helvetii alone had four hundred, besides many single homesteads. But there were also walled towns, of which the walls were an admirable combination of timber and wood, while the buildings were wholly of wood. There were twelve of such towns among the Helvetii, and the same number among the Suessiones. But in the northern parts morasses and forests, and in Britain a sort of wooden abatis, were the only protection in time of war.

Roads and bridges were numerous, and the number and character of the largest rivers—the Rhone, Garonne, Loire, and Seine—made river intercourse easy and profitable. In maritime affairs the Gauls had attained no inconsiderable skill, and in one respect had surpassed the nations of the Mediterranean. They were the first nation that regularly navigated the Atlantic, and the tribes which bordered on the ocean employed sailing vessels, with leathern sails and iron anchor-chains, not only for commerce but for war; while the war vessels of the Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans, were all, up to this time, propelled by oars, and used the sail only as an occasional aid, their trading vessels alone were sailors properly so-called. In the Channel, the Gauls, still and for long afterwards, employed a sort of leather-covered skiffs.

There was considerable commercial intercourse between even the most northern Celtic regions and the Roman province. The people of modern Brittany brought tin from the mines of Cornwall, and carried it by river or by land to Narbo and Massilia. Among the tribes at the mouth of the Rhine, fishing and the collection of birds' eggs was an important industry. The tolls levied on rivers and at maritime ports play a large part in the finance of certain cantons. In manufactures, working in metals was the only important known industry: the copper implements even now discovered in tombs, and the gold coins of the Arverni attest the skill of the Gallic workmen; and they are even said to have taught the Romans the arts of tinning and silvering. Naturally the art of mining went hand in hand with the working of metals. There were

extensive iron mines on the Loire, and the art of mining was adapted in those regions to the purposes of war. The Romans believed that Gaul was very rich in gold; but the idea is negatived by the small amount of gold discovered in tombs, and probably arose from the fables of travellers. Still the streams flowing from the Alps and Pyrenees may then have yielded sufficient produce to make the search for gold profitable through the employment of slave labour.

The taste of the Celtic workmen was not equal to their mechanical skill. The ornaments they produced were gaudy and parti-coloured, and their coins invariably imitate two or three Greek dies. But the art of poetry was highly valued, and was intimately connected with religion. Science and philosophy existed, though in subordination to theology. The knowledge of writing was general among the priests.

Among the Celts "the town had, as in the East, merely mercantile and strategic—not political—importance." The Greeks and Romans had lived, in early times, in cantons, each clan by itself; they had villages in which they bought and sold, and strong places whither they fled for refuge in case of invasion. But very soon the tower of refuge grew into a town, and became the head and centre of the clan, and the seat of law and justice. Among the Celts, however, this development never took place; they remained a mere collection of clans, and never took the step by which the clan becomes a state with a fixed centre of government.

The constitution of the clan canton was based upon three elements, the prince, the council of elders, and the body of freemen capable of bearing arms. The supreme authority rested with the general assembly by which, in important matters, the prince was bound. The council was often numerous, sometimes reaching the number of six hundred, but had not more power than the Roman senate in the regal period. In some southern clans—the Arverni, Haedui, Sequani, and Helvetii—a revolution had taken place, before the time of Caesar, which had overthrown the power of the kings and set up that of the senate in its place. In all cases their towns, even when walled, were destitute of political importance.

The dominant feature in all Celtic commonwealths is the high nobility—a class the existence of which is almost incompatible with that of a flourishing urban life. This nobility consisted for the most part of members of royal, or formerly royal, families. It monopolized all power in the state, financial, warlike, or political. The nobles forced the common freemen to surrender their freedom first as debtors and then as slaves. They maintained large bodies of mounted retainers, ambacti, and by their means defied the government and broke up the commonwealth. These retainers sometimes reached the number of ten thousand, besides the bondmen and debtors who were equally dependent. Moreover, the leading families in different states were connected by marriage and by treaty and were together stronger than any single clan. The community could no longer maintain peace or protect individuals: only those who were clients of some powerful noble enjoyed security.

The general assembly lost its importance; the monarchy usually succumbed to the nobility, and the king was superseded by the *vergobretus*, or judgment-dealer, who, like the Roman consul, held office for a year. So far as the canton held together it was led by the council, which was governed by the heads of the aristocracy.

Like the Greeks in the Persian wars, the Transalpine Gauls seem to have become conscious of their unity as a nation only in their wars with Rome. The combination of the whole Celtic nobility was favourable to the development of the idea, and there were many who were willing to sacrifice the independence of the canton or of the nobility, to purchase the independence of the nation. The universal popularity of the opposition to Caesar is attested by the telegraphic rapidity with which news was carried throughout the length and breadth of Gaul.

But though politically divided, the Gauls had long been held together by the bond of a close religious union. The corporation of Druids embraced the British islands and all Gaul, perhaps even other Celtic countries. It possessed a special head, elected by the priests themselves; schools, in which its traditions were transmitted; special privileges, such as exemption from taxation and military service. Annual councils were held near Chartres; and, above

all, the blind devotion of the people to their priests was "in nowise inferior to that of the Irish at the present day."

Such a priesthood could not but possess considerable political power: in monarchical cantons it conducted the government in case of an interregnum; it excluded individuals or states from religious and therefore also from civil society; it decided important suits, especially with regard to boundaries and inheritance; it had an extensive criminal jurisdiction, and even claimed the right of deciding on war or peace. "The Gauls were not much removed from an ecclesiastical state with its pope and councils, its immunities, inderdicts, and spiritual courts; only this ecclesiastical state did not, like that of recent times, stand aloof from the nations, but was on the contrary pre-eminently national."

But though the priests and nobility constituted a certain union of the clans, their class interests were too strong to allow this union to become really national. The only attempt at political union was the system of hegemony among the cantons; a stronger clan induced or compelled a weaker to become subordinate to it. The stronger had control of all external relations for both, while the weaker was obliged to render military service, and sometimes to pay tribute. Thus a series of leagues arose—like that among the Belgae, in the north-east, under the Suessiones; that in southern and central Gaul, under the Arverni; and that of the maritime cantons in the north and west.

The union in these confederacies was of the loosest kind. The league was represented in peace by the federal diet, and in war by the general. Contests for the hegemony went on in every league, and the rivalry spread into every dependent clan, and into every village and house, just as the rivalry between Athens and Sparta split up every independent community in Greece.

In a country where knighthood was the predominant social feature, the strength of the army was naturally the cavalry; war-chariots were also used among the Belgae and in Britain. When the general levy was called out, every man who could keep his seat on horseback took up arms, and, when attacking an enemy whom they despised, they swore, man by man, in the true spirit of chivalry, to charge at least twice through the enemy's line. There were also hired free-lances who displayed in its extremest form the

spirit of utter indifference to their own lives and to those of others which such a mode of life produces. They would often, we are told, fight for life and death at a banquet, for sport; and even sell themselves to be killed for a fixed sum of money or a number of casks of wine.

Besides the mounted force there was the levy *en masse* of infantry. Their arms were still a large shield and a long thrusting spear. There is no trace of military organization or of tactical subdivisions; each canton fought *en masse*, without other arrangement. The baggage was carried in waggons, which were used as a barricade at night. The infantry of certain cantons, such as the Nervii, was more efficient; but the Nervii had no cavalry, and were, perhaps, an immigrant German tribe. Caesar's estimate of the Celtic infantry is made plain enough by the fact that, after the first battle, he never employed them in conjunction with Roman troops.

Undoubtedly the Celts of Transalpine Gaul, as they appeared in Caesar's time, had advanced as compared with their kinsmen who had come into contact with the Romans a century and a half previously in the valley of the Po. The militia had been replaced by the cavalry as the preponderating arm. Open villages had been replaced by walled towns. Articles found in the tombs of Lombardy are certainly inferior to those found in northern Gaul. Lastly, the sense of nationality, which scarcely appears in the battles fought south of the Alps, is seen with striking force in the struggle against Caesar.

Many aspects of Celtic civilization are interesting as approaching nearly to modern culture—its sailing vessels, its knighthood, its ecclesiastical constitution, its attempts to build the nation, not on the city, but on the tribe;—but a general view of the whole, so far as the materials exist for it, suggests the thought that the Celtic nation had reached its culminating point of development. "It was unable to produce from its own resources either a national art or a national state, and attained at most to a national theology and a peculiar order of nobility." Thus the original simple valour was no more, while the higher military courage, based on morality and organization, appears but in a very stunted form. Again, the coarser features of barbarism were gone: faithful retainers were

no longer sacrificed at the death of their chief; but human sacrifices remained; torture, inadmissible in the case of a free man, was still inflicted upon free women or upon slaves. "The Celts had lost the advantages which specially belong to the primitive epoch of nations, but had not acquired those which civilization brings with it when it intimately and thoroughly pervades a people."

The Celts had long ceased to press on the Iberian tribes, and the country between the Pyrenees and Garonne was occupied by the Aquitani, a number of tribes of Iberian descent. The Roman arms and the Roman culture had already made great inroads upon the Celtic nation. The latter was now cut off by the Roman province from Italy, Spain, and the Mediterranean. Trade and commerce had already paved the way for conquest north of the Roman bounds. Wine especially, which the Gauls drank undiluted, was greatly prized; and Italian horses were imported. Roman burgesses already possessed land in cantons north of the frontier, and the Roman language was by no means unknown in free Gaul.

But the strongest pressure came from the Germans on the north and east: "a fresh stock from the cradle of peoples in the east, which made room for itself by the side of its elder brethren with youthful vigour, although also with youthful rudeness." The German tribes nearest the Rhine—the Usipetes, Tencteri, Sugambri, and Ubii—were by this time partly civilized, and inhabited fixed territories; but in the interior, agriculture was of small importance; even the names of the various tribes were unknown to the Celts, who called them by the general appellation of Suebi (wanderers), and Marcomanni (border-warriors). Before this period the Celts had been driven over the Rhine; the Boii, who were once in Bavaria and Bohemia, were harmless wanderers, and the region of the Black Forest, formerly possessed by the Helvetii, was a desert, or occupied by Germans. Nor had the intruders stopped at the Rhine; certain tribes, amongst whom were the Aduatuci and the Tunnngri, perhaps also the Nervii and the Treveri, had formed settlements west of the river, and exacted hostages and tribute from the neighbouring Gauls. Thus free Gaul was threatened at once by two powerful nations, and was at the same time torn by internal dissensions: "how should

a nation, which could name no day like those of Marathon and Salamis, of Aricia and the Raudine field,—a nation which, even in its time of vigour, had made no attempt to destroy Massilia by an united effort—now, when evening had come, defend itself against so formidable foes ? ”

The internal condition of Gaul readily became mixed up with its external relations. The Romans, from their first interference, had availed themselves of the perpetual contests for the hegemony, by which every canton was torn asunder ; they had supported the Haedui in their rivalry with the Arverni for predominance in the south, had reduced to subjection the Allobroges and many of the client cantons of the Arverni, and got the hegemony transferred from the latter to the Haedui. But the power of Rome was not the only foreign force which might be invoked. The Sequani in central Gaul, who were at the head of the anti-Roman faction, had availed themselves of the remissness of the senatorial government, to make an attempt to destroy Roman influence and to humble their rivals, the Haedui. A dispute arose between the two tribes as to tolls on the river Saone, which separated the two cantons ; and about the year 71 B.C. the German prince Ariovistus crossed the Rhine at the head of fifteen thousand men in support of the Sequani. After a long war, the Haedui were reduced to conclude a most unfavourable peace, by which they became tributary to the Sequani, and swore never to invoke the intervention of Rome (61 B.C.). The Romans talked of assisting the Haedui, and even issued orders to that effect to the governors of Gaul ; but nothing was done, and Ariovistus was even enrolled upon the list of friends of the Roman people. The result of this inaction was that numerous bands of Germans continued to cross the Rhine, and that Ariovistus determined to extend his power over the whole of Gaul. The Celts were treated as a conquered nation : even his friends, the Sequani, were forced to cede a third of their territory to make room for his followers ; and a second third was soon demanded for the tribe of the Harudes.

But the invasion of Ariovistus was not the only movement in progress. The Usipetes and Tencteri, on the right bank of the Rhine, hard pressed by Suebian hordes, had set out to find new settlements lower down the Rhine.

Suebian bands gathered opposite the canton of the Treveri. Lastly, the Helvetii, the most easterly of the Celtic cantons, in modern Switzerland, formed the desperate resolution of evacuating their own territory, in order to find a more spacious and less exposed habitation west of the Jura mountains, hoping at the same time to acquire the hegemony of central Gaul. The Rauraci, in southern Alsace, and the remnant of the homeless Boii were induced to make common cause with the Helvetii. If their scheme were carried out, their original settlement would, of course, fall to the German invader. "From the source of the Rhine to the Atlantic Ocean the German tribes were in motion; the whole line of the Rhine was threatened by them. It was a moment like that when the Alamanni and the Franks threw themselves on the falling empire of the Caesars; and even now there seemed on the eve of being carried into effect against the Celts that very movement which was successful, five hundred years afterwards, against the Romans."

It was at this moment that Caesar entered upon his province (58 B.C.). He was now governor of both the Gauls, including Istria and Dalmatia; his office was secured to him for five years, and it was extended, in 55 B.C., for five years more; he had the right of nominating ten lieutenants and (at any rate, according to his own interpretation of his powers) to fill up his legions or form new ones from the population of his provinces. His army consisted of four veteran legions, the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth, in all about 24,000 men, besides auxiliaries; he had some Spanish cavalry, and archers and slingers from Numidia, Crete, and the Balearic isles. His staff contained several able officers, such as Publius Crassus, son of Caesar's old political ally, and Titus Labienus. "Caesar had not received definite instructions; to one who was discerning and courageous these were implied in the circumstances with which he had to deal. The negligence of the senate had to be retrieved, and, first of all, the stream of German invasion had to be checked."

The invasion of the Helvetii had just begun; they had burned their towns and villages to make return impossible, and had gathered to the number of 380,000 souls at the

Lacus Lemannus, near Genava. The difficulty of crossing the mountains had determined them to cross the Rhone in a southern direction into the territory of the Allobroges, and to march first south and then west, until they reached the canton of the Santones on the Atlantic, where they had determined to settle. Their route lay though Roman territory, and Caesar was resolved to prevent them from crossing the river. He gained some days by negotiation, and in the mean time hurried up his legions from Aquileia, called out the militia of the province, and broke down the bridge over the Rhone; he then proceeded to bar the southern bank against the Helvetii by an entrenchment nineteen miles long. Baulked of their scheme, the invaders were obliged to turn to the difficult mountain route, through the passes of the Jura, and a free passage was procured for them from the Sequani by the influence of the anti-Roman party in the central cantons, who hoped to find in the Helvetii a valuable reinforcement. Caesar immediately decided to follow them; he crossed the Rhone with five legions and the troops stationed at Genava. He overtook the enemy at the Saone, where he destroyed the division which had not yet crossed. His appearance in the territory of the Haedui at once restored the predominance of the Roman party, and thus obviated any difficulty with regard to supplies; but his task still remained formidable. For fifteen days Caesar followed the unwieldy host, which had turned north in the hope that Caesar would not venture to advance far into the interior. No opportunity of fighting a battle under favourable circumstances was given; the leaders carefully guarded against surprise, and appeared to have accurate intelligence of Caesar's movements. Moreover, the Romans now began to be in want of provisions; the cavalry had turned out untrustworthy, and were suspected of carrying information into the enemy's camp. Such was the critical state of affairs when the armies were just marching past Bibracte, the capital of the Haedui. Caesar resolved to seize the place before continuing the pursuit—perhaps to establish himself there permanently. But the Helvetii, imagining that the Romans were preparing to fly, attacked them.

The armies were drawn up on parallel ranges of hills. The Celts charged and broke the Roman cavalry, but had

to retire before the legions; and when the Romans charged in turn, the Celts again advanced, while their reserve took the Romans in the flank. But the latter were met by the reserve of the Roman attacking column, and destroyed; and now the main body gave way, and retreated northwards. The Romans were too exhausted for pursuit; but, in consequence of Caesar's threats, the cantons through which the Helvetii passed refused them supplies and plundered their baggage, and the whole host were soon reduced to submit without reserve. Caesar treated them with clemency. The Haedui were directed to assign territory to the Boii within their own bounds; while the survivors of the Rauraci and Helvetii were sent back to their former territory, to defend, under Roman supremacy, the upper Rhine against the Germans. Only the south-western point of the Helvetian territory was occupied by the Romans, and the town of Noviodunum was converted into the fortress of Julia Equestris, or the colony of the horsemen of Caesar.

By the battle of Bibracte the threatened invasion on the upper Rhine was prevented, and the anti-Roman party in Gaul humbled. But on the middle Rhine Roman interference was even more urgently called for. The yoke of Ariovistus had now become more intolerable than Roman supremacy, and at a diet of the tribes of central Gaul the Roman general was asked to come to the aid of the Celts against the Germans. Caesar consented; at his suggestion the Haedui refused the customary tribute and demanded the restoration of the hostages. When Ariovistus proceeded to attack the Roman clients, Caesar sent to demand from him the hostages of the Haedui, and a promise to leave the latter tribe at peace, and to bring no more Germans over the Rhine. Ariovistus replied in terms which asserted a claim to equal right and equal power with the Romans. Northern Gaul, he said, had become subject to himself as southern Gaul to the Romans; he did not hinder the Romans from levying tribute on the Allobroges, and the Romans had no right to prevent him from taxing his own subjects. He also showed that he was acquainted with the political condition of Italy, and offered to aid Caesar to make himself ruler of Italy, if only Caesar would leave him alone in Gaul. When Caesar

requested him to appear personally like a client prince in his camp, Ariovistus refused.

The Roman troops at once began their march. They occupied Vesontio, the capital of the Sequani, and after an abortive conference between the generals, in which an attempt was made to carry off Caesar, the war languished for a time. At length the Germans established themselves in Caesar's rear, and cut off his supplies; but, imitating their own manœuvre, he sent round two legions which fortified themselves beyond the German camp, and repulsed the attempts of the enemy to dislodge them. The whole Roman army was immediately led on, and after a desperate struggle, in which the right wing of each army was victorious, the Roman reserve line under Publius Crassus decided the day in favour of the Romans. The pursuit was continued as far as the Rhine, and only a few besides the king escaped.

The line of the Rhine was by this battle won. Caesar might have expelled the Germans who had already settled themselves on the left bank; but preferring, as everywhere, "conquered foes to doubtful friends," he allowed them to remain, and intrusted them with the defence of the Rhine against their countrymen.

The consequences of this one campaign were great and lasting. It was now finally determined that the whole of Gaul should be under Roman sway, and that the Rhine should be the boundary of the empire against the Germans. "People felt that now another spirit and another arm had begun to guide the destinies of Rome."

Second campaign, 57 B.C.

After the first campaign all central Gaul submitted to the Romans, while the middle and upper Rhine were rendered safe from German incursions. But the northern cantons were not affected by the blow; moreover, close relations subsisted between them and the Germans over the Rhine; while, at the mouth of the river, Germanic tribes were making ready to cross. Accordingly, in the spring of 57 B.C., Caesar set out with eight legions against the Belgic cantons. The confederacy sent the whole first levy of 300,000 men to the southern frontier to receive him. One canton alone, that of Remi, seized the opportunity to shake off the yoke of the Suessiones, and to play the part of

the Haedui in central Gaul. Caesar entrenched himself on the Aisne and, allowing the enemy no opportunity to attack, waited for their army to dissolve. The Bellovaci, hearing that the Haedui were about to enter their territory, were the first to retire, and soon the whole host broke up, binding themselves by oath to hasten to the assistance of the first canton attacked. Some of the contingents were destroyed by Caesar during their retreat, and the western cantons—the Suessiones, Bellovaci, and Ambiani—at once submitted.

But in the east the Nervii, aided by the Viromandui, the Atrebatas, and the Aduatuci, concluded a second and closer league, and assembled their forces on the upper Sambre. They had accurate knowledge of every movement of the Romans while concealing their own. When Caesar's forces arrived at the Sambre, as the legions were pitching the camp on the left bank, while the cavalry explored the right, the latter were suddenly attacked and driven across the river. In a moment the enemy had crossed too, and the legions had scarcely time to take up their arms when they found themselves engaged in a desperate contest without order or connexion, and with no proper command. Labienus, on the left wing, overthrew the Atrebatas, while the Roman centre forced the Viromandui down the slope towards the river; but the right wing was outflanked by the Nervii, and its two legions, each driven separately into a dense mass and assailed on three sides, were on the verge of destruction. Caesar himself seized a shield and induced the wavering ranks to rally, and already connexion between the two legions had been restored when help arrived—partly from the rear-guard which came up—partly from Labienus, who had sent the tenth legion to help the general. The Nervii fell almost to a man where they stood; and of their six hundred senators only three are said to have survived.

The eastern cantons now for the most part submitted; the Aduatuci, who were too late for the battle and who still attempted to hold out, were sold for slaves *en masse*, and their clients were declared independent. The Remi, of course, became the leading canton of the district, and only the country between the Scheldt and the Rhine remained unsubdued.

Third campaign, 56 B.C.

The next year was occupied with the subjection of the Aremoric cantons. Publius Crassus had been sent to them in the autumn of 57 B.C., and had induced the powerful Veneti to submit. But they soon repented, and during the winter detained as hostages the Roman officers who came to levy grain among them. The whole coast from the Rhine to Loire rose against Rome, and the leaders were calculating on the rise of the Belgae and on aid from Britain and from the Germans.

Caesar sent Labienus with the cavalry to the Rhine, and Q. Titurius Sabinus to Normandy, while the main attack was directed against the Veneti by land and sea. Decimus Brutus hastily formed a fleet of ships, which he levied from the maritime cantons, or caused to be built on the Loire, while Caesar advanced with the best of his infantry. But the country was poor in supplies: the towns were built on islands close to the shore or on spits of land, and when the Romans had at length reduced any one of them, they had to look on while the enemy transferred their goods and families by sea to another. At length the Roman fleet arrived off the coast of Brittany; but their light vessels were no match for the strong sailing ships of the Veneti, which were too high to be exposed to damage from the Roman missiles, and too strong to be injured by the iron beaks of their ships. But the Romans disabled the enemy by cutting the ropes which fastened the sails to the yards with long poles to which sickles were fastened, and then boarded and captured the ship. A calm set in, which prevented the Veneti from gaining the high seas, and the whole immense fleet was nearly destroyed. Thus, as at Mylae two hundred years before this, the earliest naval battle fought on the Atlantic, was decided in favour of the Romans by a lucky invention. The whole coast submitted, and as an example of severity Caesar caused the whole council of the Veneti to be executed, and the people to be sold to the last man.

Meanwhile Sabinus had stood on the defensive until he could provoke the army opposed to him to an attack, which he defeated. The Morini and Menapii, who were now threatened by Caesar, retired into the depths of the Ar-

dennes, and after persevering for some days in his advance, he was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything.

Communications with Gaul had hitherto been carried on by the road over the western Alps, laid out by Pompeius in 77 B.C. Now that central Gaul was open to intercourse with Italy, a shorter route crossing the Alps in a northerly direction was required. Accordingly, in 57 B.C. Servius Galba was sent to occupy Octodurum and to subdue the neighbouring tribes, in order to secure the merchant route over the St. Bernard and along the lake of Geneva. In 56 B.C. Publius Crassus was sent into Aquitania with the similar object of conquering the Iberian tribes there, and, though opposed by contingents from beyond the Pyrenees led by officers trained in the Sertorian wars, he succeeded in reducing all the country between the Garonne and the Pyrenees.

Fourth campaign, 55 B.C.

The pacification of Gaul, so far as it could be effected by the sword, was now accomplished; but the work of defending Gaul from the Germans was still unfinished. During the winter the Usipetes and Tencteri had effected a crossing in numbers amounting to 430,000 and were intending to advance into central Gaul. On the approach of the Roman legions the invaders seemed ready to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome; but a suspicion arose in Caesar's mind that they were only negotiating to obtain delay, and, when this was confirmed by an attack upon his vanguard during the *de facto* suspension of arms, he believed himself absolved from all obligation to observe the principles of international law. When the German princes appeared to apologize for the attack, they were arrested; and the whole host, thus deprived of its leaders, was attacked and cut to pieces. However deserving of censure Caesar's conduct may have been, the German encroachments were effectually checked.

Caesar determined to follow up this blow by an expedition to the other side of the river, for which the protection afforded by the Sugambri to the fugitives of the Usipetes and Tencteri furnished a sufficient excuse. He accordingly crossed into the Ubian territory, and received the submission of several cantons. But the Sugambri withdrew into the interior; the districts adjoining the Ubii

were laid waste, while a large force assembled at a distance. Caesar did not accept the challenge, but recrossed the Rhine after a stay of eighteen days.

The remainder of the season was occupied with an expedition into Britain, which furnished, if not armed assistance, at any rate a safe asylum to the patriots of the continent. Publius Crassus had already, in 57 B.C., crossed to the Scilly islands, and in the summer of 55 B.C. Caesar himself crossed, in the narrowest part of the Channel, with two legions. The coast was covered with multitudes of the enemy, and the war chariots moved on as fast by land as the Roman galleys by sea; and it was only with great difficulty and under cover of the missiles thrown from the ships of war, that a landing was effected. Some villages submitted, but soon the natives appeared from the interior and threatened the camp; a storm severely damaged the fleet, and, as soon as the necessary repairs were accomplished, the Romans returned to Gaul.

Fifth campaign, 54 B.C.

During the winter a fleet of eight hundred sail was fitted out, and in the spring Caesar sailed a second time, with five legions and two thousand cavalry. The landing was unopposed; but a second time the fleet was nearly destroyed by the storms, and while the Romans repaired the disaster the British tribes made preparations for defence. The resistance was headed by Cassivellaunus, who ruled in what is now Middlesex and the surrounding counties. He dismissed the general levy, retaining only the war chariots, with which he dogged Caesar's footsteps, threatening his communications and devastating the country through which he was about to pass. The Thames was crossed, and the Trinobantes gave in their submission; but an attack by the men of Kent upon the fleet warned Caesar of the danger to which he was constantly subject, and the storming of a huge abatis where the cattle of the country were collected was an exploit considerable enough to afford an excuse for retreat. Cassivellaunus promised hostages and tribute, probably with no intention of giving either, and Caesar recrossed into Gaul. His immediate object—of “rousing the islanders from their haughty security” seems certainly to have been attained.

The subjection of Gaul was now complete, while both Britons and Germans had been impressed with a sense of the power of Rome; but many circumstances combined to make the Celtic nation restive under its yoke. They were ashamed when they had to confess that a nation numbering a million armed men had been subdued by fifty thousand Romans. Central Gaul and the Belgian confederacy had submitted almost without striking a blow; but the heroic resistance of the Veneti and of the Britons incited the patriotic Celts to make another attempt to recover their freedom. Even in 54 B.C. the Treveri had absented themselves from the general diet, and Caesar had carried with him into Britain their foremost men as hostages; and when the Haeduan Dumnorix refused to embark, he was pursued and cut down by Caesar's orders. His death created a deep impression all through the ranks of the Celtic nobility; every man felt that the fate of Dumnorix might be his own.

Sixth campaign, 53 B.C.

In the winter of 54-53 B.C. the main body of the Roman army was quartered in Belgian territory, in six separate divisions for convenience in the matter of supplies. The most easterly division of all, in the territory of the Eburones near Aduatuca, consisting of a legion under Quintus Titurius Sabinus, and some cohorts under Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, was suddenly surrounded by the general levy of the Eburones, under their kings Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. Provisions were ample, and the attacks of the Eburones were futile against the Roman entrenchments. But Ambiorix informed Sabinus that all the Roman divisions were being assailed simultaneously, and that all was lost unless they could effect a junction. Out of friendship for the Romans he offered them a free retreat to the nearest camp, two days' march distant. This account was credible enough; but the immediate duty of Sabinus was undoubtedly to maintain at all costs the post committed to his trust; but though he was strongly dissuaded by Cotta and others, the proposal of Ambiorix was accepted. About two miles from the camp the Romans found themselves surrounded in a narrow valley. The Eburones plied them with missiles, but would not enter into a close combat. Escape was impossible, and Sabinus

demanding an interview with Ambiorix. At the conference he was killed with his principal officers, and the whole Roman division was slain in the attack which followed, except a few who regained the camp, and threw themselves upon their swords in the following night.

The insurrection now broke out at every point. First the Eburones, reinforced by the Aduatuci, the Menapii, and the Nervii, attacked the division under Quintus Cicero in the last-mentioned canton. The besiegers constructed ramparts and entrenchments, and showered fire-balls and burning spears against the thatched huts of the Roman camp. The rising was so universal that it was long before the news of this or of the preceding attack upon Sabinus reached the general. At length a Celtic horseman stole through the enemy from Cicero. Caesar set out with only seven thousand men and four hundred cavalry; but the news of his approach was enough to raise the siege at the critical moment, when not one in ten of Cicero's men remained unwounded. The insurgent army attacked Caesar, but were defeated, and the whole insurrection almost immediately collapsed. The Eastern levies returned to their homes. The Treveri, who had advanced to attack Labienus among the Remi, also desisted for the present. Towards the close of the winter Caesar set out, with his army largely reinforced, to crush the remains of the revolt. The Nervii, Senones, and Carnutes were routed. Even the unconquered Menapii had now to submit. The Treveri were crushed, and the chief power among them reverted to the Roman party. The Germans, who had sent aid to the insurgents, were intimidated by a second crossing of the Rhine. As to the Eburones, Caesar had worn mourning ever since the disaster of Aduatuca, and had sworn not to remove it till he had revenged the treacherous death of his soldiers. Ten Roman legions now advanced into their country, after the cavalry had all but surprised Ambiorix in his house. At the same time the neighbouring tribes were invited to join in the pillage, and even a band of Sugambrian horsemen from beyond the Rhine accepted the invitation. It was a man-hunt rather than war. Many of the Eburones put themselves to death. Some few, including Ambiorix, escaped over the Rhine. Punishment now fell upon particular men in the several cantons,

and the Carnutic knight, Acco, was beheaded by the Roman lictors. At the end of 53 B.C. Caesar crossed the Alps to watch the daily increasing complications of the capital.

Seventh campaign, 52 B.C.

But for once Caesar had miscalculated. "The fire was smothered, but not extinguished." The death of Acco again filled the whole Celtic nobility with consternation. The position of affairs was most favourable for revolt. Caesar was at a distance on the other side of the Alps, while his army was encamped on the Seine. The Roman troops might be surrounded and the province overrun before he could appear, even if affairs in Italy did not prevent his return. The signal was given at Cenabum (Orleans), and all the Romans there were massacred. Everywhere the patriots were astir. Even the Arverni, the staunchest supporters of the Romans in all Gaul, were brought to join the insurrection, after a revolution which overthrew the government of the common council and made Vercingetorix, the leader of the Arvernian patriots, king. The latter soon became for the Celts what Cassivellaunus had been for the Britons. It was felt that he, if any man, was to save the nation. The insurrection spread in the west from the Garonne to the Loire, and Vercingetorix was everywhere recognized as commander-in-chief. But in central Gaul the Haedui, on whom the accession of the eastern cantons—the Sequani and Helvetii—depended, wavered. The patriotic party was strong among them, but their old antagonism to the Arverni was stronger; and while they still wavered, Caesar appeared north of the Alps, to the astonishment alike of friend and foe. He quickly provided for the defence of the old province, and sent a force northwards into Arvernian territory; then, attended by only a few horsemen, he stole through the country of the Haedui, and was again at the head of his troops.

The presence of Caesar made it impossible for the insurgents to proceed in the ordinary manner of warfare. Vercingetorix determined to make his cavalry enormously superior to that of the Romans, to lay waste the land far and wide, to burn down the towns, villages, and dépôts of supplies, and to cut off the enemy's communications.

The infantry he did not allow to face the Romans, but attempted gradually to impart to them some of the rudiments of discipline and training. He persuaded his countrymen to destroy all towns not capable of defence, and to concentrate all their powers upon a few strong fortresses.

The first operation of the insurgents was an attack upon the Boii, made with the view of annihilating them before Caesar could arrive. The latter started immediately from Agedincum, got together a small force of cavalry formed of German mercenaries mounted on Italian and Spanish horses, and, after causing Cenabum to be burnt, crossed the Loire into the country of the Bituriges. Here the new mode of warfare was tried for the first time. Twenty-four townships of the Bituriges perished on the same day, and the neighbouring cantons were ordered to follow this example. Avaricum (Bourges), the capital of the Bituriges, was to have met the same fate, but, in compliance with the entreaties of the magistrates of the Bituriges, it was resolved to defend the city.

The infantry were placed in a position near the town, where they were completely protected by morasses. The cavalry commanded all the roads and obstructed communications. Caesar could not bring on a battle, and all his attacks upon the town were repelled by the courage of the besieged. The difficulty of supplies became daily more serious, and the Roman soldiers were at length reduced to flesh rations. But at the same time the difficulties of the besieged increased, until the town could no longer be held. It was determined to evacuate and destroy it, but on the night of departure the wailing of the women betrayed the plan of Vercingetorix to the Romans, and the attempt miscarried: on the following day the walls were scaled, and neither age nor sex was spared.

Judging by former experience Caesar might have expected that the revolt would now collapse; so, after making a demonstration in the country of the Haedui, he sent Labienus with two legions to Agedincum, where were two more guarding the baggage; while he himself, with six, advanced into the Arvernian mountains.

Labienus advanced from Agedincum to get possession of Lutetia (Paris), but the town was burned by Camulo-

genus, the insurgent leader, who refused to give battle, but took up a position where he held the Roman army in check.

The main army succeeded in baffling the attempts of Vercingetorix to stop it, and arrived before Gergovia, the capital of the Arverni. Here immense stores had been collected, and the insurgent troops were encamped in a strong position under the walls of the town, which was on a hill, and were protected by strong ramparts. Caesar was not strong enough either to besiege the town or to blockade it, but remained inactive, facing his antagonist. Such a check was almost equivalent to a defeat; the Haedui prepared to join the revolt in earnest, and a body of Haeduan troops, on the march to join Caesar, was induced by its officers to declare against him, and was only recalled to nominal obedience by the presence of Caesar, who had hurried to meet it with two-thirds of his army. But during his absence Vercingetorix had attacked the Roman camp and very nearly stormed it, and it was plain that the Haeduan troops could scarcely be relied on. He determined therefore to withdraw from Gergovia, and to march at once into the canton of the Haedui, but first to make one more attempt to capture the town. While the majority of the garrison were entrenching one side of the ramparts, Caesar attacked the other; the walls of the camp were scaled, but the whole garrison took the alarm, and Caesar dared not attack the city wall. He gave the signal for retreat, but the foremost legions were carried away by the fervour of victory, and pushed on—some even into the city. They were met by masses upon masses of the garrison, who gradually forced them back, and at last chased them down the hill, where the troops stationed in the plain received them into safety. Seven hundred men, including forty-six centurions, had fallen; Gergovia remained untaken, and the halo of victory that had surrounded Caesar in Gaul began to fade away.

The Haedui at once arose, their contingent deserted from Caesar, and carried off with it the Roman depôts on the Loire. The Belgae began to stir, the Bellovaci marched to attack Labienus in the rear, and, with the exception of the Remi and the cantons immediately depending upon them, “the whole Celtic nation, from the Pyrenees to the

Rhine, was now for the first and last time in arms for freedom and nationality."

It was a grave crisis, and many voices were raised in favour of a retreat over the Cevennes into the old province. But Caesar rejected these timid counsels, called out the general levy of the province, and set out for Agedincum, whither Labienus was ordered immediately to retreat. Labienus crossed the Seine under the eyes of the enemy, fought a battle in which Camulogenus was defeated and slain, and succeeded in effecting a junction with Caesar.

The insurgents adhered to the same plan of campaign. A national assembly confirmed Vercingetorix in the supreme command, and adopted his plans without alteration. A new position was selected at Alesia (Alise Sainte Reine in the Côte d'Or), and another camp constructed. The army was ordered thither, and the cavalry raised to fifteen thousand. Caesar marched southwards to protect the province, and repulsed, with his newly levied German squadrons, the Celtic cavalry which attacked him on the route. Vercingetorix shut himself up in Alesia, and Caesar had no alternative but to besiege him there or to abandon the offensive altogether. But the whole of the Roman troops were now united, and the cavalry of Caesar were successful in every encounter: the communications of the Celtic army were cut, and the supplies of the town would soon be exhausted by the enormous army (80,000 foot and 15,000 horse) and the numerous inhabitants. At the moment when the Roman lines were on the point of completion, Vercingetorix dismissed all his cavalry with orders to rouse the whole nation for the relief of Alesia. The miserable inhabitants were turned out of the town, and perished of hunger between the lines on either side. At last the huge host of the relieving army appeared—in number amounting to 250,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry. But Caesar had prepared himself to be besieged, and his rear was protected by a strong line of entrenchments. A determined assault was made upon the Romans from without and from within; and on the second day the Celts succeeded, at a point where the lines ran over the slope of a hill, in filling up the trenches and hurling the defenders from the ramparts. Labienus threw himself with four legions upon the enemy. It was the crisis

of the struggle, and the assailants were gradually forced back, while squadrons of cavalry assailed them in the rear and completed the rout.

The fate of Alesia and of the Celtic nation was decided. The army dispersed, and the king was, by his own consent, delivered up to the Romans for punishment, in order to avert as far as possible destruction from the nation, by bringing it upon his own head. "Mounted on his steed and in full armour the king of the Arvernians appeared before the Roman proconsul, and rode round his tribunal; then he surrendered his horse and arms, and sat down in silence on the steps at Caesar's feet." Five years afterwards he was led in Caesar's triumph, and beheaded at the foot of the Capitol. "As after a day of gloom the sun breaks through the clouds at its setting, so destiny bestows on nations that are going down a last great man. Thus Hannibal stands at the close of the Phœnician history, and Vercingetorix at the close of the Celtic. They were not able to save the nations to which they belonged from a foreign yoke, but they spared them the last remaining disgrace, an inglorious fall. . . . The whole ancient world presents no more genuine knight (than Vercingetorix), whether as regards his essential character or his outward appearance. But man ought not to be a mere knight, and least of all the statesman. It was the knight, not the hero, who disdained to escape from Alesia, when he alone was of more consequence to the nation than a hundred thousand ordinary brave men. It was the knight, not the hero, who gave himself up as a sacrifice, when the only thing gained by that sacrifice was that the nation publicly dishonoured itself, and with equal cowardice and absurdity employed its last breath in proclaiming that its great historical death-struggle was a crime against its oppressor. How very different was the conduct of Hannibal in similar positions! It is impossible to part from the noble king of the Arverni without a feeling of historical and human sympathy; but it is characteristic of the Celtic nation, that its greatest man was after all merely a knight."

After the fall of Alesia no united effort was made to continue the insurrection; the league fell to pieces, and every clan made what terms it could with the conqueror. Caesar was anxious for many reasons to bring the war to

a close, and the easy temperament of the Gauls met him halfway. Where there was a strong Roman party, as among the Haedui and Arverni, the cantons obtained a complete restoration of their former relations with Rome, and their captives were released without ransom, while those of the other clans became the slaves of the legions. But not a few cantons refused to make submission, until the Roman troops appeared within their borders. Such expeditions were undertaken in the winter and in the following summer against the Bituriges and Carnutes, the Bellovaci and other Belgic cantons. The Bellovacian king Correus offered a brave resistance, but was at last slain in a skirmish. On the Loire considerable bands assembled, and required a considerable Roman force to defeat them. The last remnant of opposition was at Uxellodunum on the Lot, where Drappes and Lucterius, the brave adjutant of Vercingetorix, shut themselves up in the last resort. The town was taken only after Caesar had appeared in person, and the spring from which the garrison derived water had been diverted. The whole garrison were dismissed to their homes after their hands had been cut off.

Thus Gaul was finally subdued after eight years' war. Hardly a year later the Roman troops had to be withdrawn, owing to the outbreak of civil war; yet the Celts did not rise against the foreign yoke, and Gaul was the only part of the Roman empire where there was no fighting against Caesar. Later disturbances, like the rising of the Bellovaci in 46 B.C., were easily dealt with by the local governors. This state of peace was, it is true, purchased to a large extent by allowing the more distant districts to withdraw themselves *de facto* from the Roman allegiance; but however unfinished the building of Caesar may have been, its foundations remained firm and unshaken.

For the present the newly acquired provinces were united with the province of Narbo, but when Caesar gave up this governorship, in 46 B.C., two new governorships, of Gaul proper and Belgica, were formed. The individual cantons of course lost their independence, and paid to Rome a fixed tribute which they levied themselves. The total was £400,000; but masses of gold from the treasures of temples and of rich men also flowed to Rome, to such

an extent that, as compared with silver, gold fell twenty-five per cent.

Existing arrangements were everywhere allowed to remain as far as possible: the hereditary kingships, the feudal oligarchies, even the system of clientship by which one canton was dependent on another still existed. Caesar's sole object was to arrange matters in the interest of Rome, and to bring into power the men favourably disposed to Roman rule. Cantons where the Roman party was strong and trustworthy, such as the Remi, the Lingones, and the Haedui, received the right of alliance which gave them much greater communal freedom, and were invested with the hegemony over other cantons. The national worship and its priests were preserved as much as possible.

At the same time, Caesar did what he could to stimulate the Romanization of Gaul. A number of Celts of rank were admitted into the Roman citizenship—perhaps into the Roman senate; Latin was made the official language in several cantons; and while smaller money might be coined by the local authorities for local circulation, this might only be done in conformity with the Roman standard, and the coinage of gold and of denarii was reserved for the Roman magistrates alone.* Hereafter the organization of the cantons approached more nearly to the Italian urban constitution, and both the common councils and the chief towns became of far greater importance than hitherto. If Caesar did little in the way of founding colonies—only two settlements can be traced to him, that of Noviodunum and that of the Boii—it was because circumstances did not allow him to exchange the sword for the plough. No one probably saw more clearly than himself the military and political advantages of establishing a series of Transalpine colonies as bases of support for the new centre of civilization.

Gaul as a nation had ceased to exist; it was absorbed in a politically superior nationality. The course of the war was significant enough of the character of the nation: at the outset only single districts, and those German or half German, offered energetic resistance; and when foreign

* The following inscription occurs on a semis struck by a vergobrete of the Lexovii: "Cisiambos Cattos vercobreto; Simissos publicos Lixovio." The writing and stamping are as bad as the Latin.

rule was established, the attempts to shake it off were either without plan or were the work of certain prominent nobles, and with the death or capture of an Indutiomarus or a Vercingetorix the struggle was at an end. In the severe words of a Roman, "The Celts boldly challenge danger in the future, but lose their courage before its presence." All accounts of the ancient Celts bring out a striking similarity between them and the modern Irish. "Every feature reappears: the laziness in the culture of the fields: the delight in tippling and brawling; the ostentation—we may recall that sword of Caesar hung up in the sacred grove of the Arvernians after the victory of Gergovia, which its alleged former owner viewed with a smile at the consecrated spot, and which he ordered to be carefully preserved;—the language full of comparisons and hyperboles, of allusions and quaint turns; the droll humour—an excellent example of which was the rule, that if any one interrupted a person speaking in public, a substantial and very visible hole should be cut, as a measure of police, in the coat of the disturber of the peace; . . the curiosity, . . the extravagant credulity, . . the childlike piety, . . the unsurpassed fervour of national feeling, . . . the incapacity to preserve a self-reliant courage equally remote from presumption and from pusillanimity. . . . It is, and remains, at all times and places the same indolent and poetical, irresolute and fervid, inquisitive, credulous, amiable, clever, but—in a political point of view—thoroughly useless nation; and therefore its fate has been always and everywhere the same."

But the ruin of the Celtic nation was not the most important result of Caesar's wars. Nothing but the insight and energy of Caesar prevented Gaul from being overrun by the Germans, in whom the Roman statesman saw the rivals and antagonists of the Romano-Greek world. By his conquests and organization he gained time for the West to acquire that culture which the East had already assumed: but for him the great "migration of peoples" which took place four hundred years later under the Gothic Theodoric would have taken place under Ariovistus; and if the Roman empire had escaped destruction, the Western world at any rate would have been cut off from it.

While Caesar was creating for Rome a scientific frontier

in the West, the whole northern frontier had been disturbed from time to time. In north-east Italy, in Illyria, in Macedonia, and in Thrace there had been resistance to the Roman rule, which had been usually met in a temporary and partial manner by the senatorial governors. In one quarter only, among the Dacians, north of the Danube, a new power had arisen. Among this people there had been in primeval times a holy man called Zamolxis, associated with the king. This divine personage, after years of travel in foreign lands and after studying the wisdom of the Egyptian priests and of the Greek Pythagoreans, had returned to his native country to end his life as a hermit. He was accessible only to the king and to his servants, and gave forth through the king oracles with reference to all important undertakings. By the nation he was regarded first as priest of the supreme god, then as god himself: and this peculiar combination of monarchy and theocracy had become a permanent institution, and probably gave to the kings of the Getae a position something similar to that of the caliphs. About this time a marvellous reform of the nation was carried out by Boerebistas, king of the Getae, and the god Dekaeneos. The people were metamorphosed from unexampled drunkenness to temperance and valour, and the king used their puritanic enthusiasm to found a mighty kingdom, which extended along both banks of the Danube and stretched southward into Thrace, Illyria and Noricum. No direct contact with the Romans had yet taken place, "but this much it needed no prophetic gift to foretell, that proconsuls like Antonius and Piso were nowise fitted to contend with gods."

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Most of the above writers touch upon Gaul incidentally, as well as in the particular passages mentioned. For identification of localities, see notes to Momms. *Hist. of R. v.* ch. vii. Cf. also Momms. *Hist. of R.* bk. viii. "The Provinces from Caesar to Diocletian," *passim*, especially ch. 1, 3, 4, 5.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE JOINT RULE OF POMPEIUS AND CAESAR.

58-56 B.C. Growing opposition to the regents—Pompeius fails to control the capital.—56 B.C. Conference at Luca.—55 B.C. Pompeius and Crassus consuls.—53 B.C. Murder of Clodius.—52 B.C. Pompeius dictator.

OF the three joint rulers Pompeius was undoubtedly the foremost in the eyes of the Roman world. Nor is this surprising, for Pompeius was undoubtedly the first general of his time, while Caesar, so far as he was known, was only a dexterous party leader. In the eyes of the multitude he was to Pompeius what Flavius and Afranius had been—a useful instrument for political purposes. And if the position of Pompeius under the Galian law was compared with that of Caesar under the Vatinian, the comparison was to the advantage of the former; for Pompeius had almost the whole resources of the state under his control, and ruled nearly the whole empire, while Caesar had only certain fixed sums and four legions, and ruled two provinces. Caesar, again, was to resign his command after five years, while Pompeius had fixed his own time for retirement.

But Pompeius attempted a task beyond his powers when he undertook to rule the capital—a problem always infinitely difficult, because there was no armed force at the disposal of the government, whatever it might be. The result was complete anarchy: “after Caesar’s departure the coalition still ruled doubtless the destinies of the world, but not the streets of the capital.” The senate felt its impotence, and attempted no show of authority; Pompeius shut himself up and sulked in silence; the sound portion

of the citizens, who had at heart freedom and order, kept rigorously aloof from politics. But for the rabble of all sorts, high and low, it was a time of carnival; "demagogism became quite a trade, which accordingly did not lack its professional insignia—the threadbare mantle, the shaggy beard, the long streaming hair, the deep bass voice."

Greeks and Jews, freedmen and slaves, were the most regular attendants at the popular assemblies, and often only a minority of those voting consisted of burgesses legally constituted. The real rulers of Rome were the armed bands, raised by adventurers out of gladiatorial slaves and blackguards of all sorts. These bands had hitherto been usually under the control of the popular leaders, but now all discipline was at an end, and the leaders of the bands fought either for the democracy, for the senate, or for Crassus: Clodius had fought at different times for all three.

The most noted of these street leaders was Publius Clodius, whom the regents had already made use of against Cato and Cicero. During his tribunate he had exerted all his great talent, energy, and influence to promote an ultra-democratic policy: he gave the citizens corn gratis; prohibited the obstruction of the comitia by religious formalities; re-established the street-clubs (*collegia compitalicia*), which constituted a complete organization of the whole proletariat of the city according to streets; and set the seal of Divine favour upon his doings by erecting a grand temple of Liberty on the Palatine.

The position of Pompeius was soon seriously compromised: Clodius opposed him in a trifling matter about the sending back of a captive Armenian prince, and the quarrel became a serious feud. Pompeius revenged himself by allowing the return of Cicero, the bitter enemy of Clodius. But the real battle-ground was in the streets; and here, though Pompeius had his own hired gangs, Clodius was usually victorious. To complete the spectacle, both parties in the quarrel courted the favour of the senate; Pompeius pleased it by recalling Cicero, Clodius by declaring the Julian laws null and void. Naturally no positive result came from this "political witches' revel"—it was quite aimless; demagogism was a mere makeshift in the interregnum between republic and monarchy. It had not even

the effect of kindling the desire for a strong government based on military power; for those citizens likely to be affected in this way lived mostly away from Rome, and were not touched by the anarchy which prevailed there; and besides, they had already been thoroughly converted to the cause of authority by the Catilinarian attempts. The only important result of all this confusion was the painful position of Pompeius, which must have had considerable influence upon his future conduct.

Far more important than the change in the relations of Pompeius with Clodius was his altered position with regard to Caesar. While Pompeius had failed to fulfil the functions assigned to him, Caesar had been brilliantly successful: he had crushed the threatening Cimbrian invasion, and in two years had carried the Roman arms to the Rhine and the Channel. Already, in 57 B.C., the senate had voted him the usual honours in far richer measure than had ever been accorded to Pompeius. Caesar was now the hero of the day, master of the most powerful Roman army, while Pompeius was merely an ex-general who had once been famous. No rupture had taken place, but it was evident that the alliance must be at an end when the relative position of the parties was reversed. At any rate Pompeius found it necessary to abandon his attitude of haughty reserve, and to come forward and attempt to gain for himself a command which would again put him on equal terms with Caesar. To do this he must be able to control the machinery of government: but by his awkward quarrel with Clodius he had lost command of the streets, and therefore could not count on carrying his point in the popular assembly; and, at the same time, it was doubtful whether after his long inaction, even the senate was sufficiently under his influence to grant what he wished.

The opposition to the regents had been growing in strength and importance, and they were powerless to check it: in consequence, a change occurred in the position of the senate, which found itself largely increased in importance. The marriage alliance of Caesar and Pompeius, and the banishments of Cato and of Cicero suggested unpleasantly to the public mind the decrees and alliances of monarchs, and men began to perceive that it was no modification of the republican constitution which was at stake, but the

existence of the republic itself. Many of the best men who had hitherto belonged to the popular party now passed over to the other side. The "three dynasts," the "three-headed monster," were phrases in everybody's mouth. Even the masses began to waver: Caesar's consular orations were listened to without a sound; at the theatre no applause greeted his entrance, and his tools and associates were publicly hissed. The rulers hinted to the equites that their opposition might cost them their new special seats in the theatre, and that the commons might lose their free corn. Caesar's wealth was employed in every direction to gain adherents; no one, unless hopelessly lost, was refused assistance in distress, and the enormous buildings set on foot by Caesar and Pompeius brought gain to great numbers of men in every position. But corruption could only touch a comparatively small number, and every day brought proofs of the strong attachment of the people to the existing constitution and of their hatred of monarchy. Under representative institutions the popular discontent would have found an outlet at the elections, but under the existing circumstances the only course left for the supporters of the republic was to range themselves under the banner of the senate. Thus, for the moment, the senate rested on a firmer support than it had enjoyed for years; it began to bestir itself again. With the approval and support of the senate, a proposal was submitted to the people, permitting the return of Cicero. An unusual number of good citizens, especially from the country towns, attended on the day of voting (Aug. 4, 57 B.C.), and the journey of the orator from Brundisium to Rome was made the occasion of a brilliant demonstration in favour of the senate and the constitution. Pompeius was helpless, and his helplessness disarmed the party in the senate favourable to the regents. Had the senate possessed a leader their cause might even yet have won; they might have cancelled the extraordinary powers as unconstitutional, and summoned all the republicans of Italy to arm against the tyrants. But the necessary leader was wanting, and the aristocracy were too indolent to take so simple and bold a resolution. They preferred to side with Pompeius against Caesar, in the hope that a rupture between the two was inevitable; and to settle

matters with Pompeius, after victory, might be expected to be no very difficult matter.

It seemed natural that an alliance between Pompeius and the republicans should be formed, but the matter was brought to a test when, in the autumn of 57 B.C., Pompeius came before the senate with a proposal to entrust him with extraordinary official power. His proposal was based upon the price of corn in the capital, which had again reached an oppressive height, owing to the continuance of piracy and the negligence of the government in supervising the supply. He wished to be entrusted with the superintendence of all matters relating to corn supply throughout the whole empire, and for this purpose to be invested with unlimited control over the state treasure, with an army and fleet, and with powers superior to those of the ordinary governor in every province; and to this command he hoped that the conduct of the impending Egyptian war would naturally be added. The senate accepted the proposal in principle with outward obsequiousness, but made alterations which seriously curtailed the general's authority. Pompeius obtained no unlimited power, but merely certain large sums and fifteen adjutants for the purpose of organizing due supplies for the capital, and, in all matters relating to grain supply only, full proconsular power throughout the empire for five years. The decree of the senate was ratified by the people. The regent had missed his object, but he had obtained definite employment and an excuse for leaving the capital, and the supply of corn was soon in a more satisfactory condition. Still, without troops his proconsular authority was only a shadow, and he got a second proposal made in the senate, conferring upon him the charge of restoring the expelled king of Egypt, if necessary by force of arms. But the senate grew less and less compliant; it was discovered in the Sibylline books that it was impious to send a Roman army to Egypt. Pompeius was ready to accept the mission even without an army, but the senate refused to risk so valuable a life, and ultimately resolved not to interfere at all (Jan., 56 B.C.).

These rebuffs of Pompeius were, of course, regarded as defeats of the regents generally; and the tide of opposition rose higher and higher. The elections for 56 B.C. had

gone only very partially according to the wishes of the triumvirate, and for the consulship of 55 B.C. Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus announced himself as a candidate with the avowed object of actively opposing them. The senate solemnly deliberated over an opinion which was furnished by certain Etruscan soothsayers of repute, that the whole power over the army and treasure threatened to pass to one ruler, and that the state would lose its freedom. But they soon went on to a more practical declaration of war. As early as December, 57 B.C., the opinion had been expressed in the senate that the laws of Caesar's consulship, especially the law about the domain land of Capua, must be cancelled; and in April, 56 B.C., Cicero moved that the Capuan law should be taken into consideration on May the 1st. Domitius soon afterwards declared that he intended as consul to propose to the burgesses the immediate recall of Caesar; and in this manner the nobility threw down the gauntlet to the regents.

The triumvirs had no time to lose. Crassus immediately started north to confer with Caesar, whom he found at Ravenna; at Luca they were joined by Pompeius, who had left Rome ostensibly on business connected with the supply of grain. The most noted adherents of the rulers, such as Metellus Nepos, proconsul of Hither Spain, and Appius Claudius, proprætor of Sardinia, followed them. A hundred and twenty lictors and two hundred senators were counted at the conference; it was almost a rival senate of the monarchy as opposed to the other senate of the republic. The decisive voice lay with Caesar, and he used it to re-establish the joint rule on a firmer basis, with a more equal distribution of power. The most important governorships after Gaul, namely the two Spains and Syria, were assigned, the former to Pompeius, the latter to Crassus, and were to be secured by decree of the people for five years. Caesar was to have his own office prolonged for another five years, from 54 B.C. to the close of 49 B.C.; and to be allowed to increase his legions to ten, and to charge the pay of his arbitrarily levied troops on the state chest. Pompeius and Crassus were to hold the consulship for 55 B.C., before departing for their provinces, and Caesar was to be consul in 48 B.C.,

after the termination of his command. The military support necessary for the regulation of the capital was to be supplied by raising legions for the Spanish and Syrian armies, and keeping them in Italy as long as should seem convenient. Minor details were easily settled by Caesar's magic influence; Pompeius and Crassus were reconciled to each other, and even Clodius was induced to give no further annoyance to Pompeius.

The reasons which induced Caesar to concede to his rival so powerful a position—a position which he had refused him in 60 B.C., when the league was formed—can only be conjectured. It was not that necessity compelled him, for Pompeius was a powerless suppliant at Caesar's feet; and even if, in case of a rupture, he had joined the optimates, the alliance would not have been so formidable as to demand so heavy a price to prevent it. Probably Caesar was not yet prepared for civil war; but in any case the decision of peace or war rested, not with Pompeius, but with the opposition. Possibly purely personal motives may have contributed; Caesar was not the man to be disloyal to his allies, and he may have hesitated to break the heart of his beloved daughter, who was sincerely attached to her husband:—"in his soul there was room for much besides the statesman." But the main reason was undoubtedly the consideration of Gaul. If Caesar's object was to become king of Rome as soon as possible, it was a grave blunder to give up his present enormous superiority over his rivals, and especially to put Pompeius in a position to settle matters independently with the senate. But Caesar's was no vulgar ambition; the conquest of Gaul was an enterprise on which depended the external security and internal reorganization of the empire; it was necessary for the repression of German invasions, and necessary to furnish new soil for Italian civilization. But Caesar's Gallic conquests hindered far more than they helped him on the way to the throne, and it yielded him bitter fruit that he postponed the revolution from 56 to 48 B.C.

The aristocracy did not make good its gage: "they had taken up arms only to lay them down as soon as the adversary merely put his hand to the sheath." Nothing more was heard about discussion of the Julian laws in the senate; the legions raised by Caesar were charged on the

public chest, and the attempts to take from him one or both of his provinces decisively failed (May, 56 B.C.). Cicero was among the first to repent, and applied to himself "epithets more appropriate than flattering." * The troops for Syria did indeed depart, but the legions for Spain were dismissed on furlough, and Pompeius remained with them in Italy. At the same time the regents acted deliberately in such a manner as to withdraw from the senate what had hitherto been its especial function—the management of military matters and of foreign affairs. The arrangements made at Luca with regard to the provinces of Gaul, Spain, and Syria were submitted to and approved by the people. The regents lent and borrowed troops from each other without authority. The Transpadani were apparently treated by Caesar as full burgesses of Rome, though they had legally only Latin rights. Caesar organized his conquests and founded colonies, such as *Novum Comum*, without the consent of the senate. The Thracian, Egyptian, and Parthian wars were conducted by the generals in command without consulting or even reporting to the senate.

The majority of the senate submitted humbly enough to necessity. Cicero was now completely in the service of the regents. His brother was an officer in Caesar's army, in some measure as a hostage. Cicero himself was compelled to accept an office under Pompeius, on pretence of which he might be banished at any moment; and he submitted to be relieved from his pecuniary embarrassments by loans from Caesar and by an appointment to the joint overseership of the vast building operations in the capital. Many prominent members of the nobility were kept subservient by similar methods; but there remained a certain section which could be neither intimidated nor cajoled. The foremost of these was Cato, who ceaselessly, at the peril of his life, offered the most determined opposition in senate-house and Forum. The regents did not molest him and his followers; strong measures would have made them martyrs, and, after all, their activity was unavailing. But though destitute of important results, their action fostered and gave the watchword to the widespread discontent which fermented in secret: and they were often able to draw the majority in the senate, which secretly sympathized

* "*Me asinum germanum fuisse*" (*Ad Att.*, iv. 5. 3).

with them, into isolated decrees against its masters and their adherents. Thus Gabinius was refused a public thanksgiving in 56 B.C.; Piso was recalled from his province; and the senate wore mourning when the tribune Gaius Cato hindered the elections of 55 B.C. as long as the republican consul Marcellinus remained in office. But the great fact was unaltered—the regents were supreme. “No one,” says a contemporary writer, “is of the slightest account except the three; the regents are all powerful, and they take care that no one shall remain in doubt about it; the whole state is virtually transformed, and obeys the dictators.”

The opposition, powerless in the field of government, could not nevertheless be dislodged from certain departments of state which had considerable political influence—the elections of magistrates, and the jury-courts. The former, which belong properly to the government of the state, were, under the present *régime*, when the government was really wielded by extraordinary magistrates, unimportant; the ordinary magistrates themselves were ciphers, and the elections sank into mere demonstrations. The regents spared no pains to gain the victory even here: the lists of candidates for some years was settled at Luca; large sums were expended upon elections, and numbers of soldiers were sent on furlough from the armies of Caesar and Pompeius to vote at Rome. But the result was only partial success. For 55 B.C. Pompeius and Crassus were elected only by open violence and after the most scandalous scenes. For 54 B.C. Domitius was elected consul, and Cato praetor; while the candidates for the regents were convicted of the most shameful corruption in the elections for 53 B.C., and were abandoned by their principals. These defeats may be accounted for partly by the wide discontent at the rule of the triumvirate; mainly by the elaborately organized system of political clubs which were entirely controlled by the nobility.

The jury-courts gave even greater trouble and annoyance. As at present composed (see p. 357) the senatorial party was influential in them, but the middle class was predominant; and the fact that in 55 B.C. Pompeius proposed a high-rated census for jurymen, shows that the strength of the opposition was in the

middle class, and that the capitalists were more easy to manage. A constant warfare of prosecution was waged against the adherents of the rulers, the accusers being generally the younger and more fiery members of the nobility. Still, even here, where the regents chose to insist, the courts dared not refuse to comply. Vatinius, the best hated of all Caesar's personal adherents, was acquitted in all the processes against him. But Pompeius did not know so well how to protect his clients, and Gabinius was sent into banishment in 54 B.C., for extortions in the provinces; and even where unsuccessful, impeachments by such masters of sarcasm and dialectics as Gaius Licinius Calvus and Gaius Asinius Pollio did not miss their mark.

Still less controllable was the power of literature, which throughout these years is pervaded by a tone of the bitterest opposition. The orations of the accusers in the law-courts were regularly published as political pamphlets; the youth of the aristocracy and of the middle class in the country towns kept up a constant fire of pamphlets and epigrams; and the senator's son, Gaius Licinius Calvus, fought side by side with Marcus Furius Bibaculus of Cremona, and Quintus Valerius Catullus of Verona. The literature of the time is full of sarcasms against the "great Caesar," "the unique general," the affectionate father-in-law and son-in-law who ransack the globe to enrich their dissolute favourites. Caesar saw that such opposition could not be checked by word of command; he tried rather to gain over by his personal influence the more eminent authors. Cicero was treated respectfully, out of regard for his literary reputation; and Catullus, in spite of his sarcasms, was treated with the most flattering distinction. The commentaries on the Gallic wars were intended partly to meet the enemy on their own ground, and to set forth to the public the necessity and constitutional propriety of Caesar's operations. "But it is freedom alone that is absolutely and exclusively poetical and creative; it and it alone is able, even in its most wretched caricature, even with its latest breath, to inspire fresh enthusiasm . . . Practical politics were not more absolutely controlled by the regents than literature by the republicans."

The opposition became more and more troublesome, and the regents at length determined to take stronger measures. It was resolved to introduce a temporary dictatorship. At the close of 54 B.C. the dictatorship was demanded in the senate; but Pompeius himself still shrank from openly asking it. Even when the elections for 53 B.C. led to the most scandalous scenes, and had to be postponed for a full year beyond the time fixed, he still hesitated to speak the decisive word, and might long have hesitated but for circumstances which forced his hand. For the consulship of 52 B.C. Titus Annius Milo came forward in opposition to the candidate of the regents, who were both personally connected with Pompeius. Milo was the great rival of Clodius in the game of the streets, the Hector to the Achilles of Clodius. As Clodius was on the side of the regents, Milo was of course for the republic; and Cato and his friends supported his candidature in return. In a chance skirmish between the rival bands on the Appian Way, not far from the capital, Clodius was wounded and carried into a neighbouring house, from which he was afterwards dragged to be murdered by Milo's orders. The adherents of the triumvirs saw here an opportunity for thwarting the candidature of Milo, and carrying the dictatorship of Pompeius. The bloody corpse was exposed in the Forum, speeches were made, and a riot broke forth. The mob set fire to the senate-house, and then besieged the residence of Milo till they were repulsed by his band. They then saluted Pompeius as dictator and his candidates as consuls; and when the interrex, Marcus Lepidus, refused to hold the elections at once, he was blockaded in his house for five days. Pompeius certainly desired the dictatorship, but he would not take it at the hands of a mob. He brought up troops to put down the anarchy in the city, and then demanded the dictatorship from the senate. To escape the name of dictator, the senate, on the motion of Cato and Bibulus, perpetrated a double absurdity, and appointed the proconsul Pompeius "consul without colleague"* (25th intercalary † month, 52 B.C.).

* "Consul means colleague, and a consul who is at the same time a proconsul is at once an actual consul and a consul's substitute."

† Between February and March.

Pompeius at once proceeded energetically to use his powers against the republican party in their strongholds, the electioneering clubs and the jury-courts.

1. The existing election laws were repeated and enforced; and a special law, which prescribed increased penalties for electioneering intrigues, was endowed with retrospective force as far back as 70 B.C.

2. The governorships were to be conferred on the consuls and praetors, not as heretofore, immediately on their retirement from office, but after an interval of five years. The years which must elapse before this arrangement could be brought into action were to be provided for by special decrees of the senate from time to time—a course which put the provinces for the next few years at the disposal of the person or persons whose influence might be supreme in the senate.

3. The liberty of the law-courts was curtailed by limiting the number of advocates and the time of speaking allowed to each; and the custom of bringing forward laudatores as witnesses to character was prohibited.

4. The senate decreed that the country was in danger, owing to the disturbances connected with the affair on the Appian Way, and accordingly a commission was appointed by a special law to inquire into all offences connected with the affray, the members being nominated by Pompeius.

At the same time, all the men capable of service in Italy were called to arms, and made to swear allegiance to Pompeius; troops were stationed at the Capitol, and the place where the trial respecting the murder of Clodius was going on was surrounded by soldiers.

By these measures opposition was checked, but not, of course, destroyed. The reins were drawn tighter and the republican party was humbled. Milo was condemned by the jurymen, and Cato's candidature for the consulship frustrated. But many mischances occurred through the maladroitness of Pompeius; he was attempting an impossible task—to play at once the parts of impartial restorer of law and order, and of party chief. Thus he allowed many subordinate persons belonging to the republican party to be acquitted by the commission, and looked on in silence while every man who had taken part

for Clodius—that is for the regents—in the late riots was condemned. At the same time he violated his own laws by appearing as a laudator for his friend Plancus, and by protecting from condemnation several persons specially connected with himself, such as Metellus Scipio. Still, the regents were on the whole satisfied, and the public acquiesced, even to celebrating the recovery of Pompeius from a serious illness with demonstrations of joy. On the 1st of August, 52 B.C., Pompeius, laid down his special command and chose Metellus Scipio as his colleague.

AUTHORITIES.

Plut. Pomp. 49–55; Caes. 28; Crass. 14, 15; Cato, 41–52. Appian B. C. ii. 16–25. Cic. post Red. in sen. (Sept. 57); ad Quir. (Sept. 57); pro Dom. sua (Sept. 57); de Har. Resp. (56 B.C.); pro Sext. and in Vatin. (Mar. 56); pro Cael. Ruf. (56 B.C.); de Prov. Consul. (56 B.C.); in Pisonem, in Aul. Gab., and pro Cn. Planc. frag. (55 B.C.); pro Rabir., pro Vatin. frag., and pro Aem. Scauro (54 B.C.); de Ae. A. Mil. (53 B.C.); pro Milone (52 B.C.). Watson's Select. Lett. ii. 1–30. Liv. Epit. 104–109. Vell. ii. 46–49. Suet. Jul. 26, 27. Dio. tribunate of Clodius, xxxviii. 13; return of Cicero, xxxviii. 30 and xxxix. 6–8; 9–39; 56–59 (Egyptian war); 62–65; xl. 44–56 (Dictatorship of Pompeius, 52–56).

Transpadani.—That Caesar treated them as full burgesses not directly stated. Mommsen infers that he followed the traditions of his party by so treating them, from Cic. ad Att. v. 2, 3; ad Fam. viii. 1, 2. B. G. viii. 24. Suet. Jul. 28. Strabo, v. i. p. 213. Plut. Caes. 29. Cic. ad Att. v. 11. 2. See note Momms. Hist. of R. bk. v. c. 8.

Lex Pompeia Judiciaria, 55 B.C.—Ascon. in Pison. § 94. Bruns, III. iv.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

DEATH OF CRASSUS—RUPTURE BETWEEN POMPEIUS AND CAESAR.

54 B.C. Crassus arrives in Syria.—53 B.C. Battle of Carrhae—Death of Crassus.—51 and 50 B.C. Attempts of the republicans to deprive Caesar prematurely of his command—Alliance of the extreme republicans and Pompeius—War declared.—49 B.C. Caesar's ultimatum rejected by the senate—He crosses the Rubicon.

FOR years Marcus Crassus had been reckoned one of the regents of Rome without any claim to be so considered. But after the conference at Luca his position was changed: Caesar had allowed the consulship and the governorship of Syria to be assigned to him, in order to counterbalance the great concessions he found it advisable to make to Pompeius; and at the close of his consulship Crassus had an opportunity, as governor of Syria, of attaining, through the Parthian war, the position acquired by Caesar in Gaul. Avarice and ambition combined to inspire him, at the age of sixty, with all the ardour of youth. He arrived in Syria early in 54 B.C., having left Rome even before the close of his consulship, eager to add the riches of the East to those of the West, and to achieve military glory "as rapidly as Caesar and with as little trouble as Pompeius."

The Parthian war had already begun. Pompeius had not respected his engagements with regard to the frontier (pp. 365, 369), and had wrested provinces from the empire to confer them upon Armenia. Accordingly, after the death of king Phraates, his son Mithradates declared war upon Armenia. This was, of course, a declaration of war against Rome, and Gabinius, the governor of Syria, soon

led his troops across the Euphrates. But meantime Mithradates had been dethroned by the grandees of the empire with the vizier at their head, and Orodes now reigned in his stead. Mithradates took refuge with the Romans; but at this juncture Gabinius was ordered by the regents to restore the king of Egypt to Alexandria by force of arms, and he had to give up the Parthian war for the present. But he induced Mithradates to make war on his own account, and the prince was supported by the cities of Seleucia and Babylon. Soon afterwards, however, Seleucia was captured by storm, Babylon was reduced to surrender, and Mithradates was captured and put to death. Gabinius, who had finished the Egyptian campaign, was on the eve of resuming operations against the Parthians, when Crassus arrived in Syria and relieved him of the command.

Crassus spent the summer of 54 B.C. in levying troops and contributions, and in making an extensive reconnaissance. The Euphrates was crossed and a victory won at Ichnae; garrisons were placed in several of the neighbouring towns, and then the troops returned to Syria. This reconnaissance determined the Romans to march against the Parthians straight across the Mesopotamian desert, rather than by the circuitous route through Armenia, for the numerous Greek and half-Greek towns in the region of the Tigris and Euphrates were found ready at once to shake off the Parthian yoke.

Next year (53 B.C.) the Euphrates was again crossed, and after some deliberation it was decided to march across the desert to the Tigris rather than down the Euphrates to Seleucia, where the two rivers are but a few miles apart. The Roman army consisted of seven legions, four thousand cavalry, and four thousand slingers and archers. For many days they marched, and no enemy appeared. At length, not far from the river Balissus, some horsemen of the enemy were descried in the distance. The Arab prince Abgarus of Edessa, who had been loud in his protestations of loyalty, and who had been mainly instrumental in determining Crassus to adopt the desert route, was sent out to reconnoitre. The enemy disappeared, followed by Abgarus and his men; and after a long interval it was resolved to advance, in the hope of coming upon the enemy. The river was crossed and the army was led

rapidly forward, when suddenly the drums of the Parthians were heard, their silken gold-embroidered banners were seen waving and their helmets and coats of mails blazing in the sun; and by the side of the Parthian vizier stood Abgarus and his Bedouins.

The Romans saw at once the net in which they were ensnared. The whole Parthian army consisted of cavalry; the vizier had seen that no Oriental infantry could cope with that of Rome, and had dispensed with the arm altogether. The mass of his troops were mounted archers, while the line was formed of heavy cavalry, armed with long thrusting lances, and protected—man and horse—by armour formed of leather or of metal plates. The Roman infantry were quite unable to bring such an enemy to a close engagement, and, even if they had been able, these ironclad hosts would probably have been more than a match for them. In the desert every advantage was on the side of the enemy and none on that of the Romans. The strength of the Roman system of warfare lay in the close order in which the legions fought, and in the custom of forming entrenched camps, which made every encampment a fortification. But the close order now only served to make them an easier mark for their enemies' missiles, and in the desert ditches and ramparts could often hardly be formed. It is curious that the irresistible superiority of the Roman infantry led the enemies of Rome at about the same time, in widely different parts of the world, to meet it, and meet it successfully, by the same means—by the use of cavalry and missiles. The Parthian vizier was only carrying out on a larger scale, and under infinitely more favourable conditions, what had been completely successful under Cassivellaunus in Britain, and partially successful under Vercingetorix in Gaul.

Under such conditions the first battle between Romans and Parthians was fought in the desert, about thirty miles south of Carrhae. The Roman archers, who began the attack, were driven back; the legions, which were in their usual close order, were soon outflanked and overwhelmed by the archers of the enemy. In order that they might not be completely surrounded, Publius Crassus, the same who had served with such distinction under Caesar in Gaul, advanced with a select corps of cavalry, archers, and

infantry. The Parthians retreated, hotly pursued; but when completely out of sight of the main army of the Romans, the heavy cavalry made a stand and soon completely surrounded the band of Crassus. All the valour of the Romans and of their leader was in vain; they were driven to a slight eminence, where their destruction was completed. Crassus and many of his officers put themselves to death; out of the whole number of six thousand only five hundred were taken prisoners, not one was able to escape. Meanwhile the main army was left comparatively unmolested, but when it advanced to discover the fate of the detached corps, the head of the young Crassus was displayed on a pole before his father's eyes, and the terrible onslaught was at the same time renewed. Night alone put an end to the slaughter. Fortunately the Parthians retired from the field to bivouac; and the Romans seized the opportunity to retreat to Carrhae. They left the wounded and the stragglers—said to have been four thousand in number—on the field, and as the Parthians stayed to massacre these, and the inhabitants of Carrhae marched forth in haste to succour the fugitives, the remnant of the army was saved from destruction. But the Romans, either from want of provisions or from the precipitation of Crassus, soon set out from Carrhae and marched towards the Armenian mountains. Marching by night and resting by day the main body arrived at Sinnaca, within a day's march of safety. There the vizier came to offer peace and friendship, and to propose a conference between the two generals. The offer was accepted and terms were discussed; a richly caparisoned horse was produced—a present from the king to Crassus; and as the servants of the vizier crowded to assist the Roman general to mount, the suspicion arose among the Roman officers that it was a design to seize the person of their leader. Octavius snatched a sword from a Parthian and stabbed the groom. In the tumult which followed all the Roman officers were killed, Crassus refused to survive as a prisoner, and the whole Roman force left behind in the camp was either captured or dispersed. Only one small body, which had broken off from the main force, and some straggling bands found their way back to Syria. Ten thousand Roman prisoners were settled

in the oasis of Merv; one half of the whole force had perished.

This disaster to the Roman arms seemed likely to shake the very foundations of the Roman power in the East. Armenia became completely dependent upon Parthia, and the Hellenic cities were again enslaved. More than this, the Parthians prepared to cross the Euphrates and to dislodge the Romans from Syria. But, fortunately for Rome, the leaders on each side had changed. The vizier was executed by the Sultan Orodes, and the command of the invading army given to the young prince Pacorus; while the *ad interim* command of Syria was assumed by the able quaestor Gaius Cassius. For two years the Parthians sent only flying bands, which were easily repulsed. Owing to the negligence of the Roman government the great Parthian invasion, which came at last in 51 B.C., found nothing to oppose it but two weak legions which Cassius had formed from the remains of the army of Crassus, and which could, of course, do nothing to oppose the advance. However, under an ordinary general the Parthians were no more formidable than any other Oriental army; and though the Syrian command soon devolved upon the incapable Bibulus, nothing was effected by the invaders, and Pacorus soon came to an agreement with the Roman commander, and turned his arms against his father Orodes instead.

It is an ominous sign of the times that the national disasters of Carrhae and Sinnaca attracted almost less attention at Rome than the pitiful brawl upon the Appian Way. But it is hardly wonderful; the breach between the regents was now becoming imminent. "Like the boat of the ancient Greek mariners' tale, the vessel of the Roman community now found itself, as it were, between two rocks swimming towards each other; expecting every moment the crash of collision, those whom it was bearing tortured by nameless anguish into the eddying surge that rose higher and higher, were benumbed; and while every slightest movement there attracted a thousand eyes, not one ventured to give a glance to the right or left."

After the conference at Luca, it seemed that the division of power was made on a basis sufficiently firm to ensure its endurance, provided that both parties were disposed to

act in good faith. This was the case with Caesar, at any rate during the interval necessary for the completion of his Gallic conquests; but probably Pompeius was never even provisionally in earnest about the collegiate scheme. Still, though he never meant to acknowledge Caesar's equality with himself, the idea of breaking with him formed itself but slowly in his mind. In 54 B.C. the death of Julia, followed closely by that of her child, destroyed the personal bond between the rivals; and when Pompeius refused Caesar's overtures for fresh marriage connections, and himself married the daughter of Quintus Metellus Scipio, the breach had unmistakably begun. Still the political alliance remained, and Pompeius, after the disaster of Aduatua in 54 B.C., lent Caesar one of his Italian legions, while Caesar gave his consent and support to the dictatorship of Pompeius. But as soon as the latter found himself in a position completely outweighing in influence that of Caesar, and when all the men of military age in Italy had tendered their military oath to himself personally, it became clear that he had made up his mind to a rupture. The proceedings of the dictatorship told largely against the partisans of Caesar. This might have been accident; but when Pompeius selected for his colleague in office his dependent Metellus Scipio instead of Caesar, still more when he got his governorship of the two Spains prolonged for five years more, and a large sum of money assigned to him for the payment of troops, without procuring similar arrangements for Caesar, it was impossible to mistake his intention. Lastly, the new regulations as to the holding of governorships had the ulterior object of procuring Caesar's premature recall. No moment could have been more unfavourable to Caesar. In June, 53 B.C., the death of Crassus occurred—and Crassus had always been the closest ally of Caesar, and a bitter personal enemy of Pompeius. A few months later the Gallic insurrection broke out with renewed violence, and for the first time Caesar had to encounter an equal opponent in Vercingetorix. Pompeius was dictator of Rome and master of the senate; what might have occurred if, instead of intriguing obscurely against Caesar, he had boldly recalled him from Gaul?

The impending struggle was, of course, not between republic and monarchy, but between Pompeius and Caesar

for the crown of Rome. Nevertheless, each of the rivals found it convenient to adopt one of the old party battle-cries ; neither dared to alienate from himself the mass of respectable conservative citizens, who desired the continuance of the republic, by openly aiming at monarchy. Caesar, of course, inscribed upon his banner, "The people and democratic progress." He had been from the outset an earnest democrat, and the monarchy meant to him something which differed in little but name from the Gracchan government of the people. To Caesar this subterfuge brought little advantage, except that he thus escaped the necessity of directly employing the name of King. But Pompeius, who, of course, proclaimed himself the champion of the aristocracy and of the legitimate constitution, gained besides a large and influential body of allies. In the first place, he rallied round him the whole republican party, and the majority, or, at any rate, the soundest part of the burgesses of Italy. Secondly, what was no mean advantage for so awkward a politician, it relieved him of the difficulty of finding a plausible pretext for provoking the war. His new allies would be willing enough to provoke a conflict with Caesar, and to entrust the conduct of the war to Pompeius, who would then come forward, in obedience to the general wish, as the protector of the constitution against the designs of anarchists and monarchists, —as the regularly appointed general of the senate against the imperator of the streets.

Thus the republican party became once more a factor in the politics of Rome, owing to the rupture between the rulers. The heart and core of the republican opposition was the small circle of the followers of Cato, who were resolved to enter on the struggle against monarchy under any circumstances. The mass of the aristocracy, though averse to monarchy, desired, above all things, peace, and could not be counted on for decisive action. Hence Cato's only hope lay in a coalition with one of the regents. In alliance with Pompeius he might compel the timid majority to declare war ; and though Pompeius was not in earnest in his fidelity to the constitution, yet the war would train a really republican army and republican generals, and it would be, at any rate, easier to settle matters with Pompeius after victory than with Caesar. The *rapprochement*

between the general and the senate was made easy by the events of the dictatorship. Pompeius had refused to accept the office except from the senate; he had shown unrelenting severity against disorder of every kind, and surprising indulgence towards Cato and his followers; while, on the other hand, it was directly from the hands of Cato and Bibulus that Pompeius received the undivided consulship. An outward and visible sign that the alliance was already practically concluded was given, when, for the consulship of 51 B.C., one of Cato's pronounced adherents, Claudius Marcellus, was elected, evidently with the concurrence of the regent.

Caesar was kept constantly informed of all that happened at Rome, and formed his plans accordingly. He had doubtless long determined to take for himself, if necessary by force of arms, the supreme power after the conclusion of his Gallic wars; but he wished earnestly to avoid the deep disorganization which civil war must produce in a state; and even if civil war could not be avoided, no time could be more unfavourable for it than the present, when the insurrection in Gaul was at its height, and when the constitutional party was dominant in Italy. If he became, according to the arrangement at Luca, consul for the year 48 B.C., he might confidently reckon on out-manœuvring his awkward and vacillating rival, and, with the compliant majority in the senate at his disposal, might either reorganize the state by peaceful means, or at least enter upon the war with far greater prospects of success. Meanwhile he armed, certainly, and raised his legions during the winter of 52-51 B.C., to the number of eleven. But, at the same time, he publicly approved of all Pompeius' acts as dictator, and took no steps when he saw the alliance gradually formed between his rival and the aristocracy; only adhering immovably to the one demand, that the consulship for 48 B.C. should be granted him according to the agreement.

It was upon this demand that the diplomatic war between Caesar and the senate began, and it is important to grasp fully and accurately the exact point in dispute.

If there should be any interval between the day on which Caesar resigned his Gallic command and the day on which he entered upon his consulship, he would be liable during

that interval to criminal impeachment, which, according to Roman law, was allowable only against a man not in office; and in that case it was extremely probable that he would meet the same fate as Milo, and be compelled to go into exile. Was it necessary that there should be such an interval? According to the usual mode of reckoning, a provincial command began in theory on March 1st, of the magistrate's year of office in Rome, so that Caesar's Gallic command theoretically began on March 1st, 59 B.C., the year of his consulship, and the ten years for which it was secured to him would expire on the last day of February, 49 B.C. Accordingly there would be an interval of ten months between the end of the Gallic command and the beginning of the consulship. Caesar's opponents aimed, both directly and indirectly, at preventing him from retaining his provinces during this interval.

Firstly, *directly*. According to the old custom, Caesar's successor would have been appointed from among the magistrates for the year 49 B.C., and could not, therefore, have taken over the command until the beginning of 48 B.C.; and by the same old custom Caesar would have had the right to the command for the remaining ten months of the year 49 B.C., pending the arrival of his successor. But by the new regulation, made specially for this purpose during the dictatorship of Pompeius in 52 B.C. (see p. 433), the senate might immediately fill up any legally vacant governorship, and Caesar might therefore be relieved of his command on March 1st, 49 B.C.

Secondly, *indirectly*. Even without this special regulation passed for the purpose, the senate had a very simple means of compelling Caesar to leave his command before entering upon his consulship. The law required every candidate for the consulship to appear in person before the presiding magistrate, and to enter his name upon the official list before the election; that is, about half a year before entering on office. It was probably assumed at Luca that Caesar should be exempted from this regulation, as was often done with regard to particular candidates. At any rate, during the dictatorship of Pompeius in 52 B.C., Caesar's appearance in person was dispensed with by a tribunician law; but when the new election ordinance (p. 433) was passed, the obligation to appear in person was repeated in

general terms, and no exemption in Caesar's case was mentioned. Caesar complained, and an exempting clause was interpolated by Pompeius, but not confirmed by the people, and was therefore legally of no effect. The whole matter is a good example of Pompeius' tortuous methods. "Where he might have simply kept by the law, he had preferred first to make a spontaneous concession, then to recall it, and lastly to palliate this recall in a manner most illegal."

The remaining events to the outbreak of the civil war may be viewed in three separate stages.

I. The discussion at the beginning of 51 B.C.

In accordance with custom, the governorships of the year 49 B.C., which were to be filled by consuls, would be deliberated upon in the beginning of 51 B.C. On this occasion the consul Marcus Marcellus proposed that the two provinces of Caesar should be handed over on March 1, 49 B.C., to the two consuls who were to hold governorships for that year. The long repressed torrent of indignation against Caesar burst forth. The followers of Cato demanded that the exemption of Caesar from appearing to announce his name in person should be held invalid; that the soldiers of his legions who had served their time should be at once discharged; and that the bestowal by him of burgess-rights and the establishment of colonies in upper Italy should be considered null and void. Marcellus, in accordance with this last proposal, caused a senator of the Caesarian colony of Comum to be scourged as a non-burgess.

On the other side, the supporters of Caesar affirmed that both equity and the condition of affairs in Gaul required that Caesar should be allowed to hold his command and his consulship simultaneously; they pointed out that Pompeius had in time past combined the Spanish provinces and the consulship, and was even now in possession of proconsular power for the purpose of the supply of grain, of the Spanish governorships, and of the supreme command in Italy. The timid majority in the senate prevented any resolution being taken for months. Pompeius at last declared on the whole in favour of the proposal of Marcellus, while hinting at certain concessions which might perhaps be made to Caesar; and ultimately (September 29, 51 B.C.) the nomination of successors was postponed to the last day of February, 50 B.C.

Meanwhile the republicans tried to break up Caesar's army by inducing the veterans to apply for their discharge; and the elections for the next year were thoroughly unfavourable to Caesar. The latter had at length quelled the insurrection in Gaul, and had moved one of his legions to North Italy. War was clearly inevitable, but even now he was willing to make great sacrifices; it was still advisable to keep the legions for some time in Gaul, and he had still perhaps some hope in the strong desire for peace which the majority of the senate entertained. When the senate, at the suggestion of Pompeius, requested each general to furnish a legion for the Parthian war, and when Pompeius at the same time demanded from Caesar the legion lent him some years before, Caesar complied, and the two legions from his army were kept by the government at Capua. For the discussions of 50 B.C. Caesar had succeeded in buying the services of one consul, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, and, above all, one of the tribunes, Gaius Curio, a man of brilliant talents but of the most profligate character.* Caesar paid his debts, amounting to £575,000 of our money, and thenceforth his great gifts of eloquence and energy were exerted for, instead of against, the enemy of the senate.

II. The discussions of the year 50 B.C.

In March, 50 B.C., when the question of Caesar's successors arose, Curio approved of the decree of the year before superseding Caesar on March 1, 49 B.C., but demanded that it should be extended to Pompeius; he argued that the constitution could be rendered safe only by the removal of all exceptional positions; and at the same time, declared that he would prevent any one-sided action against Caesar by his tribunician veto. Caesar at once declared his consent to Curio's proposal; but Pompeius would only reply that Caesar must resign, and that he himself meant soon to do so, though he mentioned no definite term. The decision was delayed for months, but at last Curio's proposal was adopted by 370 votes against 20—all that the extreme republican party could muster. All good citizens rejoiced, and the party of Cato was in despair. The latter had undertaken to force the senate to a declaration of war, and they were bitterly reproached for their failure by Pompeius. As matters stood, Pompeius and Caesar were both recalled

* "Homo ingeniosissime nequam" (*Vellei.* ii. 48).'

by the senate; and while Caesar was ready to comply, Pompeius refused—the champion of the constitution and the aristocracy treated the constitutional decisions of the senate as null! But the extreme republicans were determined to bring matters to a crisis. A rumour arose that Caesar had moved four legions across the Alps, and stationed them at Placentia. This was an act quite within his prerogative, and the rumour was shown to be groundless, and yet the consul Gaius Marcellus proposed, on the strength of it, to give Pompeius orders to march against Caesar. When the senate rejected the proposal, Marcellus, in concert with the two consuls designate for 49 B.C., who were also Catonians, proceeded to Pompeius and requested him, on their own authority, to put himself at the head of the legions at Capua, and to summon the Italian militia to arms. No more informal authorization for the commencement of civil war could be imagined, but it was enough for Pompeius, and he left Rome in December, 50 B.C.

III. Caesar's ultimatum.

Caesar had fully attained his object of throwing upon his opponents the onus of declaring war; and while himself keeping on legal ground, he had compelled Pompeius to begin the struggle as the general of a revolutionary minority of the senate which overawed the majority. It was now his interest to strike a blow as soon as possible; his opponents were only just beginning to make preparations, and it might be possible to surprise the city undefended, or even to seize all Italy and shut them off from their best resources. Curio represented these considerations strongly to his chief, and Caesar at once sent to hurry on the nearest legion to Ravenna. Meanwhile he sent an ultimatum to Rome, in which he dropped all counter-demands, offered to resign Transalpine Gaul and dismiss eight of his ten legions, if only the senate would allow him either Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with one legion, or Cisalpine Gaul alone with two—and that not up to his investiture with the consulship, but only till the close of the consular elections for 48 B.C. It may almost be doubted whether Caesar can possibly have been sincere in these proposals; but it is probable that he committed the fault of playing too bold a game, and that if his ultimatum had been accepted he would have made good his word. Curio

undertook once more to enter the lion's den. On the 1st of January, 49 B.C., he delivered his master's letter in a full meeting of the senate. "The grave words of Caesar, in which he set forth the imminence of civil war, the general wish for peace, the arrogance of Pompeius, and his own yielding disposition with all the irresistible force of truth; the proposals for a compromise, of a moderation which doubtless surprised his own partisans; the distinct declaration that this was the last time that he should offer his hand for peace, made the deepest impression." The sentiment of the majority was so doubtful that the consuls would not allow a vote to be taken, even on the proposal of Marcus Marcellus, to defer the determination till the Italian levy could be under arms to protect the senate. The consul Lentulus said openly that he would act on his own authority whatever the senate might decree, and Pompeius let it be known that he would take up the cause of the senate now or never. Thus overawed, the senate decreed that Caesar should, at no distant day, give up Transalpine Gaul to Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, and Cisalpine Gaul to Marcus Servilius Novianus, and should dismiss his army, failing which he should be esteemed a traitor. The Caesarian tribunes who tried to veto the decree were menaced with death in the senate-house, and had to fly in slaves' clothing from the capital. The senate declared the country in danger, called all citizens to arms, and all magistrates, faithful to the constitution, to place themselves at their head (January 7th, 49 B.C.).

Hesitation was now no longer possible for Caesar. He called together the soldiers of the thirteenth legion, which had now arrived at Ravenna, and set before them the whole circumstances. He spoke not to the dregs of the city, but to young men from the towns and villages of northern Italy who were capable of real enthusiasm for liberty, who had received from Caesar the burgess rights which the government had refused them, and whom Caesar's fall would leave once more at the mercy of the fasces (see p. 444). He set before them the thanks which the nobility were preparing for the general and the army which had conquered Gaul, the overawing of the senate by the extreme minority, and the last violation of the tribunate of the people, wrested five hundred years ago

by their fathers from the nobility. And when he summoned them, as the general of the popular party, to follow him in the last inevitable struggle against the despised perfidious aristocracy, not an officer or soldier held back. At the head of his vanguard Caesar crossed the Rubicon, the narrow brook which separated his province from Italy, and which it was forbidden, by the constitution, to the proconsul of Gaul to pass.

AUTHORITIES.

Egypt—Dio. xxxix. 55–59.

Parthian war—Plut. Anton. 5; Crass. 16–end. Appian Syr. 51. Dio. xl. 12–30. Liv. 105, 106, 108. Flor. iii. 11; iv. 2. Vell. ii. 46. Strab. xi. Justin. xlii. 4.

Rupture with Caesar—Plut. Caes. 29–32; Pomp. 56–60; Cic. 35. Appian B. C. 25–33. Caes. Bell. Civ. init. Suet. Jul. 26–32. Liv. 107–109. Flor. iv. ii. 13–17. Dio. xl. 56–66; xli. 1–3. Cic. Watson, ii. 31–45, especially 33 and 34 (ad Fam. viii. 4, 8). For the whole of the letters of this period see Nobbe's list, p. 967.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE CIVIL WAR.

49 B.C. Resources of either side—Caesar occupies Rome—The Pompeians depart for Epirus—Spanish campaign—Siege of Ilerda—Surrender of Pompeians—Siege of Massilia—Conquest of Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily—Death of Curio in Africa.—48 B.C. Caesar crosses to Epirus—Compelled to retreat towards Thessaly—Battle of Pharsalus—Flight and death of Pompeius.—47 B.C. Caesar besieged in Alexandria during the winter—Relieved by Mithradates of Pergamus—Affairs of Asia Minor—Battle of Ziela.—46 B.C. War in Africa—Battle of Thapsus—Death of Cato.

BEFORE describing the course of the struggle between the two aspirants to the crown of Rome, it will be well to examine the resources at the disposal of each.

Caesar's authority was wholly unlimited within his own party; in all matters, military and political, the decision lay with him. He had no confederates, only adjutants, who, as a rule, were soldiers trained to obey unconditionally. So, on the outbreak of war, one officer alone, and he the foremost of all, refused him obedience. Titus Labienus had shared with Caesar all his political and military vicissitudes of defeat and victory. In Gaul he had always held an independent command, and had frequently led half the army. As late as the year 50 B.C., Caesar had given to him supreme command in Cisalpine Gaul; but from this very position he entered into a treaty with the other side, and on the outbreak of hostilities went at once to the camp of Pompeius. It was the one great disadvantage on Caesar's side that he had no officers to whom he could entrust a separate command, but this was

quite outbalanced by the unity of the supreme leadership—the indispensable condition of success.

The army numbered nine legions—at most fifty thousand men, two-thirds of whom had served in all the campaigns against the Celts. The cavalry consisted of mercenaries from Germany and Noricum, and had been well tried in the war against Vercingetorix. The physical condition of the soldiers was beyond all praise; by the careful selection of recruits and by training they had been brought to a perfection never perhaps surpassed in marching power and in readiness for immediate departure at any moment. Their courage and their *esprit de corps* had been equally developed by Caesar's system of rewards and punishments—a system so perfectly carried out that the pre-eminence of particular soldiers or divisions was acquiesced in even by their less favoured comrades. Their discipline was strict but not harassing; and while maintained with unrelenting rigour in the presence of the enemy, was relaxed at other times, especially after victory, when even irregularities and outrages of a very questionable kind went unpunished. Mutiny was never pardoned, in either the ringleaders or their dupes. Caesar took care that victory should be associated in the minds of both officers and soldiers with hopes of personal gain; every one had his share of the spoil, and the most lavish gifts were promised at the triumph. At the same time that unquestioning obedience was exacted from all, yet all were allowed some glimpse at the general's aims and springs of action, so that each might feel that he was doing his part towards the attainment of the common object, and no one could complain that he was treated as a mere instrument. During the long years of warfare a sense of comradeship grew up between soldiers and leader. They were his clients, whose services he was bound to requite, and whose wrongs he was bound to revenge. The result was that Caesar's soldiers were, and knew themselves to be, a match for ten times their number, and that their fidelity to him was unchangeable and unparalleled. With one exception, no Roman soldier or officer refused to follow him into the civil war, and the legionaries even determined to give credit for the double pay which Caesar promised them from the beginning of the war, while every sub-

altern officer equipped and paid a trooper out of his own purse.

Thus Caesar had two requisites for success—unlimited authority and a magnificent and trustworthy army. But his power extended over a very limited space. It was based essentially on the province of Upper Italy, which was indeed devoted to him and furnished an ample supply of recruits. But in Italy the mass of the burgesses were all for his opponents, and expected from Caesar only a renewal of the Marian and Cinnan atrocities. His only friends in Italy were the rabble and the ruined of all classes—friends infinitely more dangerous than foes. The newly conquered territory in Gaul could not, of course, be relied on, and in Narbo the constitutional party had many adherents. Among the independent princes Caesar had tried to effect something by gifts and promises, but without important result except in the case of Voctio, king of Noricum, from whom cavalry recruits were obtained.

Caesar thus began the war without other resources than efficient adjutants, a faithful army, and a devoted province. Pompeius, on the other hand, was chief of the Roman commonwealth and master of all the resources at the disposal of the legitimate government of the empire. But unity of leadership was inconsistent with the nature of a coalition; and though Pompeius was nominated by the senate sole generalissimo by land and sea, he could not prevent the senate itself from exercising the political supremacy, or from occasionally interfering even in military matters. Twenty years of antagonism made it impossible for either party of the coalition to place complete confidence in the other.

In resources Caesar's opponents had an overwhelming superiority. They had exclusive command of the sea, and the disposal of all ports, ships, and naval material. The two Spains were specially devoted to Pompeius, and the other provinces had during recent years been put into safe hands. The client states were all for Pompeius; many of them had been brought into close personal relations with him at different times. He had been the companion in arms of the kings of Numidia and of Mauretania; he had re-established the kingdoms of Bosphorus, Armenia, and Cappadocia, and created that of Deiotarus. He had caused

the rule of the Lagidae to be re-established in Egypt, and even Massilia was indebted to him for an extension of territory. Moreover, the democratic policy handed down from Gaius Gracchus of uniting the dependent states and of setting up provincial colonies was dreaded by the dependent princes, more especially by Juba, king of Numidia, whose kingdom Curio had lately proposed to annex. Even the Parthians by the convention between Pacorus and Bibulus (p. 439) were practically in alliance with the aristocracy.

In Italy, not only the aristocracy but the capitalists were bitterly opposed to Caesar, together with the small capitalists and landowners, and generally all classes who had anything to lose.

The army of Pompeius consisted chiefly of the seven Spanish legions—troops in every way trustworthy,—and of scattered divisions in Syria, Asia, Macedonia, Africa, and Sicily. In Italy there were the two legions lately given over by Caesar—not more than seven thousand men, and, of course, of doubtful trustworthiness. There were also three legions remaining from the levies of 54 B.C. (p. 428), and the Italian levy, which had been sworn to allegiance and then dismissed on furlough. Altogether the Italian troops which might, within a very short time, be made available, amounted to about sixty thousand men. Cavalry there was none; but a nucleus of three hundred men was soon formed by Pompeius, out of the mounted herdsmen of Apulia.

Under such circumstances the war began, early in January, 49 B.C. Caesar had only one legion—five thousand men and three hundred cavalry—at Ravenna, distant by road about 240 miles from Rome. Pompeius had two weak legions—seven thousand infantry and a small force of cavalry—at Luceria, about equally distant from Rome. The remainder of Caesar's troops were either on the Saone and Loire or in Belgica, while Pompeius's reserves were already arriving at their rendezvous. Nevertheless Caesar resolved to assume the offensive: in the spring Pompeius would be able to act with the Spanish troops in Transalpine and with his Italian troops in Cisalpine Gaul; but at the moment he might be disconcerted by the suddenness of the attack.

Accordingly Marcus Antonius pushed forward across

the Apennines to Arretium, while Caesar advanced along the coast. The recruiting officers of Pompeius and their recruits fled at the news of his approach; several small successes were gained, and Caesar resolved to advance upon Rome itself, rather than upon the army of Luceria. A panic seized the city when the news arrived; Pompeius decided not to defend it, and the senators and consuls hurried to leave, not even delaying to secure the state treasure. At Teanum Sidicinum fresh proposals of Caesar were considered, in which he again offered to dismiss his army and hand over his provinces if Pompeius would depart to Spain and if Italy were disarmed. The reply was that if Caesar would at once return to his province the senate would bind itself to procure the fulfilment of his demands. As to the war, Pompeius was ordered to advance with the legions from Luceria into Picenum, and personally to call together the levy of that district, and try to stop the invader.

But Caesar was already in Picenum. Auximum, Ceperinum, and Asculum fell into his hands; and such of the recruits as were not dispersed left the district and repaired to Corfinium, where the Marsian and Paelignian levies were to assemble. Here Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus was in command; and instead of conducting the recruits, who now amounted to fifteen thousand men, to Luceria according to the instructions of Pompeius, he remained where he was, expecting Pompeius to come to his relief. Instead of Pompeius Caesar arrived, now at the head of forty thousand men. Domitius had not the courage to hold the place; neither did he resolve to surrender it, but rather to escape during the night with his aristocratic officers. But his dastardly plan was betrayed; the troops mutinied, arrested their staff, and handed over the town to Caesar. Thereupon the forces in Alba and in Tarracina laid down their arms; a third division, of 3500 men, in Sulmo had previously surrendered.

As soon as Picenum was lost, Pompeius had determined to abandon Italy and had set out at once for Brundisium. Here all the available troops were assembled, to the number of twenty-five thousand; part of them were at once conveyed across in the ships; the remaining ten thousand were besieged by Caesar in Brundisium, but were skil-

fully withdrawn by Pompeius before Caesar could close the harbour.

In two months Caesar had broken up an army of ten legions, and made himself master of the state chest, of the capital, and of the whole peninsula of Italy. But though his resources were thus largely increased, the military difficulties of the situation were proportionally complicated. He had now to leave behind a large garrison in Italy, and to guard against the closing of the seas and the cutting off of grain supplies by his opponents. Financial difficulties, too, soon arose, now that Caesar had to feed the population of the capital while the revenues of the East were still in the enemy's hands.

The general expectation was that confiscations and proscriptions would be resorted to. Friends and foes saw in Caesar a second Catilina; and it must be allowed that neither his own antecedents nor the character of the men who now surrounded him—men of broken reputation and ruined fortunes like Quintus Hortensius, Curio, and Marcus Antonius—were reassuring. But both friends and foes were soon undeceived; from the beginning of hostilities the common soldiers were forbidden to enter a town armed, and the people were everywhere protected from injury. When Corfinium was surrendered late at night, Caesar postponed the occupation of the town until the next day, to prevent confusion and outrage in the darkness. Everywhere the officers captured were allowed to carry off their private property, and in his worst financial straits Caesar preferred borrowing from his friends to levying exactions from his foes. The aristocrats indeed, far from being appeased by Caesar's moderation, were only goaded to more frantic hatred; but the mass of quiet people, in whose eyes material interests were more important than politics, were completely gained over. Even the senators who had ventured to remain behind acquiesced in Caesar's rule. His object was fully attained: anarchy, and even the alarm of anarchy, had been kept under,—an incalculable gain with regard to the future reorganization of the state. The anarchists, of course, were bitterly disappointed, and showed a spirit which might be expected at some future time to give trouble. The republicans of all shades were neither converted nor disarmed. In their eyes their duty

to the constitution absolved them from every other consideration. The less decided members of the party who accepted peace and protection from the monarch, were none the more friendly to him in their hearts, and the consciences of the more honourable among them smote them when they thought of other members of the party who had gone into exile rather than compromise their principles. Besides, emigration had become fashionable; it was plebeian to remain and perhaps take a seat in the Caesarian senate of nobodies, instead of emigrating with the Domitii and the Metelli.

Caesar had begun the war as the protector of the over-awed senate against the violent minority; but the same inertness which had made it possible for Caesar to prevent strong action on the part of his opponent, prevented him from obtaining aid from the senate himself. The first meeting was on April 1st; but Caesar could not procure approval of his acts or power to continue the war; he then tried in vain to be named dictator. When he sent men to take possession of the treasure, the tribune Lucius Metellus attempted to protect the state chest with his person, and had to be removed by force. And at length Caesar was obliged to tell the senate that, since it refused him its assistance, he would proceed without it. He appointed Marcus Aemilius Lepidus prefect of the city, and hastened to resume the war.

Pompeius, for whatever reason, had preferred to remain in Greece rather than to go to Spain, where he had able lieutenants, a strong army, and provinces devoted to him. Accordingly Caesar had the option of directing his first attack against Pompeius himself in the East, or against the strong Spanish army under his lieutenant. He had already collected on the lower Rhone nine of his best legions and six thousand cavalry; but his enemies had been active in the same region. Lucius Domitius had induced Massilia to declare against him and to refuse a passage to his troops; and the five best Spanish legions, together with forty thousand Spanish infantry and five thousand cavalry, were on their way, under the command of Afranius and Petreius, to close the passes of the Pyrenees. But Caesar anticipated them, and the line of the Pyrenees was lost to the Pompeians. The latter

now established themselves at Ilerda on the right bank of the Sicoris, about twenty miles north of its junction with the Ebro. To the south of the town, the mountains approach pretty close to the river; to the north stretches a plain commanded by the town. Connection with the left bank of the Sicoris was maintained by means of a single solid bridge close to the town. The Caesarians were stationed above Ilerda, between the river Sicoris and its tributary the Cinga, which joins it below the town; but they could not make good their ground between the Pompeian camp and the town, which would have given them command of the stone bridge, and consequently they depended for their communications upon two temporary bridges twenty miles higher up the river. These were swept away by the floods, and the whole army was now cooped up in the narrow space between the two streams. Famine and disease appeared. A body of reinforcements from Gaul, together with foraging parties on their way back to the camp, to the number of six thousand, were attacked and dispersed under the eyes of the Caesarians on the other side of the river. Had the river been adequately guarded the Pompeians could hardly have failed of success: but the further bank was observed to be unoccupied; Caesar succeeded in restoring the bridges without much difficulty, and provisions again entered the camp in abundance. Soon his superior cavalry scoured the country far and wide, and the most important Spanish communities to the north, some even to the south, of the Ebro passed over to him, while the Pompeians began to feel the want of supplies. They determined to retreat south of the Ebro, but it was necessary first to build a bridge of boats over that river. This was done at a point below the mouth of the Sicoris. Caesar sought by all means to detain the enemy, but was unable to do so as long as he had not control of the bridge of Ilerda, since there was no ford. His soldiers worked night and day to draw off the river by canals, so that infantry might wade it; but the Pompeians had finished their bridge over the Ebro before Caesar had completed his canals, and he could only order his cavalry to follow them and harass their rear. But when the legions saw the enemy retreating they called upon the general to lead them on; they entered the river, and though the water reached their shoulders it was crossed

in safety. The Pompeians were now within five miles of the mountains which lined the north bank of the Ebro, and would soon be in safety. But, harassed by the enemy's attacks and exhausted with marching, they pitched their camp in the plain; here Caesar's troops overtook them and encamped opposite, and in this position both armies remained for the next day. On the morning of the third day Caesar's infantry set out to turn the position of the Pompeians and bar the way to the Ebro, and, in spite of all the latter could do, they found themselves anticipated. They were now strategically lost, and, in spite of ample opportunity, Caesar refrained from attacking them. The soldiers of the two armies began to fraternize and to discuss terms of surrender, but Petreius cut short the negotiations and began to retreat towards Ilerda, where were a garrison and magazines. Shut in between the Sicoris and the enemy, their difficulties increased at every step: Caesar's cavalry occupied the opposite bank and prevented them from crossing the river to gain the fortress, and at last the inevitable capitulation took place (August 2, 49 B.C.). Caesar granted to soldiers and officers life, liberty, and property, and did not, as in Italy, compulsorily enrol the captives in his army. The native Spaniards at once returned to their homes, and the Italians were disbanded at the borders of Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul.

In Further Spain, Varro determined to shut himself up in Gades; but when this town, together with all the most notable places in the province, gave itself up to Caesar, and when even Italica closed its gates against the Pompeian general, he himself resolved to capitulate.

About the same time Massilia surrendered. By sea, Caesar's lieutenant, Decimus Brutus—the same who had conquered the Veneti (p. 408),—had defeated with his improvised fleet the far stronger force of the Massiliots. He gained a second victory not long afterwards, when a small squadron of Pompeians under Lucius Nasidius had arrived to reinforce, and completely shut the besieged from the sea. On land Gaius Trebonius pressed forward the siege with energy; the works were pushed up to the very walls of the city, when the besieged promised to desist from the defence if Trebonius would suspend operations until Caesar arrived. The armistice was granted, but was

used by the Massiliots to make a treacherous sally; the struggle was renewed, and the city once more invested. On Caesar's arrival it was reduced to surrender on any terms. Domitius stole away in a boat. The garrison and inhabitants were protected by Caesar from the fury of his legions, but the city, while it retained its freedom and nationality, lost a portion of its territory and privileges.

While Caesar was occupied in Spain his lieutenants had been at work to prevent the other great danger which was imminent, namely, the starvation of Italy. The Pompeians commanded the sea and the corn provinces, Sardinia and Corsica through Marcus Cotta, Sicily through Cato, Africa through Varus and Juba, king of Numidia. Sardinia was quickly recovered for Caesar, by Quintus Valerius; the conquest of Sicily and Africa was entrusted to Curio. He occupied Sicily without a blow, and, leaving two legions in the island, he embarked with the remaining two and with five hundred horse for Africa. He effected a landing, and pitched his camp near Utica: his legions were for the most part composed of men taken over from the enemy, but he knew well how to gain their affections, and at the same time showed himself a capable officer. He was successful in several minor engagements, and at length put to flight the whole forces of Varus, and proceeded to lay siege to Utica. But there came news that king Juba was advancing with all his forces to its relief, and Curio raised the siege and returned to his former camp to wait for reinforcements. Soon afterwards came a second report, that the king had turned back, and was sending on only a moderate corps under Saburra. Curio immediately sent forward his cavalry, which surprised and inflicted much damage upon this body; he then hastened himself to complete their defeat, and succeeded in putting them to flight. But Saburra was not destitute of support. Only five miles distant was the Numidian main force, which was now seen rapidly approaching. The Roman cavalry were by this time dispersed in pursuit, all but a band of two hundred, who with the infantry were completely surrounded in the plain. In vain Curio attempted to cut his way through: the infantry were cut down to a man; only a few of the cavalry escaped. Curio, unable to bear the shame of defeat, fell sword in hand, and on the

following day the force in camp near *Utica* surrendered on receiving news of the disaster.

The expedition had been successful in relieving the most urgent wants of the capital by the occupation of *Sicily*, but the loss of *Curio* was irreparable. He was the only one of *Caesar's* subordinates who had a touch of genius and a certain magnetic power over the minds of men.

It is uncertain what had been *Pompeius's* plan of campaign for the year 49 B.C. Probably the Spanish army was meant to stand on the defensive until the Macedonian army was ready to march; a junction would then have been effected between the two armies, and a combined attempt made by land and sea to recover *Italy*. In pursuance probably of some such plan, the admirals of *Pompeius* in the Adriatic, *Marcus Octavius* and *Lucius Scribonius Libo*, attacked *Caesar's* fleet under *Dolabella*, destroyed his ships, and shut up *Gaius Antonius* with two legions in the island of *Curicta*. All attempts to rescue the latter failed, and the majority had to lay down their arms and were incorporated in the Pompeian army. *Octavius* proceeded to reduce *Illyria*; most of the towns gave themselves up to him, but the *Caesarians* maintained themselves obstinately in *Salonae* and *Lissus*.

This, the only result obtained by the Pompeian fleet in the year 49 B.C., is miserably small considering the superiority of the party by sea, and suggests an appalling picture of the discord and mismanagement which prevailed in the ranks of the coalition. The general result of the campaign had been complete success for the *Caesarians* in one quarter and partial success in another, while the plan of *Pompeius* had been completely frustrated by the destruction of the Spanish army.

But though nothing was done to obstruct *Caesar* in the West, no effort was spared to consolidate the power of the republican party in Macedonia. Hither flocked the emigrants from *Brundisium*, and the refugees from the West: *Marcus Cato* from *Sicily*, *Lucius Domitius* from *Massilia*, *Afranius* and *Varro* from *Spain*. The senate of the emigration which met at *Thessalonica* counted nearly two hundred members, including almost all the consulars. Out of scrupulous regard to formal law they called them-

selves—not the senate, for that could not exist beyond the sacred soil of the city—but “the three hundred,” the ancient normal number of senators. The majority indeed were lukewarm, and only obstructed the energy of others by their querulousness and sluggishness: but the violent minority showed no want of activity. With them the indispensable preliminary of any negotiations for peace was the bringing over of Caesar’s head; his partisans were held to have forfeited life and property, and it was even proposed to punish every senator who had remained neutral in the struggle or had emigrated without entering the army. Bibulus and Labienus caused all soldiers and officers of Caesar who fell into their hands to be executed, and probably the main reason why no counter-revolution broke out in Italy during Caesar’s absence was the fear of the unbridled fury of the extreme section of the aristocracy. Cato alone had the force and the courage to check such proceedings: he got the senate to prohibit the pillage of subject towns and the putting to death of burgesses otherwise than in battle, and confessed that he feared the victory of his own party even more than their defeat.

The position of Pompeius became more and more disagreeable after the events of the year 49 B.C. All the failures of his lieutenants were visited upon himself, while the newly formed senate took up its abode almost in his head-quarters, and impeded his action at every step. There was no man of sufficient mark to put a stop to these preposterous doings; Cato, who alone might have effected something, was jealously kept in the background by Pompeius, and Pompeius himself had not the necessary intellect or decision.

The flower of the troops were the legions brought from Italy, out of which, with recruits, five legions were formed. Two others were on their way from Syria and one from Cilicia, and three more were formed from Romans settled in Crete, Macedonia, and Asia Minor. Finally, there were two thousand volunteers, and the contingents of the subjects. The militia of Epirus, Aetolia, and Thrace were called out to guard the coast, and a body of archers and slingers was drawn from Greece and Asia Minor. Of cavalry there was a considerable body formed from the young aristocracy of Rome and from the Apulian slave herdsmen;

the rest consisted of contingents from the subjects and clients—Celts from the garrison of Alexandria (p. 372) and from the princes of Galatia, Thracians, Cappadocians, mounted archers from Commagene, Armenians, and Numidians: amounting in all to seven thousand.

The fleet numbered five hundred sail; one fifth of which were Roman vessels, and the rest from the Greek and Asiatic maritime states. Immense stores of corn and war material were collected at Dyrrachium, and for money the whole Roman and non-Roman population within reach, subjects, senators, and tax-farmers, were laid under contribution. The temper of the soldiers was good, but a great part of the army consisted of newly raised troops, and required time for training and discipline.

The design of the commander was to unite his whole force, naval and military, during the winter along the coast of Epirus. The land army moved slowly from its winter quarters at Berrhoea towards Dyrrachium; the Syrian legions were not expected until the spring. The admiral Bibulus was already at Corcyra with 110 ships.

The Pompeians were taking their time, but Caesar was not slow to act. On the conclusion of the Western campaign he had ordered the best of his troops to set out immediately for Brundisium, where ships of war and transports were already collected. These unparalleled exertions thinned the ranks of the legions more than their conflicts, and the mutiny of the ninth legion at Placentia showed the dangerous temper of the soldiers; it was mastered by the personal authority of Caesar, and at present the evil spread no farther. But at Brundisium only twelve ships of war were found, and the transports were scarcely sufficient to convey a third of the army, which numbered twelve legions and ten thousand cavalry, while the enemy commanded the Adriatic and all the islands and harbours of the opposite coast. However, on the 4th of January, 48 B.C., Caesar, with a temerity which is not justified by the success of the immediate enterprise, set sail with six legions and six hundred horse. The Pompeians were not ready to attack, and the first freight was landed in the middle of the Acroceraunian cliffs. The vessels returned to bring over the remainder of the army. Caesar at once began to disperse the Epirote militia, and succeeded in

taking Oricum and Apollonia, while Dyrrachium, the arsenal of Pompeius, was in the greatest danger.

But the further course of the campaign did not fulfil the promise of this brilliant beginning. Thirty of Caesar's transports were captured by Bibulus, and destroyed with every living thing on board. The whole coast, from the island of Sason to Corcyra, was closely watched, and for a time even Brundisium was blockaded. Nor was Dyrrachium captured, for Pompeius had hastened his march and secured it in time. Thus Caesar was wedged in among the rocks of Epirus, between the immense fleet of the enemy and a land army twice as strong as his own. Pompeius was in no hurry to attack, but established himself on the right bank of the river Apsus, between Dyrrachium and Apollonia, facing Caesar on the left bank, and awaited the arrival of the Syrian legions which had wintered at Pergamus.

Caesar was rescued from this perilous position by the energy of Marcus Antonius, the commandant of Italy. Again the transport fleet set sail, with four legions and eight hundred horse. The wind fortunately carried it past the galleys of Libo, the Pompeian admiral; but the same wind carried it northward, past the camps of Caesar and Pompeius to Lissus, which still adhered to Caesar, where it was enabled to land only by the most marvellous good fortune. At the moment when the enemy's squadron overtook the ships of Antonius, at the mouth of the harbour, the wind veered and drove them back into the open sea. Pompeius was unable to prevent the junction of Caesar's forces, and now took up a new position on the Genusus, between the river Apsus and Dyrrachium. When he refused to give battle, Caesar succeeded in throwing himself with his best marching troops between the enemy's camp and the town of Dyrrachium, on which it rested; and Pompeius again changed his position, and encamped upon a small plain enclosed between the fork formed by the main chain of the Balkans, which ends at Dyrrachium, and a lateral branch which runs to the sea in a south-westerly direction. His communication with the town was secured by the fleet, and there was therefore no difficulty about supplies, while to Caesar's camp provisions were brought at intervals only by strong detachments

sent into the interior, and flesh, barley, and even roots had to be eaten by the legions instead of wheat.

Under these circumstances inaction meant destruction to the *Caesarians*, and they proceeded to occupy the heights commanding the plain on which Pompeius lay. They invested his army with a chain of posts sixteen miles long, and cut off the rivulets which flowed into the plain, thus hoping to compel him either to fight or to embark. At the same time, as at Alesia (p. 416), Caesar caused a second, outer, line of entrenchments to be formed, to protect himself against attacks from Dyrrachium or from attempts to turn his position. The works advanced amid incessant conflicts, in which the tried valour of the *Caesarians* had usually the advantage. At one point, for instance, a single cohort maintained itself against four legions for several hours until help arrived. At length the want of fodder and water began to be so severely felt by the Pompeians, that it was absolutely necessary for them to strike a decisive blow. The general was informed by some Celtic deserters that the enemy had neglected to secure the beach between his two lines of entrenchments, six hundred feet distant from each other. Pompeius could thus attack from three sides at once. While the inner line was attacked from the camp and the outer line by light-armed troops, conveyed in vessels and landed beyond it, a third division landed in the space between the two lines and attacked in the rear the defenders who were already sufficiently occupied. The entrenchment next the sea was taken, and the second was with difficulty held by Antonius against the advance of the enemy. Soon afterwards Caesar eagerly seized an opportunity of attacking a Pompeian legion, which had become isolated, with the bulk of his infantry; but a valiant resistance was made, and as the ground had been already used for the encampment of several successive divisions, it was much intersected by mounds and ditches. Caesar's right wing and cavalry missed their way; Pompeius, advancing with five legions to the aid of his troops, found the two wings of the enemy separated and one of them isolated. A panic seized the *Caesarians*; a disorderly flight ensued, and the matter ended with the loss to Caesar of one thousand of his best soldiers. But the results of the day's fighting were more serious than

this. Caesar's lines were broken. The cavalry of Pompeius now ranged at will over the adjacent country, and rendered it almost impossible for him to obtain provisions. Gnaeus Pompeius the younger had destroyed his few ships of war which lay at Oricum, and soon afterwards burnt the transports at Lissus. Caesar was thus cut off from the sea more than ever, and, in fact, was completely at the mercy of Pompeius.

It was now open to Pompeius to attack or to blockade his enemy, or to cross in person to Italy with the main army and try to recover the peninsula. But he left his opponent to make the first move, and Caesar had no choice. He began immediately to retreat to Apollonia, followed by the enemy, who, however, after four days, had to give up the pursuit. Many voices now advised Pompeius to cross to Italy; but this plan would necessitate the abandonment of the Syrian legions, now in Macedonia under Metellus Scipio; and, besides, he hoped to capture the corps of Calvinus, whom Caesar had detached to encounter Metellus. Calvinus was now on the Via Egnatia at Heraclea Lyncestis, and only learned the condition of things just in time to escape destruction by a quick departure in the direction of Thessaly. Caesar, who had arrived at Apollonia, and had deposited his wounded there, now set out for Thessaly, in order to get beyond the reach of the enemy's fleet. He crossed the mountain chain between Epirus and Thessaly, effected a junction with Calvinus at Aeginium, near the source of the Peneus, and, after storming and pillaging Gomphi, the first Thessalian town before which he appeared, quickly received the submission of the others.

Thus the victories of Dyrrachium had borne little fruit to the victors. Caesar and Calvinus had escaped pursuit, and stood united and in full security in Thessaly. But the former caution of the Pompeians was succeeded by the most boundless confidence. They regarded the victory as already won, and were resolved at any price to fight with Caesar and crush him at the first opportunity. Cato was left in command at Dyrrachium and in Coreyra. Pompeius and Scipio marched southward and met at Larissa.

Caesar was encamped near Pharsalus, on the left bank

or the river Enipeus, which intersects the plain stretching southward from Larissa. Pompeius pitched his camp on the right bank, along the slope of Cynoscephalae. His entire army was assembled, and he had now eleven legions numbering 47,000 men and 7000 horse, while Caesar was still expecting two legions from Aetolia and Thessaly, and two which were arriving by way of Illyria from Italy; his eight legions did not number more than twenty-two thousand men and his cavalry but one thousand troopers. All military reasons urged Pompeius to fight soon, and the impatience of the emigrants had doubtless more weight than these reasons. The senators considered their triumph secure. Already there was strife about filling up Caesar's pontificate, and houses were hired in the Forum for the next elections. Great indignation was excited when Pompeius hesitated to cross the rivulet which separated the camps. He was only delaying the battle, they alleged, in order to perpetuate his part of Agamemnon and to rule the longer over so many noble lords. The general yielded, and prepared to attack. The battle-field was almost the same on which, a hundred and fifty years ago, the Romans had laid the foundation of their Eastern dominion. The right of the Pompeians rested on the Enipeus, Caesar's left upon the broken ground in front of the river. The other wings were both out in the plain, and each was covered by cavalry and light troops. The plan of Pompeius was to scatter with his cavalry the weak band of horsemen opposite to him, and then to take Caesar's right wing in the rear. But Caesar, foreseeing the rout of his cavalry, had stationed behind his right flank about two thousand of his best legionaries. As the enemy's cavalry galloped round the line, driving Caesar's horsemen before them, they were met and thrown into confusion by this unexpected infantry attack, and galloped from the field of battle.* This unexpected repulse of the cavalry raised the courage of the

* It was in this attack that the well-known direction of Caesar to his troops to strike at the faces of the enemy's horsemen was given. The infantry, acting in an irregular way against cavalry, were not to throw their pila, but to use them as spears, and, to be more effective, were to thrust at the faces of the troopers. It was probably the rough wit of the camp which suggested the idea that the Pompeian cavalry fled for fear of scars on their faces.

Caesarians. Their third division, which had been held in reserve, advanced all along the line. Pompeius, who had never trusted his infantry, rode at once from the field to the camp. His legions began to waver and to retire over the brook, an operation which was attended with much loss. The day was lost, but the army was substantially intact. Nevertheless Pompeius lost all hope, and when he saw the troops recrossing the brook he threw from him his general's scarf and rode off by the nearest route to the sea. The army, discouraged and leaderless, found no rest within the camp. They were driven from its shelter, and withdrew to the heights of Crannon and Scotussa. As they attempted to march along the hills and regain Larissa Caesar's troops intercepted their route, and at nightfall cut them off from the only rivulet in the neighbourhood. Fifteen thousand of the enemy lay dead or wounded upon the field, while the Caesarians had only two hundred men missing. The next morning twenty thousand men laid down their arms, and of the eleven eagles of the enemy nine were handed over to Caesar. Caesar had on that very day reminded his men that they should not forget the fellow-citizen in the foe; but he found it necessary to use some severity. The common soldiers were incorporated in the army, fines and confiscations were inflicted upon the men of better rank, and the senators and equites of note were with few exceptions beheaded.

The immediate results of this day, the 9th of August, 48 B.C., were soon seen. All who were not willing or not obliged to fight for a lost cause now passed over to Caesar's side. The client communities and princes recalled their contingents. Pharnaces, king of the Bosphorus, went so far as to take possession of Phanagoria, which had been declared free by Pompeius, and of Little Armenia, which had been conferred upon Deiotarus. So also many lukewarm members of the aristocracy made their peace with the conqueror. But the flower of the defeated party made no compromise; aristocrats could not come to terms with monarchy. "Into whatever abyss of degeneracy the aristocratic rule had now sunk, it had once been a great political system; the sacred fire, by which Italy had been conquered and Hannibal had been vanquished, continued to glow—although somewhat dim and dull—in the Roman

nobility as long as that nobility existed, and rendered a cordial understanding between the men of the old *régime* and the new monarch impossible." Many submitted outwardly, and retired into private life. Marcus Marcellus, who had brought about the rupture with Caesar, retired into voluntary banishment at Lesbos; but in the majority passion overwhelmed reflection. No one grasped the hopelessness of the situation more clearly than Marcus Cato. Convinced from this moment that monarchy was inevitable, he doubted whether the constitutional party ought to continue the struggle. But when he resolved still to fight—not for victory, but for a more honourable fall—he sought to draw no one into the struggle who chose to make his peace. It was, in his eyes, merely senseless and cruel to compel the individual to share the ruin of the republic.

Most of the leading men who escaped from Pharsalus made their way to Corcyra, where a council of war was held, at which Cato, Metellus Scipio, Titus Labienus, Lucius Afranius, and Gnaeus Pompeius the younger were present. But the absence of the commander-in-chief and the internal dissensions prevented the adoption of any common resolution, and it was indeed difficult to say what ought to be done. Macedonia and Greece, Italy and the East, were lost to the coalition. In Egypt there was indeed a large army, but it was soon evident that the court of Alexandria was not to be relied on. In Spain Pompeian sympathies were very strong, especially in the army, so much so that the Caesarians had to give up the idea of invading Africa from that quarter; in Africa, again, the coalition, or rather king Juba, had been arming unmolested for more than a year: so that in two regions it was still possible for the constitutionalists to prolong the struggle in honourable warfare for some time to come. By sea, too, their power was still considerable, even after the recall of the subject contingents, while Caesar was still almost without a fleet. And there was yet another possibility—that of a Parthian alliance, and of procuring the restoration of the republic at the hands of the common foe.

Meanwhile, Caesar was in hot pursuit of Pompeius. The latter had gone first to Lesbos, where he joined his wife

and his younger son Sextus; thence he proceeded to Cilicia and to Cyprus. Fear of the reception he might meet with from his aristocratic allies appears to have decided him to take refuge with the Parthian king, rather than to fly to Coreyra. He was in Cyprus, collecting money and arming a band of slaves, when he heard that Antioch had declared for Caesar and that the Parthian route was no longer open; he thereupon hastened to Egypt, from the resources of which he might hope to reorganize the war.

After the death of Ptolemy Auletes in 51 B.C., his two children—Cleopatra, aged about sixteen, and Ptolemaeus Dionysius, a boy of ten—had ascended the throne, according to their father's will, as consorts. But the brother, with his guardian Pothinus, had driven Cleopatra from the kingdom, and was lying with the whole Egyptian army at Pelusium, to protect the eastern frontier against her, when Pompeius anchored at the promontory of Casius, and asked permission to land. His request was about to be refused when the king's tutor, Theodotus, pointed out that, if rejected, Pompeius would probably use his connections in Egypt to instigate rebellion in the army, and that it would be better to make away with him. Accordingly Achilles, the royal general, and some of the old soldiers of Pompeius went off in a barge to Pompeius, whom they invited to come on board in order to be conveyed to land. As he was stepping on shore the military tribune, Lucius Septimius, stabbed him in the back, under the eyes of his wife and son, who had to watch the murder from the deck of their vessel (Sept. 28, 48 B.C.). It was the same day of the same month on which, thirteen years ago, he had entered the capital in triumph over Mithradates. He was "a good officer, but otherwise a man of mediocre gifts of intellect and of heart. . . . Barely once in a thousand years does there arise among the people a man who is a king not merely in name but in reality. If this disproportion between semblance and reality has never perhaps been so strongly marked as in Pompeius, the fact may well excite grave reflection that it was precisely he who in a certain sense opened the series of Roman monarchs." When Caesar arrived in Alexandria all was over. He turned away in deep agitation when the murderer brought the head of his

rival to his ship. How Caesar would have dealt with Pompeius had he been captured alive it is impossible to say. But interest as well as humanity would probably have counselled clemency. "The death of Pompeius did not break up the Pompeians, but gave them, . . . in his sons Gnaeus and Sextus, two leaders, both of whom were young and active, and the second a man of decided capacity. To the newly founded hereditary monarchy, the hereditary pretendership attached itself at once like a parasite, and it was very doubtful whether by this change of persons Caesar did not lose more than he gained."

Caesar's immediate object was accomplished: but he landed and proceeded at once to settle matters in Egypt. He was accompanied by 3,200 men and 800 cavalry, and, taking up his abode in the royal palace, he began collecting the money he urgently needed, and regulating the Egyptian succession. No war contribution was imposed, and the arrears of the sum stipulated for in 59 B.C. (p. 372) were commuted for a final payment of ten million denarii (£400,000). The brother and sister were ordered to suspend hostilities, and it was decided that they should rule jointly, in accordance with their father's will. The kingdom of Cyprus was given—as the appanage of the second-born of Egypt—to the younger children of Auletes, Arsinoe and Ptolemaeus the younger.

But a storm was brewing. Alexandria was a cosmopolitan city, hardly inferior to Rome in the number of its population, and far superior in stirring commercial spirit. In the citizens there was a lively national self-importance, which can hardly be called patriotism,—a turbulent vein which made them indulge in street riots as heartily as the Parisians of to-day. Pothinus and the boy-king were much discontented with Caesar's arrangements, and ostentatiously sent the treasures of the temple and the royal plate to be melted at the mint. Both the piety and the national feeling of the populace were shocked. The Roman army of occupation had become denationalized by its long sojourn in Egypt and by inter-marriage with the women of the country; they were indignant at being obliged to suspend their action on the frontier at the bidding of Caesar and his handful of legionaries, and numerous assassinations of his soldiers in

the city revealed to Caesar the danger in which he was placed. He contented himself with ordering up reinforcements from Asia, and meantime prosecuted the business in hand. It was a time of rest after toil, and never was there greater gaiety in the camp. "It was a merry prelude to a grave drama." The Roman army of occupation suddenly appeared in Alexandria, under the leadership of Achilles, and the citizens at once made common cause with the newly arrived soldiers.

Caesar hastily collected his scattered troops, seized the king and his minister, and entrenched himself in the palace and theatre. The war fleet, as there was no time to place it in safety, was burned; and the lighthouse island of Pharos was occupied by means of boats. Thus the way was kept open for reinforcements. Orders were at once issued to the commandant of Asia Minor and to the nearest subject countries to send troops and ships in all haste. In the streets the insurrection had free course: fighting went on from day to day; but Caesar could not break through to the freshwater lake of Marea, nor could the Alexandrians master the besieged or deprive them of water. The canals from the Nile were spoiled by introducing salt water, but wells dug on the beach furnished a sufficient supply. The besiegers then directed their attention to the sea. The island of Pharos and the mole which connected it with the mainland divided the harbour into a western and an eastern port. The latter with the island were in Caesar's power; the former, with the mole, in that of the Alexandrians. The fleet of the latter had been burnt, but they equipped a small squadron and attempted, though in vain, to prevent the entrance of transports conveying a legion from Asia Minor. But when, soon after, the besiegers captured the island and compelled Caesar's ships to lie in the open roadstead, his position was indeed perilous. His fleet was compelled to fight repeatedly, and if it should once be defeated he would be completely hemmed in and probably lost. Accordingly he determined to attempt to recover the island. The double attack from the sea and from the harbour was successful, and both the island and the part of the mole nearest it were captured, and henceforward remained in Caesar's hands.

But relief was at hand: Mithradates of Pergamus, who claimed to be a natural son of the old enemy of Rome, arrived with a motley army gathered from all the communities of Cilicia and Syria. He occupied Pelusium, and then marched towards Memphis to avoid the intersected ground of the Delta. At the same time, Caesar conveyed part of his troops in ships to the western end of lake Marea, and marched round the lake and along the river to join Mithradates. The junction was effected; and the combined army marched into the Delta, where the young king (who had been released by Caesar in the hope of allaying the insurrection) was posted on rising ground between the Nile and some marshy swamps. Caesar attacked from three sides at once, the camp was taken, and the insurgents were either put to the sword or drowned; among the latter was the young king. The inhabitants met Caesar on his entry in mourning, and with the images of their gods in their hands implored mercy. The conqueror contented himself with granting to the Jews settled in Alexandria the same rights as the Greek population enjoyed, and with substituting for the army of occupation, which nominally obeyed the Egyptian king, a regular Roman garrison of three legions, under a commander nominated by himself, whose birth made it impossible for him to abuse his position,—Rufio, the son of a freedman. Cleopatra and her younger brother Ptolemaeus received the crown, under the supremacy of Rome; the princess Arsinoe was carried off to Italy. Cyprus was again added to the Roman province of Cilicia.

The Alexandrian insurrection is unimportant in itself, but it compelled the man on whom the whole empire now depended to leave his proper task for nearly six months. In the meantime, accident or the ability of individual officers decided matters everywhere.

In Asia Minor, Calvinus had been ordered, on Caesar's departure, to compel Pharnaces to evacuate the territories he had occupied, especially lesser Armenia (p. 466). But Calvinus was obliged to despatch to Egypt two out of his three legions, and was defeated by Pharnaces at Nicopolis. When Caesar himself arrived, Pharnaces promised submission, but took no steps to relinquish his conquests, in the hope that Caesar would soon depart. But Caesar

broke off negotiations, and advanced against the king's camp at Ziela. A complete victory was gained, and the campaign was over in five days. The Bosporan kingdom was bestowed upon Mithradates of Pergamus. Caesar's own allies in Syria and Asia Minor were richly rewarded; those of Pompeius dismissed, as a rule, with fines and reprimands. But Deiotarus was confined to his hereditary domain, and lesser Armenia was given to Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia.

In Illyria there had been warlike operations of some importance while Caesar was in Egypt. The interior swarmed with dispersed Pompeians, and the Dalmatian coast was bitterly hostile to Caesar. But the Caesarian lieutenant, Quintus Cornificius, was able not only to maintain himself but to defeat Marcus Octavius, the conqueror of Curicta (p. 459), in several engagements. During the winter Aulus Gabinius arrived to take over the command of Illyria, and soon began a bold expedition into the interior. But his army was swept away; he suffered a disgraceful defeat during his retreat, and soon afterwards died at Salonae. Finally Vatinius, the governor of Brundisium, defeated the fleet of Octavius with a force extemporized out of ordinary ships provided with beaks, and compelled him to quit those waters.

But the condition of things was most serious in Africa, where the most eminent of the Pompeians had gathered after the defeat of Pharsalus, and had had ample time to reorganize the war on a large scale. The fanaticism of the emigrants had, if possible, increased; they continued to murder their prisoners, and even the officers of Caesar under a flag of truce. King Juba, in whom was combined all the fury of a barbarian and of a partisan, wished even to extirpate the citizens of every community suspected of sympathizing with the enemy, and it was only by the intervention of Cato that Utica itself was saved. It had been no easy task to fill the vacant post of commander-in-chief. Juba, Metellus Scipio, Varus, the governor of the province, all laid claim to it, while the army desired Cato, who was indeed the only man who had the necessary devotion, energy, and authority. But through Cato's own influence the decision fell upon Scipio, as the officer of highest standing; nevertheless it was Cato

alone who confronted the insolent claims of king Juba, and made him feel that the Roman nobility came to him, not as suppliants to a protector, but as to a subject from whom they were entitled to demand assistance. With Scipio the king carried his point, that the pay of his troops should be charged on the Roman treasury, and that the province of Africa should be ceded to him in the event of victory.

The senate of the "three hundred" again appeared, and filled up their ranks from the best or wealthiest of the equites. Warlike preparations went forward with great activity. Every man capable of bearing arms was enrolled, and the land was stripped of its cultivators. The infantry numbered fourteen legions, of which four were legions of King Juba armed in the Roman manner. The heavy cavalry, consisting of Celts and Germans who arrived with Labienus, was sixteen hundred strong, to whom must be added Juba's squadron, equipped in the Roman style. The light troops were mostly Numidians, and very numerous, javelin men, and archers mounted or on foot. Lastly there were 120 elephants, and the fleet of fifty-five sail under Varus and Octavius. Money was provided by the self-taxation of the senate, which included many very wealthy men; huge stores were accumulated in the fortresses, while the open towns were denuded of provisions.

An evil star seemed to preside over the African expedition of Caesar. Not only was it delayed by his long absence in Egypt, but the preparatory measures which he set on foot before leaving for Egypt miscarried. From Spain, Quintus Cassius Longinus had been ordered to cross into Africa with four legions, and to advance against Numidia in conjunction with Bogud, king of western Mauretania. But in this army were many native Spaniards, and two of the legions had formerly been Pompeian. Difficulties arose, which were only aggravated by the unwise and tyrannical conduct of the governor. A formal revolt broke out, and was only repressed on the disavowal of Longinus by the respectable Caesarians and on the interference of the governor of the northern province. Gaius Trebonius, who arrived in the autumn of 47 B.C. to supersede Longinus, everywhere received obedience; but

meanwhile nothing had been done to hinder the enemy's organizations in Africa.

Still more serious difficulties occurred among the troops collected in southern Italy for the African campaign. The majority of these consisted of the old legions which had "founded Caesar's throne in Gaul, Spain, and Thessaly." They were spoiled by victory and disorganized by their long repose in Italy. The tremendous demands made on them by their general had thinned their ranks to a fearful extent, and had left in the minds of the survivors a secret rancour which only wanted an opportunity to break forth. The only man who had any influence over them had been absent, almost unheard of, for a year; and when orders to embark for Sicily arrived the storm burst. The men refused to obey unless the promised presents were paid to them, and threw stones at the officers sent by Caesar. The mutineers set out in bodies to extort fulfilment of the promises from the general in the capital. Caesar ordered the few soldiers in the city to occupy the gates, and suddenly appeared among the furious bands demanding to know what they wanted. They exclaimed, "Discharge." Their request was immediately granted. As to the presents promised on the day of triumph, as well as the lands destined for them, though not promised, Caesar added, they might apply to him on the day when he and the other soldiers should triumph; in the triumph itself they could not of course participate, as having been previously discharged. The men were not prepared for this turn of affairs. They had demanded discharge in order to annex their own conditions to their service if refused. They were ashamed, too, at the fidelity with which the imperator kept his word, even after they had forgotten their allegiance, and at the generosity with which he granted more than he had promised. When they realized that they must appear as mere spectators at the triumph of their comrades, when their general addressed them no longer as "comrades," but as "burgessess" (quirites)—a name which destroyed, as it were, at one blow the whole pride of their past soldierly career,—when they felt once more the spell of the man whose presence had for them an irresistible power, they stood for a while mute and undecided, till

from all sides a cry arose that the general should once more receive them into favour, and again permit them to be called Caesar's soldiers. After a sufficient amount of entreaty Caesar yielded; but the ringleaders had a third cut off from their triumphal presents. "History knows no greater psychological masterpiece, and none that was more completely successful."

Thus again the African campaign was delayed. When Caesar arrived at Lilybaeum the ten legions destined for embarkation had not nearly arrived, and the experienced troops were the farthest distant. However, Caesar sailed on the 25th of December, 47 B.C., with six legions, five of which were newly raised. Storms prevented the enemy's fleet from obstructing their passage, but the same storms scattered Caesar's fleet, and he could not disembark near Hadrumetum more than 3,000 men and 150 horsemen. He got possession of the two seaports of Ruspina and Little Leptis, and kept his troops within entrenchments, and ready at a moment's notice to re-embark if attacked by a superior force. But the remaining ships arrived soon afterwards, and on the following day Caesar made an expedition with three legions into the interior to procure supplies. He was attacked by Labienus, who had nothing but light troops; and the legions were soon surrounded. By deploying his whole line, and by a series of spirited charges, Caesar saved the honour of his arms and made good his retreat; but had not Ruspina been close at hand, the Moorish javelin might have accomplished the same result as the Parthian bow at Carrhae.

Caesar would not again expose his soldiers to such an attack, and remained inactive till his veteran legions should arrive. In the interval he tried to organize some force to counterbalance the enormous superiority of the enemy in light-armed troops. He equipped light horsemen and archers from the fleet, and succeeded in raising against Juba the Gaetulian tribes. The Mauretanian kings, Bogud and Bocchus, were Juba's natural rivals, and there still roamed in those regions a band of Catilinarians under Publius Sittius of Nuceria, who had eighteen years ago become converted from a bankrupt Italian merchant into a leader of free bands. Bocchus and Sittius fell upon Numidia, occupied Cirta, and com-

pelled Juba to send a portion of his troops to his southern and western frontiers. Still Caesar's position was unpleasant enough: his army was crowded together within a space of six square miles; corn was supplied by the fleet, but there was great dearth of forage. If Scipio retired and abandoned the coast towns, he might at least endlessly protract the war; this plan was advised by Cato, who offered at the same time to cross into Italy and call the republicans to arms. But the decision lay with Scipio, who resolved to continue the war on the coast. This blunder was all the more serious because the army which they opposed to Cæsar was in a troublesome temper, and the strictness of the levy, the exhaustion of the country, and the devastation of many of the smaller townships had produced a feeling of exasperation in the region to which the war was transferred. The African towns declared, wherever they could, for Caesar, and desertion increased continually in the army. But Scipio marched with all his force from Utica, appeared before the towns occupied by Caesar, and repeatedly offered him battle. Caesar refused until all his veteran legions had arrived, when Scipio on his part grew afraid, and nearly two months passed away in skirmishes and in efforts to procure supplies.

When Caesar's last reinforcements had arrived he made a lateral movement towards the town of Thapsus, strongly garrisoned by the enemy. Scipio now committed the unpardonable blunder of risking a battle to save the town, on ground which placed the decision in the hands of the infantry of the line. He advanced to a position immediately opposite Caesar's camp on the shore, and, at the same time, the garrison of Thapsus prepared for a sally. Caesar's camp-guard sufficed to repulse the latter; and his legions, forming a correct estimate of the enemy from their want of precision and from their ill-closed ranks, compelled a trumpeter to sound for the attack even before the general gave the signal. The right wing, in advance of the rest of the line, turned the elephants opposed to them back upon the ranks of the enemy; they then broke the left wing of their opponents, and overthrew the whole line. The old camp of the enemy was at a distance, and the new one was not yet ready, so that the defeated army

was almost annihilated. The legionaries refused all quarter; they were tired of being hurried from one continent to another in pursuit of an enemy who, though always defeated, was never destroyed. Fifty thousand corpses covered the field of Thapsus, among which were those of several Caesarian officers suspected by the soldiers of sympathy with the enemy. The victorious army numbered no more than fifty dead (April 6, 46 B.C.).

The struggle was over in Africa: Cato convoked the senate at Utica, and asked them to decide whether they would yield or continue their defence. At first the more courageous view seemed likely to prevail, but ultimately it was resolved to yield. Faustus Sulla, and Lucius Afranius soon arrived with a body of cavalry and wished to defend the city after slaughtering *en masse* the untrustworthy citizens. Cato indignantly refused; and after checking, as far as he could, by his authority and by largesses, the fury of the soldiery, and after providing the means of flight for those who feared to trust themselves to the mercy of Caesar, he at last held himself released from his command, and, retiring to his chamber, plunged his sword into his breast.

Few of the fugitive leaders escaped: Afranius and Faustus were delivered up to Caesar, and when he did not order their immediate execution were cut down by the soldiers. Metellus Scipio was captured by the cruisers of Sittius, and stabbed himself. King Juba, half expecting the issue, had caused a huge funeral pile to be prepared in the market-place of Zama, upon which he proposed to consume himself with all his treasures and the dead bodies of all the citizens. But the latter had no desire to adorn the funeral rites of "the African Sardanapalus;" and closed their gates when he appeared in company with Marcus Petreius. The king, "one of those natures that become savage amidst a life of dazzling and insolent enjoyment, and prepare for themselves even out of death an intoxicating feast"—resorted with Petreius to one of his country houses, where, after a copious banquet, he challenged Petreius to fight him in single combat. The conqueror of Catilina fell by the hand of the king; and the latter caused himself to be stabbed by one of his slaves. Labienus and Sextus Pompeius fled to Spain,

and betook themselves to a piratical warfare by land and sea.

The kingdom of Massinissa was now broken up. The eastern portion was united with the kingdom of Bocchus, and king Bogud was rewarded with considerable gifts. Cirta was handed over to Publius Sittius as a settlement for his half-Roman bands; but this same district, as well as the largest and most fertile part of Numidia, was united as "New Africa" with the older province of Africa.

The struggle, which had lasted for four years, thus terminated in the complete victory of the new monarch. The monarchy might no doubt be dated from the moment when Pompeius and Caesar had established their joint rule, and overthrown the aristocratic constitution. But it was only the battle-fields of Pharsalus and Thapsus that set aside the joint rule, and conferred fixity and formal recognition on the new monarch. Pretenders and conspiracies, even revolutions and restorations, might ensue, but the continuity of the free republic, uninterrupted during five hundred years, was broken through, and monarchy was established as an accomplished fact.

That the constitutional struggle was at an end was proclaimed by Cato when he fell upon his sword at Utica. The republic was dead, the treasure was carried off,—why should the sentinels remain? "There was more nobility, and, above all, more judgment in the death of Cato than there had been in his life." He was not a great man; he was the ideal of unreflecting republicanism, and this has made him the favourite of all who make it their hobby; but he was "the only man who honourably and courageously defended in the last struggle the great system doomed to destruction. Just because the shrewdest lie feels itself inwardly annihilated before the simple truth, and because all the dignity and glory of human nature ultimately depend not on shrewdness but on honesty, Cato has played a greater part in history than many men far superior to him in intellect. . . . It was a fearfully striking protest of the republic against the monarchy, that the last republican went as the first monarch came,—a protest which tore asunder like gossamer all that so-called constitutional character with which Caesar invested his monarchy, and exposed in

all its hypocritical falsehood the shibboleth of the reconciliation of all parties, under the aegis of which despotism grew up. . . . The unrelenting warfare which the ghost of the legitimate republic waged for centuries—from Cassius and Brutus down to Thrasea and Tacitus, nay even far later—a warfare of plots and literature, was the legacy which the dying Cato bequeathed to his enemies.” Immediately after his death the man was revered as a saint by the party of which in his life he was often the laughing-stock and the scandal. “But the greatest of these marks of respect was the involuntary homage which Caesar rendered to him when he made an exception to the contemptuous clemency with which he was wont to treat his opponents, Pompeians as well as republicans, in the case of Cato alone, and pursued him even beyond the grave with that energetic hatred which practical statesmen are wont to feel towards antagonists who oppose them in a domain of ideas, which is as dangerous in their view as it lies beyond their reach.”

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CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY.

Caesar's lineage and character—His attempts to unite the state, to satisfy his own extreme partisans and conciliate his opponents—Principles of the popular party and of Caesar—Caesarianism—Caesar's offices—Title of Imperator—Monarchical insignia and prerogatives—Legislation—The royal edict—The senate—The executive—The subject territories—The magistrates—Religion—Legal administration—Military reorganization—Financial reforms—Increase of soldiers' pay—Condition of the capital—Measures of reform and police—Condition of Italy—Agriculture—Money-dealing—The middle class—Rich and poor—Immorality—Influence of women—Depopulation—Caesar's measures—Relief of debtors—Law of insolvency—Restrictions on money-dealing—Encouragement of agriculture—Regulation of the municipal system—The provinces—Tyranny of the Roman magistrates and capitalists—Measures of relief and protection—Nationalities of the empire—The Greek and the Jew protected—Latinization of the provinces—Distinctions between Italy and the provinces levelled—Elements of administrative unity—Survey of the empire—Fusion of religions—Condition of the criminal and civil law—Weights and measures—The Calendar.

CAESAR was in his fifty-sixth year (born July 12, 102 B.C. ?) when the battle of Thapsus made him sole monarch of Rome. He was sprung from one of the oldest noble families of Latium, and traced his lineage back to the heroes of the Iliad and to the kings of Rome; and he spent the years of his boyhood like any other noble youth of the period, in playing with literature and verse-making, in love intrigues and the arts of the toilette, together with another art much studied at that period, that of always

borrowing and never paying. But manhood found his vigour both of mind and body unimpaired; in fencing and riding he was a match for any of his soldiers, and the incredible rapidity of his journeys astonished both friend and foe. His power of intuition was remarkable, and displayed itself in the practicability and precision of his orders, even when he had not seen with his own eyes, while his memory never failed him. "Although a gentleman, a man of genius, and a monarch, he had still a heart." His love for his mother was deep and lasting, while he was sincerely devoted to his wives, and, above all, to his daughter Julia. His fidelity to his associates was unwavering, and several of them, such as Aulus Hirtius and Gaius Matius, showed their attachment to him after his death. But, above all, Caesar was a realist and a man of sense; his passion was never stronger than he could control. Literature and verse-making occupied him at times, but in his sleepless hours he chose to meditate upon the inflections of Latin nouns and verbs. After the revels of his youth he avoided wine entirely, and though he enjoyed, even when a monarch, the society of women, he allowed them no influence over him. He prided himself upon his personal appearance, and covered the baldness of his later years with the laurel chaplet which he wore in public. It was the result of this cool realism that Caesar possessed the power of living keenly in the present moment, undisturbed by memory or expectation; that he could at any moment apply his whole genius to the most incidental enterprise. To this he owed his "marvellous serenity," his independence of control by favourite or friend. He never deceived himself as to the power of fate and the ability of man; he felt that in all things fortune—accident—must bestow success, and this perhaps is the reason why he often chose to play so desperate a game.

Caesar was from the beginning of his political career emphatically a statesman: his aim was the regeneration, political, military, intellectual and moral, of his own and of the Hellenic nation. He was a brilliant and masculine orator, an author of an inimitable purity and simplicity of style; as a general he disregarded routine and tradition, and conducted each campaign with regard to its own

requirements. Like William of Orange, he stood always ready for battle after defeat, and in the rapid movement of masses of men—the highest and most difficult element of warfare—he was unrivalled. But he was all these things only secondarily, and merely because he was a statesman: they were but the means to an end. His original plan had been to compass his aim, like Pericles, without force of arms, and it was not till the age of forty that he found himself at the head of an army. This improvised generalship is seen in the temerity with which, in many instances, notably when he landed in Epirus, he set aside, without absolute necessity, the best-founded principles of war. But, though a master of the art of war, he did his utmost to avert civil strife, and, after the struggle, he allowed no hierarchy of marshals or government of praetorians to arise. He had every quality which makes the statesman. He was a born ruler, and compelled men of all natures to work in his service. His talent for organization was unsurpassed, and is seen in the creation and management of his political alliances and of his army. He never made the blunder, which so many others have made, of carrying into politics the tone of military command: he was a monarch, but never a tyrant. In his life there were doubtless many mistakes, but there was no false step of passion for him to regret; nothing to be compared with the murder of Kleitos or the burning of Persepolis, in the life of Alexander. Whatever his task, he always recognized its natural limits; where he recognized that fate had spoken, he always obeyed. Alexander on the Hyphasis, Napoleon at Moscow, turned back because they were compelled: Caesar turned back voluntarily on the Thames, and on the Rhine; and on the Danube and the Euphrates he thought, not of unbounded conquests, but of well-considered frontiers.

Such was the man—so easy and yet so difficult to describe. Tradition has handed down copious and vivid information regarding him, and yet no man is more difficult to reproduce to the life. The secret lies in his perfection; the artist can paint anything except only consummate beauty. “Normality admits, doubtless, of being expressed, but it gives us only the negative notion of the absence of defect.” In the character of Caesar, the great contrasts of

existence meet and balance each other. He was of the mightiest creative power, and yet of the most penetrating judgment; of the highest energy of will and the highest capacity of execution; filled with republican ideals, and at the same time born to be king. He was "the entire and perfect man;" and he was this because he was the entire and perfect Roman; he was in the full current of his time, and possessed in perfection the special gift of his nation—practical aptitude as a citizen.

In the work of regenerating the state, Caesar started at once from the principle of the reconciliation of parties—so far as antagonistic principles can be reconciled at all. The statues of Sulla, overthrown by the mob in the capital after Pharsalus, were ordered to be set up again; the men who had been banished in the Cinnan and Sertorian times were recalled, and the children of those outlawed by Sulla (p. 301) were restored to their full rights. In the same way, all who had suffered loss of rights in the early stages of the recent struggle, especially through the impeachments of 52 B.C. (p. 433), received full restitution. The only exceptions were made in the case of those who had put to death the proscribed for money, and of Milo, the condottiere of the senatorial party.

These steps were easy; but it was much more difficult to deal with the parties, which even now, after the war, confronted each other with undiminished hatred. Caesar's own adherents were among the most dissatisfied with the results of the struggle. The Roman popular party expected Caesar to accomplish for them what Catilina had attempted; and loud was their outcry when it became plain that the most which debtors could expect from him was some alleviations of payment and modifications of procedure. They began even to coquet with the Pompeians, and during Caesar's long absence from Italy, in 48 and 47 B.C., to instigate a second civil war.

Just before the battle of Pharsalus the praetor Marcus Caelius Rufus proposed to the people laws granting to debtors a respite of six years free of interest, and cancelling all claims from loans or house-rents. When deposed by the Caesarian senate he entered into negotiations with Milo for a rising in Italy. Milo raised his standard in the region of Thurii, and Rufus formed a plan, which was

frustrated, to seize Capua. The fall of the two leaders put an end to the incident (48 B.C.); but in the following year Publius Dolabella revived the laws of Rufus, and disturbances took place, which had to be put down by Marcus Antonius, the commandant of Italy, by military force.

At the same time that Caesar repressed with a strong hand the ebullitions of his own left wing, he tried to pave the way for the gradual extinction of the republican party by a policy of combined repression and conciliation. He refused to triumph on the ground of victories won over his fellow-countrymen. The statue of Pompeius was restored to its former distinguished place in the senate-house, and political prosecutions of his opponents were confined within the narrowest limits. The papers found in the enemy's head-quarters after Pharsalus and Thapsus were burnt unread; all the common soldiers, except those burgesses who had enlisted under king Juba, escaped with impunity. Even the officers obtained free pardon until the close of the Spanish campaign of 49 B.C.; after that date all who served as officers in the enemy's army, or who sat in the opposition senate, forfeited property and political rights, and were banished from Italy for life. Any who had fought once more after accepting pardon forfeited life at once. But these rules were applied in the mildest possible manner; the punishment of death was rarely inflicted; many were pardoned or escaped with fines, and in fact almost all were pardoned who could bring themselves to ask favour of Caesar. Ultimately, in 44 B.C., a general amnesty was issued.

But the opposition was none the more reconciled. Open resistance there was none, but secret agitations and, above all, the literature of opposition gave expression to the seething republican discontent. The praise of Cato was the favourite theme of opposition pamphlets, which were replied to by Caesar and his confidants. "The republican and Caesarian scribes fought round the dead hero of Utica like the Trojans and Hellenes round the dead body of Patroclus." But, naturally, the Caesarians had the worst of it with a republican public. Hence literary men, like Publius Nigidius Figulus, and Aulus Caecina, found more difficulty than any other class in obtaining permission to return to Italy; and in Italy itself they were subjected to

a practical censorship whose punishments were purely arbitrary. But though risings of republicans and Pompeians were perpetually preparing in every part of the empire, and conspiracies were formed even in the capital itself, Caesar was not induced to surround himself by a body-guard, but contented himself with making known the plots, when detected, by public placards. His clemency and his indifference were not the fruit of sentiment, but of the statesmanly conviction that vanquished parties are absorbed within the state more rapidly than they can be exterminated by proscription. Besides, he needed for his own high objects all the talent, culture, and distinction which the aristocratic party embraced; for here, in spite of all, was still to be found all that remained of a free and national spirit among the Roman burgesses. Like Henry IV. of France and William of Orange, Caesar found that his difficulties only began with victory. For the moment all parties united against their chief, and against his own great ideal. But what Caesar lost the state gained; voluntarily or compulsorily, men of all parties worked at the erection of the new mighty edifice; and if the reconciliation was but external, no one knew better than Caesar that antagonisms lose their keenness when brought into outward union, and that only in this way can the statesman anticipate the work of time.

In attempting to give a detailed account of the mode in which the transition was effected from the old to the new, it must be remembered that Caesar came not to begin but to complete. The principles of the popular party, which Caesar had from the beginning adopted to the full, were the principles of Gaius Gracchus, and had, since his time, been the essential principles of the democracy. They were—the alleviation of the burdens of debtors; transmarine colonization; equalization of the differences of rights existing between the classes in the state; emancipation of the executive from the senate. And these remained the principles of Caesar as monarch; for his monarchy was like the monarchy of Pericles and of Cromwell, “the representation of the nation by the man in whom it puts supreme and unlimited confidence.”

With regard to the judgment to be passed upon Caesar, too much care cannot be taken to avoid the common

blunder of using historical praise and historical censure, applied to particular circumstances, as phrases of general application; and, in the present instances, of construing praise of Caesar as praise of what is called "Caesarism." History is instructive with respect to the present only as she reveals the necessary organic conditions of civilization—"the fundamental forces everywhere alike, and the manner of their combination everywhere different,"—the knowledge of which leads men, not to slavish imitation, but to independent reproduction. The history of Roman imperialism is in reality the bitterest censure of modern autocracy which could be written by the hand of man "Every constitution which gives play to the free self-determination of a majority of citizens infinitely surpasses the most brilliant and humane absolutism," just as the smallest organism is superior to the most artistic machine; the former is living and capable of development, but the latter cannot develop, and is therefore dead. Caesar's work could bring no blessing in itself, but was necessary and salutary because the ancient political organization, based upon slavery and ignorant of representative government, ended logically in military monarchy as the least of evils. "When once the slave-holding aristocracy in Virginia and the Carolinas shall have carried matters as far as their congeners in the Sullan Rome, Caesarism will there too be legitimized in the view of the spirit of history; where it appears under other conditions of development, it is at once a caricature and a usurpation." * History too "is a Bible, and if she cannot any more than the Bible hinder the fool from misunderstanding, and the devil from quoting her, she too will be able to bear with and requite them both."

Formally the position of the new monarch assumed a singular shape.

1. He was invested with the dictatorship, at first temporarily, after his return from Spain in 49 B.C.; again for an indefinite time after Pharsalus; finally from the 1st of

* In later editions the following note is appended by Professor Mommsen: "When this was written, in the year 1857, no one could foresee how soon the mightiest struggle and most glorious victory as yet recorded in human annals would save the United States from this fearful trial, and secure the future existence of an absolute self-governing freedom not to be permanently kept in check by any local Caesarism."

January, 45 B.C., as an annual office, which was in 44 B.C. conferred on him for life.

2. He held the consulship for 48 B.C.—the office which immediately occasioned the civil war; afterwards he was appointed for five and finally for ten years—once without colleague.

3. He was invested with tribunician power for life, in 48 B.C.

4. With the first place and the leading vote in the senate.

5. With the title of imperator for life.

6. He was already pontifex maximus (p. 374), but became a member of the college of augurs.

7. Numerous decrees of the senate entrusted him with the right of deciding on war and peace, the disposal of armies and treasure, the nomination of provincial governors, and many other privileges; together with such empty honours as the title of pater patriae, and the designation of the month in which he was born by the name of Julius.

It is difficult in this confused union of offices to determine by what formal shape Caesar chose to express the new absolute power, but the new name of imperator is in every respect its appropriate formal expression, just because it is new, and no outward occasion for its introduction is apparent. It expresses concisely all the functions of the chief of the state—the concentration of official power in the hands of a popular chief independent of the senate. The title prevails on Caesar's coins, especially those of the last period, by the side of the dictatorship; in his law as to political crimes the monarch is designated by this name; and, what is most decisive, the authority of imperator was given to Caesar for his bodily or adopted descendants. The new monarchy was to be hereditary. The new office was based on the position which consuls or proconsuls occupied outside the pomerium, and included not only the military but the supreme administrative and judicial power. Moreover, the imperator, unlike the consul, had never been checked by the right of provocatio or been obliged to respect the advice of the senate.

In fact the new office of imperator was nothing else than the regal office re-established; as the consulship was only the kingship with certain restrictions imposed, so for the

new office these restrictions were once more removed. Almost every feature of the old monarchy reappears in the new: the union of supreme military, judicial, and administrative power in the hands of the prince; the religious presidency over the commonwealth; the right of issuing binding ordinances; the reduction of the senate to a council of state, the revival of the patriciate and of the *præfecture* of the city; the power of the prince to nominate his successor under the form of adoption. Again, as the old kings of Rome had been the protectors of the commons against the nobility, so Caesar came "not to destroy liberty but to fulfil it." Nor had the idea of the regal office ever become obsolete at Rome; at various times, in the republican dictatorship, in the decemviral power, in the Sullan regency—there had been a practical recurrence to it. And as mankind "have infinite difficulty in reaching new creations, and therefore cherish the once developed forms as sacred heirlooms," it was natural for Caesar to connect himself with Servius Tullius, as Charlemagne connected himself with Caesar, and as Napoleon attempted to connect himself with Charlemagne. Accordingly, beside the statues of the traditional seven kings on the Capitol, Caesar ordered his own to be erected as the eighth. He appeared in public in the costume of the old kings of Alba; in the formula for political oaths the genius of the emperor was added to the Jovis and the Penates of the Roman people; from the year 44 B.C. the head of Caesar appears on the coins—the recognized outward badge of monarchy. There could be no doubt as to Caesar's view of his position; it is even possible that he wished to assume the title of king; certainly he was often pressed by his adherents to assume it—most strikingly when Marcus Antonius, as consul, offered him the diadem before all the people. But it is probable that Caesar was resolved to avoid the name as tainted with a curse, and as familiar to the Romans of his day chiefly as applied to the despots of the East, and the scene with Antonius may have been designed to put an end once and for all to rumours on the subject.

Whatever the title, the sovereign was there, and all the due accompaniments of royalty at once made their appearance. Caesar appeared in public, not in the consular robe

with purple stripes, but in the robe wholly of purple, and received without rising from his chair the procession of the senate. Rents rose in the quarter of the city where he lived; personal interviews became so difficult that Caesar was often obliged to communicate in writing even with his nearest friends. A new monarchical aristocracy arose to replace the old patriciate, which still existed but had dwindled away until not more than fifteen or sixteen genuine patrician families remained. Caesar had the right of creating new patrician gentes conferred on him by popular decree, and thus established a new nobility entirely dependent on himself.

Thus the regal tradition was completely renewed; the burgess assembly remained by the side of the king as the ultimate expression of the sovereign will of the people; the senate was reduced to its old function of giving advice to the ruler when requested; and the whole magisterial authority of the state was concentrated in the monarch.

In legislation the primitive maxim of Roman law was reverted to, that the assembly in concert with the king can alone alter the law of the state; and Caesar regularly had his enactments confirmed by the people. Though the authority of the comitia was only a shadow, yet their existence was a standing acknowledgment of the principle of the sovereignty of the people, and an energetic protest against sultanism.

But at the same time the other maxim of state law was revived, that the command of the supreme magistrate is binding at least as long as he remains in office; and hence the royal edict now obtained the force of law.

On the other hand, while Caesar formally acknowledged the sovereignty of the people, it was no part of his plan to divide his authority with the senate. He made use of it as a council to advise him with regard to new laws, and for issuing important administrative regulations. The latter were usually issued formally in the name of the senate, and there are instances of such decrees of which none of the senators recited as present had any knowledge. In order to make it representative as far as possible of all classes, and also in order to take from it its character as head-quarters of the opposition, it was raised at once to the number of nine hundred; and, to maintain this

increase, the number of quaestors—all of whom became annually members of the senate—was raised from twenty to forty. Of these, twenty were nominated by the emperor, who had also the privilege of conferring the honorary rights of the quaestorship on whomsoever he pleased. The immediate extraordinary increase was carried out solely by Caesar's nomination, and the new members included many non-Italians and persons of humble or dubious origin.

At the same time, the whole executive was concentrated in the hands of the monarch. Every question of any moment was decided by the emperor in person; and Caesar was able to carry personal government to a height which seems incredible to men of modern times. The Roman house was a machine, and the intellectual powers of slaves and freedmen were as much at the disposal of the master as their manual labour. So, whenever circumstances permitted, Caesar filled up any post demanding special confidence with slaves, freedmen, or clients of humble birth. "It was the beau-ideal of bureaucratic centralization."

In matters strictly political Caesar of course avoided, whenever possible, any delegation of his functions; when this was inevitable, as when he was compelled to be absent from Rome, his representative was usually no political personage, but his banker, the Phoenician Lucius Cornelius Balbus, without regular official jurisdiction. In finance, the private means of the monarch were kept strictly separate from the property of the state; but the whole financial management, the levying of the provincial revenues and the coinage—were entrusted to the slaves and freedmen of the emperor. The provincial governors, now that they were relieved of all financial business by the new imperial tax receivers, became little more than military commanders. Egypt, on account of its great resources, and its geographical isolation, which rendered it peculiarly liable to be broken off from the central power under an able leader, was entrusted to a man little likely to abuse his position (p. 471). The more important of the other provinces were given to those who had been consuls, the others to those who had been praetors, and the distribution of provinces among qualified candi-

dates was vested in the imperator. The consuls for the year were often induced to abdicate to make room for other men (consules suffecti); moreover the number of praetors was raised from eight to sixteen, and the nomination of them entrusted to the imperator; finally, the prince could nominate titular praetors or quaestors, and by these various means could always count upon a sufficient number of candidates favourable to himself. As a rule the consular governor remained not more than two years, the praetorian not more than one in his province. The Roman magistrates—consuls, praetors, aediles, tribunes, and quaestors—retained substantially their former powers; but their position was radically changed. Formerly they had been magistrates of the empire, now they were magistrates of the city of Rome, and the consulship became little but a titular post, important only as implying the reversion of a higher governorship. The election of consuls, tribunes, and plebeian aediles was free from restriction; but half of the praetors, curule aediles, and quaestors were nominated by the monarch. The tribunician power was left in the main untouched, but a refractory tribune would of course be summarily dealt with.

Thus, for all general and important questions, the imperator was his own minister; he controlled the finance by his servants and the army by his adjutants; the old state-magistracies were again converted into magistracies of the city of Rome; and, in addition to all this, he acquired the right of nominating his successor. The autocracy was indeed complete.

In spiritual matters Caesar made little alteration, except to attach the supreme pontificate and the augurship to the person of the monarch. Such support as religion could give to the state was now transferred to the monarchy, but it can scarcely have been worth having.

With regard to the administration of the law, Caesar revived the ancient regal right of bringing both capital cases and private suits before himself for sole and final decision. He often sat, like the ancient kings, in the Forum to try burgesses in cases of high treason; client princes accused of the same offence were tried in Caesar's house: so that the only privilege of burgesses in this respect was that of publicity. But for all ordinary cases the former

republican procedure was retained. Criminal causes went before the several jury-commissions appointed to deal with them: civil cases came either before the centumviri, as the court of inheritance was called, or were referred to single judices. The general superintendence of judicial proceedings was conducted in the capital chiefly by the praetor: in the provinces by the governors. Political crimes were still referred to a special commission; the law on this subject was laid down with great precision, and excluded all prosecution of opinions, while it fixed as the penalty, not death, but exile. The question of the selection of jurymen was left, as before, according to the law of Cotta (p. 357) except that the tribuni aerarii were set aside, and the rating of jurymen fixed at 400,000 sesterces (£4000.)

The old republican jurisdiction and that of the king were on the whole co-ordinate, and any case once decided upon before either bar was regarded as closed. But by his tribunician power the king might interfere with any sentence (unless where the law specially forebade the veto of the tribunes) so as to cancel it, and might then, by virtue of his judicial supremacy, order the case to be tried anew before himself. This was the germ of the system of appeal to a higher court, a thing unknown to earlier procedure.*

But these innovations—which cannot with certainty be pronounced improvements in themselves—could not cure the evils from which the Roman administration of justice was suffering. In the first place, criminal procedure could never be sound in a slave state. For the duty of proceeding against a slave must be left, *de facto* at any rate, to the master, who will punish crime in a slave only so far as it impairs his value: slave criminals at Rome were sold to the fighting booth, just as an ox given to goring was sent to the butchers; but punishment for crime as crime could scarcely exist for slaves. Again, during the long course of political disturbance criminal prosecutions, even against freemen, had become mere faction fights, to be fought out by means of favour, money, and violence. All classes bear the blame of this demoralization, but the class of advocates must take the lion's share. Among

* This cannot be proved to have existed anterior to Augustus.

all the numerous pleadings in criminal causes which have come down to us from this epoch, scarcely one makes a serious attempt to fix the crime and to put the proof or counterproof into proper shape.* Civil procedure suffered in the same way, though, from the nature of the case, of course in a minor degree. Caesar retained and even made more severe the curb imposed on forensic eloquence by Pompeius (p. 433), and, under his rule, of course open corruption and intimidation of the courts came to an end. But he could not pluck up the roots of the evil, or reproduce in the minds of the people the sacred sense of right and reverence for law which alone can insure the purity of judicial administration.

Nowhere was the general decay of the state more conspicuously exemplified than in the condition of the military system. This was now in much the same condition as that of the Carthaginians in the time of Hannibal. The governing classes furnished the officers: the subjects, plebeians and provincials, the rank and file. The general was left practically to himself, and to the resources of his province. All civic or national spirit had deserted the army; *esprit de corps* alone held it together; it had ceased to be the instrument of the commonwealth, and had become that of the general who commanded it. Under the ordinary wretched commanders it became a rabble; but in the hands of a capable leader it attained a perfection of which the burgess army was incapable. The higher ranks in the state became more and more averse to arms; so that the military tribuneship, once so keenly competed for, was open to any man of equestrian rank who chose to serve. The staff of officers usually gave the signal for mutiny and desertion. Caesar himself has described the scene at his own head-quarters when orders were given to advance against Ariovistus—the cursing and weeping, the making of wills, the requests for furlough. The levy was held with great unfairness; and soldiers once levied were kept thirty years under the standards. The burgess

* “*Plura enim multo,*” says Cicero, *De Orat.* (ii. 42. 178), primarily with reference to criminal trials, “*homines judicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate, aut iracundia aut dolore, aut laetitia, aut spe, aut timore, aut errore, aut aliqua permotione mentis, quam veritate, aut praescripto, aut juris norma aliqua, aut iudicii formula aut legibus.*”

cavalry had degenerated into an ornamental guard; the "burgess" infantry was a troop of mercenaries collected from the lowest dregs of the populace. The subjects furnished the whole of the cavalry and light-armed troops, and began to be employed extensively in the infantry. The post of centurion went by favour, or was even sold to the highest bidder: the payment of the soldiers was most defective and irregular. Of the decay of the navy enough has been said before; here too, as elsewhere, everything that could be ruined had been reduced to ruin under the oligarchic government.

Caesar's military reorganization was limited substantially to the tightening and strengthening of the reins of discipline. The system itself he did not attempt—perhaps he did not wish—to reform. He did indeed enact that, in order to hold a municipal magistracy or sit on a municipal council before the thirtieth year, a man must serve, either three years as an officer, or six years in the ranks; and thus attempted to attract the better classes into the army. But he dared not associate the holding of an honorary office unconditionally with the fulfilment of the time of service. The levy was better arranged, and the time of service shortened; for the rest, the infantry continued to be raised chiefly from the lower orders of burgesses, the cavalry and light infantry from the other subjects. Two innovations must be placed to Caesar's account: one the use of mercenaries in the cavalry, to which he was driven by the untrustworthiness of the subject cavalry; the other the appointment of adjutants of the legion with praetorian powers (*legati legionis pro praetore*). Hitherto the legion had been led by its military tribunes, who were appointed partly by the burgesses, partly by the general, and who, as a rule, commanded the legion in succession. But henceforward colonels or adjutants of the whole legion were nominated by the emperor in Rome, and were meant chiefly as a counterpoise to the governor's authority. The most important change in the military system was, of course, the new supreme command; for the first time the armies of the state were under the real and energetic control of the supreme government. In all probability the governor would still retain the supreme military authority in his own

province, but subject to the authority of the imperator, who might take it from him at any moment and assume it for himself or his delegates. There was no longer any fear, either that the armies might become utterly disorganized, or that they might forget that they belonged to the commonwealth in their devotion to their leaders.

Perhaps it was the sole illusion which Caesar allowed himself to cherish, that the monarchy he had founded could be otherwise than military. That a standing army was necessary he saw of course, but only because the nature of the empire required permanent frontier garrisons; and to the regulation of the frontier his military plans were substantially limited. He had already taken measures for the tranquillization of Spain, and had provided for the defence of the Gallic and the African boundaries; he had similar plans for the countries bordering on the Euphrates and the Danube. Above all, he was determined to avenge the day of Carrhae, and to set bounds to the power of Boerebistas, king of the Getae (p. 421), who was extending his dominions on both sides of the Danube. Fabulous schemes of world-wide conquest are ascribed to Caesar, but on no respectable authority, and his conduct in Gaul and Britain gives little countenance to such traditions. At any rate it is certain that he did not intend to rest his monarchy primarily on the army, or to set the military power above the civil. The magnificent Gallic legions were dissolved as incompatible with a civic commonwealth; only their glorious names were perpetuated by newly founded colonies. The soldiers who obtained allotments were not settled together to form military colonies, but scattered throughout Italy, except where, as in Campania, aggregation could not be avoided. Caesar attempted in every way to keep the soldiers within the sphere of civil life: by allowing them to serve their term, not continuously, but by instalments; by shortening the term of service; by settling the emeriti as agricultural colonists; by keeping the army aloof from Italy, on the distant frontiers. No corps of guards—the true criterion of a military state—was ever formed by him; even as general he dropped the body-guard which had long been usual; and, though constantly beset by assassins in the capital, he contented himself with the usual escort of lictors. But this noble ideal, of a

kingship based only on the confidence of the people, could but be an illusion; amidst the deep disorganization of the nation it was impossible for the eighth king of Rome to reign merely by virtue of law and justice. Just as little could the army which had placed him on the throne be really absorbed again into the state. The Campanian mutiny and the battle-field of Thapsus showed how the legionaries had learned their lesson. Thousands of swords still flew at Caesar's signal from their scabbards, but they no longer returned to their scabbards at his signal. Caesar's creation could not but be a military monarchy; he had overthrown the *régime* of the aristocrats and bankers, only to put a military *régime* in its place. Nevertheless, it was important that at the outset Caesar laboured, however uselessly, to avoid military rule; and it is owing to his exertions that for centuries the emperors of Rome used the army in the main, not against the citizen, but against the foe.

The financial embarrassment in which the state found itself during recent years was not caused by deficiency of revenue, which had lately been increased by £850,000 since the formation of the provinces of Bithynia-Pontus, and Syria. The taxation of foreign luxuries, too, yielded a constantly increasing revenue; and immense sums had been brought into the state chest by Lucullus, Metellus, Pompeius, Cato, and others. But expenditure had likewise increased, and the whole department had been mismanaged. The corn distribution had gradually come to absorb one-fifth of the revenue; the military budget had risen with the addition of Cilicia, Syria, and Gaul to the list of provinces. Again, special warlike preparations had swallowed up enormous sums. Still, boundless as were the resources of the empire, the exchequer might have met all these claims upon it but for mismanagement and corruption.

Apart from these last two causes there were two institutions, both introduced by Gaius Gracchus, which "ate like a gangrene into the Roman financial system,"—the corn distributions and the leasing system. The latter was retained for the indirect taxes; but the direct taxes were in future either paid in kind, like the contributions of corn and oil from Sardinia and Africa, or converted into fixed money payments, the collection being entrusted to

the communities themselves. The corn distributions could hardly be abolished; but in their present form they were an assertion of the principle that the ruling community had a right to be supported by its subjects. Caesar reduced the number of persons relieved from 320,000 to 150,000, which number was fixed as a maximum, and he excluded from the list all but the most needy, thus converting the institution from a political privilege into a provision for the poor.

A thorough revision of income and expenditure was carried out. The ordinary items of revenue were fixed anew. On many communities and districts total exemption from taxation was conferred, either directly or by bestowal of the franchise. Many others had their tribute lowered: that of Asia was reduced by one-third; in the newly conquered districts of Illyria and in Gaul the tribute was fixed at a low rate; all Gaul paid but forty million sesterces (£400,000). On the other hand, some communities, as Little Leptis in Africa, had their tribute raised; the recently abolished Italian harbour dues (p. 388) were reimposed: and to these ordinary sources of income were to be added great sums raised from booty, temple treasures, forced loans and fines imposed on subject communities or on individuals; above all, from the proceeds of the estates of the defeated party. The fine of the African capitalists who sat in the senate at Utica amounted to a hundred million sesterces (£1,000,000), and the property of Pompeius sold for £700,000. These confiscations were necessary, because the strength of the aristocrats lay in their colossal wealth; but the proceeds were scrupulously devoted to state purposes, and the purchase money was always rigidly exacted, even from Caesar's closest adherents, such as Marcus Antonius.

The expenditure was largely diminished by the restriction of the corn distributions; and these, together with supply of oil for the baths, were now provided for by contributions in kind from Sardinia and Africa, and thus kept separate from the exchequer. But the military expenditure was increased, both by the augmentation of the standing army and by the raising of the pay from 480 sesterces (£5) to 900 (£9) annually. Both steps were

necessary: the first owing to the want of any efficient defence of the frontiers; the second because the former pay of $1\frac{1}{2}$ sesterces ($3\frac{1}{4}d.$) per day had been fixed at a time when money had an entirely different value, and when the soldier entered the army, not for pay, but for the irregular gains which he made at the expense of the provincials. The new scale was fixed at $2\frac{1}{2}$ sesterces ($6\frac{1}{2}d.$) per day, the ordinary day's wages at the same period being 3 sesterces ($7\frac{1}{2}d.$). Caesar's extraordinary expenses during and after the civil wars were enormous. The war had cost immense sums; every common soldier in Caesar's army received twenty thousand sesterces (£200) at its close; every neutral burgess in the capital, three hundred (£3). Buildings undertaken in the capital cost in all 160,000,000 sesterces (£1,600,000). Yet, in spite of these immense disbursements, in March, 44 B.C., there was in the public treasury a sum of seven hundred million sesterces, in that of Caesar one hundred millions (in all £8,000,000)—tenfold the amount which the treasury had held in the most flourishing times of the republic.

But the task of breaking up the old parties, and furnishing the state with a suitable constitution, an efficient army, and well-ordered finances, was not the most difficult part of Caesar's work. It remained to regenerate the Italian nation, to reorganize Rome, Italy, and the provinces.

As to Rome itself, nothing could be more deplorable than the condition into which it had fallen. In it, as in all capitals, were congregated the upper classes, who regarded their homes in town as mere lodging places, the foreign settlers, the fluctuating population of travellers on business or pleasure, the mass of indolent, criminal, bankrupt, and abandoned rabble. All real communal life had ceased in Rome: it was a centre to which people flocked from the whole extent of the empire for speculation, debauchery, intrigue, or crime. All the evils inseparable from great capitals were found intensified at Rome, and there were others peculiar to itself. No city, perhaps, was ever so completely without free industry of any kind, which was rendered impossible by the importation of foreign commodities and by the extensive employment of slaves in domestic manufacture. Nowhere, again,

were such masses of slaves congregated; nowhere were the slaves of so many different nationalities—Syrians, Phrygians, half-Hellenes, Libyans, Moors, Getae, Iberians, and, of late years, Celts and Germans in daily increasing numbers. Still worse were the masses of freedmen—often free only *de facto*—a mixture of beggars and of rich parvenus, no longer slaves but not yet burgesses, economically and even legally dependent on their masters. Retail trade and minor handicrafts were almost entirely in their hands, and in riots and at elections their influence was supreme. The oligarchical government had done nothing to mend these evils. The law prohibiting persons condemned for capital offences from living in the capital was not enforced; the police supervision over clubs and associations was first neglected and then forbidden by law (p. 423). Popular festivals had been allowed to increase so largely that the seven principal celebrations alone occupied sixty-two days. The grain supply was managed with the greatest remissness, and the fluctuations in prices were fabulous and incalculable. Lastly, the free distributions were a standing invitation to all destitute and indolent burgesses to come and take up their abode in the capital. Out of all this neglect sprang the system of clubs and bands, the worship of Isis and other religious extravagances. Dearth and famine were ordinary incidents; life was nowhere more insecure than at Rome. The condition of the buildings and streets was equally disgraceful, nothing was done to prevent the constant overflows of the river, and the city was still content with one bridge over the Tiber. The streets were narrow and steep, the footpaths small and ill-paved. Ordinary houses were wretchedly built, and of a giddy height, while the palaces of the rich formed a striking contrast to the decaying temples of the gods, with their images still carved for the most part in wood. “If we try to conceive to ourselves a London with the slave population of New Orleans, with the police of Constantinople, with the non-industrial character of the modern Rome, and agitated by politics after the fashion of the Paris of 1848, we shall acquire an approximate idea of the republican glory, the departure of which Cicero and his associates in their sulky letters deplore.”

Caesar could not, of course, alter the essential character of the city, nor would this have suited his plan. To be the head of the Roman empire it must remain what it was, the denationalized capital of many nations, situated at the meeting-point of East and West; and for this reason Caesar tolerated the new Egyptian worship, and even the strange rites of the Jews, alongside of those of Father Jovis; while at his popular festivals he caused dramas to be performed, not only in Latin and Greek, but in Phoenician, Hebrew, Syrian, and Spanish. The primary evils could not be eradicated; Caesar could not abolish slavery or conjure into existence a free industry in the capital. But by his extensive building operations he at any rate gave to the willing an opportunity of honourable employment, while the limitation of the distributions must have stopped the influx of the destitute into Rome. The existing proletariat was reduced by measures of police and by comprehensive transmarine colonization. Eighty thousand settlers were sent abroad during the few years of Caesar's government. The grain supply was placed upon a regular and efficient basis, and entrusted to the two newly appointed corn-aediles. The club system was checked by laws, and came to an end of itself as the elections ceased to be of practical importance. In future, with some few exceptions, the right of forming associations depended upon the permission of the monarch and the senate. At the same time, the laws regarding violence were rendered more severe, and the right of the convicted criminal to withdraw himself from part of the penalty by self-banishment was set aside. The repair of the streets and footpaths was laid as a burden upon house proprietors, and the whole regulation of the streets was entrusted to the four aediles, who each superintended a distinct police district. Building in the capital received a stimulus which put to shame everything that had been accomplished in former days. And the new buildings were not merely monuments of splendour, but contributed largely to the public convenience. The crowded Forum was relieved by the construction of a new comitium in the Campus Martius, and of a new place of judicature, the Forum Julium. In the same spirit, oil was supplied to the baths free of cost, as a measure of sanitation. Other and more brilliant

projects, such as the alteration of the whole lower course of the Tiber, so as to provide more space for public edifices, to drain the Pomptine marshes, and to provide the capital with a safe sea-port, were cut short by the death of Caesar.

But when all was done, Rome, just because it was incapable of a real municipal life, was essentially inferior to other municipalities of the period. "The republican Rome was a den of robbers, but it was at the same time the state: the Rome of the monarchy, although it began to embellish itself with all the glories of the three continents, and to glitter in gold and marble, was yet nothing in the state but a royal residence in connection with a poor-house, or, in other words, a necessary evil."

The reorganization of the police of Rome was, of course, a small task compared with the social reorganization of Italy. The plague-spot in the condition of Italy was, as it had long been, the disappearance of the agricultural and the unnatural increase of the mercantile population. In spite of numerous attempts to foster the system of small holdings, farm husbandry was scarcely anywhere predominant in Italy. In the districts of Tibur and Tusculum, on the shores of Tarracina and Baiae, where the Italian farmer had once sowed and reaped, there was now to be seen only the barren splendour of the villas of the nobles, with all the appurtenances of gardens and fish-ponds salt and fresh, nurseries of snails and slugs, game preserves, and aviaries. The stock of a pigeon-house was valued at £1000, the fishes left behind by Lucius Lucullus brought £400. Accordingly the supply of such luxuries developed into a trade which, if intelligently prosecuted, brought large profits. Gardening, the production of vegetables, fruit, and flowers, especially roses and violets, in Latium and Campania, and of honey, were the most profitable. The management of estates on the planter system gave results which, from an economic point of view, far surpassed anything which the old system of small cultivators could have given, especially in central Italy, the district of the Fucine lake, of the Liris and Volturnus. Even some branches of industry, such as were suitable accompaniments of a slave estate, were taken up by intelligent landlords, and

ians, weaving factories, brickworks, were conducted on the demesne. Pastoral husbandry, which was always spreading, especially in the south and south-east, was indeed in every respect a retrograde movement, but it too participated in the general progress, and accomplished much in the way of improvement of breeds.

The dimensions which money-dealing assumed by the side of this unnaturally prosperous estate husbandry, and the extent to which capital flowed to Rome, is shown by the singular fact that at Rome the ordinary rate of interest was six per cent. ; that is, one-half the average rate elsewhere in ancient times.

The result of this economic system, based upon masses of capital, was the most fearful disproportion in the distribution of wealth. Nowhere is the phrase "a commonwealth composed of millionaires and beggars" so applicable as at Rome in the last stages of the republic ; nowhere has the essential maxim of the slave state, that the rich man who lives by the exertion of his slaves is respectable, and the poor man who lives by the labour of his hands is necessarily vulgar, been so widely recognized. A real middle class there can never be in any fully developed slave state ; the nearest approach to it in the Roman commonwealth was composed of men who were either too cultivated or too uncultivated to go beyond their own sphere of activity, and to take any share in public life. Of the former class, Cicero's friend, Titus Pomponius Atticus, is a typical example. He acquired a large fortune by estate farming and by extensive money transactions ; but he was never seduced into soliciting office, or even into money transactions with the state ; his table was ample, but moderate, and was maintained at a cost of one hundred sesterces (£1) per day ; he was content with an easy existence, which included all the charms of a country and a city life, together with intercourse with the best society of Rome and Greece, and all the enjoyments of literature and art. Of the less cultivated rural gentleman (*pater-familias rusticanus*) an example is furnished by Sextus Roscius, who was murdered in 81 B.C. He manages his thirteen estates in person, and comes seldom to the capital, where his clownish manners contrast strongly with those of the polished senator. In such men and in their country

towns the discipline, manners, and language of their fathers were best preserved. Traces of such a class appear wherever a national movement arises in politics, and from it sprung Varro, Lucretius, Catullus, and all the freshest literature of the time. An excellent picture of this simple landlord life may be found in the graceful introduction to the second book of Cicero's treatise "*De Legibus*."

But the vigorous class of landlords is completely out-balanced by the two predominant classes in the state, the mass of beggars, and the world of quality. The relative proportions of poor and rich we have no means of accurately knowing. But fifty years earlier the number of families of established wealth did not amount to two thousand; and the disproportion had probably increased. The growth of poverty is shown by the crowding into the army, and into the city for the corn-largesses; that of wealth, by the fact that an author of this generation describes an estate of two million sesterces (£20,000), of the Marian period, as "riches, according to the circumstances of that day," and by the enormous fortunes possessed by individuals. The estate of Pompeius amounted to 70,000,000 sesterces (£700,000); Crassus, who began with a fortune of 7,000,000 (£70,000), died, after lavishing enormous sums on the people, worth 170,000,000 (£1,700,000.) The result was, on both sides, economic and moral disorganization. The Roman plebeian became a lazy mendicant, fonder of gazing in the theatre than of working. The gladiatorial games flourished as never before; freedom had so fallen in value that freemen often sold themselves for board and wages as gladiatorial slaves. In the world of quality essentially the same features occur. As the plebeian lounged on the pavement, the aristocrat lay in bed till late in the day; unbounded and tasteless luxury everywhere prevailed; huge sums were lavished on politics and on the theatre, to the corruption of both. In 54 B.C., the first voting division alone was paid £100,000, and all intelligent interest in the drama vanished amidst the insane extravagance of decoration. Rents in Rome were four times as high as in the country; the house of Marcus Lepidus, at the time of Sulla's death the finest in Rome, was, a generation later, not the hundredth on the list of Roman palaces. A palatial sepulchre was a necessity to

every noble who wished to die as became his rank ; horses, dogs, furniture, dress, plate, all cost outrageous sums. But it was the luxury of the table, the coarsest luxury of all, which flourished most bravely. There were dining-rooms for winter and summer ; sometimes the meal was served on a platform in the deer-park, and the guests were entertained by a theatrical Orpheus, at whose notes trained roes and wild boars gathered round. Italian delicacies had become vulgar, and even at popular festivals three sorts of foreign wine, Sicilian, Lesbian, and Chian were distributed. Emetics were commonly taken to avoid the consequences of a meal. Debauchery of every sort had become a profession, by which instructors in the theory and practice of vice could gain a living. Of course no fortune could bear the ravages of such expenditure. The canvass for the consulship was the usual high-road to ruin. The princely wealth of the period is far surpassed by the more than princely liabilities. Caesar in 62 B.C. owed £250,000 more than his assets. Marcus Antonius owed at the age of twenty-four, £60,000 ; fourteen years later £400,000, Curio owed £600,000 ; Milo £700,000. The borrowing of the competitors for the consulship once suddenly raised the rate of interest from four to eight per cent. Insolvency was usually prolonged by the debtor as long as possible, and when the final crash came the creditors perhaps got—as in the case of Milo—four per cent. of their lendings. The only man who profited by such a condition of things was, of course, the cool banker. The debtors were either in servile subjection to their creditors, or ready to get rid of them by conspiracy and civil war. Hence the cry of “ clear sheets ” (*novae tabulae*), the motto of Cinna and Catilina, of Caelius and Dolabella.

Under such circumstances morality and family life had become antiquated things ; poverty was the only disgrace, the only crime ; the state, honour, freedom were alike sold for money. Men had forgotten what honesty was, and a man who refused a bribe was regarded as a personal foe. The criminal calendars of all ages and countries could scarcely furnish a tale of crime so horrible, so varied, and so unnatural as the trial of Aulus Cluentius reveals in the bosom of a respectable family in an Italian country town. Nevertheless, the surface of life was overspread with a

veneer of polish and professions of universal friendship. All the world exchanged visits. At houses of quality the crowds of visitors were admitted in a fixed order, the more notable one by one, the others in groups, or in a body at the close. Invitations to dinner and the customary domestic festivals became almost public ceremonials, and even at his death the Roman was expected to provide each of his countless friends with a keepsake. Instead of the genuine intimacy of family ties there was a spectral shadow of "friendship," not the least of the evil spirits which brooded over the horrors of the age.

Another equally characteristic feature was the emancipation of women—not merely the economic emancipation from father or husband—which had long ago been accomplished, but a freedom which allowed them to interfere in every department of life. The ballet dancers (*mimæ*) and all their tribe pollute even the pages of history; liaisons in even the best circles were so common that only a very extraordinary scandal could excite comment. The intrusion of Publius Clodius at the women's festival of the *Bona Dea*, a scandal hitherto unparalleled, passed almost without investigation. The carnival time for license of this sort was the watering-place season (in April), at *Baiæ* and *Puteoli*; but the women were not content with their own domain. They invaded the realm of politics, attended political conferences, and took their part in all the coterie intrigues of the time. The lightness with which divorce was regarded may be inferred from the conduct of the stern moralist Cato, who did not hesitate to divorce his wife for a friend who wished to marry her, or to marry her again after the death of his friend. Celibacy and childlessness became increasingly common, especially in the upper classes; even with Cato and his circle the same maxim was now current to which Polybius had traced the decay of Hellas, that it is the duty of a citizen to keep great wealth together, and therefore not to beget too many children.

During all this period the population of Italy was growing steadily smaller. The amount of talent and working power necessary for the government of the empire was no longer forthcoming from the peninsula, especially as a large part of its best material was continually being lost

for ever to the nation. The aristocracy lost the habit of looking on Italy as their home. Of the men enlisted for service, large numbers perished in the numerous wars, and many more were wholly estranged from their native land by the long period of service. Speculation kept many of the land-holders and merchants away from their country, and their itinerant habits estranged them from civic and family life. In return for these sound elements Italy received a rabble of slaves and freedmen, handicraftsmen and tradesmen from Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, who moreover flourished chiefly in the seaports and in the capital; in many parts of Italy there was not even this compensation, and the population visibly declined. The pastoral districts, such as Apulia and the region round Rome, became every year more desolate: many towns, such as Labici and Gabii, could hardly find representatives for the Latin festival; Tusculum consisted almost solely of families of rank who lived at Rome but retained their Tusculan franchise. In some portions of Italy, especially Campania, things were not so bad; but in general, as Varro complains, "the once populous cities of Italy stood desolate."

"It is a terrible picture, but not one peculiar to Italy; wherever the government in a slave-state has fully developed itself, it has desolated God's fair world in the same way. . . . As in the Hellas of Polybius, and the Carthage of Hannibal's time, . . . the all-powerful rule of capital ruined the middle class, raised trade and estate-farming to the highest prosperity, and ultimately led to a . . . moral and political corruption of the nation. . . . Not until the dragon-seed of North America ripens, will the world have again similar fruits to reap."*

The evils of Italy were in their deepest essence irremediable; the wisest government cannot give freshness to the corrupt juices of the organism, or do more in such a case than remove obstructions in the way of the remedial power of nature. The worst excrescences vanished under the new rule, such as the pampering of the proletariat, the impunity of crimes, the purchasing of offices. But Caesar was not one of those overwise men who refuse to embank the sea because no dyke will keep out a sudden influx of

* Written in 1857. See note on p. 486.

the tide. Though no one knew better than himself the limits of his power, he applied all his energies to bring back the nation to home and family life, and to reform the national economy by law and decree.

In order to check the absence of Italians from Italy the term of military service was shortened, and men of senatorial rank were prohibited from living out of Italy except on public business. Other Italians, of marriageable age, were forbidden to be absent for more than three consecutive years. In his first consulship Caesar had especially favoured fathers who had several children, in founding his colony of Capua. As imperator he offered rewards to fathers of numerous families, and treated divorce and adultery with great rigour. In order to repress some of the worst forms of luxury, extravagance in sepulchral monuments was cut down by law, the use of purple robes and of pearls was restricted, and a maximum was fixed for the expenditure of the table. Even the semblance of propriety enforced by these police measures was, under the circumstances, not to be despised. The laws designed to meet the existing monetary crisis, and for the better regulation of monetary dealings in future, were more serious and promised better results. The law which was produced by the outcry against locked-up capital, and which provided that no one should have on hand more than sixty thousand sesterces (£600) in gold and silver, was probably only meant to allay the public indignation, and can hardly have been enforced. The treatment of pending claims was a more serious matter. Two important concessions were made to debtors in 49 B.C. First, the interest in arrear was struck off, and that already paid was deducted from the capital. Secondly, the creditor had to accept as payment the property of the debtor at its estimated value before the general depreciation caused by the civil war; which of course was only fair, inasmuch as it compelled the creditor to bear his share of the general fall in values. But the first provision, which in practice compelled the creditor to lose, besides the interest, an average of twenty-five per cent. of his capital, amounted to a partial concession to the cry for a total cancelling of debts. But the democratic party had always taken their stand upon the illegality of all interest: interest was, in fact, forbidden by the *lex Genucia*, which

was extorted by the plebeians in 342 B.C., and which was still formally valid; in the confusion of the Marian period it had even been enforced for a time. And though Caesar can hardly have shared the crude views of his party, he could not entirely repudiate its traditional maxims; especially as he had to decide this question, not as the conqueror of Pharsalus, but even before his departure for Epirus.

Besides assisting the debtor of the moment, Caesar did what he could permanently to repress the fearful omnipotence of capital. According to Roman law the insolvent debtor became the slave of his creditor; and though modified in secondary points, the principle had remained unaltered for five hundred years. It was Caesar who first gave to an insolvent the right of saving his personal freedom though with diminished political rights; of ceding his property to his creditors, and beginning a new financial existence. Claims arising from the earlier period could be enforced against him only if he could meet them without renewed financial ruin. At the same time, Caesar did not disown the antipathy of his party to usury. In Italy, for the future, no single capitalist was allowed to lend sums amounting to more than a fixed proportion (perhaps one half) of the value of his landed estate. In consequence of this law every money-lender was compelled to be also a landowner, and the class of capitalists subsisting wholly on their interest would disappear from Italy. It was also forbidden to take a higher interest than one per cent. per month; or to take interest on arrears of interest, or to claim interest to a greater amount than the capital—provisions which were probably first introduced by Lucius Lucullus in Asia Minor, and which were extended to all the provinces by decree of the senate in the year 50 B.C.

For the improvement of agriculture the first necessity was the improvement of the administration of law and justice. Hitherto neither movable nor immovable property had been secure. The leaders of armed bands, when their services were not required in the capital, had applied themselves to rounding off the country estates of their masters by violently expelling the rightful owners. Such proceedings were now at an end. A high road was made from Rome through the passes of the Apennines to

the Adriatic, and the level of the Fucine lake was lowered for the benefit of the Marsian farmers. In order to check brigandage and encourage free labour, Italian graziers were required to take at least a third of their herdsmen from free-born adults. In the encouragement of small holdings Caesar showed himself scrupulously observant of every legitimate title, whether derived from Gracchus or Sulla; but the commission of twenty was revived to revise all Italian titles; and the whole of the actual domain land of Italy which was suitable for agriculture was destined for distribution. In the selection of farmers the veterans were first considered; and thus Caesar restored to his country as a farmer the proletarian whom he had levied as a recruit. Desolate Latin communities, such as Veii and Capena, were provided with new colonists. The new owners were forbidden to alienate their lands for twenty years.

The newly organized municipal system, which had been developed out of the crisis of the social war (p. 309), was regulated by Caesar in two ordinances of 49 B.C. and 45 B.C., the former of which applied to Cisalpine Gaul only, while the latter remained the fundamental law for all succeeding time. It proceeded on the line of purifying the urban corporations from all immoral elements, and of restricting centralization to the utmost. The communities were still allowed to elect their own magistrates, and to exercise a limited civil and criminal jurisdiction.

Such were Caesar's regulations for the reform of the social economy of Italy. It would be easy to show that they were insufficient, and that they acted in some respects injuriously,—still easier to show that the evils of Italian economy were incurable. But Caesar did not hope or expect from them the regeneration of Italy. This he attempted to attain in a very different way, for the understanding of which it is necessary to review the condition of the provinces as Caesar found them.

The provinces in existence at this time were fourteen in number: seven European—Further Spain, Hither Spain, Transalpine Gaul, Italian Gaul with Illyricum, Macedonia with Greece, Sicily, Sardinia with Corsica; five Asiatic—Asia, Bithynia with Pontus, Cilicia with Cyprus, Syria, Crete; two African—Cyrene, Africa. To

these Cæsar added three more—Lugdunese Gaul, Belgica, and Illyria, which was now erected into a separate province.

Under the oligarchy the provinces were reduced to a condition of hopeless misery which it seems impossible for any government ever to surpass. It is true that, before the Romans had their day, the rule of Greeks, Phoenicians, or Asiatics had almost everywhere driven from the nations all sense of right and liberty. The Roman provincial, when accused, was obliged to appear personally at Rome; the Roman governor interfered at pleasure in every detail of administration; the Roman administrators and their train were bound by no rule of morality and justice, and outrages, rapes, murders with or without the form of law, were of daily occurrence. But these things had gone on from time immemorial under Carthaginian overseers and Syrian satraps, and the well-being of the provincials was far less disturbed by them than by the financial exactions, in which the Romans outran all former tyrants. The ordinary taxes were rendered doubly oppressive by the mode of levying them. As to the quartering of troops, Roman statesmen themselves confessed that a town suffered nearly as much from it as when stormed by an enemy. The taxation was properly an indemnification for the burden of military defence undertaken by Rome, and the communities taxed had a right to be exempt at any rate from the ordinary service. But garrison duty was still for the most part imposed upon the provincials, as well as the whole burden of cavalry service; and the extraordinary contributions for the supply of grain to the capital, the costly naval armaments and coast defences against the pirates, the military requisitions in time of war, were frequent and oppressive in the extreme. In Sicily the number of farms decreased fifty-nine per cent. during three years of the administration of Gaius Verres, and the ruined cultivators were not small farmers, but considerable planters and Roman burgesses! In the client states the burdens were, if possible, heavier. In addition to the Roman exactions came those of the native courts; farmer and king were alike bankrupt. And to these, to some extent regular exactions, are to be added the plunderings of the governor and of all his friends each

of whom expected to return to Rome a made man. The advocates and jurymen at home expected to share the spoil; so that the more the governor stole, the greater his security. And these were the successors of the men who had brought nothing home from the provinces but the thanks of the subjects and the approval of their countrymen!

Nor is this all. The tyranny of the Italian men of business was even worse than that of the governors. Much of the landed property and most of the commerce and finance of the provinces were in their hands. Usury flourished as never before. The small landowners managed their estates as the debtor-slaves of their creditors. Communities had sometimes to pay four per cent. per month for loans. Frequently a man of business got the title of envoy (*libera legatio*) conferred on him, and sometimes had men put at his disposal for the more effective prosecution of his affairs. On one occasion, a banker, who had a claim on the town of Salamis in Cyprus, kept its council blockaded in the town-house until five members died of hunger. And still to all these miseries and oppressions there remain to be added general calamities, for some of which, such as war, brigandage, and piracy, the inefficiency of the Roman government was responsible. The general result, even in the comparatively prosperous provinces of Spain and Narbonese Gaul, was total ruin. Towns like Samos and Halicarnassus stood empty; even the patient Asiatic was weary of life. The statesmen of Rome allowed that the Roman name was unutterably hateful throughout Greece and Asia; and when the men of Heraclea, in Pontus, put to death the whole of the Roman tax-collectors, "the only matter for regret was that such things did not occur oftener."

The wounds inflicted could only be healed by time; but Caesar took care that there should be no new inflictions. The new governors were the servants of a stern master, and were practically appointed by him (p. 491). Their functions were largely restricted by the new supreme command in Rome and by the new adjutants associated with them (p. 494). The raising of the taxes, too, was probably already committed to imperial officials, so that the governor was now surrounded by an independent

staff, directly responsible to the imperator. The law against exactions had been made more stringent by Caesar in his first consulate, and was applied with inexorable severity. At the same time, the extraordinary burdens were limited to the necessary requirements, and the ordinary burdens materially lessened. Exemptions from tribute were liberally granted, the direct taxes lowered, the system of *decumae* (p. 316) confined to Africa and Sardinia, and the system of middlemen in the collection was set aside. That Caesar, like Sertorius, tried to free the subjects from the burden of quartering troops cannot be proved, but it was in this spirit that the heirs of his policy created military camps, and converted them into towns which formed rallying-points in the barbarian frontier districts.

To deliver the provincials from the tyranny of Roman capital was a far more difficult task. Its power could not be directly broken, and a radical cure could only be hoped for from the gradual revival of prosperity. Isolated abuses, such as the custom of *libera legatio*, were abolished, and palpable acts of violence or flagrant wrong were sharply punished; but this was all. Caesar had, as governor of Further Spain in 60 B.C., assigned to the creditors two-thirds of the income of their debtors in order to pay themselves; and Lucius Lucullus had in Asia cancelled a portion of the arrears of interest, and assigned to the creditors a fourth part of the produce of the lands of their debtors. It is probable that similar liquidations were instituted in the provinces generally after the civil wars. As to the remaining evils of piracy and brigandage, these might be expected to disappear through the fresh vigour of the new *régime*. At any rate, with Caesar hope dawned afresh, and the first intelligent and humane government which had appeared for centuries began to rule. "Well might the subjects in particular mourn along with the best Romans by the bier of the great liberator."

We have now surveyed in outline the principal measures by which Caesar attempted to reorganize existing institutions, to get rid of abuses, and to reform the whole system of government. But this was, on the whole, but the negative part of his task. For the regeneration, it might almost be said the re-creation, of the state he tried to lay a firm foundation upon which might be realized that con-

ception which had first been grasped by Gaius Gracchus, and which was afterwards taken up by Sertorius in Spain. Like those great statesmen, Caesar looked forward to the time when the provinces, as such, would disappear, and when a new Helleno-Italic nation should arise in a new and wider home, with a fresher, broader, grander national life, which would of itself be the extinction of the sorrows and wrongs of the nation for which there could be no redress in old Italy. The emigration of Italians to the provinces had been going on for centuries. Gaius Gracchus was the first to guide the Italians systematically to settle beyond the bounds of Italy by his colonization of Carthage and Narbo. Sertorius had done his best to Latinize the Spaniards of rank, and to introduce Italian culture into Spain, and by Caesar's time there was a large Italian population ready to his hand in nearly every province of the empire. On the other hand, the interpenetration of the Latin and the Hellenic character was as old almost as Rome. The Roman legionary was followed everywhere by the Greek schoolmaster, and the Latin higher culture was nothing but Hellenism proclaimed in the Latin tongue. Everywhere it was felt that Rome was the protector and avenger of Hellenism. The idea of a new Italo-Hellenic empire was not new, but Caesar was the first to grasp it, and systematically to carry it out. The first conditions for the realization of this idea were the extension and preservation of the two nations which were destined jointly to rule, and the absorption of the barbarian races. There was, indeed, a third nationality—the Hebrews—which might almost have claimed a place by the side of the other two. The Jews were numerous and powerful in the city of Rome, and influential everywhere as traders; but the Jewish nation is denied the gift of political aptitude. The Jew stands in a relation of indifference to the state, clothes himself readily with any nationality, and is unfit to be a member of a governing hierarchy. But for this very reason he seemed made for the purposes of this new state, which was to be built upon the ruins of a hundred different nationalities, and accordingly Judaism was everywhere protected by Caesar as “an effective leaven of cosmopolitanism and of national decomposition.”

The Greek nationality was protected wherever it existed, notably at Massilia and Alexandria, but the Italian none the less remained everywhere in the ascendant. Hellenism was too dangerous by its intellectual superiority, by its wide extension, and by the firm hold which it had obtained in Italy, to make it desirable for the government to extend it by direct action. The rule of the Greek lackeys had already begun with Theophanes, the confidential servant of Pompeius, and his influence was at once a sign of the times and a warning full of ill omen for the future. But the Roman element was everywhere promoted by the government, both by means of colonies and by Latinizing the provincials, and, to further this object, the principle that all the land in the provinces not ceded by special act of the government to communities or private persons was the property of the state, was retained by Caesar, and raised from a democratic party-theory to a fundamental maxim of law. Cisalpine Gaul now (in 49 B.C.) of course received *de jure* the full citizenship which it had already enjoyed *de facto* for forty years, and remained for centuries the head-quarters of Italian manners and culture. Transalpine Gaul henceforth occupied the place of the old sister province, and became more and more an Italian land. Four new colonies were founded in it, at Baeterrae (Beziers), Arelate (Arles), Arausio (Orange), and Forum Julii (Fréjus), with which were connected the names of the most famous of the Gallic legions. Other communities, such as Nemausus (Nîmes), received Latin rights. In other non-Greek and non-Latin regions centres of Italian civilization were established: in northern Gaul, Noviodunum (Nyon) arose on the Lemane Lake; in Spain, Emporiae was founded; and the ancient city of Gades was admitted to full rights (49 B.C.). A few years later (45 B.C.) other communities were similarly favoured, and others received Latin rights. In Africa, the project of Gaius Gracchus was renewed, and a Roman Carthage arose on the old site; Utica had apparently already received Latin rights, and Cirta was constituted as a Roman military colony. In Greece, the restoration of Corinth was energetically carried out, and a plan formed for cutting through the Isthmus. In the remote East, Heraclea and Sinope were reinforced by

bodies of Roman colonists; Berytus in Syria received an Italian constitution, and even in Egypt a Roman station was established on the island of Pharos.

Through these arrangements the Italian municipal system was carried into the provinces in a manner far more comprehensive than ever before. The fully enfranchised communities of the provinces were on an equality with those of Italy in two respects; namely, that they administered their own affairs and exercised a limited legal jurisdiction, while the more important processes of law came before the Roman authority, usually the governor of the province. The autonomous Latin communities had probably unlimited jurisdiction, as well as administrative freedom, though the governor could of course interfere in virtue of his general power of control. There was now for the first time a whole province, that of Cisalpine Gaul, consisting entirely of Roman burgesses; and this fact marked the disappearance of the first great difference between Rome and the provinces. The second began soon to disappear, at any rate in practice. It is true that the legal distinction between Italy as the sphere of civil law and of the consuls and praetors, and the provinces as the sphere of martial law and of the proconsuls and proprætors, remained; but the procedure of martial and of civil law had for long been practically the same: what had been the true and vital point of distinction vanished when legions ceased to be stationed ordinarily in the provinces, and were kept only where there was a frontier to be guarded. "The rule of the urban community of Rome over the shores of the Mediterranean was at an end; in its stead came the new Mediterranean state:" and the restoration of Carthage and Corinth showed clearly that the old *régime* of political tyranny which had destroyed those two famous centres of commerce was over, and that a new era of national and political equality had begun.

The new united empire was, of course, rather an inanimate product of art than a vigorous growth of nature; it needed unity of institutions as well as unity of government; unity in constitution and administration, in religion and jurisprudence, in money, weights, and measures. In all these departments Caesar did little but lay the foundations; only here and there the lines which he drew can still be traced.

As to administration, the three most important elements of unity have already been noticed : the transition of the sovereignty from the municipal council of Rome to the sole master of the Mediterranean monarchy ; the conversion of that council into a supreme imperial council representing Italy and the provinces ; above all, the transference, which was now begun, of the Roman and Italian municipal organization to the provinces. One other important work in this department was undertaken by Caesar—an improved census of Italy, which was to be taken in future, not at Rome, but simultaneously in each Italian community ; and a survey of the whole empire, which was ordered, suggests that Caesar intended to make arrangements for a similar census in the provinces. It was of the first importance to the new empire that the government should have at its disposal a comprehensive view of the resources in men and taxation at its command.

In religion, men had for long been busied in forging together the Italian and Hellenic worships, a task which was rendered easier by the abstract formless character of the Roman gods. At the same time, local faiths were tolerated and protected.

In the field of law, the criminal department, in which the government must always interfere directly to a large extent, was easily made uniform by judicial enactment throughout the empire. In civil law, commercial intercourse had long ago developed naturally the code which the united empire required. Roman urban law was still based formally upon the Twelve Tables. But commercial intercourse between Romans and non-Romans had long ago developed an international private law (*jus gentium*), a body of maxims relating chiefly to commercial matters, according to which Roman judges gave judgment when from the nature of the case they were compelled to revert to the common notions of right underlying all commercial dealings. This body of law arose originally out of proceedings between Romans and non-Romans ; but, in practice, dealings between Romans and Romans, particularly commercial matters, had come to be judged by the standard of what was substantially a compromise between this new law and the old Twelve Tables. Secondly, this new law was to a certain extent in use

throughout the whole extent of the empire as subsidiary law; the various local statutes were retained for transactions between members of the same legal district, while those between members of different districts were regulated according to the principles of the new law as expressed in the praetor's edict. Caesar's design for a new code was never carried out; but it is easy to guess what must have been his intentions. It was most necessary, first, that the new urban law should be extended as subsidiary law to the provinces where it had properly no application; and, secondly, that the old law of the Twelve Tables with its accretions, which still formally outweighed the later code, should be set aside in favour of this newer and spontaneous growth.

In respect of money, measures and weights, and kindred matters the Roman standard was alone used in all official intercourse; and the non-Roman systems were restricted to local currency, and placed in a fixed ratio to the Roman. Under the republic the coinage had been exclusively silver, gold being given and taken by weight. But from Caesar's time gold obtained the first place; the new Caesarian gold piece (worth about 20s. 7d.) was coined to an enormous extent. In a single treasure, buried only a few years after his death, eighty thousand of them were found. The mint of Massilia was closed, but the coining of small silver and copper money was permitted to many western communities. Later the arrangement found in existence is this; that the denarius has everywhere legal currency, while local coins are in circulation at a tariff unfavourable to them as compared with the denarius.

The calendar, like every other institution, had become hopelessly confused under the oligarchical government, and had come to anticipate the solar time by sixty-seven days, so that, *e.g.*, the festival of Flora was celebrated on July 11th, instead of on April 28th. This evil was finally removed by Caesar, and the Italian farmer's year was introduced, together with a rational system of intercalation, into religious and official use. At the same time, the beginning of the year was altered from the 1st of March to the 1st of January, the date which had already been long predominant in civil life owing to the fact that the

supreme magistrates entered upon office on that day. The new Julian calendar, which is still in the main the standard of the civilized world, came into use on January 1, 45 B.C.

Such was the manner in which Caesar attempted to lay the foundations for the regeneration of the Roman state. "There was doubtless much corruption in this regeneration; as the unity of Italy was accomplished over the ruins of Samnite and Etruscan nations, so the Mediterranean monarchy built itself on the ruins of countless states and tribes once living and vigorous; but it was a corruption out of which sprang a rich growth, part of which remains green to the present day." Caesar ruled as king of Rome for about five years and a half; the intervals of seven great campaigns, which altogether gave him but fifteen months in the capital, were all the time allowed him to regulate the destinies of the world. This very rapidity proves that the plan had long been meditated and its parts settled in detail. The outlines were laid down, the future alone could complete the structure; and, indeed, Caesar was heard himself to say, that he had lived long enough.

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INDEX.

Abgarus, 368, 436
Abydus, 183, 191
Acarnania and the Acarnanians, 183, 185, 186, 200
Acco, 413
Acerrae, 158
Achaean colonies in Italy and Sicily, 36, league of cities, 37; decay, 37
 — league, 183, 186, 190; war against it, 219
Achaeans, 37, 38, 194
Achaia, province of, 219
Achillas, 468
Acilius Glabrio M', 190
 — M'. Glabrio (consul 67 B.C.), 346
Acrae, 136
Adcensi velati, 24
Adherbal, 245, 246
Adoption, 16
Adsidui, 50
Aduatuca, 401, 411
Aediles, plebis, 54, 55, 56
 — in the municipia, 87
 — ceriales, 500
Aegates Insulae, battle at the, 135
Aemilius Lepidus Marcus, 329, 330
 — (city prefect), 455
Aemilius Papus L., 140
Aemilius Paullus L., 153, 154
 —, 198
Aemilius Scaurus M., 246, 247, 252, 262, 264, 269
 — (adjutant of Pompeius), 368
Aequi, 26, 85, 86
Aerarii, 17, 42

Aerarium, 27, under the control of the quaestors, 46
Aesernia colonized, 108, 269, 270, 273
Aethalia, 33, 38
Aetolians, side with Rome against Philip, 161, 181, 184, 186; side with Antiochus against Rome, 189, 190, 194, side with Rome against Perseus, 197; treatment of, by Rome, 200
Afranius, 333, 422, 455, 477
Africa, before the Gracchan period, 215, 216; made a province, 219; after Pharsalus, 467, 473-479
Agathocles, 78, 105
Agedincum, 414
Ager publicus. See **Domains**.
Agnati, 13
Agriculture, known to Greeks and Italians, 4; basis of the Italian economy, 11, 50; distress and diminution of the farmers, 54, 65; relief of, 69; destruction of, 167, 173, 210, 211; Carthaginian system, 117, 118, 122; condition of before and at the time of the Gracchi, 224-227, 319, 501, 502, 506-508
Agrirentum founded, 39; taken by Carthage, 106, 119, 127, 160; besieged by the Romans, 129; given up to them, 161
Agron, 138
Alae sociorum, 112

- Alaesa**, 138
Alalia, 34, 39, 116
Alba, 9, 25
 —, on the Fucine lake, colonized, 97, 198
Albanians in the Caucasus, 366
Aleria, 130
Alesia, 416, 417
Aletrium, 97
Alexander Jannaus, 368
Alexander, pretended son of Perseus, 219
Alexander the Great, 102, 103, 221, 482
Alexander the Molossian, 93
Alexander II. of Egypt, 338, 353
Alexandria, 180, 181, 468-471
Allia, battle on the, 80
Allies, Italian, bound to furnish naval or military contingents, 112; in the second Punic war, 168; diminution of rights and increasing oppression, 183, 205; relations to Rome in time of Gracchi, 238, 239; grievances and war with Rome, 267, seqq., 289, 290, seqq., 321, 501, 505-507
Allobroges, 146, 251, 380, 394, 402
Alphabet, 116
Alps, Graian, 79, passage by Hannibal 146, 147 and n., expeditions against Alpine peoples, 251, 252, civilization of, due to Etruscans, 82; new roads over, 332, 409
Ambacti, 398
Ambiorix, 411, 412
Amisus, 342, 370
Anagnia, 96, 105
Ancona, 77
Anicius, L., 199
Annius Milo T., 432, 483, 505
Antigonus, 102
Antigonus Doson, 144
Antioch in Syria, 338
Antiochus Asiaticus, 343; restored by Lucullus, 344; ejected by Pompeius, 368
Antiochus III. the Great, allies with Philip against Egypt, 182, conduct during second Macedonian war, 183, 187; war with Rome, 188-194
Antiochus IV. Epiphanes, of Syria, 200, 220
Antium, 34, 92, 109, 110
Antonius C., 355, 377, 380, 382
 —, lieutenant of Caesar, 459
Antonius M., expedition against the pirates, 340, 348
 —, the Triumvir, 462, 484, 497, 504
Aous, the river, 184
Apennines, 1, 2, 8, 150, 175
Apollonia, 139, 161, 184, founded 37; allied with Rome, 109
Appeal (provocatio), 17, 44, 45, 55, 235, 267, 375, 391
Appellate jurisdiction of the Imperator, 492
Appuleius Saturninus L., 260-262, 375
Apulia, 38, 95, 173
Aquae Sextiae, 251, 254, 255, 395
Aqueducts, 319
Aquileia, founded 175
Aquillius M', 245, 281, 282
Aquitani, 409
Aratus, 181, 183
Arausio, 253
Archelaus, 284-286
Archidamus, 93
Archimedes, 160
Ardea, 65, 86, 87
Area Capitolina, 27
Aretas, 368
Arevacae, 213, 214
Argos, 108, 186
Ariarathes IV., king of Cappadocia, 189, 193
Ariarathes VI., assassinated, 280
Aricia, 86, 87; battle at, 77; becomes a municipium, 92
Ariminum, colonized, 108; fleet-station, 109; bulwark against the Celts, 139, 140
Ariobarzanes, 280, 281, 472
Ariovistus, 402, 405, 406
Aristion, 283
Aristobulus, 368
Aristonicus, 220
Aristotle, 120
Armenia, 180, 193, 220
 — Lesser, 280
Army, earliest organization, 15, 16,

- Servian arrangements, 23, 24, 25;
 service of allies, 111, 112; begin-
 nings of a standing army, 178;
 decay, 198, 204, 205, 208, 214,
 215, 217, 222, 274, 493; reor-
 ganized by Marius, 257-259; by
 Caesar, 494, 497
Arno, the, 175
Arpi, resists Samnites, 90, 95; joins
 Hannibal, 155, 158; recovered by
 Rome, 166
Arretium, invokes Roman aid, 82;
 makes peace with Rome, 96;
 conduct in the second Punic war,
 168
Artaxata, 345
Arverni, 250, 251, 253, 395-398,
 402, 413, 417
Arx, 9, 27
Asculum, 269, 271, 272
Asia (Syria), extent, 179, 180; posi-
 tion after the war with Antiochus,
 192, 193 (cf. Antiochus)
Asia Minor, 180, 181, 220, 278, 285-
 287; farming of taxes abolished,
 303; restored, 357, 358, 364;
 settlement by Pompeius, 369, 471,
 497, 508
Asinius Pollio, 431
Atarbas, 133
Atella, 155
Athamanes, 184
Athenagoras, 184
Athenians, commercial connection
 with Etruscans, 35; expedition
 against Syracuse, 77; during war
 with Philip, 183, 184, 186
Athenion, 245
Athens, 283-285
Atilius M., 131, 132
Atilius Regulus C., 140
Atropatene. See **Media**.
Attalidae, 195, 220
Attalus, 180-182, 189
Attalus, brother of Eumenes, 199
Attius Varus P., 473
Auctoritas Senatus, 45
Augurs, 67, 304
Aurelius Cotta C., friend of Drusus,
 268, 355; brother of L. Cotta, 357
Aurelius M., 340
Aurelius Scaurus M., 253
Aurunci, 88
Aurunculeius Cotta L., 411
Ausculum, 105
Autones, 8, 95
Avaricum, 414
Bactrians, 180, 220
Baebius M., 190
Baecula, 164
Balearic Isles, 119, 124
Bankruptcy, 507
Belgae, 254, 399, 406, 411, 415, 418
Bellovaci, 407, 415, 418
Beneventum, 107, 108, 165
Betultus, 251
Bibracte, 404
Bithynia, 180, 193, 194; a Roman
 province, 339-341, 369
Boarding-bridges, 130
Bocchus. See **Mauretania**.
Boeotians, 183, 186, 197
Boii, Italian, 79, 101, 139, 174, 175
 —, in Germany, 251, 401-403, 405,
 414
Boiorix, 253
Bomilear, 247
Bononia, 79
Bosporan kingdom, 279, seqq., 364,
 seqq.
Bovianum, 89, 96
Bovillae, 87
Brennus, 80
Bridge building, 11
 —, Milvian, 318
 —, Sublician, 27
Brigandage, 168, 173
Britain, 396, 399, 408, 410
Brittany, 396, 408
Brixia, 79
Brundisium, 37, 108, 138, 183, 199,
 293, 302, 453, 461, seqq.
Bruttians, 90, 91, 93, 94, 104, 108,
 155, 165, 166, 168, 169, 172
Building in Rome, 318, 319, 425,
 500
Bulla, 203
Burgess-body, its primitive con-
 ditions, 15, 16; duties and rights,
 17; extension, 206; clients and city
 rabble, 207; incipient corruption,
 207, 231
 — cavalry. See **Army**.

Burgess colony. See **Colony.**

— rights. See **Civitas.**

Byzantium, 181, 182

Cabira, 341, 346

Caecilius Macedonicus Q., 214, 219, 228, 232, 247-249, 261, 262

Caecilius Metellus G., 133

Caecilius Metellus Nepos Q., 386, 387

Caecilius Metellus Pius Q., Creticus, 273, 290, 293, 295, 327, 331, seqq., 349, 357, 364, 373

Caecilius Metellus Scipio Q. (consul 52 B.C.), 440, 464, 467, 472, 476, 477

Caecina A., 485

Caelius Rufus M., 483

Caenina, 10, 25

Calatia, 155

Calendar, 517

Cales, 92, 158; naval station, 109

Calpurnius Bibulus M., 389, 432, 460-462

Calpurnius Piso Cn. (the Catilinarian), 377, 378

Calpurnius Piso L., 217, 223

—, father-in-law of Caesar, 390

Camars = **Clusium**, 88

Cameria, 25

Campanians in Sicily, 127. See **Capua.**

Canaan, 115

Cannae, 153-156

Cantonal constitution in Gaul, 397

Canusium, 153, 168

Capena, 80, 81

Capitolium, 9, 27

Cappadocia, 180, 189, 193, 220, 279-281, 338, 366, 369, 370, 472

Capua, taken from the Etruscans, 78, 90; under Greek influence, 90, 91; seeks Roman aid, and revolts, 91; recovered, 92, 95, 98; receives Caerite rights, 112; its nobles receive privileges, 113; resists Hannibal, 151; joins him, 155; he winters there, 158; siege and capture, 158-167; its ruin, 167, 172, 205; colonized, 235, 292, 294, 297; its lands resumed by Sulla, 306, 378, 389

Caria, 193

Carinae, 11

Carnutes, 412

Carrhae, 437, seqq.

Carsioli, 97

Carthage and **Carthaginians** in connexion with Etruscans and Greeks, 34, 39, 76, 77, 78; in Sicily, and her early relations with Rome, 106-109; at variance with Egypt, 114, origin, position, empire, constitution, wealth, compared with Rome, 115-125; first Punic war, 127-135; peace, 135, 136; mercenary war, 137; causes of second Punic war, 141-144; war, 145-173, Roman policy towards Carthage, 175-177; war with Massinissa, 215-217; third Punic war, 217-219; colony sent by C Gracchus, 235, 238, 239, restored, 515

Carthage, New or Spanish (**Cartagena**), 143, 162, 163

Carthalo, (1) Carthaginian admiral, 133; (2) leader of the patriot party, 216

Carthalo, lieutenant of Crassus, 439

Carthalo L., 224

Carthalo Longinus L., 253

Carthalo Longinus Q., 473

Carthalo Sp., 58, 64, 65

Casilinum, 151, 158, 165

Cassivellaunus, 410

Castrum Novum, 108, 110

Catena, 36

Cato. See **Porcius.**

Cattle, 52; increase of stock-raising, 211, 224

Caudine Forks, 94, 95

Caulonia, 37

Caunus, 189

Celetrum, 184

Celtiberians, 162, 178, 213, 214, 263

Celts, character and migrations and invasion of Italy, capture of Rome, subsequent incursions, result of migrations, 78-82; take part in the Samnite war, 97-102; subdued by Rome, 139-140, 174-175; join Carthage in second Punic War, 147-149, 168, 169; different tribes of, 250-252

Celts, of Asia, 180, 199; war with, 193
 —, Transalpine, 139, advance into Italy checked, 174–175
Cenomani, 79, 139, 140, 174
Censorship instituted, 63; importance, 64, 204; plebeians eligible, 66; under Sulla, 303, 306; restored by Pompeius, 357; reorganized by Caesar, 516
Census, origin, 24; every fourth year, 46, extended to Sicily, 138
Centumviral court, 307, 308, 492
Centumviri, a Latin senate, 16
Cephalenia, 194
Cermalus, 11
Centrones, 147
Chaeronea, 284
Chalcedon, 182, 340
Chalcis, 179, 184, 185, 190, 191
Chersonese, Tauric, 279
Chersonese, Thracian, 180, 193, 251
Chios, 181, 191, 285–287
Cilicia, 180, 188; seat of piracy, 221, 244, 338, 340, 347–349, 363, 364, 369, 371
Cimbri, 252–255
Cincinnatus. See **Quinctius**.
Cineas, 103, 104, 105
Circeii, 86, 87
Circus, 27
Cirta, 177, 246, 475, 478
Cius, 182
Cives sine suffragio, protected burgesses, 24; burgesses without right of electing or being elected, 81; their position, 96, 97, 111, 112; disappearance of this class, 205
Civic community as opposed to a state, 308, 309, 491, 499
Civitas (citizenship), originally coincident with patriciate, 14; could not be lost within the state or Latin League, 26; sparingly conferred in early times, 22, 23; given to the Alban clans, 28; later civitas of the plebeians, 47; burgess rights, formerly forced upon the holders, now coveted and conferred as a favour, 111; rarely conferred after conquest of Italy, 268; bestowed on Italians, 272, 274, 276, 289, 292, 293, 302, 375, 444, 514

Civitates foederatae, 31^o
 — immunes, 316
Clans, form the community, 14 15; clan-villages, 8; gentes maiores et minores, 21; in Gaul, 397
Classes, 23
Classici, 23
Clastidium, 148
Claudius Ap., 59, 60
 —, 198
 —, 228, 230, 232
Claudius C., 129
Claudius Caecus Ap., 70, 104
Claudius Caudex Ap., 129
Claudius Cento C., 184
Claudius Marcellus C. (consul 50 B.C.), 446, seqq.
Claudius Marcellus M., 156, 158, 160, 165, 167
 —, 214
 — (consul 51 B.C.), 442, 444, 447
Claudius Nero C., 163, 166, 168, 169
Claudius Pulcher Ap., 166
Claudius Pulcher P., 133
Clavus, 203
Cleonymus, 96
Cleopatra, daughter of Ptolemy Auletes, 468
Clientship, 14, 22, 23, 24, 42, 57
Clodius P., 391, 423, 424, 428, 432
Cluentius A., 504
Clupea, 131, 132
Clusium, 88, 140
Cohorts. See **Legion**.
Collatia, 10, 25
Collegia (clubs), 326, 423, 499, 500
Colline Gate, battle at, 296
Collini, 12
Coloniae civium Romanorum, at first on the sea-coast, 109, 110
 — Latinae, earliest 26; Romans predominate, 85
Colonies, salutary effect, 69, 208; stoppage of, 226; those of C. Gracchus, 233; of Drusus, 264; of Sulla, 276, 302, 326; of Lex Servilia, 378. Cf. **Capua**.
 —, non-Italian, 235, 243; proposals of Saturninus, 260; of Caesar, 419, 429, 513, 514
Comana, high-priest of, 369
Comitia centuriata, 24, 44, 45; re-

- formed, 208, 209, 235; treatment by Sulla, 276, 304
- Comitia**, composition and powers, 70, 204; nullity, 206; condition in time of Gracchi, 224, 231, 232; of Sulla, 304; of Caesar, 489; in relation to Lex Gabinia, 359; corruption of, 326, 503
- *curiata*, summoned by the king, 17; plebeians admitted, 44, 45; plebeian curiate assembly, 55, 57
- *tributa*, 57 and *n.*, 61; treatment by Sulla, 303, 304
- Comitium**, 27
- Commercial interests**, effect on politics, 216, 219, 320, 321, 506
- Commercium**, denied to Italian communities, 112; to Sicilian, 137
- Comum**, 429
- Concilium**, denied to Italian communities, 112
- *plebis*, 57 *n.*, 61 *n.*
- Concord**, temple of, 66
- Confarreatio**, 14
- Confiscations**, by Sulla, 301, 302; by Caesar, 497
- Consentia**, 93
- Consuls**, origin and powers, 41–44; position in reference to senate, 46; restrictions and suspension, 55, 56, 59, 60, 63, 64; plebeians admitted, 66; exclusion of the poorer citizens, 205; re-election of, 304; regulation of powers by Sulla, 305; decay, 491
- Conubium**, between Romans and Latins, 26; forbidden to Italian communities, 112; to provincial, 137
- Cora**, 85, 87
- Corbio**, 87
- Corecyra**, 37, 96, 138
- Corduene**, 337, 366, 369
- Corfinium**, 268, 270, 273, 453
- Corinth**, 37, 179, 185, 186, 219; restored, 514
- Corioli**, 87
- Corn**, distribution of, 235, 242, 261, 264; restricted, 269; renewed, 292; abolished, 303; restored, 329, 354, 384; restricted by Caesar, 497
- Cornelia**, 228, 232, 240
- Cornelii**, Sulla's freedmen, 302
- Cornelius Balbus L.**, 490
- Cornelius Cethegus P.**, 327
- Cornelius Cinna L.**, 277, 288, *seqq*
- , son of the preceding, 329
- Cornelius Cossus A.**, 80
- Cornelius Dolabella P.**, 101
- , admiral of Caesar, 459, 484
- Cornelius Lentulus Crus L.**, 447
- Cornelius Lentulus Sura P.**, 380
- Cornelius Merula L.**, 289, 291
- Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus P.**, takes Carthage, 217; Numantia, 215; character, 227, 228, 230; death, 233
- Cornelius Scipio Africanus P.**, saves his father, 148; character and Spanish campaigns, 163, 164; African expedition, 169–172; opposed to Antiochus, 192; separates the orders in the theatre, 204, opponent of Cato, 208; courts the rabble, 210; death, 194, 195
- Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus L.**, 192, 193
- Cornelius Scipio Calvus Cn.**, 140, 154, 162
- Cornelius Scipio L.**, 130
- Cornelius Scipio L.**, 293, 294
- Cornelius Scipio Nasica P.**, 216, 230
- Cornelius Scipio P.**, 147, 148, 154, 162
- Cornelius Sulla L.**, in Jugurthine war, 249; in Social war, 269, 272, 273; consul 88 B.C., appointed to Eastern command, 273; marches on Rome, 275; first legislation, 276, departed for the East, 277; war with Mithradates, 278–287; in civil war, 292–298; dictatorship, 300; proscriptions, 301; reconstitution of Roman state, 302–310; his character and career, 310–313; political results of his death, 329
- Cornificius L.**, 472
- Corona civica**, 171
- Coronea**, 197, 198
- Corsica**, Etruscan, 34, 77; Carthaginian, 108; Roman, 130, 137, 138; war with, 175; Marian colony in, 263

- Cortona**, 96
Coruncanianus Tib., 105
Cosa, 108
Cossyra, 119
Cotta. See **Aurelius**.
Cottian Alps, 146, 332
Cotys, 197
Cremona, 140, 175
Crete, seat of piracy, 221, 347-349, 364, 369
Criminal procedure under G. Gracchus, 235, 236; under **Sulla**, 307, seqq., 375; under **Caesar**, 491, 492
Critolaus, 219
Croton, 37, 90; occupied by Rome, 101; by **Hannibal**, 170
Crustumium, 25, 54
Cumae, oldest Greek settlement, 36, 38; checks Etruscan advance, 77, 116; conquered by **Sabellians**, 90; obtains **Caerite** rights, 92
Curia, 15, 16
Curius Dentatus M., 69, 70
Cursor. See **Papirius**.
Curule magistracies, 203, 204
Customs, Sicilian, 138; in the empire, 316, 317
Cyclades, the, 180
Cynoscephalae, 185
Cyprus, 115, 180; annexed by Rome, 338, 371, 391, 468, 471
Cyrene, 114, 117, 180, 182; a Roman province, 339
Cyzicus, 181; besieged by **Mithradates**, 340, 341; enlarged by **Pompeius**, 370

Dacian kingdom founded, 421
Dalmatia. See **Illyricum**.
Damascus, 368
Dardani, 184
Dea Dia, 10
Debt, 54, 65, 66, 68, 274; reduced to one-fourth, 292; **Cataline's** projects, 377, 504. Cf. **Coelius Rufus**, **Cornelius Dolabella P.** (2), and **Bankruptcy**.
Decemvirs, 58-60; **decemviri sacris faciundis**, 66
Decius Mus P., 98
Decurio, 16
Dediticii, name given to **Bruttian** and **Cisalpine Celtic** communities, 172, 205; applies to allies after **Social war**, 274
Deiotarus, 340, 369
Delium, peace negotiations at, 286
Delmum, 251
Delos, 200, 225, 284
Delphic oracle, 38
Demetrius, 179, 190
Demetrius Poliorcetes, 102
Demetrius, son of **Philip of Macedonia**, 196
Diana, temple of, on the **Aventine**, 28
Dictator, 42-44; has to allow appeals, 60; **plebeians** eligible, 66; office set aside, 152, 209; **Sulla's** dictatorship, 300; **Caesar's**, 486
Dionysius of Syracuse, 77, 90, 119
Divisores tribuum, 326
Dolabella. See **Cornelius**.
Domains, property of the state, 17; treatment of, in early times, 52; mismanagement of, 53; attempt of **Cassius**, 58; increased distress, 65; new regulation by the **Licinio-Sextian laws**, 66-68; large assignation of 208, 210; occupation of **Italian domains**, 226, 229, 231, 232, 233; under **Sulla**, 302, 306; in provinces, 315; **Lex Servilia**, 378; under **Caesar**, 509. See **Capua**.
Domitius Ahenobarbus C., 251
 —, governor of **Africa** 81 B.C., 297
Domitius Ahenobarbus L. (consul 54 B.C.), 430, 453, 455, 458
Domitius Calvinus Cn., 464
Doric colonies, 36, 37
Drepana, 131, 133
Druids, 398
Dullius, C., 130
Dumnorix, 411
Duoviri navales, 109; **sacris faciundis**, 66
Dyrrhachium, 461-464. See **Epidamnus**.

Eagle introduced as a standard, 258
Eburones, 411, 412
Ecnomus, 131
Edessa. See **Osroene**.
Edictum praetoris urbani, 374, 517

- Egesta.** See **Segesta**.
Egnatius Gellius, 97
Egypt, character of the kingdom, 180; first contact with Italy, 114; supplies Rome, 167; before the time of the Gracchi, 215, 220; revenue, 318; bequeathed to Rome, 338, 371, 372 n., 376, 378, 426, 436, 468-471, 490
Elephants, use of, in battle, 103, 104, 105, 107; Carthaginian, 132, 133, 145, 149, 171
Eleusinian mysteries, 139
Elymais, 192
Emigrants, Roman, in Spain, 330, 332, 334, 335; with Mithradates, 338, 367; with the pirates, 347
Emporiae, 143, 175
Ephesus, 190, 191
Epicydes, 160
Epidamnus, 37
Epirus and the Epirots, 35, 102, 103, 107, 138, 185
Equestrian centuries, 204; proposed increase of, 208
 — order, 204; raised by C. Gracchus, 236, 237; restricted by Sulla, 303. See **Jury Courts**.
Erote, 134
Eryx, 134
Etruria, boundaries of, 32; southern part conquered by Rome, 81
Etruscans, origin, etc., 30-35; early relations with Romans and Phoenicians, 38, 41; fall of power, 76-82; in the Samnite wars, 96, 97, 101, 104, after the war with Pyrrhus, 112; in the second Punic war, 168; in Social war, 269-272; struggles against Sulla, 295, 302; insurrection of Lepidus, 330; cf. Catilina, 379-380
Euboea, 179
Eumenes, 189, 190, 193, 194, 197, 199
Eurymedon, 191
Exports, Italian, 320
Fabii, 57
Fabius Hadrianus M., 342, 346
Fabius Maximus Q., 151, 152, 156, 158, 165, 167, 171, 209
Fabius, Maximus Allobrogicus Q., 251
Fabius, Rullianus Q., 70, 72, 96, 98
Faesulae, 379, 380
Falerii, 32, 80, 81, 88
Family, among the Romans, 13, 14, 504, 507
Felsina = Bononia, 79
Ferentinum, 97
Feriae Latinae, 9
Ficulnea, 25
Fidenae, 10, 25, 26; Roman, 78, 79
Financial position during second Punic war, 165, 167; in seventh century, 306, 315-319; under Caesar, 490, 491, 496-498
Firmum, 108
Fish-ponds, 321, 501
Flamininus. See **Quinctius**.
Flaminius C., 140, 150, 151, 155, 209, 210
Flavius Fimbria C., 286, 287
Fleet. See **Maritime affairs**.
Formiae, 92
Forum Romanorum, 2
Fregellae, 92, 95, 105, 168; destroyed, 234
Freedmen, confined to four tribes, 273; under Lex Sulpicia, 274; under Cinna, 289; under Sulla's constitution, 324, 375; position at Rome, 423, 499
Frentani, 89
Frusino, 97
Fulvius Flaccus M., 232, 233, 234, 239, 240, 250
Fulvius Flaccus Q., 166
 —, 178
Fulvius Nobilior M., 194
Fulvius Nobilior Q., 213
Functions, defined, 71
Fundi, 92
Furius, Bibaculus M., 431
Furius Camillus L., 81
Furius Camillus M., 66, conquers Veii, 80
Gabii, 10, 87
Gabinus A., 359-361, 371, 372, 390, 430, 431, 435, 436
Gades, 119, 164, 457, 514
Gala, 162
Galba. See **Sulpicius**.

Gallaeci, subdued by Caesar, 394
Gaul, south coast (Narbonensis), 250, 251; in Sertonian war, 332, 334; Caesar's views concerning, 393, 394, 403, 418, 419, 428; boundaries, 394; relations to Rome, 394, 395, 402; to the Germans and others, 401, 403; population, 395; urban life, 396, 397; agriculture, 395; commerce, 396; mining, art, science, 397; political organization, 397-399; religion, 398, 399; army, 399, 400; civilization, 400; wars with Caesar, 403-418; taxation, 418, 497; Latinization, 419; colonies, 419, 514. Cf. Julius Caesar.
Gela, 36, 119
Gelo, 77
Gens. See **Clan**.
Gentilius, 198, 199
Gentiles. See **Agnati**.
Genucius Cn., 57
Gergovia, 415
Romans, first appearance in Roman history, 252; relations to Celts, 401, 402; to Romans, 402, 405, 406
Gerunium, 152, 153
Glabrio. See **Acilius**.
Gladiatorial war, 349-351
 — games, first in Etruria, 82; Capuan, 91; at Rome, 321, 503
Gold mines, 250, 315, 397
Gracchus. See **Sempronius**.
Graeco-Italian culture, religion, art, etc., 4-6
Grain, sale at low prices, 207, 210. See **Agriculture**.
Greece, relations with Macedonia, 179, 181, 183; declared free, 186; patriot party, 196, 197; treatment, 200
Greeks, in Italy and Sicily, 35-39; struggles with Etruscans, 77, 78; with the Sabellian races, 90, 91; adhere to Rome in the Hannibalian war, 155
Grumentum, 168, 270
Hadrumentum, 118, 171
Haedui, 251, 395, 397, 402, 404, 405, 411, 413, 415, 418, 419

Haliartus, 197
Halicarnassus, 181, 189
Halicyae, 139
Halys, 193
Hamilcar Barca, war in Sicily, 130, 131, 134, 135; mercenary war, 137; political position and exploits in Spain, 141, 142, 147
Hamilcar, Carthaginian general, 130
Hannibal, character and capture of Saguntum, 143-145; march from Spain to Italy, 145-147; first campaign, 147-149; second campaign, 150-152; third campaign, 152-156; fourth campaign, 157, 158; his isolation, 159, 161; gradual retreat, 165; fresh successes and march on Rome, 166; retreats after death of Hasdrubal, 168, 169; returns to Africa, 170; defeated at Zama, 171; reforms the Carthaginian constitution, 176; goes into exile, 176; received by Antiochus, whom he aids, 189-191; death, 194
Hannibal, son of Gisgo, 129, 130
Hanno, (1) son of Hannibal, 129; (2) a Carthaginian general, 129; (3) commands the Bruttian army, 165; (4) Carthaginian general in Sicily, 160; (5) son of Bomilcar, 146; (6) the Great, 141, 142
Hasdrubal, (1) 141; (2) son of Gisgo, 164; (3) brother of Hannibal, 145, 154, 159, 162-164; reaches Italy, 168, 169; (4) brother-in-law of Hannibal, 142, 143; (5) son of Hanno, 132; (6) leader of the patriots in Carthage, and general, 216; (7) commander of the citadel, 218
Hatria, on the Po, 38, 77, 82, 88
 — in the Abruzzi, 98
Helvetii, 251, 253, 254; population of, 395, 397; in Black Forest, 401; migration, 403-405, 413
Heraclea in Italy, 36, 90; battle of, 104, 105; makes peace with Rome, 156; joins Hannibal, 166
 — in Trachinia, 191
 — on the Euxine, 341, 342, 370, 511, 514

- Herculaneum**, 94
Herdonius App., 57
Hermæan promontory, battle at, 132
Hernici, allied with Rome, 26; join the Romano-Latin league, 85; rise against Rome, 87; refuse to join a revolt, 92, 94; join the Samnites, 96; punishment, 96, 97; relation to Rome, 112
Hesiod, 36
Hiempsal, 245
Hiero I., 77
Hiero II., war against the Mamertines, 127-129; allies with Rome, 129, position after the first Punic war, 136, 137; conduct in the second Punic war, 152, 155
Hieronymus, 155, 159
Himera (Thermae), 36, 119, 133; battle at, 77, 116
Himilco, (1) 133; (2) 160
Hippo Regus, 118
Hippocrates, 159, 160
Hipponium, 90
Hirpini, 89, 155
Hirtuleius L., 331-333
Homer, 36
Honorary surnames, 207
Hostilius Mancinus A., 198
Hostilius Tubulus C., 168
House-father, 13, 14
Human sacrifices in Gaul, 401
Hyrcanus, 368

Iapydes, 251
Iapygians, 3
Iberians in Georgia, 366
Ilerda, 455-457
Illyrians, piracy, 138, 139, 145. See **Genthius**.
Illyricum, subjugation of the Dalmatians in, 251, 421, 497
Ilva, 33
Imbros, 186
Imperator, 487, 488
Imperium, 15
Imports, Italian, 320
Indo-Germans, 3
Insubres, 79, 139, 140, 147, 148, 174
Interamna, 95

Interest, 59, 68, 274, 276, 483, 507, 508
Interrex, 18
Ionian Sea, 35, 36
Isaurians, 348
Issa, 77
Isthmian games, Romans admitted to, 139
Itali, 7-8
Italia (Cortinium), 270, 273
Italians, two divisions of, 3; distinction from and resemblance to the Greeks, 4-6; migrations of, 7-8
Italy, physical character, 1, 2; union of, 3, 113, 114; natural boundaries of, 136; political boundary the Rubicon, 306, North Italy = Gallia Cisalpina or Italian Gaul, 306, 514, 515

Janioum, 8, 10, 11, 26, 27
Jannaeus, 368
Jews, 368; in Alexandria, 471, 513
Juba, 452, 458, 467, 472, 475-477
Judaea, 220, 338, 368, 371; position in Caesar's state, 513
Judges, Carthaginian, 120, 121
Judices = consuls, 41
Jugurtha, 245-249
Julia, Caesar's daughter, 391, 440, 481
Julius Caesar C., opposed by Sulpicius, 275, 291
—, family and connections, 329, 480; character, 329, 480-483; year of birth, 336 n., abstains from Lepidan rising, 329; against Mithradates, 340; prosecutes Sullan partisans, 355, supports Lex Gabinia, 360, Pontifex Maximus, 374, 384; relations with Catilinarian conspiracy, 376, 377, 382, 383; democratic zeal, 375, 376, 386, praetorship, 386, 387; his rapid rise, 388; governor of Spain, 388, 394; alliance with Pompeius and Crassus, 389; consul 389-391; governor of two Gauls, 390, 451, wars with Gauls and Germans, 403-418; crosses Rhine, 409, 412; invades Britain, 410; settlement of Gaul, 418, 419; at Luca 427, 428; rupture with Pompeius, 440-

- 448; recalled, 444; his ultimatum, 446; crosses Rubicon, 448; Civil war, 449-479; regulation of Italy, 454, 455; Egypt, 471; attitude towards the old parties, 483-485; Caesarism, 486; regulates the new monarchy, 486-489, the state, 489-493; the army, 493-496; finance, 496-498; Rome and Italy, 498-509; the provinces, 509-512; attitude towards Jews and Greeks, 512-515; census, 516; law of the empire, 516, 517; coinage, 517, calendar, 517, 518, length of his reign, 518
- Julius Caesar L.**, 269, seqq.
- Junius Brutus Damasippus L.**, 297-299
- Junius Brutus Dec.**, 240
- , 408, 457
- Junius Pennus M.**, 233
- Junius Pullus L.**, 132
- Junius Silanus M.**, 163
- , 253
- Jupiter Capitolinus**, 28
- Jupiter Latiaris**, 9
- Jury courts**, transferred by C Gracchus from the senate to the equites, 236, 237, 263, 264; Drusus' proposal, 264, 265; Lex Plautia, 271; under Sulla, 303, 354, 355, Lex Aurelia, 357, regulations of Pompeius, 433; of Caesar, 492
- Jus**, *imaginum*, 63, 203
- Jus** separated from *iudicium*, 42-43
- Juventius**, 219
- King**, position, powers, etc., 14-19; abolished, 40-43, 85; powers revived under the name of dictator, 43-44; compared with monarchy of Caesar, 486-489
- Labeo**. See **Fabius**.
- Labici**, 65, 87
- Labienus T.**, 375; with Caesar in Gaul, 403, 407, 408, 412, 414-416, 449; in Civil war, 449, 460, 467, 473, 477
- Laelius C.**, 163
- **Sapiens C.**, 227, 228
- Laevinus**. See **Valerius**.
- Lampsacus**, 181, 189
- Land**, division of, at the time of Servius, 23; distribution of, by T. Gracchus, 229-232; by Sulla, 302, 354; by Pompeius, 356, 357, 387, 389, 390; by Caesar, 495, 509
- Language, Latin**. See **Latinizing**.
- Lanuvium**, 86, 87
- Larissa on the Peneius**, 185
- Latin communities**, as regards the domain question, 233; right of migration curtailed, 268; in Social War, 270; in Cisalpine Gaul, 272; Latin rights given to insurgent communities, 302; *Jus Latinum* to Cisalpine Gaul, 272; in Transalpine Gaul, 514
- Latin league of thirty cantons** under Alba, 9; new position under Rome, 25, 26, 28; war with Rome, and renewal of league and loss of power, 85, revolt against Rome, 86; closing of the league, and list of the towns included, 87; new restrictions by Rome, 87; anger of the Latins, 87, 88, fresh revolt, 91; dissolution of league, politically, 92, treaties between Rome and each community, 92; refuse to join Pyrrhus, 105, position after the war with Pyrrhus, 111; increased oppression, 205
- Latinizing**, of Italy, 113, 173; of the land between the Alps and the Po, 174, 175; of Spain, 331, 332; of Gaul, 394, 401, 419, 514; of the empire by Caesar, 513-517
- Latins**, first immigrants and extent of migration and settlements, 7, 8; relation to Umbro-Samnites, 88
- Latium**, physical character, 8; limits fixed, 87
- Laurentum**, 87
- Laus**, 37, 90
- Lavinium**, 10, 87
- Law**, Roman and Latin, harmonized, 26; administration of, in municipia and colonies, 112, 309, 310, 515, 516; codification projected, 517; appeals, 492; regal jurisdiction restored, 491, 492. Cf. **Jury courts**. *Quaestiones*.

Legati legionis pro praetore, 494

Legatus, 42

Leges:—

Appuleia agraria, 260, 263

— **frumentaria**, 261, 354

Aurelia, 357

Baebia, 179

Caecilia, abolition of Italian tolls, 388

Canuleia, 63

Cassia agraria, 58, 65

— **tabellaria**, 223, 224, 227

Corneliae. See **Cornelius Sulla**.

Domitia de sacerdotiis abolished by Sulla, 304

Fabia de plagiaris, abduction, 350

Flaminia agraria, 210

Fulvia de civitate sociis danda, 233

Gabinia, 223, 359–361

Genucia, 68

Hortensia, 67, 70

Icilia, 55

Julia, 272

— **agraria**, 389, 390

— **Juliae**. See **Julius Caesar C.**

Junia de peregrinis, 233

Labiena restoring **Lex Domitia**, 375

Liciniae Sextiae, 65–68

Liviae (of the elder Drusus), 230

— (of the younger Drusus), 264, 265

Maecilia agraria, 65

Maenia, 68

Manilia, 361

Manlia, 68

Mucia de civitate, 268

Ogulnia, 67

Plautia iudiciaria, 272

— **Papiria** de civitate, 272

Plotia, 335

Poetelia, 68

Pompeia de iudiciis, 430

Publilia (of 471 B.C.), 57

— (of 339 B.C.), 66

Sacratae, as to the appointment of plebeian tribunes and aediles, 54

Semproniae, 229, 231, 232. See **Sempronius Gracchus**.

Servilia, 378

Sulpiciae, 274, 289

Sumptuariae, 308, 507

Leges (continued):—

Tabellariae (**Gabinia**, **Cassia**, **Papiria**), 222, 223

Terentilia, 58

Titia agraria, 263

Valeria de provocatione, 42

— on Sulla's dictatorship, 300

Valeriae Horatiae, 60, 61

Legion, copied by **Pyrrhus**, 105; divided into cohorts, 258

Legislation, by decree of the community, 17; acquired practically by the senate, 73

Lentulus. See **Cornelius**.

Leontini, 36

Lepidus. See **Aemilius**.

Leptis Magna, 118, 177; **Minor**, 118

Leucopatra, 219

Lex, primarily agreement, 17; distinct from edict, 47; interval between the introduction and passing of, 263

Liburnae, 138

Libyans, 118, 124, 125, 177

Libyphoenicians, 118, 124

Licinius Calvus C., 431

Licinius Crassus L., 260, 264, 265

Licinius Crassus M., character, 328; in Sullan war, 292, 293; in Servile war, 351; coalition with **Pompeius**, 356–358; relation to **Catilinarian conspiracy**, 376, 377, 381–383; in triumvirate, 388, 389, at **Luca**, 427; second consulship, 430; in **Syria**, 435–438; death, 438; his wealth, 503

Licinius Crassus Mucianus P., 228, 232

Licinius Crassus P., 197

—, 263

—, **Caesar's** lieutenant, 403, 406, 408, 409, 410, 437, 438

Licinius Lucullus L., 214

—, character, 343, 345; lieutenant of **Sulla**, 284, 286; war against **Mithradates** and **Tigranes**, 340–346; estimate of his generalship, 346; his aims in **Asia**, 342, 343, 370; superseded by **Pompeius**, 365; opposes **Pompeius**, 387; humiliated by **Caesar**, retires from political life, 373, 374

Licinius Lucullus M., in Sullan war, 296, 327, 373

Licinius Nerva P., 244

Licinius Stolo C., 65

Lietores, 15, 42

Ligurians, 32, 79, 82, 139, 145, 148, 169, 174, 175

Lilybaeum, 33, 107, 119, 132, 133, 135, 145, 148

Lingones, 139; in Gaul, 419

Lissus, 77

Livius C., 191

Livius Drusus M., 239

— 264, 265

Livius Salinator M., 168

Locri, occupied by the Romans, 101; its fate in the Pyrrhic war, 106, 107

Locris, 179, 186

Luca, conference at, 427

Lucanians, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 101, 104, 107, 108, 112, 155, 166, 173, 270, 273

Luceres, 10, 12, 21

Luceria, 95, 158

Lucretius Ofella Q., in Sullan war, 295, 299, 310

Luna, 175

Lugdunum Convenarum, 335, 394

Luperci, 12

Lusitanians, 178; war with Rome, 213, 214; revolt, 263; subdued, 394

Lutatius Catulus C., 135

Lutatius Catulus Q., 254, 291

—, consul 78 B.C.; 327, 330, 361, 362, 382, 386

Lycia, 193

Lydia, 180

Lysimachia, 192

Maccabees. See **Judaea**.

Macedonia, land and people, 179; power in Greece, 181; relations with Rome, 139, 144, (see **Philip**); at the beginning of the third war with Rome, 196; broken up into four confederacies, 198, 199; becomes a province, 219, 251; in Sertorian times, 334, 337; in Caesar's, 421. Cf. **Perseus**, **Philip**-**p**us.

Machares, 342, 367

Maelius Sp., 64, 65

Maenius C., 92

Magister equitum, 44

Magister populi, 44

Magistrates, deputies only military, 43; relation to the senate, 45, 73; edicts of, valid during office, 41; order of succession, etc., prescribed, 71; unimpeachable during tenure of office, 206; distinction between military and civil authority, 48; Sulla's regulations, 304-306; Caesar's, 490, 491; provincial governorships, 359-361, 433, 443, 490

Magnesia, 192

Mago, Hannibal's brother, 149; in Spain, 164; in Italy, 169, 170

Mallius Maximus C., 253

Mamertines. See **Messana**.

Manilius C., 361

Manilius M., 217

Manlius C., 379, seqq.

Manlius Capitolinus M., 64, 65, 80

Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus T., 92

Manlius Torquatus T., 159

Manlius Volso Cn., 193

Manlius Volso L., 131

Manumission, tax on, 68, 315; freedmen restricted to the four city tribes, 70; share in military service and in the suffrage, 208; this equality removed, 209

Mantua, 31, 82

Marcellus. See **Claudius**.

Marcus Censorinus L., 217

Marcus Coriolanus C., 57

Marcus Philippus L., 264, 265, 299

Marcus Philippus Q., 197-199

Marcomanni, 401

Maritime affairs, Rome's original position in, 11; piracy and efforts to improve position, 108-110, 125; building of fleets, 130, 132, 134-136; neglect of, 221, 348, 349; reorganized, 363

Marius C., character and career, 256; in the Jugurthine war, 247-249; in the Teutonic and Cimbric wars, 253-255; military reforms and their significance, 249, 250, 257-

- 259; political position and failure of projects, 259-263; in social war, 269, seqq; desires Eastern command, 274; appointed to it, 275; exiled, 276; returns to Italy and Rome, 289-291; seventh consulship and death, 291; his memory rehabilitated, 376
- Marius, C.**, son of the preceding, 294, 295
- Marius Gratidianus M.**, nephew of C. Marius (1), 301
- Marriage**, 14; marital power, 13, between patricians and plebeians null, 47; made valid, 63; in revolution period, 322, in Caesar's time, 504, 505, 507
- Marrucini**, 94, 273
- Mars**, worship of, 12
- Marsians**, offshoots of the Umbrians, 3, 89; join the Samnites, 96, in the Social war, 269, seqq
- Massaesylans**, 177
- Massilia**, 39; allied with Rome, 109; conflicts with Carthage, 119, in second Punic war, 145, 146, 175, power, 250; position in Gaul, 394, 395; trade, 396; in Civil war, 455, 457, 458, treatment by Caesar, 514
- Massinissa**, character of, 173-177; part in second Punic war, 132, 164, 170, 171; after the war, 176, 177, 216, 217, 245, 249
- Massiva**, 246
- Mauretania**, 177, 246, 248, 473, 475
- Maxitani**, 117
- Media**, 220
— Atropatene, 180
- Mediolanum**, 79, 140
- Mediterranean**, 1
- Medullia**, 25
- Megalopolis**, founded by Pompeius, 370
- Melita**, 119
- Melpum**, 79, 80, 82
- Memmius C.**, 246, 260
- Menapii**, 395, 408, 412
- Mesopotamia**, 338, 345
- Messana**, 36, 119; seized by Mamertines, 106, war with Hiero, 128; cause of the first Punic war, 128, 129, 148
- Metapontum**, 37, 90, 166
- Metaurns**, 168
- Metellus**. See **Caecilius**.
- Micipsa**, 245
- Military service**, length of, 233, 343, 495
- Milo**, 103
- Mines**, Spanish, 179; gold in Piedmont, 250, 315; in Gaul, 396, 397
- Minturnae**, 98, 110, 276
- Minucius Rufus M.**, 152
- Mithra**, 220
- Mithradates I.**, 228
- Mithradates**, king of Parthia, 435, 436
- Mithradates of Pergamus**, 471
- Mithradates VI.**, Eupator, character, 278, 279, conquests and alliances, 279, 280, 339; comes into contact with Rome, 280, 281; first war with Rome, massacre of Italians, 281-286, terms of peace, 286, 287; second war with Rome, 298; third war with Rome, 338-342, 364-368; takes refuge with Tigranes, 343; entrusted by Tigranes with the command, 345; regains his kingdom, 346, defeated by Pompeius, 365, revolt of his Bosphoran subjects, 367; death, 367
- Money**, gold, 517, Celtic, 397; coinage in Gaul, 419, of Pompeius, 370 money dealing, 320, 507
- Mons Sacer**, 54, 60
- Montani**, 12
- Motya**, 119
- Mucius Scaevola P.**, 228, 230, 232
- Mucius Scaevola Q.**, son of the above, 263, 295
- Mulvius pons**, 31
- Municeps**, passive burgess, 24
- Municipal constitution**, Latin, remodelled, 85, 87
— system, 86, 205; developed in Italy, 308-310; regulated by Caesar, 509; extended to provinces, 515
- Muthul**, battle on the, 247
- Mutina**, 175
- Mutines**, 160, 161
- Mylae**, battle of, 130

- Myndus**, 189
Myonnesus, 191

Nabataean state, 338, 368
Nabis, 181, 186,
Narbo, 243, 251
Narnia, 97, 169
Nasica. See **Cornelius**.
Naupactus, 191
Naval warfare, 130
Navigation of the Gauls, 396, 400, 408
Naxos, 36
Neapolis, 38; relations with the Samnites, 90, 94; faithful to Rome, 158
Neetum, 136
Nemausus (Nîmes), 514
Nepete, 32, 87
Nervii, 400, 401, 407, 412
Nicomedes II., king of Bithynia, 280
Nicomedes III., Philopator, 281; bequeaths his kingdom to Rome, 339
Nicopolis, 370, 471
Nigidius Figulus P., 484
Nobility, development of, 48, 69, 203; in possession of the senate and equestrian centuries, 203, 204; need of money for office, 207; new nobility of Caesar, 489
Nola, 7; under Etruscans, 34; under Samnites becomes Greek, 90; in the Samnite wars, 94, 95; in the second Punic war, 158; in Social war, 269, seqq., 289
Nomentum, long independent, 25; member of Latin league, 87; burgess-town, 92
Norba, 85, 87
Norbanus C., 293, 294, 296
Noviodunum (Julia Equestris), 405, 514
Nuceria, under Greek influence, 90; in Samnite wars, 94, 95
Numana, Syracusan, 77
Numantia, 215
Numidia, 245-249
Numidians (or Berbers), 176, 177

Ocriculum, 97
Octavius Cn., 289, 290, 291
Octavius L., 364

Octavius M., 229
 —, admiral of Pompeius, 459, 472, 473
Odrysiens, 197
Odysseus (Ulysses), 38
Opimius L., 239, 240
Oppius Q., 282
Opsci, 7
Optimates and Populares, 224
Orchomenus, battle at, 285
Orestis, 186
Ostia, 11, 17; position towards Rome, 28; naval quaestor at, 109; roadstead silted up, 319; post for Eastern imports, 320
Oxus, 220

Paelignians, 89; join the Samnites, 96; 269, seqq.
Paestum, 108
Palaeopolis, 94
Palatine, 11, 12, 23, 27
Pamphylia, 199, 348
Pandisia, 37
Panormus, 119, 131, 133
Panticapaeum, 279, 367
Paphlagonia, 280, 281
Papirius Carbo C., 232-234, 252, 253
Papirius Carbo Cn., 289, 293-296
Papirius Cursor L., 95, 96
Papius Mutilus C., 270, seqq.
Parma, 175
Paros, 186
Parthenope, 38
Parthia, foundation of, 220; contact with Romans, 281; encroached on by Tigranes, 337, 338; agreement with Lucullus, 365; alliance with Pompeius, 365; agreement with Pompeius, 369; war with Rome, 435-439; agreement with Bibulus, 452; mode of warfare, 437
Parthians, 179
Pastoral husbandry, 225, 502
Paternal authority, 13, 14
Patres conscripti, 45
Patricians, the Roman burgesses, 14, 16; decrease of, 22; become a privileged and governing nobility, 47, 48; lose their privileges, 67; new patriciate of Caesar, 489
Patronus, 16. See **Clientship**.

- Paullus.** See **Aemilius**.
Pedarii, 45
Pedum, 87; becomes a municipium, 92
Pentri, 155
Pergamus, 181, 182, 189, 191, 193, 220, 282, 283, 286
Perpenna C., 270
Perpenna M., 297, 332, 333, 335
Perseus, 196-199
Persians, 77
Perusia, 33, 96
Pessinus, high priest of, 369
Petreius M., 382, 455, 457, 477
Phanagoria, 279, 367, 369, 466
Pharisees, 369
Pharnaces, son of Mithradates, 367, 466, 471
Pharos, 470
Pharsalus, battle at, 464-466
Phasis, 366
Philippus V., of Macedonia, character of, 182; ally of Hannibal, 154, 161; first war with Rome, 161, 165, 169; his power, 179; invades Asia Minor, 182; second war with Rome, 183-185; results, 185, 186; attitude during war with Antiochus, 190; dissatisfaction and preparations for a third war, 194-196
Philippus, the Pseudo, 219
Philopoemen, 183
Phocaeans, 36, 39
Phocis, 179
Phoenix in Epirus, 138
Phoenicians, home of, character, etc., 115, 116; in Italy, 35; contest with the Greeks, 39. See **Carthage**.
Phraates, 369, 435
Phrygia, 180; attached to province of Asia, 278, 282
Picentes, 89; war with Rome, 108; in the second Punic war, 168; Campanian, 155, 172
Pilumnus populus, 16
Piracy, 138, 139, 221; used by Mithradates, 282, 348; unchecked by Romans, 319, 347; in concert with Sertorius, 332, 334, 348; their organization, 347, 348; expeditions of Servilius, Antonius, and Metellus, 348, 349, 364; Gabinian law, 359, 360; suppressed by Pompeius, 363, 364; recrudescence after Civil war, 478
Pisaurum, 175
Piso. See **Calpurnius**.
Pistoria, 382
Placentia, 140, 148, 149, 168, 175
Plautius Hypsaesus L., 226
Plebeians, origin, etc., 22, 23; eligible for military commands, 24; admitted to the curiae and senate, 44-46; acquire burgess-rights, 47, 48. Cf. **Patricii**, and **Tribuni plebis**.
Plebiscitum, 55, 57, 67
Plurality of offices, 71, 72
Poeni. See **Phoenicians**.
Pompaedius Silo, 270, seqq.
Pompeii, 94; colony of Sulla, 302
Pompeius Cn., character, 327, 328, 355, 370, 371, 440; Sullan partisan and lieutenant in Sullan war, 294, 299; praetor in Sicily, 297; saluted "Magnus," 298; opposes Pompeius, 310; attitude to Lepidus, 329, 330; command against Sertorius, 332-335; coalition with democrats and Crassus, 355-361; war with pirates, 363, 364; with Mithradates, 364-366; peace with Tigranes, 366; conquers Caucasian tribes, 366; settlement of Parthia, 369; of conquered territories, 369, 370; of Syrian affairs, 368; triumph, 370; position on return to Rome, 385-388; coalition with Caesar and Crassus, 388-391; management at Rome during Caesar's absence, 422-434; of corn supplies, 426; dictatorship, 432-434; rupture with Caesar, 439-448; in the Civil war, 449-466; flight and death, 466, 468; his wealth, 503
Pompeius Cn., son of above, 469
Pompeius Q., 215
Pompeius Rufus Q., 275, 277
Pompeius Sext., 469, 477
Pompeius Strabo Cn., in Social war, 271 seqq., 277, 290

- Pomponius Atticus**, 502
Pomptine Marshes, 95, 319
Pontifex Maximus, 43
Pontifices, increase of, 67; in municipia, 309
Pontius of Telesia, Samnite leader, 296, 297
Pontus, 180, 220; under Mithradates VI., 279, 280; occupied by Romans, 341; made a Roman province, 369. See **Mithradates**.
Popilius Laenas M., 215
Population, of the oldest Roman territory, 11; at the time of Servius Tullius, 24; decrease of, 173, 211. Cf. **Census**.
Populonia, 33, 38
Populus, 16
Porcius Cato M., character, etc., 207, 208; in Spanish war, 178; in war with Antiochus, 191; as governor, 206; his reforms, 208, 209; estimate by posterity, 210; commissioner to Carthage, 216; death, 217; his estimate of Hamilcar, 142
Porcius Cato Uticensis M., character, 373, 374, 478, 479; in Catilinarian conspiracy, 381, 382; opposes Pompeius, 386, 387, 429, 432; mission to Cyprus, 391; opposes the regents, 441, 444, 445; in Civil war, 458-460, 464, 467, 472, 476, 477-479
Porsena, 76-77
Port dues, 17; abolished, 388; re-established, 497
Posidonia, 37, 90
Postumius Albinus A., brother of Spurius, 247
Postumius Albinus Sp., 247
Postumius L., 154
Potentia, 175
Praefecti annonae, 64; urbi, 42
Praeneste, war with Rome, 86; a member of the Latin league, 87; cedes territory, 92; later position, 111; siege of, 295-297
Praetores, name of consuls, 41; a third consul, 66; governors of provinces, 137; in Spain, 179; inadequate, 204; under Sulla, 304, 305, 306; under Caesar, 491
Praetor peregrinus, 204
Praetoriani, 258
Precarii, 51; precarium, 53
Priests, nominated by the king, 15; not by the consuls, 43; power in politics, 64; chosen by co-optation, 304; by the tribes, 375
Princeps senatus, 46
Prisci Latini, 8
Privernum, 92
Proletarii, 50; admitted by Marius to enlistment, 258
Proscriptions of Sulla, 276, 301, 326, 357, 375, 483
Provinciae originally the departments of the consuls, 71; provincial constitution, 137, 138, 205, 206; Spain, 179; acquisition of, 221; fundamental distinction of, 515; distribution by senate, 305; number, in Sulla's time, 305; in Caesar's, 509
Prusias, 182, 193, 194
Ptolemaeus Epiphanes, 182
Ptolemaeus Philopator, 188
Ptolemaeus, son of Lagus, 102, 180
Ptolemaeus the Cyprian, 338
Ptolemaeus XI., Auletes, 338; recognized by Romans, 371; expelled and restored, 372; Egypt after his death, 468
Publicani, origin of, 53; 236
Punic wars: first, 127-136;—second, causes of, 141-145; march of Hannibal from Spain to Italy, 145-147; battles of Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene, 148-151; events to battle of Cannae, 151-156; events in Italy, 157-159; war in Sicily, 159-161; war in Macedonia, 161; in Spain, 162-164; in Italy, and fall of Capua, 165-167; Hasdrubal and battle of Sena, 168-169; Scipio's expedition to Africa and end of war, 169-173;—third, 216-219
Puteoli, 38; Eastern trade, 320
Pydna, 198, 200
Pyrgi, 38; stormed by Dionysius, 77; burgess-colony, 110
Pyrrhus, character, early history, and historical position of, 102, 103; interest of, 100, 101; lands at

- Tarentum, 103, 104; war with Rome, 104, 105; Sicilian expedition, 105-107; battle of Beneventum, 107; death, 108
- Pyxus**, 37
- Quaestiones perpetuae**, repetundarum, 223; extended by Sulla, 307, 308; under Caesar, 492
- Quaestors**, under the republic, 43; two new ones to manage the military chest, 60; four quaestores classici, 109; provincial, 137; increased to twenty, 303; to forty, 490
- Quartering troops in the provinces**, avoided by Sertorius, 332, 510, 512
- Quinctius Cincinnatus L.**, 65
- Quintus Flamininus T.**, 184-187, 189; nepotism, 205
- Quinctius L.**, 360
- Quinctius Pennus Capitolinus T.**, 167
- Quirinal city**, 12, 21
- Quirites**, 16
- Rabirius C.**, trial, 375
- Raeti**, 31
- Ramnes**, 10, 12, 21, 22
- Ras-ennae**, 31
- Raudine plain**, 254
- Ravenna**, 31
- Recruiting**, system of Marius, 257, 258
- Regillus**, lake, 85
- Regulus**. See **Atilius**.
- Religion**, Etruscan, 34; Italian and Roman, 4-6
- Remi**, 406, 407, 412, 415, 419
- Representative institutions unknown to antiquity**, 231; approached to at Rome, 303, 308, 309
- Rex sacrorum**, 41
- Rhégium**, 36, 90; occupied by Rome, 102; mutinies and repulses Roman attacks, 106; refuses to admit Pyrrhus, 107; is stormed by Romans, 108
- Rhine**, boundary of Gaul, 394, 401-403, 405, 406; crossed by Caesar, 409, 412
- Rhodes**, ally of Rome, 109; after the second Punic war, 181; war with Philip, 182, 183; opposes Antiochus, 189-191; reward, 193; humiliated, 199, 200; resists Mithradates, 283; rewarded, 287
- Rhone**, Hannibal's passage of, 145, 146; Helvetii prevented from crossing, 404
- Road**. See **Via**.
- Roma quadrata**, 11
- Rome**, site, character, rise, etc., 10-12; amalgamation of Palatine and Quirinal, 21; division, 23; Servian wall and the seven hills, 26-28; burnt by the Gauls, 80; condition in Caesar's time, 498-501
- Rostra**, 27; decorated with the beaks of the Antiate galleys, 92
- Rubicon**, boundary of Italy, 306; crossed by Caesar, 448
- Rufinus**. See **Cornelius**.
- Ruspina**, battle at, 475
- Rutili**, 26
- Rutilius Lupus P.**, 270, seqq.
- Sabellians**, 7, 10, 93, 94
- Sabines**, 8; contact with Rome, 26; conquered, 85, 98
- Sadducees**, 368
- Saguntum**, allied with Rome, 143; attacked and taken by Hannibal, 144, 145, 154; recaptured by Rome, 162
- Salassi**, 147
- Salii**, 12
- Sallentini**, 108
- Sallustius Crispus C.**, 376
- Samnites**, a branch of the Umbrians, 3, 4; movements, 7, 88, 89; loose federation and character of conquests, 90-93; wars with Rome, 93-98; join the Lucanians, 101; join Pyrrhus, 104, 107; make peace, 108; league dissolved, 112; in the second Punic war, 151, 155; lose territory, 173; in Social war, 269, seqq.; courted by Sullans and Cinnans, 290; march on Rome, battle, 296, 297 punishment, 297
- Samos**, 189, 191
- Samothrace**, 198
- Sardinia**, Carthaginian, 34, 76, 119; attacked and occupied by Rome,

- 130, 137; Carthage attempts to recover, 159; wars in. 175; occupied by Lepidus, 330; by Q. Valerius, 458
- Sassinae**, 108
- Saticula**, 95
- Satricum**, 86, 87; revolts, 95
- Scaptia**, 87
- Scipio**. See **Cornelius**.
- Soodra**, 138, 139
- Scordisci**, 251, 252
- Scotussa**, 185
- Scribonius Curio C.**, bought by Caesar, 445; manages his interests at Rome, 445-448; recovers Sicily, 458; killed in Africa, 458, 459; his debts, 504
- Scribonius Libo C.**, 459
- Scriptura**, 17, 52, 53, 317
- Seyros**, 186
- Scythia**, 279
- Secession**. See **Sacred Mount**.
- Segesta**, 138
- Selinus**, 119
- Sempronius Asellio A.**, 274
- Sempronius Gracchus C.**, character, 234; on the land commission, 230; 232, 233; quaestor, 234; tribune and measures, death, 234-240; improves Italian roads, 319; after his fall, 242, 243, 259, 262
- Sempronius Gracchus Ti.**, 158, 159, 165, 166
- (father of the two Gracchi) in Spain, 178, 228
- , character, proposals, and death, 228-232
- Sempronius Longus Ti.**, 148
- Sena Gallica**, colony, 102; battle near, 168
- Senate**, origin, powers, etc., in regal times, 18, 19; increased power, 45, 46; plebeians admitted, 45, 46, 48; tribunes admitted, 72; real power vested in the senate, 72-74; contrasted with the judges of Carthage, 123; conduct of the first Punic war, 132, 134, 136; patriotism in the second war, 155, 156; estimate of its foreign policy, 201; becomes purely aristocratic, 203-205; lax control of praetors, 206; mismanagement of land, 210, 211; senatorial commissions, 215; decline and corruption of, 221, 222, 224; attacked by C. Gracchus, 236, 237; its subsequent rule, 243, 244; under Sulla, 303, 304, 306, 357; dispensing power curtailed, 374; abuses corrected, 374; foreign affairs after its restoration by Sulla, 337, seqq.; under Caesar, 489, 490; opposition senate of Italians, 269; of Sertorius, 331; of the regents, 427; in Macedonia, 459; in Africa, 473. Senatorial jurymen. See **Jury Courts**.
- Senones**, 79, 80; expelled from Italy, 101, 412
- Sentinum**, 97, 98
- Septimius L.**, 468
- Septimontium**, 11
- Sequani**, 402, 404, 413
- Sergius Catilina L.**, character, 377; conspiracies, 377-382; death, 382
- Sertorius Q.**, character, 330, 331; in Marian war, 289-291, 295, 297; in Mauretania, 331; returns to Spain, 331; struggle with the Roman government, 331-335; organization of Spain, 331-332; to eat with Mithradates, 339
- Servian**, wall, 26, 27; constitution, 23-25; voting arrangements restored, 278
- Servilius Ahala C.**, 64
- Servilius C.**, 245
- , 269
- Servilius Caepio Q.**, 214
- , 243, 253
- , 261, 264
- Servilius Rullus P.**, 378
- Servilius Vatia Isauricus P.**, 348
- Sestus**, 191
- Setia**, 86, 87
- Sextius Lateranus L.**, 65
- Sibylline oracles**, 426
- Siccus Dentatus L.**, 60
- Sicily**, position, 2; early immigrants, 7; Greeks in, 36, 39, 77; condition after the death of Agathocles, 105, 106; Pyrrhus in, 107; Phoenicians in, 116; Car-

- thaginian rule in, 119, 120, 122, 124; condition of, before first Punic war, 127, 128; surrendered to Rome, 135-138; attempts to recover it by Carthage, 145, 155, 159-161; slavery in, 225, 226; occupied for Caesar, 458. Cf. Slaves.
- Sidon**, 116, 118
- Signia**, 85, 111
- Silver plate at Rome**, 322
- Sinnaca**, 438
- Sinope**, 181, 279, 341, 342; extended, 370, 514
- Sinuessa**, 98, 110
- Siris**, 37
- Sittius P.**, 381, 475, 477, 478
- Slaves**, 14; work on estates, 53, 66, 225, 226; employed in rural labour, 51, 52, 211; carry on trades, 225; system of, 225; insurrections of, in Italy and Sicily, 225, 226, 244, 245; increase of, 320, 321, 498, 499, 501, 502, 503; checked by Caesar, 509; gladiatorial war, 349-351; in Sicily, 351
- Smyrna**, 189, 191
- Solon**, 59
- Soluntum**, 119
- Sora**, 88, 95, 97
- Soracte**, 8
- Spain**, Phoenicians in, 115, 119; under Hamilcar, 142, 143; a Roman province, 164; after second Punic war, 177; constant warfare in, 178, 179, 213-215, 263; Sertorius in 330-335; Caesar in, 394, 455-457; Caesarian lieutenants in, 473
- Sparta**, 181, 186, 219
- Spartacus**, 350, 351
- Spina**, 34, 88
- Stabiae**, 271
- Stoicism at Rome**, 322, 373
- Subura**, 11, 23
- Suburra**, 458
- Suebi**, 401, 403
- Suessa Aurunca**, 95
- Suessa Pometia**, 86
- Suessiones**, 399, 406, 407
- Sugambri**, 401, 409
- Sulpicius Galba P.**, 166, 183, 184
- Sulpicius Galba Serv.**, 214
- Sulpicius Peticius C.**, 80, 81
- Sulpicius Rufus P.**, 274-27.
- Surrentum**, 34
- Sutrium**, 81, 96
- Sybaris**, 36, 37
- Syphax**, 162, 170, 171
- Syracuse**, 36, head of the Sicilian Greeks, 77, 78, 119, 120; calls in Pyrrhus, 105-107; in the Punic wars, 127, 129, 136, 137, 159, 160
- Syria**, 200, 220, 221, 282, 338, 343, 344, 366, 368, 369, 371; Crassus appointed governor, 427, 435, 436, 439, 471, 472
- Tactics**, Roman and Parthian, 437, Celtic, 399, 400; of Vercingetorix, 413-416; of Britons, 410
- Tarentum**, 36; commerce of, 37; rise, 77; attacked by Samnites, 90, 91, 93, 94; conduct in Samnite wars with Rome, 95, 96; mob attacks Roman fleet, 102; calls in Pyrrhus, 103-105; held by Milo, 106, 107; surrendered to Rome, 108, 128; in the second Punic war, 165-167
- Tarpeian Hill**, 27
- Tarquinius**, home of the, 32; expelled from Rome, 41
- Tarquinius**, one of the twelve Etruscan towns, 32, 33; war with Rome, 81
- Tarracina**, 87
- Tarraco**, 162
- Task-work**, 16
- Taurini**, 146, 148
- Taurisci**, 251-253
- Tauromenium**, 127
- Taxation**, direct, unknown, 17; Italian, 315; Provincial, 315; 496-498, 510-512
- Taxiles**, 284, 341
- Teanum Sidicinum**, under Greek influence, 90; calls in Rome, 91; garrisoned by the Samnites, 93
- Tectosages**, 180, 193
- Telamon**, 38, 140
- Temesa**, 37
- Tempe**, pass of, 185
- Tencteri**, 401, 402, 409
- Tenths**, 138, 316
- Terentius Varro M.**, 152-153
- , 457, 459

- Terina**, 37
Territory of Rome, original, 10, 11; increased, 25, 26; lessened, 76, 77; conquest of Veii, 80; south Etruria conquered, 81; extension south and east, 85, 86: at end of Samnite wars, 98; at end of Pyrrhic war, 110, 111; extends to the Po, 175
Teutones, 252, 254
Thala, 248
Thapsus, 118; battle of, 476-477
Thasos, 182
Theatre, seats of the equites in, 303, 358
Thermae. See **Himera**.
Thermopylae, 191
Thessaly, 179, 184, 185, 190, 198
Theveste, 118
Thrace, 185, 189, 192, 197; Thracians invade Macedonia and Epirus, 251; wars in 282, 337, 421
Thurii, 90; apply to Rome, 101; captured by the Tarentines, 102; in the second Punic war, 166
Tiber, 8, 10, 11, 26, 27; stone bridge, 318; neglect of, 319; Caesar's project, 501
Tibur, revolts from Rome, 86; in the Latin league, 87; cedes territory, 92; position, 111, 501
Ticinus, 148
Tifata, Mount, 166
Tigranes, ally of Mithradates, 280-282; increase of his power, 337, 338; in third Mithradatic war, 339; war with Rome, 343-346, 364-366, 367
Tigranocerta, 338, 343, 344
Tingis, 331
Titius, 10, 12, 21, 22
Titurius Sabinus, 408, 411, 412
Toga, 16; togati, 113
Tolistobogi, 180, 193
Tolumnius Lars, 79
Torboletes, 144
Torrhebi, 31
Trades at Rome, 320, 321, 328, 499, 500
Transpadani, 306; claim the civitas, 325, 375; Caesar governor, 390, 403, 447, 514, 515
Trasimene lake, 150-151
Trebellius, 360, 361
Trebia, 149
Trebonius, 457, 458
Treviri, 395, 401, 411, 412
Tribes of the clans, 10, 21, 22; Servian levy-districts, 23; their voting, 57; four added, 81; more additions, 92; in all thirty-five, 70
Tribunal, 27
Tribuni militum, elected by the comitia, 204, 205, 493
 — militum consulari potestate, 63
 — plebis, origin, 54; powers, etc., 55; compared with consuls, 56; value, 56, 57; suspended during the decemvirate, 58-60; restored with new powers, 60, 61; change of character, 72; eligible for re-election, 233; power restricted by Sulla, 304, 324, 354; restored, 357; under Caesar, 491
Tributum, 17
Trifanum, 92
Triumph, meaning of, 5; becomes common, 207
Trocmi, 180
Triumvirate, first, 356; second, 388, 389
Tryphon, in Sicily, 245
Tullianum, 27, 249, 381
Tullius Cicero M., accuses Verres, 355, supports Lex Manilia, 361; consul, 378; opposes Lex Servilia, 378; during Catilinarian conspiracy, 378-383; banished, 391; recalled, 423-425; threatens opposition to regents, 427; submits, 429, 431
Tullius Cicero Q., 412
Tunes, 131
Turdetani, 177
Tuscan Sea, 33
Tusculum, 10; revolts, 86; member of Latin league, 87; treatment of, 86, 87
Tutela, 13
Twelve tables, origin, 59
Tyre, 116, 118
Ubii, 401, 409
Ulysses, 38
Umbrians, branch of the Italians, 3; language, 3, 4; migrations, 7;

- evidence of movements, 88; in the Samnite war, 96, 97; in Social war, 269, seqq.
- Urbs**, 9
- Usipetes**, 401, 402, 409
- Usury**, 59, 68, 320, 483, 507, 508
- Utica**, relations with Carthage, 118, 124; Scipio's conflicts at, 170; in third Punic war, 217, 219; in Civil war, 458, 472, 477, 478
- Uxentum**, 155
- Vaccæi**, 214
- Vadimonian Lake**, 96
- Vaga**, 248
- Valerius Catullus Q.**, 431
- Valerius Corvus L.**, 207, 208
—, 284, 285, 286, 299
- Valerius Corvus M.**, 72
- Valerius Laevinus M.**, 158, 161
- Valerius Laevinus P.**, 104, 105
- Valerius Maximus M.**, 54
- Valerius Maximus Messalla M.**, 129
- Valerius Poplicola L.**, 60
- Varius Q.**, 270, 273, 274, 291
- Varro**. See **Terentius**.
- Vatinius P.**, 390, 431, 472
- Vectigalia**, 17
- Veii**, 25, 32; assignment of territory, 65; captured, 80, 82
- Velia**, 11, 27
- Velites**, 24
- Velitrae**, 86, 87; revolts, 91, 92
- Veneti**, 31, 81, 82, 139, 140; Gallic, 408
- Venusia**, 98; in Pyrrhic war, 104; in second Punic war, 154, 167, in Social war, 271, 273
- Vercellæ**, 254, 255
- Vercingetorix**, 413-418
- Verres C.**, 355, 510
- Verona**, 79
- Verulæ**, 97
- Vesta**, 27
- Vestini**, 94
- Veterans of Marius**, lands allotted to, 260; of Sulla 302, 329, 330; of Pompeius, 357, 387, 389; of Caesar, 495, 509
- Vetulonium**, 33
- Vetilius C.**, 214
- Vettius T.**, 244
—, informer, 391
- Via Aemilia**, from Ariminum to Placentia, 175
— Appia, to Capua, 95; to Venusia, 98; to the Ionian sea, 108
— Aurelia, coast road from Rome to Luna, perhaps at the same time as the Aemilian, 175
— Cassia, 175
— Domitia, from the Rhone to the Pyrenees, 251, 320
— Egnatia, to protect the Macedonian frontier, from Apollonia and Dyrrhachium to the Hebrus, 219, 319
— Flaminia, 97, 175
— Gabinia, connecting Adriatic ports with interior, 319
— Postumia, from Genua to Aquileia, 318
— Valeria, 97
- Vicus Tuscus**, 32
- Vine-culture in Italy**, 4, increase of, 211
- Viriathus**, 214
- Vitruvius Vaccus**, 92
- Volaterræ**, 275, 302
- Volci**, 33
- Volsci**, wars with Rome, 26: clients of the Etruscans, 34; subdued by Rome, 85, 86; revolt, 91, 94, 97
- Volsinii**, 33; its aristocrats call in Rome, 82
- Vote by ballot**, 223, 224
- War-chariots in Britain**, 410
- Women**, 505
- Xanthippus**, 131, 132
- Zacynthus**, 194
- Zama regia**, 171
- Zamolxis**, 421
- Zanoe**. See **Messana**.
- Ziela**, 472



